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VARIOUS TYPES OF THEORY

FORM CRITICISM AND ITS DEVELOPMENTS

II. VARIOUS TYPES OF THEORY

Before a general critique of form criticism is given, a summary of the main theories, arranged according to their chief advocates, will be made. Only the broadest outline will be possible, but with sufficient illustrations in detail to make the outline intelligible. Particular criticisms of individual theories will also be added.

a. The missionary preaching theory

M. Dibelius 2 began by assuming that traditions in the early church were conditioned by missionary needs. This meant that he proceeded from what he conceived to have been the early Christian method to an analysis of the text of the gospels. According to him the

traditions existed first of all in sermons and the earliest forms were therefore imposed by the demands of the kerygma, to be added to later by more developed forms adaptable to other practical needs.

(i) Paradigms. These were short narratives which ended with a saying and which were designed mainly to bring out the importance of the saying. Examples of these are the healing of the paralytic and the incident of the ears of corn.

(ii) Novellen or tales. These were narratives which aimed to show Jesus as a wonder-worker.

According to Dibelius these are differentiated from the former by having no saying attached to them and by having a more secular tone. Moreover, while the paradigms were used by preachers, Novellen were created by story-tellers. Examples are the cleansing of the leper and the stilling of the storm.

(iii) Sayings. For the purpose of catechesis there would be collections of sayings, distinct from those in the paradigms because unattached to any narratives.

(iv) Legends. The name is unfortunate for it at once suggests something unhistorical. Under it Dibelius classed narratives relating extraordinary things about holy people. As an example, the infancy stories may be mentioned.

(v) Myths. Under this classification, Dibelius included the baptism, temptation and transfiguration, in each of which he found an interaction between what he called mythological persons.

Because of the varied character of the forms thus classified, Dibelius supposed that there were at least three different types of Christian workers involved—preachers, teachers and narrators. But the distinction seems to have been created by Dibelius’ analysis rather than being vouched for by independent historical testimony. In fact, it is difficult to conceive of any certain method of defining the difference between the various functions, while there is no evidence at all for a class of people wholly devoted to telling stories about Jesus without preaching the gospel.1

      

From Tradition to Gospel (translated by B. Lee Woolf, 1934, from Die Formgeschichte des  Evangeliums, first published in 1919). Cf. also idem, A Fresh Approach to the New Testament and  Early Christian Literature (1936), pp. 27 ff., for further comments on his classification, and his article  in TR, n.f., 1 (1929), pp. 185–216, for an assessment of form‐critical trends up to that date. 

It should be noted that many scholars who do not accept Dibelius’ categories nevertheless maintain  that mission work exerted a formative influence on the tradition. In a study of a portion of Luke’s  special material, W. R. Farmer (NTS 8, (1962) pp. 301–316), suggests that a certain Greek rhetorical  form (χρεία) is discernible in the introductory material to some of Luke’s parables, and this leads him  to suppose that Christian preachers and teachers often conformed to this contemporary method of  presenting material. Cf. M. Dibelius, From Tradition to Gospel (1934), pp. 152 ff., for a similar line of 

b. The Christian imagination theory

Appearing about the same time as Dibelius’ theory and somewhat akin to it was R.

Bultmann’s exposition of form criticism.2 But his approach was both more radical and more influential than that of Dibelius. Indeed so widespread has been the impact of Bultmann on gospel studies that his presentation must be considered in greater detail.

(i) In order to appreciate Bultmann’s opinions, some attention must be given to his particular background.1 He was reared in the liberal school of thought which focused on the quest of the historical Jesus as the most important task for Christian faith. This is the position for which A. Harnack and H. J. Holtzmann 2 may be regarded as major representatives. Bultmann studied under Harnack and the latter’s opinions naturally formed an important part of his background in his formative years. His own reaction against the historical Jesus of the liberal school in favour of a more dynamic Christ of faith was the result of his disillusionment with the liberal Jesus. He recognized that if faith depended on the quest for the historical Jesus, it became dependent on historical research, with all its uncertainties.

