Trust in Salesperson

Trust has been defined and measured in the marketing and the social sciences in a variety of ways. Shapiro (1987) notes these diverse views and that the concept has resulted in a confusing number of definitions being applied to a host of units and levels of analysis. Moorman et al. (1993) indicate that the existing measures reflect factors rather than dimensions of trust, and proceed to correct this gap by defining trust in terms of two components—a belief component and a behavioral intention component; they also stress that vulnerability and uncertainty are critical to trust.

Consistent with Moorman et al. (1993), trust is defined in this study in terms of both cognitive properties (trust as a belief) and conative properties (the willingness to bestow trust). For example, if a salesperson is honest and sincere, the customer will believe in the trustworthiness of the salesperson. When this belief is strong and confidence in the salesperson’s goodwill is high, customers should be willing to bestow trust. The belief component helps shape the customer’s perceptions as to whether the salesperson can deliver expected outcomes (Andaleeb 1992). With greater confidence in that belief, the focal party will be more willing to make oneself vulnerable by bestowing trust. Importantly, trust represents the giving up of a substantial measure of decision and control by the focal party (i.e., the customer) to

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the other party (i.e., the salesperson). Consequently, trust is defined as the customer’s willingness to risk being influenced by a salesperson. Trust bestowal is preceded by a confident belief that the decision will produce favorable outcomes; unfavorable outcomes will be attributed to factors beyond the salesperson’s control.

These elements also apply to salesperson relationships. Retail consumers want appealing, enthusiastic, energetic, knowledgeable, friendly, trustworthy salespeople who perform correctly (Wolfinbarger & Gilly 2003; Zeithaml et al. 2000). Often, they prefer some form of personal interaction and a quick response from service personnel (Chen & Dubinsky 2003; Parasuraman et al. 2005), strongly rely on reliability/fulfilment (Wolfinbarger & Gilly 2003; Zeithaml et al. 2002), want quick and easy access to service personnel when problems occur, sometimes want to be compensated (Zeithaml et al. 2002; Parasuraman et al. 2005) and prefer clear-stated service policies about privacy, security, and shipping and handling (Wolfinbarger &

Gilly 2003).

According to the Crosby, Evans and Cowls’ (1990, p.69) definition, “trust occurs as customers develop a tacit understanding with sellers and come to believe that sellers are reliable and will act in their interests”. Moorman, Deshpande and Zaltman (1993) think that trust is a kind of willingness of transaction partners, where each is confident with regard to the other. Morgan & Hunt (1994) have tried to explain trust through the concept of confidence and reliability; they suppose that trust is the perceived level of confidence regarding a transaction partner’s reliability and honesty.

In the relevant research on customer relationships, trust is treated as a fine basis on which to build stable relations (Garbarino & Johnson 1999). Hence, it could be inferred that trust is the main element for the development of a high-level relationship, especially during the initial period. As to commitment, it is not only an important characteristic for maintaining a good long-term relationship (Dwyer, Schurr & Oh 1987; Hennig-Thurau & Klee 1997; Mactintosh & Lockshin 1997) but also is an expression of the willingness of customers to engagement in relationships with retailers (Moorman et al. 1992; Wulf et al. 2001). When the proportion of commitment increases, it is not difficult to infer that the relationship on both sides becomes more stable.

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Figure 2.10: A Conceptual Model of Variables Influencing Trust

Source: Swan & Nolan (1985, p.12.)

Swan and Nolan (1985, p.42) proposed a broad conceptual framework that included five sets of variables: the buyer’s personality; the buyer’s experience with salespeople in general and the salesperson’s firm; the salesperson’s characteristics and behavior;

the image of the firm; and buyer attribution of a salesperson’s trustworthiness and other characteristics. However, Swan and Nolan did not empirically test the proposed relationships between trust and its antecedents. In another study, Swan, Trawick and Silva (1985) suggested that a salesperson can gain trust if customers feel that the salesperson is dependable and reliable, honest/candid, competent, has customer orientation and is likeable/friendly. Crosby, Evans and Cowles (1990) examined a model of relationship quality, proposing that similarity, service domain expertise and relational selling behavior would explain customers’ trust and satisfaction in a salesperson.

