2 Between the Western and the Soviet Model: Propaganda in China before 1949
2.8 The Third Front: The War over Public Opinion, 1925-1931
As the tension between China and Japan rose over the course of the 1920s and 1930s and China looked for ways to gain the sympathy of the international community, international propaganda became increasingly important. The experiences of the First World War had led to a systematic study of the function of propaganda and an institutionalization of propaganda as part of international relations. As indicated above, China adapted the debate on propaganda almost from the very moment that propaganda became a subject of systematic study in Europe, and the term xuanchuan entered the Chinese vocabulary around the same time or soon after senden became a central concept in the Japanese government. The division into military wars, economic wars, and propaganda wars was quickly adapted in China244 and soon became a form of common knowledge among people writing on propaganda.
After the end of the First World War, a large body of literature on propaganda emerged in all major Western countries involved in the war. In Germany, it became commonplace, especially among military elites, to blame the loss of the war on a “propaganda deficit”245 both at the domestic and the international propaganda front.246 The role of propaganda in Germany’s loss of the war was also highlighted in China.247 One author noted that the First World War was not decided on the military front, but mainly on the economic front and the propaganda front.248 Prominent statements made by German military generals and in the German press in this context were often picked up to bolster the importance of propaganda well into the 1930s, although it is doubtful that they were taken directly from the German context and incorporated into Chinese articles on international propaganda. It is more likely that these quotations already circulated in English-language treatises on propaganda and found their way into
244
E.g. Wang Yizhi 王一之, “Ouzhan zhong zhi guoji xuanchuan zhan” 欧战中之国际宣传战 [The international propaganda war during the European war], Xin zhengzhi 3, no 1 (1939): 64- 77. Wang speaks of “three fronts” (san ge zhenxian 三个阵线). Also see Wang Yizhi, “Woguo guoji xuanchuan shang de yanjiu” 我国国际宣传上的研究 [Chinese research on international propaganda]. Xin zhengzhi 2, no 4 (1939): 66-76.
245 The term Propagandadefizit had been coined by Martin Mohr, who later became head of the
German Institute for Press Studies (Deutsches Institut für Zeitungskunde). Cf. Bussemer,
Propaganda, 102.
246 Cf. Bussemer, Propaganda, 103-104.
247Wang Yizhi, “Ouzhan zhong zhi guoji xuanchuan zhan,” 64. 248 Ibid., 66.
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the Chinese debate from there.249 An article in the journal Journalism Quarterly (Baoxue jikan 报学季刊)250 from 1934 quoted Kaiser Wilhelm II and Hindenburg
to emphasize the importance of propaganda.251 Another article quoted a “German general” and a “German paper.”252
As China got much of its literature on propaganda from the United States, however, Germany was not portrayed as entirely unskilled in the art of propaganda in every Chinese text on the topic. Instead, many texts introduced several different propaganda strategies used during the war and then explained which country had excelled at which strategy.253 For the balance in the propaganda war, Chinese authors not only wrote about propaganda skills, but also took hard aspects, such as control over means of communication into account. Thus, it was noted that Germany was in a weaker position in the propaganda war because Britain controlled the telegraph system and wireless telecommunication technology was not yet developed enough that it could be employed by Germany on a wide scale.254
In the 1930s, journals published overviews of international propaganda initiatives organized by different countries.255 The purpose was quite similar to later overviews: To try to stay up to date with developments in the field and at the same time to demonstrate the importance of propaganda by arguing that all countries in the world paid attention to it. Propaganda measures were regularly divided into “proactive” (jiji 积极) and “reactive” (xiaoji 消极).256
This could refer to the distinction between propaganda and censorship measures and other
249
Works written in European languages other than English were usually translated on the basis of an English or Japanese translation.
250 The journal was launched in Shanghai in October 1934 and connected to the manager of the
Shenbao, Zhang Zhuping 张竹平. Cf. Duan Bo 段勃, “Baoxue jikan: Minguo shiqi yi fen
zhongyao de xinwenxue xueshu kanwu” 《报学季刊》:民国时期一份重要的新闻学学术刊 物 [Journalism quarterly: An important academic publication on journalism from the Republican period], Chuanmei guancha 传媒观察 [Media observation], no, 11 (2010).
251 Wu Tianfang, “Zhongguo dangqian zuiyao de guoji xuanchuan wenti,” 4.
252 Hao Gong 浩公, “Xuanchuan” 宣传 [Propaganda], Shehuixue zazhi 社会学杂志 [Journal of
sociology] 4, no. 3-5 (1931): 199-120.
253 See for example Wang Yizhi, “Ouzhan zhong zhi guoji xuanchuan zhan,” 64-77. 254 Ibid., 65.
255 E.g. “Shijie geguo boyin xuanchuan zhenxian zhi xianzhuang” 世界各国播音宣传阵线之现状
[The current situation on the broadcasting front in various countries of the world], Guangbo
zhoubao 广播周报 [Broadcasting weekly] 104, no. 1 (1936): 58-60. The article included
examples and illustrations from the U.S., Great Britain, Italy, and Germany, including images of King Edward VII, Hitler, and Mussolini while giving speeches or broadcasting to the public.
