Various conceptualisations of power

Parsons (1963, 1967a) conceptualisation of power lays emphasis on the pursuit of collective goals (and mobilisation driven by consensus) as

„facilitative‟ and seen distinct from „distributive‟ approaches that highlight the

“hierarchical character of power, and the divisions of interest which are frequently consequent upon it” (Giddens 1997:341), i.e. power by A over B, in relation to the coercive and sectional pursuit of goals. Giddens elaborates on two aspects of power: in the broad sense, power can be seen as the

„transformative capacity of human agency‟ which refers to the capability of the actor to intervene in a series of events to change their course. In the narrow sense, power is „relational‟ and may be defined as „the capability to secure outcomes where the realisation of these outcomes depends on the agency of others‟ (Giddens 1976) and can be understood as power „over‟

others or power as „domination‟ (ibid). The relational aspect of power is further explicated by Lee (1999: 246) who likens power to electricity as “it has the possibility of existence everywhere but can only be identified as it flows from one thing to another”.

Explaining the source of power, Giddens argues that in any given social interaction use of power can be understood in terms of “resources and facilities which participants bring to and mobilise…so as to influence or control the conduct of others party to that interaction” (1976:112). In his formulation of the „structuration theory‟ Giddens proposes that “power…is generated in and through the reproduction of structures of domination. These

structures are constituted by resources of two sorts- allocative and authoritative” (1984:258). While Giddens in his analysis of social power lays emphasis on structural domination and dependency, he argues that “…actors in subordinate positions are never wholly dependent, and often adept at converting whatever resources they possess into some degree of control over the conditions of reproduction of the system…there exists a dialectic of control, continually shifting balances of resources, altering the overall distribution of power” (Giddens 1982b: 32).

Michael Mann in his study of „The Sources of Social Power‟ (1986) gives valuable insights to the analysis of how power is wielded or acquired (Stewart 2001). Mann‟s social analysis departs from the totalitarian view of societies. He instead proposes a conception of societies as “multiple overlapping and intersecting power networks” and can be best accounted in terms of “the interrelations of four sources of power: economic, military, ideological and political relationships” (Mann 1986). These sources of social power, he argues, are organisations‟ institutional means of social control for attaining human goals. Thus Mann‟s strategic perspective on power is “the ability to pursue and attain goals through mastery of one‟s environment” (ibid:

6). He explores this ability through two aspects of social power: distributive, that being exercised over other individuals, and collective, whereby persons cooperate to enhance their joint power over third parties (ibid). The latter of Mann‟s proposition clarifies the development of interdependent relationships, which may transcend national, international and transnational boundaries as

is the case with global public private arrangements. However, referring to it as „cooperation‟ could be misleading.

A central argument here is: most social interactions and relations have both aspects of power, distributive and collective, exploitative and functional, intertwined and operational. Mann (1986) explains this through his central concept of „organisational power‟ stressing the extent to which implementation of collective goals requires the organisation and division of function, thus subjecting it to „distributive power‟. Drawing parallels with the classic elite theory, he proposes that organisational power (and the inherent dominant relations) gains stability as those at the top ensure compliance by exercising control through laws and norms as well as through organisational outflanking of the masses at the bottom. The latter are unable to resist or collectively organise because they are embedded within collective and distributive power organisations controlled by others (ibid). In this organisational perspective on power, Mann attributes outflanking to diffused power (distinct from authoritative power), which spreads spontaneously and unconsciously through a social group, resulting in “social practices that embody power relations but are not explicitly commanded” (ibid: 7).Thus, a central feature of diffused power is „normalisation‟ owing to which the

„outflanked‟ subordinates do not deem resistance necessary.

The process of normalisation can be better understood in terms of Foucault‟s concept of „disciplinary power‟. Foucault delineates distinct modern forms of

domination as those of „disciplinary power‟ and „bio-power‟ (See Foucault 1980). While the classical „sovereign‟ model of power proposed that power may direct, coerce or even repress those subject to it, disciplinary power constructs the subjectivity necessary for the successful operation of a particular regime of power/knowledge. It is this „subjectivisation‟ that lies at the heart of the disciplinary model and identifies a distinctively modern power configuration: one which subjugates (to someone else by control and dependence) and makes subject to (tied to identity by a conscience or self-knowledge) (Foucault 1982). Unlike the sovereignty model where domination is expressed through prohibition or punishment of the censured action, in the disciplinary model it inculcates the required action by making it the desired action within the framework of political rationalities and technologies of power (Stewart 2001). Foucault‟s conceptualisation of power has come under criticism for its denial of normativity of political engagement and resistance (ibid: 20) and failure to acknowledge that collective disciplines can function both as structures of domination and as elements of agentic power (See Habermas 1990b, Fraser 1989a). This omission according to Taylor (1986:93) “precludes the possibility of an emancipatory conception of power as human agency”.