Bultmann’s disillusionment led him to seek an approach to the gospels which would emancipate him from the need for historical demonstration. Only so could the simplest, in his opinion, ever come to faith. He was further prompted to this non-historical approach by his commitment to existential philosophy. Deeply influenced by Heidegger, Bultmann

maintained that the most important element in Christian faith was an existential encounter with Christ, by which he meant a confrontation with Christ which demanded a decision whether to accept or reject. If existential encounter was all-important, historical proof was clearly irrelevant. It is essential to note that Bultmann’s non-historical approach to the gospel materials was part of his presuppositions. In short, historical enquiry itself becomes little more than an academic exercise.

One other factor dominated the approach of Bultmann to form criticism and that was his allegiance to the History of Religion School of thought (religionsgeschichtliche Schule)3 which was a powerful movement in the early part of the twentieth century. According to this School the earliest Jewish traditions were translated into new forms suitable for the Gentile world, making full use of Gentile categories of thought. Although the main thrust of this School was in the interpretation of the epistles, it could not fail to affect the approach to the gospels. It at once suggested that the investigator should look for the interpretive elements. A clear-cut distinction between Judaic and Hellenistic Christianity must inevitably affect one’s         argument. Farmer does not hold that the preachers created the material, but only that they selected  the form in which to present it, and there is clearly less objection to this view than to that of 

Dibelius. It is by no means evident, however, that the ‘form’ could not have been part of our Lord’s  own presentation. 

The History of the Synoptic Tradition. For a more concise statement of Bultmann’s position, cf, his  essay in Form Criticism (Eng. Tr.2 1962) combined with the essay of K. Kundsin. For a summary and  critique of his position cf. E. B. Redlich, Form Criticism (1939), pp. 30 ff., R. H. Fuller, The New 

Testament in Current Study (1962), pp. 9 ff., and W. Barclay, The First Three Gospels (1966), pp. 43 ff. 

Cf. J. D. Smart, The Divided Mind of Modern Theology (1967), pp. 31 ff. 

Cf. A. Harnack, What is Christianity? (1901); H. J. Holtzmann, Die synoptischen Evangelien (1863). 

The main representatives of this school were R. Reitzenstein, Die hellenistischen  Mysterienreligionen (1927) and W. Bousset, Kyrios Christos (1926). 

approach to history. It should be noted, however, that the grounds of this

religionsgeschichtlich theory have been undermined through an acknowledgement of the lateness of the evidence on which it was based and through the increasing evidence from Jewish sources (such as Qumran) that the supposed gap between Jewish and Gentile Christianity has been considerably overdrawn.

(ii) Bultmann’s approach to the gospel material is therefore dominated by various influences which dispose him to treat history as irrelevant. The sharp distinction between the historical Jesus and the Christ of faith arose, according to him, through the Easter event. Those who had come to have an encounter with the Christ of faith could no longer look at the Jesus of history except in the light of their new experience.1 They could no longer be impartial observers. But this would apply to all the evangelists. They must have written from the standpoint of faith. Hence was born what the Germans call Gemeindetheologie.The gospel records become sources of early Christian theology rather than historical data for the life of Jesus.2 Bultmann makes so much appeal to the community that his species of form criticism may not unjustly be called a theory of community creativeness. It will be noticed that

Bultmann has here combined two aspects. All would agree that the traditions were preserved by those who had come to faith and that the gospel writers were writing to encourage faith in others. But Bultmann has gone much further when he claims that the ‘community’ created most of the material.

(iii) Some indication of the details in Bultmann’s theory will illustrate the extent to which he attributes traditions to community origin. His classification of material resembles that of Dibelius. Instead of paradigms, Bultmann speaks of apophthegms, but he means practically the same. The main distinction is the extent to which material under this classification is attributed to the community. Dibelius is content to suggest that frequently an additional saying was attributed to Jesus in order to apply his teaching to the needs of the community.

For Dibelius,1 the additional explanatory statement was not arbitrarily invented by the

community, but considered to be a loyal interpretation of the teaching of Jesus. But Bultmann goes much further in holding that the community invented the whole incident.

      

Bultmann continually appeals to the kerygma as evidence of the Christ of faith. By this term he  draws attention to the dynamic activity of preaching, but it should be noted that some scholars use  the term in a different sense, i.e. of its content (as for instance C. H. Dodd). Cf. J. P. M. Sweet’s  discussion, ET 76 (1965), pp. 143–147. 

This negative approach to history is shared by all who have adopted the Bultmann position. It is  basic to D. E. Nineham’s interpretation of Mark in his Pel C (1963). Wherever possible Nineham  intentionally avoids considering the historicity of events precisely because they cannot be proved. 

