URBAN FIXED LINE RAIL PLANS

The principal scheme currently in construction is the LUAS light rail project in Dublin, the largest such undertaking in Ireland for over a century. This was originally envisaged as a single line connecting Dundrum (with an extension to Sandyford as a variant),

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE OP 133

through Dublin city centre, to Tallaght. Traffic projections in the initial assessments were based on the full penetration of the city centre which, as well as encouraging usage, would also have resulted in operating economies in the form of a single depot, shared staff and common reserve rolling stock. The decision to construct two separate lines which nowhere interconnect, and which do not traverse the city centre as originally envisaged, will result in lower patronage and higher operating costs, as compared with the original scheme.

The experience with LUAS is instructive. The initial commitment to LUAS was made on the basis of a first cost estimate of IR£228m., equivalent to €290m. (at 1995 prices). Subsequent to the initial decision, major design changes were made which changed both the potential costs and benefits of the system. However, a full cost-benefit analysis (CBA) of the revised scheme was not undertaken before it was chosen. As with the experience in revising the roads programme, this case shows the importance of undertaking a full cost-benefit analysis of all major infrastructural projects before committing finally to their implementation. With full information better decisions might be made in the future on such major infrastructure projects.

The most recent cost estimates for the revised scheme range upwards from €750m., and there has, of course, also been a substantial delay in project delivery. We estimate that the general index of underlying construction cost inflation would explain an increase in the budgeted figure for the rather different first proposal, estimated at €290 million, to a maximum of about €470m. The remaining excess cost must be attributed to other factors, including in particular design changes. Some of these involved a

downward respecification of the project, but some also involved significant additions. The most significant downward respecification was the removal of the critical city centre section. Sections were added elsewhere, including an Eastward addition towards the Docklands and the Sandyford section.

Cost overruns on urban fixed-line projects are a common experience world-wide, as are failures to meet the patronage targets on which initial assessment and political sanction were based (Flyvbjerg, Bruzelius and Rothengatter, 2003). There are documented cases where costs were double what had been expected, with patronage half what had been promised. The LUAS experience, not least because it fits the international pattern, should inform future decision-making about fixed-line investment in Dublin or in other Irish cities. It is exceedingly rare for such projects, anywhere in the world, to cost less than estimated by the project promoters. It is equally unusual for these schemes to deliver the passenger volumes promised. The DART electrification scheme in Dublin in the early 1980s cost more than budgeted, and delivered fewer passengers than promised when commissioned. The principal lesson drawn in the extensive international literature on this topic is that the initial cost/benefit assessment, carried out before any

commitments are given, is absolutely central. These projects are rarely abandoned once commenced.

The costs of disruption during construction are sizeable for on- street urban projects, and can constitute a major portion of total economic costs. No estimate of these costs was included in the evaluation of LUAS to our knowledge, despite a recommendation that this be done from the External Evaluator to the 1994-1999 Operational Programme on Transport. Cost/benefit studies must include all economic costs, and not just cash costs. A chronology of the LUAS project is given in DKM (2003b).

A second, though much smaller, Dublin fixed-line investment has been the twin-tracking of the suburban line from Clonsilla to Maynooth. The current Summer 2003 timetable shows just twenty daily stopping services on this route on weekdays, even though the infrastructure work was completed, we understand, in 2001. A suburban service with headways approaching 60 minutes cannot be expected to deliver meaningful user benefits, and the lesson is that infrastructure investment alone will not pay off unless adequate operational management and performance is delivered. To attract significant patronage, suburban service must offer frequencies at least in the 10/15 minute zone at peak, according to all international experience. Dublin suburban rail planning appears to us to have focused excessively at times on capacity at the expense of frequency, in order to accommodate mainline and freight operations in the Dublin area. These activities should not be given scarce ‘paths’ on the system without explicit costing of the damage done to suburban frequency possibilities. We are aware that Irish Rail will introduce a new timetable from January 2004 and that this will see substantial frequency improvements in the Dublin suburban system, including Maynooth.

Following on the Platform for Change document prepared by the Dublin Transportation Office, which proposed a city-wide Metro system for the Dublin area at costs ranging up to €8bn., there has been a continuing debate on major new fixed-line options for Dublin. Most recently, there have been contentions that the Dublin Transport Office (DTO) system, or parts of it, could be built for sums considerably less than the Dublin Transport Office (DTO) estimates. In the light of both Irish and international experience, we must recommend that a degree of scepticism is justified in assessing cost estimates. If major further investment is to be made in fixed- line options it is likely that these will only be economic if major efforts are made to increase the density of the city, especially along the transport corridors. While scope for such action is limited, the continuing rapid growth in Dublin leaves more opportunity for influencing future density than is the case for most other European cities. The importance of such supplementary policies for developing a sustainable city is stressed in Chapter 13.

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE OP 135 Table 6.13: Bus/Rail % Share in Dublin: DTO AM Peak Estimates by

Mode 1991 1997 2001 % Change 1997-2001 Car 64 72 70 +67 Bus 25 19 23 +109 Rail 11 9 7 +27

Source: Dublin Transport Office Preliminary Estimate, January 2003.

There are broader grounds for recommending caution in entering into commitments to fund further fixed-line investments in Dublin. The net impact to date of bus and rail investment in the Dublin area has been a substantial improvement in bus patronage, at modest cost, versus a disappointing passenger performance by rail, at substantial cost (Table 6.13).

If Dublin continues as a low density city, bus will have strong advantages over fixed-line systems, and it is currently the predominant public transport mode in Dublin. During the period 1997 to 2001, bus trips at the morning peak more than doubled in the greater Dublin area. Notwithstanding the greater investment spend on rail (Maynooth-Clonsilla double-tracking, Malahide DART extension, Greystones DART extension, station openings and upgrading, and rolling stock acquisition), morning peak rail trips grew only 27 per cent. Bus market share actually rose by 4 points, an unusual achievement for an urban bus company. The fixed-line share fell two points, and was just 7 per cent in 2001. On these figures, the payoff to the modest investment in buses and Quality Bus Corridors has been impressive, and the payoff to rail investment disappointing. Rail proponents can argue that the full benefits of some of the rail investment have yet to be seen, and there is some truth in this. But aside entirely from lower cost, the shorter lead-times and roll-outs for bus projects should be seen as an argument in their favour.

URBAN BUS

The introduction of QBCs and the increase in number of services has been successful in increasing patronage. However, the utilisation of the bus fleet could be improved and travel times for users significantly reduced through Measures such as faster loading through use of multiple doors and the adoption of a coherent and efficient integrated ticketing system. The need to introduce an integrated ticketing system has long been recognised. It may involve some simplification of fares and loss of revenue. However, by reducing delays in collecting fares and loading times, it would reduce journey times, increase patronage, and produce a better utilisation of the expensive capital stock. However, these benefits are not guaranteed. In particular there is a danger that a new integrated system could be introduced that could prove both expensive to implement and could fail to deal with the issue of delays in boarding buses.

Recommendation: In planning future public transport investments in Dublin, expensive rail projects which take a long time to deliver need to be rigorously compared to cheaper bus-based schemes that are fast to implement. Investment in public transport needs to be combined with road user charging.