The Egalitarian-Paretian Ethos
3. The trilemma and the ethical solution
3.1. In response to the claim that equality of opportunity and Pareto-efficiency
are co-obtainable (minus those inequalities and/or Pareto-inefficiencies
consistent with the personal prerogative) if and when the talented produce at their
upmost capacity for equal reward (Claim 1), the freedom objection can be
The Freedom objection: Even if Claim 1 is true (and it might be false if
the psychological assumption on which it rests were disproven17), Cohen
must nevertheless solve the equality-Pareto-freedom trilemma.
To illustrate the trilemma, Cohen refers to the doctor-gardener case
(Cohen, 2008, pp. 184-185). In doctor-gardener, as would be true in reality, the
realization of Pareto-efficiency is dependent not only on the talented producing
at their upmost capacity but also on certain occupations being filled. For
simplicity of illustration, in doctor-gardener the realization of Pareto-efficiency is
dependent on just one individual’s occupational choice as regards these two occupations, with Pareto-efficiency being dependent on her choosing doctoring.
This individual, A, possesses the skills required of either occupation, has a liking
for both, but prefers gardening to doctoring for equal reward; for example, A
prefers to be a gardener for £20k p.a. than to be a doctor for £20k p.a. But A’s preferences differ in light of unequalising incentive payments. When the salary
offered for doctoring hits £50k p.a., with the salary offered for gardening
remaining at £20k p.a., the extra £30k p.a. is sufficient material incentive for A to
prefer doctoring to gardening.
Before proceeding, some clarifications are necessary. In doctor-gardener,
I assume that equality of income is used for illustrative purposes only, and that
we should understand it as consistent with equality of opportunity; otherwise
Cohen has strayed from his critique of the Pareto argument and the target of the
freedom objection. Thus, for equality of opportunity and Pareto-efficiency to co-
obtain in doctor-gardener A must doctor at £20k p.a. If A were to garden at £20k
p.a. it would be consistent with equality of opportunity but Pareto-inefficient,
whereas if A were to doctor at £50k p.a. it would be Pareto-efficient but result in
inequality of opportunity. The trilemma in doctor-gardener is thus: (i) deny A
freedom of occupational choice by forcing her to doctor at £20k p.a.; (ii)
compromise Pareto-efficiency by granting A freedom of occupational choice but
no unequalising incentive payments with the consequence that A chooses to
garden at £20k p.a.; (iii) compromise equality of opportunity by granting A
freedom of occupational choice and unequalising incentive payments with the
consequence that A chooses to doctor at £50k p.a. In (i) equality of opportunity
and Pareto-efficiency co-obtain; in (ii) equality of opportunity and freedom of
occupational choice co-obtain; and in (iii) Pareto-efficiency and freedom of
occupational choice co-obtain. But in none of (i), (ii) and (iii) do all three
desiderata co-obtain.
3.2. In seeking a solution to the trilemma, Cohen takes inspiration from a policy
of blood donation favored by Richard Titmuss and the work of Joseph Carens.18
Titmuss favored neither paid nor forced blood donation, but voluntary non-paid
blood donation. That policy, of course, risks health care services being left with
an insufficient supply of blood if insufficient numbers volunteer to donate. An
objector might therefore have put it to Titmuss that instead of risking an
insufficient supply of blood, society should adopt a policy that either offers
people incentives to donate or forces them to donate. To this, Cohen says
Titmuss should respond with an ethical solution, ‘by expressing confidence that a sufficient number of people might be moved to give [blood], through some
combination of principled commitment and fellow feeling’ (Cohen, 2008, p. 189). Cohen proposes the very same solution to the trilemma, arguing that,
‘equality, freedom, and Pareto [are co-obtainable] if [A] chooses the stethoscope against [her] preference for the hoe as a result of some combination, as in the
Titmuss solution, of principled commitment and fellow feeling’ (Cohen, 2008, p.
189).
