Tye’s representationalism and visual angles

Peacocke’s nonconceptual representational content inA Study of Conceptscould

not fully account for the two-coin case and the one-coin case. Peacocke still needs the notion of the sensational aspect of experience to fully account for the phenomenology. Tye, in contrast, admits no non-representational element in the phenomenology. His representationalist position is that the phenomenal character of experience is representational content – that is, the phenomenology represents the

external world. 231 In his view, picking out any element found in what is

phenomenally present to us would result in picking out a representation of something mind-independent. Bright redness phenomenally present to me, for example, is bright redness of an external object, e.g. a tomato, represented by my experience. On Tye’s representationalism, this is true of everything included in the phenomenal character of experience.

Could Tye’s representationalism account for the two-coin case and the one-coin case? Let us begin by looking at his criticism of Peacocke’s notion of sensational properties. In one of Peacocke’s examples, two trees seem the same in size, while there is also a sense in which one of them seems larger than the other. Tye rejects Peacocke’s account, which appeals to the sensational properties of experience. According to Tye, the phenomenological difference between the sizes of the two trees is the difference between the representations ofvisual angles. One of the trees

seeming larger than the other represents its subtending a larger visual angle than the other tree.232

231

Tye (2002a), p. 137. See also Tye (1995), pp. 134-7.

232

As Tye mentions, Peacocke inSense and Contentdenies that a visual angle can

be represented by the object’s size in the visual field. Peacocke’s reason for this denial is that representational content has to be conceptual – that is, that perception with a certain representational content requires the subject’s possession of the concepts constituting that content. However, Peacocke says, even for someone who lacks the concept of a visual angle, it could be the case that one of the trees occupies a larger area of the visual field. This, for Peacocke, proves that representational content of experience involves no concept of a visual angle, and therefore represents no visual angle.233

Tye’s proposal is that a representation of a visual angle is nonconceptual. If the

representation is nonconceptual, the perceiver need not entertain or acquire the concept of a visual angle in the case of the two trees. Thus, the difference in size between the trees included in the phenomenology nonconceptually represents the difference between the visual angles they subtend.234

The same explanation could be applied to the two-coin case. The upright coin and the slanted coin both seem to have the same shape. This, for Tye, means that experience conceptually represents two objects having the same shape. At the same time, there is a sense in which the two coins seem to differ in shape. Tye would explain this in terms of nonconceptual representations of visual angles. Let us suppose that the top of one of the two coins is rotated away from the perceiver, the average distance of the coins from the viewpoint being equal. The visual angle subtended by the vertical diameter of the slanted circle would be smaller than that subtended by the diameter of the upright circle. (Figure 7 illustrates the side view of

233

Peacocke (1984), pp. 19-20.

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the two coins in relation to the viewpoint.) Then, the slanted coin seeming to have a smaller vertical length than the upright coin – thereby seeming elliptical – nonconceptually (and veridically) represents the visual angle subtended by the slanted coin being smaller than that subtended by the upright coin. Since the representations of these two visual angles are nonconceptual, the coins can seem different in shape, or one of them can seem elliptical, without the subject possessing the concept of a visual angle.

In my view, however, Tye’s theory could not adequately explain the one-coin case. Peacocke’s explanation of the case where a perceiver looking at a wire cube experiences an aspect switch is that the representational properties change while the sensational properties remain unchanged. Tye criticises Peacocke’s account, contending that what remains the same, as well as what changes, is representational. According to Tye, experiences before and after the aspect change represent some common spatial properties. For example, both of the consecutive experiences represent the side ABCD as being lower than the side EFGH, and represent the side

Figure 7 Upright coin Slanted coin v2 v1 Viewpoint v1: Visual angle subtended

by the upright

v2:Visual angle subtended by the slanted

AEHD as being to the left of the side BFGC. For Tye, Peacocke is wrong in taking what remains the same after the change as non-representational.235

Tye would explain the one-coin case in a similar manner. When the S-change occurs, the subject’s experience ceases to represent an ellipse, and begins to represent a circle. Nevertheless, the representational content partly remains unchanged. For example, the upper part of the object is still represented as being higher then the lower part, and the left edge is still represented as slightly to the left of the top edge. This would only mean that some of the spatial relations between the parts of the object are represented in the same way before and after the S-change. It would still be puzzling why there is a sense in which the object does not seem to change at all. (For the same reason, I think that Tye’s explanation of the wire cube case is inadequate.)

4. Reichenbach

According to Reichenbach’s phenomenological view, the object as visually perceived is itself neither constant nor changing in shape and size. Moreover, two or more objects delivered by visual perception are themselves neither congruent nor incongruent with each other. So, there is no description of congruence or incongruence that could be obtained by taking the visual phenomenology at face value. In the two-coin case, there is nothing in the phenomenology that the perceiver could take at face value to describe that the two objects as seen are congruent or incongruent. So, if the perceiver describes that the two objects as seen are congruent, she is only inclined to assume their congruence. If the perceiver describes that the two objects as seen are incongruent, she is only inclined to assume their

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incongruence. The description that the two objects as seen are congruent or that they are incongruent would be a description imposed on the phenomenology due to the perceiver’s inclination. Thus, in the two-coin case, the perceiver might be inclined to impose on the phenomenology the description that the two objects as seen are congruent, or the description that they are incongruent. Neither of these descriptions would result from the perceiver’s taking the phenomenology at face value. For there is nothing in the visual phenomenology that the perceiver could take at face value to describe their congruence or incongruence.

