United Kingdom Approach

While the United States fire, EMS and police services rely on individual regions or localities to implement specific policy, the United Kingdom (UK) operates much differently as part of a national response framework. The UK is no stranger to acts of violence and terrorism, which include many of the same strategic and operational problems as those facing the U.S. The coroner’s inquest that followed the 2005 London bombings indicated that there was a lack of inter-agency training that led to initial chaos, confusion and carnage.88 _{The 2010 shootings in Cumbria, England, highlighted the}

different risk thresholds employed by the three “Blue Light” services of police, fire and ambulance service.89 _{Following these incidents and many others, the UK implemented}

national policies to provide a unified framework and provide for joint emergency services interoperability among the three Blue Light services.90 _{In the United States, events}

known as “Hostile Events” or “Active Shooter” events are classified as a “Marauding Terrorist Firearms Attack” (MTFA) in the UK.91

In 2009, the National Policing Improvement Agency issued the Guidance on

Multi-Agency Interoperability, which provided a unified framework that enhanced

practices for communications and coordination across the command and control structures. This guidance set forth how and when the principles of interoperability should be employed and at what level they should be used within the organizations.92 _Another

document, the Emergency Response and Recovery guidance, compliments emergency preparedness and sets out how the duties under the Civil Contingencies Act of 2004 and its supporting regulations should be implemented. This document focuses on guiding principles, practical considerations, and operational procedures for the emergency

88 _{JESIP Engagement Manager and Senior Users, JESIP–Programme Definition Document and HM}

Government Response (United Kingdom: Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Programme, 2013), 4..

89 Ibid., 4. 90 Ibid., 4–7. 91 Ibid., 7.

92 National Policing Improvement Agency (NPIA), Guidance on Multi-Agency Interoperability (United Kingdom: NPIA, 2009), Foreword.

response and recovery phases.93 _{Most recently, in February 2013, the Joint Emergency}

Services Interoperability Programme (JESIP) was established to address many of the UK

events which led to the Project Definition Document. The aim of JESIP was to ensure that the “Blue Light” services are trained and exercised to work together as effectively as possible at all levels of command in response to major or complex incidents (including fast moving terrorist scenarios) so that as many lives as possible can be saved.”94 _These

UK documents set out national guidance for responding to a marauding terrorist firearms attack and set out at a strategic level, the common vision of the challenges, the roles and responsibilities and priority tasks for the emergency services. It provides overarching strategic objectives and generic priority tasks have been developed for responding to a MTFA that assist with the planning and implementation of the functional roles and responsibilities of the Blue Light services. These documents provides guidance on basic joint operating principles; the identification, mobilization and scene assessment; casualty management; and fire hazards management.

Joint Operating Principles provide the basis for requiring command representatives from each of the emergency services to provide a timely, rapid and streamlined decision-making process, appropriate level of command support at the scene, identification and deployment of trained personnel for key command and support functions, and flexibility to apply these principles to the variations of regional and local operational guidelines. These principles acknowledge the difficulty in supporting a MTFA and basic premise that emergency service personnel may have to operate in locations that have not been declared completely safe. These principles are intended to reflect the progression of the joint emergency response from the onset to the conclusion of the incident.

The UK policy allows armed officers to escort fire and ambulance personnel into the warm zone; however this practice cannot be guaranteed and must be determined during the joint risk assessment process. The deployment of specialized fire and rescue

93 _{HM Government, Emergency Response and Recovery—Non-Statutory Guidance to Complement}

Emergency Preparedness. (London: HM Government, 2005), 4.

94 JESIP, JESIP–Programme Definition Document, 5.

and ambulance service personnel into the warm zones is not dependent on the presence/ availability of armed officers to provide an escort or cover. Contingency plans must be developed to provide for a response without armed police officers and the use of non- specialized emergency service personnel should be deployed as soon as the threat has been neutralized. Casualty Management provides the operational guidance for the management of casualties by specialized emergency service personnel equipped with appropriate PPE and specialized training for deployment into the warm zone. These incidents provide the unique nature of having a potential active threat present while patient care and removal is taking place.

The recommendations for response to an active shooter or MTFA in the UK differ from the U.S. in that the policies and procedures are being set forth on a national level to all three Blue Light services.95 _{While not prescriptive, the two guiding documents}

described above provide an overarching framework for a standardized approach across the UK and not left to independent services to formulate these overarching goals. These strategic and operational plans act as guidance to resilience planners and emergency responders in the development and implementation of local response plans that are consistent with the national approach and interpretation of risk.96 _{While the fundamental}

principle of guidance is based upon maximizing the safety of the emergency responders, these national documents do not replace existing major incident procedures or local emergency response plans, but are meant to provide guidance on the particular challenges that these types of events pose. As police, fire and EMS agencies throughout the United States respond to these hostile events, it will be national guidance that allows the agencies within the U.S. to remain consistent in policy development and training and allow organizations to receive national funding to implement these new procedures.

95 Ibid., 6–7. 96 Ibid., 4

D. CONSIDERATIONS FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF A CROSS-