A typology of the different implementation models at the establishment

The three phases described can also be further divided based on the types of estab- lishment and the way they implemented the ERA.

(a) The one-sided implementation

The first type of implementation can be described as ‘one-sided implementation’532 this was favoured by Südwestmetall. This type of implementation, however, often re- sulted in conflicts in the second and third phase of implementation because of the lack of dialogue between the employer and other relevant entities such as the works councils.533 In some companies fights on each pay grading were reported.534 In other companies wherethe employer chose to no longer act unilaterally, the processwould be stopped and the grading process would be recommenced in dialogue and in con- junction with the relevant entities such as theworks councils.535 Instances where this occurred may be described as ‘failed unilateral adoption’.536

529 Ibid, 203-212. 530 _{Ibid, 212.} 531 _{Ibid, 201.} 532 Ibid. 533 Ibid, 201-203. 534 _{Ibid, 202.} 535 _Ibid. 536 Ibid, 203.

(b) The integrated norms oriented implementation of the ERA

The second type of implementation may be described as ‘integrated norms orientated implementation’.537 This differs largely from the first type in that all the shareholders were involved in the process. There were not many types of implementation which worked so effectively. However, this type led to widespread acceptance of the new wage structure in companies as it was done in conjunction with and through intensive dialogue with the trade union oriented works councils.538

(c) The integrated modifying adoption of the ERA

The third type of implementation was the ‘integrated modifying adoption of the ERA’539. These types of establishments tried to behave proactively in respect of the employees who would lose nominal income and agreed with the works council on the progressive reduction measures to avoid such losses.540 They agreed with works councils that no one should lose nominal income with the implementation of ERA. Within some establishments this 10 percent was reduced to 7 percent and in other companies to 4 percent.541 Within other establishments the 10 percent agreed on was not changed, but employees whose income would be reduced by 10 percent with ERA were paid a once-off extra payment out of the unused money in the ERA- fund.542 In companies that made this decision there were still many conflicts raised because of the disappointment of employees caused by their degrading and the re- sulting feeling of devaluation.543

537 _{Ibid, 202.} 538 _{Ibid, 203-207.} 539 Ibid, 207. 540 Ibid. 541 _{Ibid, 208.} 542 _{Ibid, 209.} 543 Ibid, 207-212.

Proportionate Income Differentials, p 127 of 186

It can be assumed that within this group there were the companies where the works council and the management were well aware that ERA would result in nu- merous changes within establishments which may cause disappointment for the em- ployees. In the process they thus tried to reduce the disappointment of employees, this may have helped but was not sufficient to avoid all conflicts.544

(d) The distributive-pay, regulation-modifying adoption of ERA

The fourth type can be called the ‘distributive-pay, regulation-modifying adoption’545 type. A central part of the discussion for companies following this type of implemen- tation was the concern of saving money and reduction of the total wage volume. In these types of establishments ERA has been viewed as critical since its inception and the concern to reduce pay costs dominated the implementation process for such es- tablishments.546 It has been found that when the whole process became flooded with conflicts a change to a cooperative process was not effective.547

It can be said, that for the entire implementation the social interaction be- tween the actors, respect and understanding especially for labour could have the ef- fect of either reducing conflicts or the lack thereof of a conflict raising affect.548 The implementation worked best where processes were transparent, the collaboration was cooperative and the company was not trying to use ERA as an instrument for the re- duction of its wage bill.

The significant amount of companies who saved money with ERA can possi- bly be explained in part by the pay structure set out in ERA, but can also explain why so many conflicts arose. The research especially on the second form of implementa- tion has shown that conflicts arose half as often in the view of employees when co- 544 Ibid, 210. 545 Ibid, 212. 546 _Ibid. 547 _{Ibid, 212-218.} 548 Ibid, 217.

1.796 €

2.319 €

2.061 €

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Before ERA: Basic pay (min 3 years vocational training)

operation and collaboration existed in the implementation of ERA.549 This does not in fact mean that there were less difficulties. It only shows that where conflicts have been dealt with through mutual respect and on equal footing (in the practical opera- tions) between the works council and IG Metall on the one side and management and Südwestmetall on the other, the conflict management was deemed to have been han- dled better and was more positively perceived by employees.550 This explains the dif- ferent responses by employees to the question of how great the conflicts around the ERA implementation were. As one knows there are always different ways of dealing with disagreements. It is significant that in companies where there was cooperation and collaboration by respecting the different roles and opinions of the actors the same proceedings have been perceived as half as conflicted as under opposite cir- cumstances.551