In the two-coin case, there are both a sense in which the two objects seem congruent, and a sense in which they seem incongruent. If so, the perceiver is both inclined to assume their congruence and inclined to assume their incongruence. One might ask: is it possible to have two conflicting inclinations in relation to the same phenomenology? Reichenbach would presumably explain, from the empiricist standpoint, that the inclination to assume congruence between the two objects as seen is an acquired inclination, whereas the inclination to assume incongruence between them is an inborn one. As we saw in the last chapter, he says that a train that is leaving seems to a child to become smaller. His view is that a child learns to experience constancy of shape and size. Reichenbach would say that a child who looks at an upright coin and a slanted coin for the first time would be inclined to assume that the two objects as seen are incongruent. Perhaps the child goes on to become used to looking at an upright coin and a slanted coin being measured as congruent by a ruler (or an object he assumes to be rigid), or become used to looking at a rotating coin, assuming the object as seen to be rigid. What is required for learning is an empirical matter. At any rate, the child, after a necessary training stage, will acquire the inclination to assume that the two objects as seen are congruent

when looking at an upright coin and a slanted coin. Thus, if Reichenbach’s empiricist account is right, it would be that the two conflicting inclinations are inborn and acquired ones. It would presumably be that the acquired inclination is stronger for adults, who would be more inclined to assume congruence between the two objects as seen in the case of an upright coin and a slanted coin. But if there is also a sense in which the two coins seem to differ in shape, it would be that the inborn inclination has diminished, but has not completely ceased.

Since I have separated Reichenbach’s phenomenological account from his empiricism, I present the phenomenological account as neutral on whether the two conflicting inclinations are inborn or acquired. Thus the phenomenological view is compatible with a possible claim that, in the two-coin case, the inclination to assume congruence is inborn whereas that to assume incongruence is acquired. (Strawson (1979) would adopt this claim. He would say that it requires a sophisticated attitude to describe coins viewed from various angles as differing in shape.) My phenomenological view could also allow that, in the two-coin case, both of the conflicting inclinations are inborn, or that they are both acquired.

In the two-coin case, although the upright coin and the slanted coin seem congruent, there is a sense in which they seem to differ in shape. My explanation is that the perceiver in the two-coin case has both of the conflicting inclinations. This would not be to ascribe a contradictory state to the perceiver. Generally, it is possible for us to have conflicting inclinations. To give an example outside the topic of perception, when I hear an unrealistic story, I might feel inclined to believe it, and also feel inclined to deny its truth. Although it is contradictory both to believe and not to believe the story, it is possible both to be inclined to believe it and to be inclined not to believe it. Analogously, it would be contradictory to make both an

assumption of congruence and an assumption of incongruence regarding the same two objects delivered by perception. But it would be possible to have both an inclination to assume congruence and an inclination to assume incongruence. If the perceiver reports that the two coins not only seem congruent, but seem incongruent, she has the two conflicting inclinations at the same time. (One inclination might be stronger than the other.)

From the standpoint of Reichenbach’s phenomenological view, the explanation of the one-coin case would be as follows. Before the S-change, the coin only seems elliptical to the perceiver. This means that the perceiver has an inclination to assume that the width and height of the object as perceived are unequal in length. After the S-change, the coin seems circular to the perceiver. This means that the perceiver comes to be inclined to assume that the width and height of the object as seen, or all diameters of it, are equal in length. The perceiver does not have this latter inclination before the S-change. That is why the coin only seems elliptical at first. After the S-

change, the perceiver might say that there is still a sense in which the slanted coin seems elliptical. If so, this would be because the first inclination has not completely ceased. Neither the first nor the second inclination is an inclination to take the phenomenology at face value.

The above explanations of the two-coin case and the one-coin case can accommodate the intuition that, in the two-coin case, there is a sense in which the twoobjectsseem to differ in shape, and that, in the one-coin case, there is a sense in

which the objectseems to undergo no change at all. In the two-coin case, there is a

sense in which the two objects seem to have different shapes, because the perceiver is inclined to assume the twoobjects delivered by perception to be incongruent with

the two objects seem to have different shapes, the perceiver is inclined to assume

that the two objects delivered by perception are incongruent. In the one-coin case, there is a sense in which the object does not seem to change at all. This is because

the object as perceived really undergoes no change all. Indeed, the visual phenomenology remains entirely unchanged while the perceiver’s inclination in relation to it changes. As have pointed out, our inclination and assumption do not affect the visual phenomenology.

Reichenbach’s treatment of shape and size constancy grounds his criticism of Kant’s tenet that perception is bound to be Euclidean. I have shown that we should prefer Reichenbach’s treatment of it to contemporary explanations of it. Contemporary theories would not be an obstacle to pursuing Reichenbach’s phenomenological view.