Virtue Ethics

We are not studying in order to know what virtue is, but to become good, for otherwise there would be no profit in it.

Aristotle

According to Velasquez et al. (1988):

Virtues are attitudes, dispositions, or character traits that enable us to be and to act in ways that develop this potential. They enable us to pursue the ideals we have adopted. Honesty, courage, compassion, generosity, fidelity, integrity, fairness, self-control, and prudence are all examples of virtues.

Virtue ethics in western societies derives from ancient Greek philosophy, particularly the Aristotelian understanding of a virtuous person. Aristotle23 _{is the} originator of virtue ethics and even today, his approach to ethics has a profound influence on modern virtue theorists. Below is a brief description of the basic tenets of Aristotelian thought.

a. Aristotle’s Virtue Ethics

Aristotle followed Socrates and Plato in taking the virtues to be central to a life well-lived, but was the first to put the notion of virtue ethics into the social framework from the viewpoint that human experience is a holistic process (Kraut, 2010). Aristotle claimed that virtues are socially situated, cultivated and constitutive of a human life well-lived (eudaimonia). Aristotle distinguished two kinds of virtue: moral virtues (virtues of character) and intellectual virtues (or dianoetic virtues)24 _{(Crisp, 2000; Hughes, 2001). Moral virtues are courage,} temperance, self-discipline, moderation, modesty, humility, generosity, friendliness, truthfulness, honesty, justice. Intellectual virtues include scientific knowledge (episteme), artistic or technical knowledge (techne), intuitive reason (nous), practical wisdom (phronesis), and philosophic wisdom (sophia).

23 _{In his book “Nicomachean Ethics”, Aristotle fully develops his virtue theory.} 24 _{From the Greek ‘aretai dianoetikai’.}

Aristotle considered virtues as important parts of the good individual person and likened them to acquired skills. He further believed that virtues are not naturally possessed, but form part of the conscious choice of individuals based on practical wisdom (phronesis), which needs continuous affirmation to be acquired. In today’s terms, the Aristotelian notion of practical wisdom is compatible with the term good judgment25 _{according to Banks (2006).}

Aristotle put great emphasis on the training of character in a virtues modus vivendi. More specifically, the philosopher believed that the training of character begins in the early years and continues until the end of a person’s life. He claimed that for a person to be virtuous they must practise good character traits all the time, what he refers to a habitual excellence. The Aristotelian position could be seen as analogous with lifelong learning (Carr, 2007).

With regard to the training of character, Aristotle believed instructors should function as role models for their trainees. Parents may be good or bad role models for their children during their upbringing, as well as teachers and others engaged in the education process. This would suggest that practitioners, social work teachers or practice instructors/supervisors may also function as positive or negative role models for both their students and clients (see also Chapter 3.8).

Like Aristotle, modern virtue theorists argue that the concept of the goodness of an action is associated with the character of the person, so priority is placed on the qualities of the human character. Like Aristotle, contemporary virtue theorists emphasise the role a good upbringing plays in becoming a virtuous person. Following Aristotle’s views on moral education and development, modern virtue ethicists also attach importance to these concepts, considering them the basis for human flourishing. In particular, MacIntyre (1987), one of the foremost

25 _{According to Banks (2006), ‘Good judgment could be regarded as a characteristic of the}

professional. It can be linked with the notion of the reflective and reflexive practitioner, requiring, among other things, the ability to learn from and reflect on experience, a sensitivity to people’s feelings and situations, attentiveness to features of situations and an ability to reason’(pp. 67-68).

proponents of virtue ethics, claimed that virtue is obtained from daily interaction with other people, in communities of practice and through a trial and error process. He also believed that ethics are culturally and role situated.

b. Virtue Ethics and Social Work

Clark (2006:88) notes that, ‘… good professional practice is not sufficiently described either by technical competence or by grand ethical principle; it also subsists essentially in the moral character of the practitioner’. In fact, social work as a value-laden profession cannot be separated from virtue ethics because the effective application of professional values and ethics depends not only on duty- minded or even skilful social workers, but they must also be the carriers of good character traits.

Rejecting the value-neutrality of the social work profession in liberal individualistic societies, Clark (2006) turns his attention to the moral personality of the social worker and the features that constitutes a good professional. In his view, social workers must fulfil all the requirements described in various statements on human rights regarding personal relationships. In addition, social workers should meet context-sensitive moral standards where social work is in operation. For Clark, ‘social workers are necessarily practitioners of context- sensitive moral values and bearers of particular moral character’ (ibid: 86).

Other social work writers like Webb (2006: 221) see virtue ethics as a ‘process of reflection, deliberation and self-understanding’ for professionals. For Webb, what is important is that ‘virtue calls upon the inner sense of the essential rightness of one’s stance commensurate with the situation and the determination of a moral dialogue with the rest of society’ (ibid: 221). Houston (2003), Hugman (2005), and Lovat and Gray (2008), influenced by Habermasian discourse ethics for critical thinking, also argue that in a democratic society virtue ethics enters into a moral dialogue in everyday relationships, including in the work environment, rather than a set of pre-determined rules about morality.

From the above, it can be argued that contemporary writings on virtue ethics in social work emphasize, on the one hand, the notion of the critical self-reflection of the social worker about his or her individual ethical stance and on the other, the moral and ethical dialogue between social workers and other people engaged in social work practice as a dialectical process.

Key criticisms

Virtue ethics is a theoretical system that, like many others, has also limitations. The aim here is not to make an exhaustive list of the drawbacks of such an approach or dissenting voices, but to illustrate some difficulties26_{, which are often exposed by} both supporters and opponents of virtue ethics.

One difficulty is that virtue ethics is contextual and consequently its applicability is related to specific cases (van Staveren, 2007). Further, virtue ethics is ‘culture- specific’ (Campbell, 2005:46) and thus does not have universal acceptance (Campbell, 2005; van Staveren, 2007). In addition, according to opponents of these approaches in professional practice, virtue ethics ‘ignores social and communal dimensions’ because emphasis is given to the moral character of individuals, not the social context where social beings interrelate (Campbell, 2005:47). Nevertheless, recent findings in the domain of positive psychology have shown that, although societies vary in their ethical practices, they all recognise common virtues such as courage (e.g. bravery, persistence, integrity, vitality); wisdom and knowledge (e.g. creativity, curiosity, open-mindedness, love of learning, perspective); humanity (e.g. love, kindness, social intelligence); justice (e.g. citizenship, fairness, leadership); temperance (e.g. forgiveness and mercy, humility and modesty, prudence, self-regulation) and transcendence (e.g. appreciation of beauty and excellence, gratitude, hope, humor, spirituality) (Peterson and Seligman, 2004; Dahlsgaard et al., 2005).

Another limitation is that virtue ethics is based upon motive (Slote, 2001) and motives alone do not always lead to good judgement and action (Banks, 2004, 2006; van Staveren, 2007). For instance, a social worker might have the good intention to help his/her clients, but this is not always enough to make appropriate decisions and react effectively in the client’s interest. As already seen, other factors play a significant role in ethical judgements. On the other hand, it is by no means certain that all social workers or students27 _{studying to become social workers} embody the qualities of good character or possess only positive motives towards the profession and the population they serve.

To conclude, Banks (2006:70) points out that ‘people are not always virtuous’ or able to ‘make good judgements’ and for this reason she believes social work must adopt specific principles and rules to underpin its raison d’etre (ibid: 2006). However, she accepts virtue ethics as a process in moral education and development given that for her, like other social work writers mentioned earlier, social work is not a profession that relies only on acquired skills or prescribed rules and obligations, but it also needs virtues to be functional.