For the purpose of this thesis, however, the perspective on normalisation of power and practices is crucial for analysing social power relations in networks and in effect, partnership arrangements. Angus Stewart suggests that this distinction enables the possibility of the existence of relationships

that appear as a result of “self evident common interest” but may in fact embody “definitive asymmetries of power” (2001:26).

A separate body of work contextualises the analysis of power in terms of inter-dependency (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978, Pfeffer 1981, Ulrich et al. 1984, Keohane and Nye 1989). Resource dependency theorists argue that both internal hierarchies and the distribution of power in external relationships determine resource allocation within organisations and explain behaviour and outcomes (Elston 2005). Developed through the work of Emerson (1962), this perspective proposes that organisations depend for resources on key stakeholders in their external environment and strive to be effective in meeting the goals of these powerful stakeholders. He establishes an inverse relationship between power and dependence by positing that the power of A over B is derived from the dependence of B on A. Hence, dependence on other individuals or organisations will create power in those external resources. This interdependence between actors, although regarded as a key driver for effectiveness (Gulati and Sytch 2007), can lead to conflict and uncertainty (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). If we assume knowledge or access to information and ideas is power, uncertainty or lack of access to information suggests a lack of power.

This perspective is particularly relevant to the analysis of power in public private arrangements, which characterise relationships of high dependencies between potentially unequal partners with varying degree of control over

resources. I posit that access to and control over resources not only determines power balance within interactions but also determines the very need (appropriateness of these arrangements) and nature of these relationships. The resource dependency theory can thus help us understand: i) who (organisational actors) is sought out for such arrangements and who becomes an asset or a liability in partnership and, ii) the shifting power balance between the different players and their planning, implementing, monitoring roles within partnership arrangements. It can also help us explain the conflict and tensions in network or partnership development, i.e. the factors determining formation of newer relationships and the breaking of existing relationships in successive Global fund rounds.

The resource dependency perspective has been critiqued for focusing exclusively on official hierarchies and their functioning and thus denying the existence of informal, less obvious power structures. I acknowledge the limitations of this theoretical perspective and concur that resource dependency theory is too simplistic an explanation for describing a complex phenomena like public-private interactions. Hence, I do not restrict my analysis of power to resources. Instead, I regard resources as one of the many structural factors (others include rules, guidelines and norms) that constitute social practices. Besides, I adopt Lukes (1974) third dimension of power i.e. values, norms and ideologies exercised through all social interactions or the notion of “discourse” to complement my analysis of power and explain the „disciplinary regime of the Fund‟.

Summarising some of these debates, I posit that: power can be conceived in the terms of the ability of an actor (or an institution) to get others to do something by not only controlling material resources and possessing capabilities, but also determining “shared meanings and the creation of inter-subjectivities” that constitute interests and practices (Adler 1997:336). This conceptualisation can be explained by: i) the hierarchical nature of organisational relations as embodied in the rules and norms, and the differential control over organisational resources within hegemonic structures wherein, the goals are heteronymously determined, and ii) normalisation of power and practices. This explanation entails both the coercive and consensus elements of Gramsci‟s analysis. Through his concept of „cultural hegemony‟ in ideology, Antonio Gramsci (1992) gave valuable insights to how power gets normalised. Explaining the absence of a proletariat revolution in Western European countries, he posited that the workers were made to believe that their interests coincided with those of the capitalist class and so, did not revolt.

Thus, a more nuanced analysis of power focuses on both „hard‟ and „soft‟

power. While hard power is essentially coercive, Joseph Nye (cited in Harmer 2005) argues that soft power refers to “cultural, ideological and institutional forces”, central to which are the “beliefs and values that set the agenda and the framework of debate” (ibid). If we are to apply the above conceptualisation of power to public private interactions, it is important to examine the ways in which these subjectivities are created and the role

discourse and ideas play in “socialising states and other social actors (in the chain of brokerage) into accepting certain practices and models through their interaction with international actors” (Wendt 1992, Hall 1993).