But Bultmann’s non‐historical approach raises a difficulty since it creates the need for some other  source of faith if there is no possibility of basing it on the historical Jesus. He has denied the  dilemma, but Nineham takes refuge in the church (cf. his article in The Church’s Use of the Bible,  1963, pp. 159 ff.). J. Knox has proposed a similar solution in his book The Church and the Reality of  Christ (1964). But neither Nineham nor Knox has recognized the inconsistency of appealing to the  testimony of the church when they have already denied the historical accounts, which they regard as  products of the church. Cf. the criticisms of this point of view by A. T. Hanson, Vindications (ed. A. T. 

Hanson, 1966), pp. 74 ff. But cf, also Nineham’s defence of his position in Christian History and  Interpretation (ed. W. R. Farmer, C. F. D. Moule, R. R. Niebuhr, 1967), pp. 199–222. 

Cf. From Tradition to Gospel (1934), pp. 64 ff. 

Instead of Dibelius’ Novellen, Bultmann prefers miracle stories. Not all the miracles are included in this group, which is restricted to those in which no specific teaching material is included. Both Dibelius and Bultmann reject the miraculous and therefore the historicity of the gospel account of miracles. This is not so much on the basis of ‘form’as on philosophical and theological grounds. Yet some explanation is necessary of how these stories arose.

Various suggestions are made. It may have happened as a result of a dramatization of a saying of Jesus, as in the case of the healing of the blind man which illustrates the saying that Jesus is the light of the world. Or the withering of the fig-tree could be a development from the parable of the barren fig-tree. Or some Old Testament miracle may have suggested a parallel New Testament miracle. Or else some alien story from another source has been transferred to Jesus. In all these suggested explanations, the development of the miracle story is directly attributable to the creation of the community. Bultmann cites many supposed parallels from pagan sources which relate wonder stories 2 and supposes that these justify his conclusion that many of the miracle stories in the gospels are of the same type and must therefore be regarded as legendary. Yet the parallels cited are vastly different in content.

Unlike the pagan parallels, there is an absence in the gospel narratives of magical incantations and the like which at once puts them into a different category.1

Bultmann, liked Dibelius, chooses the term legend for one of his classification of forms.

Both men regard this group as influenced by the current practice of ascribing to holy men extraordinary happenings. As with other groups, Bultmann sees here again the creation of the community, whose interests in the many people other than Jesus mentioned in the narrative would lead them to create legends concerning them.

In close association with legend is the classification of myth. Indeed Bultmann places these myths under legends. It is necessary at once to know in what sense he uses the term. His own definition will be valuable : ‘Mythology is the use of imagery to express the

otherworldly in terms of this world, and the divine in terms of human life, and the other side in terms of this side’ (Kerygma and Myth, p. 10). The descending dove and the heavenly voice at the baptism of Jesus come under this category. Although myth in this sense may not necessarily refer to something unhistorical, Bultmann would not give historical credence to any of these narratives. To him they contain elements which are unintelligible today.

It is in the sayings of Jesus that Bultmann shows his most characeristic approach.2 He divides them into several groups: Wisdom words, ‘I’ words, Prophetic and Apocalyptic Sayings, Law words and rules and parables.

Under the first group, Bultmann analyses wisdom sayings in general and particularly the Old Testament wisdom literature and observes parallels with many of the sayings of Jesus.

He suggests that three possibilities exist. (a) Jesus may have used existing secular wisdom sayings and proverbs and adapted them to his own needs.(b) He may have created his own sayings and (c) the church may have used secular wisdom sayings and attributed them to Jesus. Bultmann places much of this class of sayings material in the gospels under the third

      

For instance, a story of a Finnish fairy tale in which a girl fed an army on three barley corns (The  History of the Synoptic Tradition, p. 236) is considered as a parallel to the feeding of the five  thousand. 

Cf. E. B. Redlich, Form Criticism (1939), p. 127. 

Cf. his full discussion, op. cit., pp. 69–179. 

classification.3 But he does admit a few sayings where he is prepared to see characteristic teaching of Jesus. His criteria for genuineness are those sayings where the sense of eschatology is strong (e.g. Mk. 3:24–27, where the strong man is overcome), those which involve a summons to repentance (e.g. Lk. 9:62), those involving ‘reversal’ (such as Mk.