Trust is a central construct within social relationships (Deutch 1962; Blau 1964) and, therefore, has been identified as a ‘core relational building block’ (Wilson 1995). It represents an essential ingredient within close and interdependent marketing relationships (Dwyer, Schurr & Oh 1987; Moorman, Deshpandé & Zaltman 1995). If marketing relationships are to be explained as the ‘absence of power’ (Morgan &

Hunt 1994), then trust between parties is paramount, particularly considering that successful interdependent relationships require committed parties to make transaction-specific investments. Given that these investments are non-redeemable, with little or no value outside the relationship (Heide & John 1990; Heide & Stump 1995), trust has been found to be pivotal in successful RM, as the construct encourages marketers

Salesperson variables

Expertise, intentions likability

Trusting disposition Customer

knowledge

Trust in organisation

Trust in salesperson

Customer variables Organisational variables

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to preserve their ‘investments’ through cooperation (Morgan & Hunt 1994). Aulakh, Masaaki and Arvind (1996) argue that trust can be used as a substitute for hierarchical governance, insinuating some degree of control; therefore, the hazards of opportunistic behaviour in longer-term relationships are mitigated if there is trust between the two parties (Ganesan 1994).

Doney and Cannon (1997) point out that inter-organisational trust can act as a governance mechanism that mitigates opportunism. Therefore, higher levels of trust within interdependent relationships are extremely important when one considers that a more committed party becomes more vulnerable to opportunism (Gundlach, Achrol &

Mentzer 1995). Opportunism is described as self-seeking interest (Williamson 1975).

However, in a social exchange context whereby power is not the controlling mechanism, trusting parties tend to take the view that a partner ‘never does that’, given that trust comprises benevolence and honesty (Larzelere & Huston 1980). In this regard, benevolence is described as the extent to which a party is motivated beyond individualistic interests; i.e., considers the welfare of others. The second dimension of honesty is the extent to which another party’s intentions are believable.

Therefore, trust is an integral aspect of all relations, as it comprises the “belief in the integrity of another” (Larzelere & Huston 1980, p.595). Doney and Cannon (1997) have posited that trust can be examined as the context of a capability process which comprises the assessment of whether one party can fulfil its obligations within the relationship. Furthermore, Ganesan (1994) feels that trust comprises beliefs and expectations about the other party in terms of their reliability and intentions; this generalised expectation (Rotter 1967) was found to provide confidence in the perception of an exchange partner’s reliability (Morgan & Hunt 1994).

Deutch (1962) points out that as trusting behaviours also consist of actions that increase vulnerability through reliance upon others, and given that the behaviour of each party is not under the other party’s control, this could possibly result in penalties for acquiescence greater than the potential benefit derived from the trusting action.

Paradoxically, Morgan and Hunt (1994) infer that expressing commitment towards the relationship can in part serve as a mechanism to help ‘protect’ any transaction-specific investments that could otherwise be regarded as non-redeemable. Gundlach,

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Achrol and Mentzer (1995) argue this very point by suggesting that while initial credible commitments are essential for developing relationships as expressed through social norms, it is these norms that help sustain and strengthen commitment.

Therefore, in the context of social exchange theory, commitments are made largely upon the premise that the other party will not act opportunistically. However, there must be a corresponding level of vulnerability within the relationship that needs to be negated in some fashion. Without the perception of vulnerability in a relationship trust becomes unnecessary, because any related outcomes are really inconsequential (Moorman, Zaltman & Deshpandé 1992). Therefore, trusting behaviour must lead directly to relational commitments. On an empirical level, trust was found to have an influential effect upon commitment (Morgan & Hunt 1994), long-term orientation (Ganesan 1994) and propensity to remain within a relationship (Anderson & Weitz 1989). Given that trust-based relationships are so highly valued that there is a desire for parties to commit themselves to them (Morgan & Hunt 1994), as well as going by the current wisdom, it is hypothesised that trust has a positive effect on commitment.

As trusting another means that the parties need to take risks, this implies that the trust construct acts as a source of confidence in the other party. Young and Wilkinson (1989) point out that in an atmosphere of trust and commonality of purpose, transactions are less costly to complete and, thus, are translated into performance benefits for all concerned. Shared values within the relationship also foster trust between the parties. Therefore, the tendency to trust is not only a function of perception about another but also about ones’ own intentions towards that party, inferring that trust is reciprocal because individuals feel bound by the trust invested in them. Trusting behaviour is most likely to occur when there is a positive orientation towards the other’s welfare and can also occur when the right circumstances are present. Although not exhaustive, these circumstances include: the knowledge of what the other person will do, whether a system that communicates mutual responsibilities exists, whether this system can handle violations and whether the relationship has the

‘power’ to reduce incentives to engage in untrustworthy behaviour.

