Trying to Redefine the Role of the Written Product

With regard to the tangible nature of writing, Ortner argues that linguistic expressions are – more than other conscious actions – particularly well-suited to stabilize: when we speak and write, we capture, record, stabilize, tighten, and make tangible the inner as well as outer world (Ortner, 2000, p. 128). In this sense, language and writing are – in many cases – means of giving substance to fleeting impressions, to what is vaguely present in the background or in the foreground, but barely graspable. He refers to writing as materiality in the flesh of language (“Materialität im Fleisch der Sprache”, Ortner, 2000, p. 130). In the materializing process of writing, linguistic expression becomes graspable as objectivations, which offer orientation for human beings’ actions by providing distance, permanence, and editability.²⁰ As such, objectivations in language allow for thinking in a qualitatively different way, creating a part of the world as a workpiece to be processed further.²¹

Ortner’s idea of the actual process of writing is that language offers small reusable units which are arranged according to calculation-like rules or abstract patterns. The metaphor he uses is that of pixels which are arranged to form a line or picture. Characteristics of objectivations are (p. 131):

- They are material or immaterial products in a production process.

- In language, they organize content and structure of strings of signs (“Zeichenketten”).

Drawing from Gestaltpsychology, Ortner describes objectivations as figures before a (relatively unstructured) background and as figures which are unfolded to Gestalts like verbal chains, texts, or utterances. The engine for these processes is the search for equilibrium between objectivations.

20 In the context of Ortner’s research, the concept of objectivation serves to justify why self-reports of professional writers may be used as data for writing research: they provide the traces from which writing strategies may be reconstructed.

21 If we replace objectivation with representation, the reader more familiar with Cognitive Science may be reminded of Clark and Chalmer’s extended cognition hypothesis; Clark (2006) also writes about the materiality of the “ultimate artifact” language. I will elaborate on this in chapter 7.2.3.

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- Objectivations, as objects of controlled (or controllable) behavior, can be manipulated in processes.

- The role of language in objectivation is materialization, stabilization, and socialization of objetivations, providing a basis for potential further processing. As such, language is a medium for balance between different objectivations and a medium for the production of a social final version (“soziale Endversion”, p. 132).

I may do Ortner’s thinking injustice, but in his idea of the process he is himself caught in the trap of the representationalism he so strongly criticizes: “objectivation of a piece of the world in a linguistic version” transports the assumption that language is there to represent the world in the sense of translation. Although he points out that the piece of the world being created is an individual version (“individuelle Welt(-ausschnitts)version”, p. 130), the idea of a symbol coding entities in the world, i.e. the idea of language symbolically representing entities in the world, is not abandoned. Like Molitor-Lübbert, Ortner assumes that symbols of the “inner world” are coding for objects in the outer world. This perspective is qualified by the idea that propositional knowledge “refers to” other kinds of knowledge and the idea that the world represented in the text is an individual version.

Conceptually, writing boils down to symbol manipulation, as he characterizes writing as

“propositional work” (p. 5), as an act which interweaves and connects propositions (“das Schreiben als propositonsverwebende- und verknüpfende Tätigkeit”, p. 5).

However, Ortner’s approach differs from the cognitivist approach in two aspects: First, in his focus on the material nature of language, particularly the written product, and its effects on thinking: instead of mental representations, there can be inner or outer objectivations, which in turn may allow for qualitatively different ways of thinking. Second, he holds that writing is not always motivated by a problem to be solved, but may as well be rooted in a striving for coherence between objectivations, in aiming for a state of equilibrium.

3.5 Discussion

The cognitive process theory of writing in its successive versions centers on the “sub-processes” of writing, while remaining at best vague with regard to the question how a writing process is

orchestrated. In this sense, there is no place for the writer, which, from a didactic point of view, begs the question of how informative such a theory can be for practitioners in process-oriented writing didactics who are dealing with whole writers and their individual writing processes.

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The “classical” model of writing as a cognitive process by Hayes and Flower as well as its successors is fit to solve “closed”, well-defined problems. However, writing tasks tend to be highly “ill-defined”.

Many activities, especially in the early phases of a typical academic writing project, like a seminar paper, are more akin to finding and defining “the problem” rather than solving a given problem by calling the relevant mental processes. Moreover, in the current approach problems will be solved on the basis of propositional knowledge. I argued that in this approach the process of writing is

“knowledge neutral” in the sense that the process operates on propositions, but structures and processes are independent and do not have an impact on each other. Propositions of different fields of knowledge may be de- and re-contextualized in the same process of writing, inferences may be made on the basis of basic propositions, which may yield new propositional knowledge structures, but nothing qualitatively new. Thus, if writing is to be the epistemic-heuristic and even creative process that, for example, Molitor-Lübbert and Ortner claim, the atomistic concept of propositional knowledge as well as seeing the role of knowledge in the writing process merely as resource or, if not

“well-organized”, hindrance, the role of knowledge in academic writing processes must be reconsidered. Furthermore, I argued that the position of the “rhetorical problem” as something which is “added” to the writing process is collateral damage caused by the cognitivist approach with its concept of knowledge, as used by Hayes and Flower. Instead, it should be at the center of any cognitive theory of the writing process. Understanding writing as problem solving neglects the fact that writing, especially when working on an academic text, is not an end in itself. As Ortner points out, writing can also be rooted in intrinsically motivated attempts of striving for coherence/ a state of equilibrium. Academic writing is usually about something of importance to the writer, at least in the world s/he shares with a particular discourse community.

