Vindicating and non-vindicating explanations

Of course, just because our conversational practices seem to indicate that

something is the case, it does not follow that it is the case. On the contrary, I take it that there are no less than three possible solutions to the Problem of Self-

Knowledge. The first solution is to endorse what Fricker calls a non-vindicating explanation of our practices regarding self-knowledge. This account can

acknowledge that we tend to treat self-ascriptions as if they are LG-authoritative, LG-basic and psychologically non-inferred, but will hold that this practice is, as it turns out, based upon some misconception on our part. Commonly, such a view will be supported by empirical evidence that, it is claimed, shows that our access to our own thoughts is substantially more fallible than we assume. We have, it is claimed, no special epistemic access to the contents of our own minds, and our practice of acting as if this is the case is based upon an illusion.

The second solution is to endorse a vindicating but deflationary explanation of our practices. On this account, it is perfectly appropriate for us to treat certain self-ascriptions in this way. But this is not because people are capable of knowing their own cogito-like thoughts in a way that no others can. That we treat them in this way has no significant epistemological implications at all: it is merely an ‘artefact of grammar’ that explains the appropriateness of this practice.

The standard way of defending such a view is to argue that cogito-like thoughts and other related self-attributions (avowals), function very differently in our language-game from the way reports function. Essentially, the idea is that there is no plausible way of explaining how avowals can be reports of independent states of affairs while accounting for the features unique to them—that is, as Crispin

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Wright would put it, the fact that they are ‘groundless’ and ‘authoritative’ (Wright 1998). Reports, it is claimed, follow a different set of grammatical rules from the ones followed by avowals, and, consequently, avowals cannot be genuine reports. This is a kind of vindicating explanation of our common practices. We are right to treat avowals as LG-authoritative, -basic and psychologically non-inferred,

according to this account, but this is simply because of the way the language-game is played. These features of avowals are not to be explained in terms of some underlying cognitive ability, but can be understood as mere artefacts of grammar. This, it is claimed, is the most basic explanation we can give here—the explanatory bedrock is language.

Third, and finally, we might endorse a vindicating, non-deflationary account of our practices. On this account, it is perfectly appropriate for us to treat self- ascriptions in the way we do treat them, and it is appropriate because people are able to know, in a way that no others can, exactly what they are thinking. This account, then, takes the special status of cogito-like thoughts not to be a status that is granted by our linguistic mores, but a status that is earned by the believer. That we treat self-ascribers as beyond epistemic reproach is a result of a genuine cognitive achievement on their part.

Now, of these three possible solutions, I take it that a deflationary vindicating explanation is only worth considering as a last resort. Its plausibility hinges crucially on a non-deflationary account being untenable. That is to say, if we had at hand a satisfactory explanation of how avowals are the result of the sort of ‘genuine cognitive achievement’ that is required for knowledge, it would be difficult to see how a deflationary account would be in any way appealing. For what possible reason would such an account be preferable? As epistemologists, I take it that our aim should be to offer a proper epistemological solution to the Problem of Self- Knowledge. We should only offer a non-epistemological solution if we have reason to think we can do no better.

I also see no reason to be pessimistic about the prospects of the

‘groundlessness’ and ‘authoritativeness’ of avowals being fully accommodated by an epistemological theory. Authoritativeness is not a difficult characteristic to

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incorporate into an epistemological theory. There are many fields of enquiry that admit of experts, people who we consider to be in a better epistemic position than the rest of us.

And to say that self-knowledge is groundless is simply to say that it is basic in the terminology I have been using here. Here is Wright’s explanation of what groundlessness is:

The demand that someone produce reasons or corroborating

evidence for such a claim about themselves—‘How can you tell?’—is always inappropriate. There is nothing they might reasonably be expected to say. In that sense, there is nothing on which such claims are based. (Wright 1998, p. 14)

However, note that on the epistemological account I have put forward, the groundlessness of a statement does not indicate that it is not known. Non-

inferential a priori knowledge is groundless in just this way and yet is still a form of

knowledge. That is to say, I have argued that non-inferential a priori knowledge is

the knowledge of self-evident propositions, and self-evident propositions are groundless propositions. A priori knowledge, on the account I have put forward, just is knowledge of, and knowledge epistemically based upon, self-evident judgements. As such we already have an epistemology in place that can

accommodate groundless beliefs. So if it turns out that cogito-like beliefs really are groundless (rather than just assumed to be groundless) that would not prevent them from counting as knowledge.

So I shall set this possible solution to the Problem of Self-Knowledge to one side.