In chapter I I two main s t r a te g ie s fo r dealing w ith the problem of
demandingness emerged. Both appealed to c e r t a in fe a tu re s of human
nature, and o f the human agent in p a r t i c u l a r : the c o n s e q u e n tia lis t s tra te g y appealed to these features to motivate the claim th a t i t is COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE to ask too much of people; and the N a g e l/S c h e ffle r s tra te g y appealed to these featu res to motivate the claim th a t i t i s UNREASONABLE to ask too much of them. (The c o n tra c ta ria n s tra te g y also appealed to the idea th a t i t i s unreasonable to ask too much of people, but as I argued th at i t would need supplementation by a theory th a t provided c r i t e r i a fo r what i s 'reasonable* or 'u n reaso n ab le', and as Nagel and S c h e f fle r have attempted to supply such c r i t e r i a , I have concentrated on them.) I argued, f i r s t l y , th a t the general kind of approach th a t Nagel and S c h e ffle r employ i s compatible w ith P I , and so may be seen as a le g it im a t e moral argument; in p a r t i c u l a r , th at the appeal to what i t i s reasonable to ask o f people i s one th a t can be i m p a r t i a l l y j u s t i f i e d , in s o fa r as c o m p a tib ility w ith PI guarantees i m p a r t i a l i t y . I t i s compatible w ith P I, because i t re s ts on taking everyone in to account in the same way, but s p e c i f i c a l l y in t h e i r ro le AS AGENTS: i f there are features of human nature th a t are p la u s ib le candidates for having fundamental moral relevance, and render us, as agents, r e s i s t a n t to extreme moral demands, then i t w i l l not in f r i n g e PI to take those fe a tu res in to account.
w ith P I, but represents the best i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of P I: given th a t we do a l l play these d i s t i n c t i v e ro le s o f p a tie n t and agent, and th a t one c e n tr a l fu n ctio n of m o ra lity i s to connect agents and p a tie n ts , i t would seem necessary fo r m o ra lity to take a l l of us in t o account in the same way in both of these d i s t i n c t i v e ro le s . Consequentialism, by c o n tra s t, seems to re q u ire a kind of w i l l e d f o r g e t tin g o f the kind of r o le th a t moral p r in c ip le s are to play in the l i v e s o f agents, w ith t h e i r p a r t i c u l a r nature: when i t i s found th a t human beings seem p e c u lia r ly i l l - a d a p t e d to do what consequentialism re q u ire s of them, fe a tu re s of th a t nature are then b e la te d ly accomodated in the kind of
s t r a t e g ic way th a t we have seen. But i f those fe a tu re s are q u ite
general, and p la u s ib ly candidates fo r having fundamental moral
relevance, then i t seems th a t we should get them in t o focus at the ground l e v e l o f our moral theory, r a th e r than in tro d u cin g them through the back door a t the end.
I then argued th a t, though i t would not i n f r i n g e PI to give an
independent normative r o le to fe a tu res o f human nature th a t render us,
as agents, r e s i s t a n t to extreme moral demands, Nagel and S c h e ffle r
f a i l to provide adequate c r i t e r i a fo r determining what those features are. The u n d is c rim in a tin g appeal to 'p erso n a l' motives or concerns, understood by reference to 'impersonal' ones, seems to l e t in too many fe a tu res of human nature th a t we would not want to endorse. And so I suggested th a t we determine which fe a tu res of human nature to give
such an independent normative s tatu s to by referen ce to an
agent-centred model of exc ellenc e, a model th a t would give us the
c r i t e r i a fo r what should be taken as 'reasonable' th a t Nagel and
'unreasonable' to expect of people i s , in a sentence, what i s q u ite incompatible w ith what we fe e l to be the best achievable f u l f i l l m e n t of t h e i r nature as human beings - and as p a r t i c u l a r , i n d iv id u a l human beings, i t should be borne in mind, in a p a r t i c u l a r s o c ia l s e t t in g and c u lt u r e .
So I have three broad suggestions to c o n trib u te to the debate about