Uranium Mining on U.S Public Lands

the tax break, expected losses would grow propor- tionally. It is useful to note that between 1994 and 2007 the share of domestic uranium purchased by the civilian sector dropped from more than 20 per- cent to less than 8 percent (Bonnar 2008).

Earth Track estimates that the subsidy value of percentage-depletion allowances for uranium is about $25 million per year.

5.1.2. Uranium Mining on U.S. Public Lands

While uranium mining on any land benefits from percentage-depletion allowances, its extraction from public lands can tap into a range of other subsidies as well. They include low taxes and fees, inadequate financial assurance against damage, and the shifting of large remediation costs to the taxpayer.

The removal of valuable resources from public land for use in private commerce represents the sale of a public asset. Governments (and taxpay- ers) share in the gains primarily through royalties, excise taxes, and other fees that the extracting entity pays. If those fees are too low, or nonexis- tent, taxpayers have given away wealth that must be made up in other ways, such as through higher personal income taxes. Financial-assurance mecha- nisms such as reclamation bonds play a related role in protecting taxpayer interests by ensuring that the party benefiting from the mining activity will leave the site in good condition, rather than as a liability for the state.

5.1.2.1. Royalty and Tax Regimes, Land Patenting

Federal lands. Under the terms of the antiquated Mining Law of 1872, uranium can be mined royalty-free from federal lands.60 _{By contrast, federal}

58 Uranium mining also receives subsidies on a cost-depletion basis, as the mines are assumed to last only seven years, and within that period assets can be depreciated using a highly favorable 200 percent declining-balance method. To the degree that cost depletion itself is heavily subsidized, the metrics for percentage depletion over cost depletion will understate the actual subsidy.

59 These are weighted-average spot prices, which more evenly reflect average price levels. However, during 2007 there were periods of much higher spot prices. 60 A small amount of land owned by the DOE and managed under its Uranium Leasing Program is an exception, as it does charge some royalties.

royalties for coal and oil range from 8 to 16.7 per- cent (Earthworks 2007).

Additional subsidies to claimants as a result of the Mining Law include no liability to help pay for cleaning up abandoned mines, as well as limit- ed exposure to environmental regulations related to water quality and habitat protection (Pew 2009). Uranium-mine lands have been “patented” at a low cost of five dollars per acre or less.61 _Patenting turns valuable public land into private land that can then be used for a variety of purposes, includ- ing non-mining real estate development. Congress placed a moratorium on patenting in 1994, which it has renewed annually ever since—though it has not yet eliminated the practice entirely (Horwitt 2009).

The CBO estimated that hardrock mining income from royalty-free extraction on federal lands “would average roughly $1 billion per year” with net increases in Treasury royalty receipts of about $40 million per year (though not all attributable to uranium) (CBO 2007a: 29). However, the implied royalty rate in the CBO work of 4 percent is well below the royalty rates noted for other minerals.62 _{Based on historical} uranium-extraction rates, Earth Track estimates the low royalty rates would generate a small subsidy of roughly $5 million to $20 million per year. This subsidy would rise with extraction rates or the value of extracted minerals.

State lands. State law, rather than the Mining Law of 1872, governs hardrock mining from state- owned land in the West. Fees for uranium, which mirror those for other valuable commodities more closely, include royalties, severance taxes, mine license taxes, and resource excise taxes. In many cases, state fees are applied to extraction even from federal lands located within the state boundaries

(GAO 2008b: 2). New Mexico, for example, levies a minimum 5 percent royalty on uranium from feder- al lands, though the state allows up to a 50 percent deduction for transportation and processing costs, yielding a 2.5 percent net rate. Uranium extraction from all lands in the state also pays a severance tax equal to 3.5 percent of taxable value, which trans- lates to 1.75 percent of revenues (GAO 2008b: 22, 23). Rates in Utah are an 8 percent royalty on uranium from state lands, plus a severance tax for uranium on all lands equal to 2.6 percent of the proceeds received from the sale of yellowcake (GAO 2008b: 26).

Royalties are commonly based on a percent- age of gross proceeds (basically, revenues), with no allowance for expenses. Some state-level royalties, however, including those for uranium, use a “net-proceeds”-based calculation that allows the deduction of certain expenses before royalties are calculated. While deducting costs may seem fair, such a system gives claim holders a strong incentive to pad costs or other expenses in order to reduce royalties owed. Too often, the manipulations end up short-changing taxpayers (Earthworks 2007).

Rising mine activity means higher subsi- dies. Surging uranium prices in the past few years have greatly increased interest in uranium mining throughout the West:

• U.S. production had declined dramatically, but rose sharply in 2007 and remained high in 2008 (EIA 2009b). As of mid-2007, there were 35 permitted uranium mining projects in Colorado alone, all active but not yet producing (Carlson and Schwartz 2007).

• Analysis of Bureau of Land Management (BLM) data by the Environmental Working Group (EWG 2006) found that in 2006 uranium mining interests became some of the

61 There are now annual maintenance fees of about $100/acre, which increase the cost of speculative landholding and patenting. This change has improved the situation somewhat, lead- ing to some claims being relinquished (Humphries 2007)

62 The lower rate reflected terms of a mining reform bill then under consideration that would have implemented a 4 percent royalty on existing mines and an 8 percent royalty on new mines.

largest claim holders in at least seven states.63 By contrast, in May 2004 there were no ura- nium interests among the largest claim holders. Figure 2 shows how uranium claims overall in Colorado, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming increased from less than 4,300 in FY04 to more than 32,000 in FY06 (EWG 2009: 3).

• As of January 2009, there were more than 1,110 mining claims within five miles of Grand Canyon National Park, compared with just 10 in January 2003 (EWG 2009). Although the Department of Interior put a two-year hold on claims near the Grand Canyon in July 2009,

many of the mining claims in the affected region can still be developed if the claim had been vali- dated prior to the hold (Barringer 2009).

While the drop in uranium prices since 2007 may dampen mine activity somewhat, prices remain well above recent lows. The additional min- ing activity will result in substantially larger sub- sidies via patenting, royalty relief, and inadequate bonding. But as discussed in the next section, envi- ronmental liabilities from this activity (which will ultimately be borne by taxpayers) are expected to surge in coming years as well.

16,000 14,000 12,000 10,000 8,000 6,000 4,000 2,000 0 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Fiscal Year

Colorado New Mexico Utah Wyoming

Figure 2. Uranium Mining Claims

Source: BLM 2007, analyzed by EWG 2009.

5.1.3. Inadequate Bonding, High