10:31) and those requiring some change in people (Mk. 10:15). It must be noted that

Bultmann’s judgment is not based on ‘form’, but on his own preference. It is almost entirely subjective.

The ‘I’ sayings of Jesus are sayings in which he makes a special claim or specific

demand. In the majority of these sayings Bultmann sees something which the community has produced to meet its own situations. Wherever sayings imply some theological view of Jesus (as, e.g. Mt. 10:32–33; Lk. 12:8–9) these are community products. When they predict the death or resurrection of Jesus (as Mt. 17:12) they are sayings created after the event. Those which involve doing things ‘in the Name’ (e.g. Mt. 7:22) reflect an ecclesiastical situation.

There are other sayings said to be by the Risen Lord which are transferred to the earthly Jesus (as, e.g., Mt. 18:20) and others relating to persecution which reflect back from the subsequent history of the church. Yet other sayings presuppose an assessment of the life of Jesus as a whole and must have come from a later situation (e.g. Mk. 10:45; Mt. 11:19). To summarize Bultmann’s approach in this section, it may be said that anything which could conceivably have been a community product could not have been original to Jesus.

Those which Bultmann classes as Prophetic and Apocalyptic sayings fare no better. He sees much material which is attributed to Jesus after the event, such as the predictions of persecutions for his followers (e.g. Mt. 5:10–11; Lk. 6:22–23; Mt. 10:17–22). Those which foretell the fall of Jerusalem, which have long been regarded by scholars as readings back, are treated in the same way. In some instances Jewish material has been attributed to Jesus (as, e.g., the apocalyptic passages in Mk. 13, the sheep and goats parable in Mt. 25:31–46 and the lament over Jerusalem in Lk. 13:34–35). In other cases Bultmann sees late Hellenistic formulations (as in Lk. 21:34–36). His argument regarding those sayings is that the church made no distinction between sayings of Jesus and pronouncements of Christian prophets and therefore was not aware of what was the community product and what was a genuine saying.1 But John 14:26 is to the point here, which mentions the special promise that the Spirit would remind the disciples of what Jesus had personally said. Many of the Law words and rules are easily assigned by Bultmann to the community since they recall a situation in which the church has become an organized institution. This group of sayings are community sayings in that they are community summaries of the principles of Jesus. Examples may be found in Mark 2:27–28 (on the attitude to the sabbath), Mark 10:11–12 (on divorce), Matthew 6:1–18 (on alms, prayer, fasting) and Mark 7:6–8 (on the oral law). Further, some sayings reflect a period of controversies, which are seen as controversies of the church period rather than the time of Jesus (e.g. Mt. 5:17–20, concerning the Law; Mt. 16:18–19, concerning Peter’s position; Mt. 18:15–17, concerning Christian relationships; Mt. 18:19–20, concerning community prayer; Mt. 10:5–16, concerning the missionary task).

Nevertheless some of the Law sayings which disagree with the Jewish attitude are

conceded to be probably genuine. Among the parables Bultmann finds more that is authentic,       

Examples of such non‐authentic sayings singled out by Bultmann are Mk. 8:36–37; Mt. 5:14, 42; 

10:24; 12:30; Lk. 16:10. In commenting on the Golden Rule (Mt. 7:12; Lk. 6:31), Bultmann draws no  distinction between the positive form in the teaching of Jesus and the negative form in rabbinical  usage. To him the expression reflects naive egoism. 

Form Criticism (1934), pp. 56 ff. 

because most of them force a man to come to a decision. They do not make a man’s mind up for him.2 It will be seen, therefore, that as a result of Bultmann’s theories, little authentic material remains. He accepts only about forty sayings as genuine and the mere event (the

‘thatness’) of the life and death of Jesus on the cross.3 All the rest of the gospel material is either the creation or adaptation of the community. Such a result will seem shattering to those who require some historical basis for their faith, but for Bultmann this presents no problem, since he begins by denying the necessity of any connection between history and faith. In a later section on historical criticism (pp. 243 ff.) reference will be made to various criteria used by Bultmann and others to determine authenticity. But some general comments on the basis of Bultmann’s approach are relevant here.

What he does not explain is how the community imagination developed. It needs some

What he does not explain is how the community imagination developed. It needs some