On a more abstract level, this still prevalent cognitivist approach in writing research describes cognitive processes as modules which eventually sum up to the “whole individual”, controlled by a monitor or central executive or ominous homunculus which organizes the single modules in running their cognitive processes in order to come up with plans and decisions for action. The researcher’s focus on the single module creates a perspective which “naturally” renders goals, motivations, and the like external events, which potentially disturb the otherwise smoothly running cognitive

process.²² In this vein, knowledge (if “disorganized”), rhetorical problem, and written speech are also viewed as “constraints” potentially hindering the writing process. In seeking to provide a solution to the theoretical problems posed above, Ortner suggests widening the concept of knowledge by assuming propositional knowledge to refer to other types of knowledge; in contrast, Wrobel draws

22 I have merely spelled out this criticism for the writing research presented above, in cognitive cognitivist approach has been debated at least since the 1970ies (e.g. Varela, 1990).

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on speech act theory, framing speech acts as linguistic action (Sprachhandlungen) and considers the context of the writing process; finally, Molitor-Lübbert and Ortner seriously include the “text written so far” into the theoretical account of the writing process. However, with the partial exception of Ortner, none of them depart from the idea that writing is problem solving by operating on

propositional knowledge. I hope to have convinced the reader at this point that doing so is, indeed, a good idea.

Writers of all levels of expertise usually do not experience academic writing as a routine process

“running smoothly”. To pick up on Wrobel’s comparison above, maybe we should not attempt to picture the process of writing as well-plannable as a trip to Rome. A more adequate image may be an expedition into unchartered territories, where opportunistic planning and charting complement each other as we try to plan for the expected and improvise with the unexpected, using the equipment at hand. A first step towards accounting for such a “messy” process is to develop a different view concerning the “constraints” posed by knowledge, the rhetorical problem, and written speech. They suddenly rise from an “added constraint” to the core of the writing process, addressing knowledge (“what I want to say”), the writer’s relation to the academic community (“to whom will I say what in a way which will have the desired effect”), and last but not least the writer’s own position in

discourse (“I”).

An alternative theoretical account of academic writing as a cognitive process thus

1. needs to develop a different account of the role of knowledge in the writing process and 2. needs to place the “rhetorical problem” at the center rather than at the periphery of the

writing process.

I agree with Ortner that the effects of objectivation in general and its effect on thinking in particular need to be considered. Thus,

3. the role of the environment, particularly the artifact produced (“text written so far”), and, with it,

4. the very nature of writing as a cognitive process, which is widely understood to be “written speech”,

need to be reconsidered as an inherent part of a theoretical account of writing.

After the central position of the cognitive process as symbol manipulation has become vacant, I propose to follow what successful practice in process-oriented writing didactics teaches:

5. consider “the whole writer”.

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Conceptualizing cognitive processes (almost) exclusively as internal has led to – loosely speaking – the necessity to model a whole (very much bounded) world within the individual. In my attempt to understand academic writing as a cognitive process, I propose to take a broader perspective and consider the writer in his/her interaction with the environment(s). Considering the environment, it is possible to focus on its physical, social, and cultural, and – although not considered in this context – virtual aspects. It is not by accident that figure 6 places what has been referred to as “constraints” at the center of the writing process, cutting across writer and environment. In considering the role of knowledge, the nature of writing, and the rhetorical problem, I do not want to the reader to infer that they are independent of each other; rather, I am using them as categories under which I will proceed to discuss the interaction processes between writer and environment.

The arrows mark a possible impact of writer and environment on each other, in an ongoing process.

Thus, the writer must be seen not as static, carrying out cognitive procedures, but as a developing individual affected by and affecting his/her world. Figure 6 should be understood as a framework for the discussion in the next chapters. I should state again that my interest is in the development of the academic writer, starting with the transition phase from school to tertiary education.

In theorizing about writing processes, at least two temporal domains play a role, either explicitly or implicitly. While Hayes & Flower (1980) dismiss the idea of a phase model, Gould (1980) and Wrobel (1995) relate to them in the sense that they propose a process at macro-level, which represents the progression of the overall writing project, whereas the process at micro-level refers to writing-as-it-is-happening. A writing project can span a short period of time, like writing an email or letter, as in Wrobel’s research, or a longer period, like writing an academic publication or a thesis. If writing is considered a cognitive process, this encompasses at least two temporal domains: the act of writing in

“real time” as observable behavior, or “writing-as-it-is-happening”, and the cognitive processes in organizing the academic writing project from research question (or assignment) to finalization, i.e. all actions leading to the final text. It may span, e.g., in case of a thesis, considerable periods of time and

Figure 6: Perspective on writing as a cognitive process (for explanation see text).

social/cultural physical role of knowledge

nature of writing (“written speech”) rhetorical problem (or dimension)

environment writer

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encompass intermediate products (texts of various genres, diagrams, tables, drawings, etc.) and other observable behaviors.

With regard to the development of the academic writer, changes may be expected at both levels. In the following chapter I will therefore focus on the cognitive developmental dimension of academic writing.

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