Marketing relationships grounded in social exchange theory tend to reveal an anthology of actions that collectively can be attributed only to high levels of trust;

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viz., (1) non-retrievable relationship investments, (2) acceptance of influence from the other party, (3) sharing of open communication, (4) reduction of control and (5) forbearance from opportunism (Smith & Barclay 1997). These actions usually allude to the presence of trust by way of being interpersonal in nature and directed specifically towards an individual, group or category of persons (Swan & Nolan 1985). In the industrial context which epitomises interpersonal trust, Swan and Nolan (1985) point out that trust is so crucial that salespersons regard it as one of the main goals in their dealings with customers. Trust in the salesperson duly reflects their level of dependability, reliability, honesty and competence. As these factors impact directly upon their capacity to perform their roles effectively, this tends to imply that the construct has a meaningful impact upon the positive outcomes desired from being in the marketing relationship. In a similar interpersonal setting, trust was regarded as the most critical factor in helping to differentiate effective from ineffective relationships within selling partnership relationships (Smith & Barclay 1999).

In service contexts involving high levels of interpersonal contact, uncertainty stemming from intangibility, complexity and lack of service familiarity result in many buyers having to rely upon the integrity and confidence of the salesperson (Crosby, Evans & Cowles 1990). Crosby, Evans and Cowles (1990) further argued that trust is crucial in service relational contexts because individuals seek predictability and obligatory behaviour in their quest to obtain future relational rewards. Coupling this with a service context that inevitably exposes customers to risk and uncertainty, any desired relational outcomes are usually achieved by directing trust at the service provider’s employees.

However, Anderson and Narus (1990) suggest that care must be taken not to generalise trust as a construct within interpersonal relations and trust within inter-organisational relationships because they involve personal and firm losses, respectively, should the other party act opportunistically. In short, if their own personal loss is not at stake, employees are more likely to be perceived as behaving in an untrustworthy manner. Given that the customer–firm relationship involves both individuals and organisations, the inevitable question that needs to be addressed is whether trusting behaviour can be directed towards the individual, the firm or both.

Young and Wilkinson (1989) point out that, in fact, trust is viewed by employees

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within the firm as a desirable attribute. This implies that as trust is attached to people that represent the firm, they may be regarded by the customer as an extension of the firm. Morgan and Hunt (1994) point out that the relationship-building activities of the firm can apply equally to all relationships both within, and external to, the firm;

thereby insinuating that trust is inherent in all relationship types. This tends to suggest that despite the ‘interpersonal’ nature of the construct, trust can also be directed at retailers. To illustrate this point, consider the function of money within society; viz., as (1) a unit of account, (2) a medium of exchange and (3) a store of value (Waud, Hocking, Maxwell & Bonnici 1989). People have trust in the currency of the day;

however, the effectiveness of these three functions also must be linked to the level of confidence that the individual directs towards the financial and political systems needed to facilitate the flow of money within society. In effect, a currency would become valueless if there was a lack of trust in the capacity of the government and the central bank to ‘pay as promised’; therefore, these are institutions to which people direct their trust.

Doney and Cannon (1997) point out that whilst there may be some scholarly disagreement as to whether organisations, in fact, can be targets of trust, the literature tends to support the view that trust can be directed towards supplier firms, its salespeople and/or both. Given that individuals in a firm were found to hold an attitude of trust on behalf of their firm towards their trading partner (Young &

Wilkinson 1989), this suggests that social exchange theory is valid in helping to explain trust within the supplier–distributor context. Morgan and Hunt (1994) draw specifically upon this theoretical viewpoint to capture the positive affects of inter-organisational trust upon retailers and consumers within the retail industry. In short, they found that trust acted to increase cooperative behaviours, functional conflict and commitment between retailers and consumers at the same time as reducing uncertainty within the relationship. Garbarino and Johnson (1999) also examined trust directed towards a service organisation and found that customers who trusted the service organisation in terms of the perceived quality and reliability of the service offered had higher levels of future purchase intentions.