The principled commitment Cohen has in mind is a commitment to
equality of opportunity. His solution requires that ‘the talented, in particular, disbelieve that anything [presumably except differences of taste and/or choice],
including their fortunate productive endowments, entitles them to better rewards
or better conditions of life’ (Cohen, 2008, p. 190). However, just as acting consistently with a belief in the difference principle does not require the talented
to produce at their upmost capacity for equal reward, acting consistently with a
belief in equality of opportunity does not require the talented to produce Pareto-
efficiently, whether that be in terms of productive capacity and/or occupational
choice. As Jonathan Quong says of the ethical solution, equality of opportunity
‘does not require talented people to choose any particular occupation – it merely forbids talented people (subject to a limited agent-centered prerogative) from
accepting unequalizing incentives for taking on socially optimal jobs. The world
where [A] chooses to [doctor at £20k p.a.] is not a more egalitarian world than
the one where [A] chooses gardening at the same wage, it is rather a Pareto
Indeed, it seems that the only case in which acting consistently with a
belief in equality of opportunity requires a certain occupational choice, is when
either the alleviation of, or compensation for, inequalities that do not reflect
differences of taste and/or choice are dependent on it. For example, A would
appear to act inconsistently with a belief in equality of opportunity if, as a
consequence of her choice to become a gardener, another individual was left to
suffer through no fault of her own some type of relative disadvantage that, had A
chosen to become a doctor, could have been alleviated. But, when conditions in
doctor-gardener are such that no matter A’s occupational choice it remains possible to alleviate and/or compensate for those inequalities that conflict with
equality of opportunity, her choice to become a gardener, despite being Pareto-
inefficient, is consistent with a belief in equality of opportunity.
This is why Cohen’s ethical solution to the trilemma requires not only that the choices of the talented be informed by a belief in equality of opportunity,
but that their choices be informed by a belief in equality of opportunity in
combination with ‘fellow feeling.’ This phrase is incredibly vague, but in the paragraphs that follow Cohen speaks of ‘an obligation to serve others,’ of ‘a
desire to contribute to society,’ and of a ‘sense of commitment to other people’ (Cohen, 2008, p. 190). In effect, ‘fellow feeling’ is a belief in a duty to produce Pareto-efficiently in terms of both productive capacity and occupational choice.
To illustrate, let us consider how Cohen thinks the ethical solution works in
doctor-gardener:
[In doctor-gardener] the ethical solution [requires that] people
believe in equality [of opportunity], so the talented, in particular,
disbelieve that anything [except differences of taste and/or
choice], including their fortunate productive endowments, entitles
them to better rewards or better conditions of life. A, being one of
them, consequently takes a doctoring job at... £20,000: thereby a
key presumption in the trilemma argument… is falsified – it is not necessarily true that, under the conditions that structure the
doctor-gardener example, the doctor will (simply) choose
[gardening for] £20,000, and eschew doctoring unless she receives
£50,000. [It is true only] if we set aside her desire to satisfy
egalitarian principle and/or her sense of commitment to other
people…
(Cohen, 2008, p. 190)
The first thing to notice is that Cohen initially implies that a belief in
equality of opportunity is sufficient reason for A to choose to doctor at £20k p.a.
But, as noted previously, if the realization of equality of opportunity is not
dependent on it, to act consistently with a belief in equality of opportunity does
not require A to choose to doctor at £20k p.a.; it requires only that she refuse
unequalising incentive payments to doctor at £50k p.a. The second thing to
notice is Cohen’s claim that the trilemma holds true only if we set aside A’s ‘desire to satisfy egalitarian principle and/or her sense of commitment to other people.’ It is this commitment to the well-being of others, what is effectively A’s
belief in a duty to produce Pareto-efficiently so as to provide the greatest
possible contribution to society, that requires A to doctor. And, when A’s belief in that duty is combined with her belief in equality of opportunity, A must choose
to doctor at £20k p.a. if she is to act consistently with both beliefs.
Thus, as Quong argues, ‘Cohen’s proposed ethical solution to the trilemma does not, properly construed, rely on an egalitarian ethos prevailing
amongst talented persons. Rather, it relies both on an egalitarian ethos (which
precludes unequalizing incentives) and… a Paretian ethos (which directs talented people to choose jobs where they will contribute the most to the overall
social product)’ (Quong, 2010, p. 328). The Paretian ethos on which the ethical solution relies cannot therefore be a requirement of Cohenite distributive justice,
because, as implied by his critique of the Pareto argument19 and in light of his
parameters for fundamental principles of distributive justice20, considerations
pertaining to Pareto-efficiency are distinct from those pertaining to distributive
justice. Of course, the Paretian ethos could be constitutive of some other
conception of distributive justice. But consistent with a Cohenite conception of
distributive justice, even if Cohen is right that distributive justice requires not
only coercive rules but an ethos that informs people’s choices within those rules, the Paretian ethos on which the ethical solution relies necessitates that A go
beyond what Cohenite distributive justice requires of her.21 It may even be true,
as Quong argues, ‘that Cohen’s Paretian ethos is in fact a supererogatory ethos, that is, it requires talented people to go beyond not only what justice requires, but
19 See section 2
20 See Introduction, section 2.2
21 For an alternative view on this point, where the duty to produce Pareto-efficiently is instead
what morality more generally could reasonably require (by morality I mean to
refer to any moral duties we might owe to others, even if they are not duties of
justice)’ (Quong, 2010, pp. 328-329).