The war for the donbas

Immediately after the collapse of Yanukovych’s rule, Russia annexed Crimea and proceeded to try to unleash a ‘Russian spring’, i.e. to stoke a rebellion against Kyiv in the eastern and southern parts of Ukraine, from Kharkiv to Odessa. What it wanted to achieve was a ‘federalisation’ of Ukraine, i.e. its transforma­ tion into a state made up of two constituents, which would permanently thwart Kyiv’s aspirations to rapprochement with the West and bind it with Russia. That plan failed as it ran into opposition from not only most of the young generation, the middle class, a majority of the oligarchs, but also the bureaucracy and the state apparatus (the interests of the latter, including the existing corruption patterns, had by then become too closely linked to the Ukrainian state for the administration apparatus to be willing to risk major change). Meanwhile, the ‘silent pro­Russian majority’ on whose support Russia counted turned out not to be a majority any more: the generation of ‘orphans of the Soviet Union’ had grown older, smaller and less active.

The ‘Russian spring’ only succeeded in parts of the Donbas. It was there that the separatist rebellion started, conducted by paramilitary formations from Russia and members of the Ukrainian special police forces which had been disbanded in the wake of the Revolution, and backed primarily by immigrant communities with loose links to Ukraine, and also apparently by sections of the criminal world. The rebellion also had the silent support of old­age pensioners, nostalgic about the times of Brezhnev­era prosperity (and their own youth). In view of the disintegration or marginalisation of the major pro­Russian forces in Donbas, i.e. the Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine and the Communist Party of Ukraine,199 _{Russia re­activated fringe separatist communities like the} Donetsk People’s Republic (an organisation by that name had existed at least since 2010). When their first actions met with success, Russia provided back­ ing in the form of both media coverage and military assistance (instructors, militants, special troops, and later also regular army units).

Ukraine was defenceless in the face of Russian aggression. In early 2014, its armed forces theoretically had around 121,000 troops, but only 5000 at best

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(and possibly as few as 3000) were combat­ready,200 _{and even those were oper­} ating within small groups rather than fully staffed units. That was the result of the deliberate dismantling of the armed forces under Yanukovych,201 _{as well} as the fact that all Ukrainian governments since 1992 had neglected the army. As a result, Ukraine surrendered Crimea without a fight (and much of its armed forces along with it), was unable to quickly respond to the Russian­inspired capture of government buildings in the cities of the Donbas, and later on, was highly inept at conducting its first military operations.

In that situation, the burden of defending the country was taken on by the Maidan Self­Defence, supported by volunteers, especially from the eastern oblasts, and backed financially and organisation­wise by the Dnipropetrovsk oligarch Ihor Kolomoyskiy. The volunteer battalions formed in this way (dobro- baty) were poorly armed, disastrously equipped and usually poorly trained (even though there were many army and police veterans within their ranks), but they were militant and persistent. And since at that time they were fight­ ing equally poorly trained and badly commanded (albeit slightly better armed) semi­regular units, the difference in the level of determination was decisive. Thus, the Ukrainian volunteers managed to stop the advancement of the rebel­ lion until the newly established National Guard and the Land Troops recon­ structed at an impressive pace could join the fight.202

When the Ukrainians gained a sufficient advantage in summer 2014 to be able to suppress the rebellion by force, Russia decided to intervene directly, and deployed regular units with heavy weaponry. The Ukrainians were defeated (but not crushed), and the dobrobaty suffered massive losses in the battle of Ilovaysk in August 2014. Further fighting led to an impasse: Kyiv was unable to expel the Russians beyond the border and dismantle the self­proclaimed republics,

200 _{Як „зливали” Крим: у РНБО розсекретили стенограму засідання за 2014 рік, 22 February}

2016, https://www.obozrevatel.com/ukr/crime/42817­yak­zlivali­krim­v­rnbo­rozsekre­ tili­stenogramu­zasidannya­za­2014­rik.htm, accessed on 25 February 2016, and Встреча начальника Генерального штаба вооруженных сил Украины В. Муженко с блоггерами, 28 February 2016, http://bmpd.livejournal.com/1762315.html, accessed on 28 February 2016.

201 _{The dismantling of the army may be blamed to a large extent on the presence of Russian}

agents within the Ministry of Defence and the General Staff, which the president tolerated. Dmytro Salamatin, one of the defence ministers from that period, had only been a citizen of Ukraine since 2004.

202 _{The National Guard was formed in 2014 by reorganising the Internal Troops, which were}

in a much better condition than the armed forces, but had no artillery of their own, and some of whose units had been actively involved in resisting the Revolution of Dignity.

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while Russia was unable to force the Ukrainians to capitulate.203 _{In that situ­} ation, a ceasefire deal was concluded, which was apparently taken seriously only by the Western negotiators who wanted a cessation of hostilities, but not a resolution to the conflict.

Since February 2015, Ukraine has been in a state of ‘neither peace nor war’: the country pretends to be involved not in a war, but rather an ‘anti­terror operation’, even though at the same time it has spoken of an occupation of the Donbas.204 _{Ukraine also still maintains diplomatic and consular relations with} the Russian Federation, as well as elaborate trade relations and visa­free travel arrangements.205 _{The 1997 Treaty on Friendship, Co­operation and Partnership} likewise remains in force. Russia, on the other hand, has been pretending that it is not at war, but merely providing humanitarian assistance to the separa­ tist republics.206 _{Meanwhile, every day several Ukrainian soldiers are injured} or killed in armed incidents, mostly involving artillery fire (there is no reliable information available on the losses suffered by the Russians and the separa­ tists). The low­intensity trench warfare goes on and may continue for years, especially since neither side considers itself to have been forced to make any major political concessions.

Fighting a war against external aggression, which also involves some elements of civil war, has been a challenge for the Ukrainian state, comparable only to the Chernobyl disaster. Among other reasons, this is because the response requires not only military, organisational and economic measures, but also a kind of reflection which would lead to the revision of many views which had hitherto seemed obvious. Ukraine has looked in the mirror again, and has seen an image of itself that is new in many respects.