From a different theoretical viewpoint, Joshi and Stump (1999) considered that whilst relationships from the perspective of transaction cost economics (TCA) are nothing

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more than a series of discrete exchange transactions, there is usefulness in integrating trust into the TCA perspective. Relationships modelled upon TCA operate principally under the assumption that partners are potentially opportunistic, but these authors suggest that substituting trust for opportunism does not invalidate TCA theory. In fact, they contend that the inclusion of the construct tends to offer greater predictive validity than opportunism alone. Typifying the point, their study found that whilst high levels of manufacturer-specific investments increased joint action between suppliers and buyers, the level of trust further enhanced this outcome.

The aforementioned examples are not intended to be exhaustive since trust is an equally valid construct when directed towards individuals or the firm within the marketing context. These examples indicate that the variety of ‘targets’ to which trust can be directed is best explained by the notion that trust acts as the ‘property’ of collective units and, therefore, is pertinent to relations among people rather than being confined solely to meaning an individual’s psychological state (Lewis & Weigert 1985).

Having received a great deal of attention across a number of disciplines (Deutch 1962; Williamson 1979; Ford 1980; Morgan & Hunt 1994), it is not surprising that there is no universally accepted definition of the trust construct (Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt & Camerer 1998). Bigley and Pearce (1998) point out that the diversity of conceptualisations of trust is disconcerting to many scholars in the social sciences and largely attribute the variety of approaches to trust to the diverse theoretical perspectives and research interests in existence.

Conceptually, Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt and Camerer (1998) conclude that there appears to be a convergence across the disciplines on the two antecedent conditions that must exist before trust can arise; namely, (1) risk, and (2) interdependence. The first antecedent condition risk is considered essential because, effectively, it creates the opportunity, or need, for trust to exist in the first instance. These same authors describe risk as the perceived loss that one party may occur from their actions with another party, and point out that risk stems directly from uncertainty within the relationship. Wicks, Berman and Jones (1999) concur with this view by suggesting that conditions of trust arise when either of the parties has something to risk, adding that this is extremely important because it acts as the foundation for promising

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preferred economic outcomes to the firm/individual. Thus, trusting behaviour consists of actions that increase vulnerability through reliance upon others and, as their behaviour is not under one’s control, it could possibly result in penalties for giving consent in silence; penalties which are greater than the potential benefit derived from this trusting action (Deutch 1962). Typically, trust-based marketing relationships result in trusting behaviours which manifest in actions that reflect willingness to accept vulnerability in the face of uncertainty (Smith & Barclay 1997).

The second antecedent condition, interdependence, implies some degree of reliance upon the action of another; it involves uncertainty and complexity. Doney and Cannon (1997) believe trust serves as a functional alternative to rational prediction as a strategy for the reduction in complexity because trust is more efficient and effective along a number of dimensions and, therefore, allows social interactions to proceed on a simple and confident basis. Therefore, trust acts not only to reduce potential doubt within the relationship but also complexity (Luhmann 1979; Young & Wilkinson 1989). On this point, Lewis and Weigert (1985) suggest that two types of strategy help reduce complexity; namely, (1) rational prediction, and (2) trust. Some scholars (Doney & Cannon 1997; Rousseau et al. 1999) point out that predicting the actions of another party effectively represents calculative-based trust and, therefore, is underpinned by the capacity of one party to calculate the probability of another taking certain actions.

Doney and Cannon (1997) argue that whilst there are indeed a number of distinct processes that can be used to help explain the development of trust, see Table 2.5 below, this perspective is founded in economics literature insofar as parties base their trust in others upon the rational assessment that another party will act in a particular manner. In short, this represents cognitive trust and develops directly out of a

‘calculated’ expectancy that is linked by the trustor to the perceived likelihood that the other party will, or will not, cheat on them. This calculative process involves the

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Table 2.6: Trust-Building Processes

Source: Doney & Cannon 1997, p.38

mental assessment both of the costs and rewards of the other party remaining within the relationship. As outcomes from cheating are associated directly with losses that may be incurred should the trustee be caught, the higher the perceived losses facing the trustee, the higher the level of trust by the trustor. From a slightly different perspective, Rousseau et al. (1999) refer to this calculation-based trust as being one of a number of different types of trust, as juxtaposed to variations in the process of developing trust. They do concur with Doney and Cannon (1997) that calculated trust is grounded in the theory of rational choice economics and starts to emerge when the trustor perceives the trustee will perform acts that are beneficial to them. By the same

Trust-Building Process Generic Drivers

Trust-Building Process Generic Drivers