256 E.g. Liu Naifu 柳乃夫, “Xunsu kuoda guoji xuanchuan” 迅速扩大国际宣传 [Quickly expand
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restrictive means.257 However, reactive could also mean to be forced to have to react to accusations made by the enemy rather than being able to determine oneself what was discussed by the international community.258
The debate in Europe and the U.S. (and presumably Japan as well) had the outcome that propaganda came to be viewed as a form of “magical weapon” in China as well. International propaganda was described as “a powerful weapon” (liqi 利器)259 that helped the citizens of a country to prosper and progress and that thus constituted “the most indispensable instrument in the competition over national existence” (minzu shengcun jingzheng zui bu ke queshao de gongju 民
族生存竞争最不可缺少的工具).260
One argument made frequently was that
China, which had just awoken, was not yet ready to fight a military or an economic battle and therefore needed to try even harder to excel in the propaganda war.261 This is reminiscent of the argument that Edward Carr made about the Soviet Union later and was also invoked by Chinese authors when speaking in more general terms of the “oppressed peoples” (bei yapo minzu 被
压迫民族).262
Another article argued that the 20th century was a “century of open public opinion” (yulun gongkai zhi shiji 舆论公开之世纪). All who could make their voice heard had an advantage, regardless of their military strength.263
One argument often used by students and intellectuals to stress the urgency of better international propaganda was the fact that even in this “soft” area, China was significantly behind Japan, with disastrous consequences. Thus, Japan served
257 E.g. in “Zhanshi duiwai xuanchuan dagang,” 28-30.
258 E.g. in Xiao Zisheng 萧子升, “Guanyu Hu’an jiying de liang dian: Duiwai xuanchuan, duinei
xuanchuan”关于沪案及应的两点:对外宣传，对内宣传 [Two points about the Shanghai Massacre: International propaganda, domestic propaganda], Mengjin 猛进 [Fierce advance], no. 15 (1925): 6.
259 Long Sheng, “Guoji xuanchuan yu Shanghai guoji dianxunshe,” 1. 260
Ibid., 3.
261 E.g. Sun Yizhi 孙义植 and Zhong Xuanmin 钟选民, “Shijieyu zai guoji xuanchuan shang zhi
xiaoli” 世 界 语 在 国 际 宣 传 上 之 效 力 [The effectiveness of Esperanto in international propaganda], Xuesheng zazhi 学生杂志 [Literally: Student journal; parallel Esperanto title:
L’Esperanta Studento] 15, no. 11 (1928): 127.
262 Zhou Anguo 周安国, “Bei Yapo minzu yu xuanchuanzhan” 被压迫民族与宣传战 [The
oppressed peoples and the propaganda war], Huangpu yuekan 黄埔月刊 [Hwang Poo monthly] (No year): 41. Dacheng data claims this article is from 1924; however, this year is evidently false as the article quotes Lasswell’s Propaganda Technique in the World War (1927). The article could be from Minguo 民国 24, i.e. 1935.
263 He Xie 何爕, “Xin Zhongguo yu guoji xuanchuan” 新 中国与国际宣传 [New China and
international propaganda], Dongfang zazhi 东方杂志 [Eastern miscellany] 25, no. 24 (1928): 33.
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both as primary competitor and as primary reference model. Starting in the mid- 1920s, Japan’s international propaganda was frequently portrayed as being ahead of China in all possible ways – their news releases were faster, their equipment was more modern, and their methods were more innovative.264 Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs had established a Department of Information (Jōhōbu 情報部) by 1921 to adapt to the new post-war diplomatic environment in which propaganda would play a more and more important role.265 Its main responsibility was news-related propaganda, including supervising “independent” Japanese media and liaising with foreign media organizations.266 With the creation of the Department, Japanese news propaganda was expanded from countering anti- Japanese protests in the U.S. and China (reactive) to a more proactive program.267 In 1923, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs added the Department of Cultural Affairs for China.268 In 1924, Japan set up the supra-ministerial Research Committee for International Information Telecommunication, which was primarily created to research wireless news transmission.269
Calls for better international propaganda usually came in the wake of conflicts with foreign powers in China, although aside from these relatively immediate concerns, the idea of being perceived by foreigners as uncivilized also continued to be a motivation.270 In fact, as the section on the propagation of Chinese history has shown, lack of recognition as a worthy civilization and lack of political support were linked in the heads of some Chinese participants in the debate. The first widespread calls for better international propaganda driven by a sense of crisis came together with the May Thirtieth Movement of 1925. The event that led to the movement is known in China as the May Thirtieth Massacre
264 E.g. Long Sheng, “Guoji xuanchuan yu Shanghai guoji dianxunshe”; Xiao Gan 萧乾, “"Mo
guai waiguo baozhi: Women tai zhuoyu guoji xuanchuan 莫怪外国报纸：我们太拙于国际宣 传 [Don’t blame foreign papers: We are too clumsy in international propaganda], Nahan 呐喊 [The cry], no 2 (1937):27-28; “Ri kuoda guoji xuanchuan” 日扩大国际宣传 [Japan expands international propaganda], Guoji huikan 国际汇刊 [International general publication] 2, no 10 (1936): 48.
265 Akami, “The Emergence of International Public Opinion,” 111-113. 266
Ibid., 114.
267 Ibid.
268 The Department was renamed Department of Cultural Affairs in 1927 after it was put in charge
of cultural affairs in countries other than China as well. Ibid.
269 Ibid., 115-116. This committee, according to Akami, was the first attempt to coordinate news
propaganda, although itprobably only survived until 1925.
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(Wu Sa Can’an 五卅惨案). On May 30, 1925, Shanghai students had gathered to protest the shooting of a Chinese worker in a Japanese-owned cotton mill. In the course of the demonstration, British police opened fire on the protestors, killing thirteen students on Nanjing Road in the International Settlement.271
The incident led both to a discussion of the usefulness of international propaganda272 and to some short-lived non-governmental attempts at international propaganda, such as the Shanghai Student Union publishing nine issues of a journal named the English Weekly (Yingwen zhoubao 英文周报) in 1925.273 One paper called for people to mobilize their Chinese friends studying or working abroad and sending them copies of newspaper articles so that they had enough information to spread.274 According to their own account, members of China’s Esperanto movement also sent letters to Esperanto societies around the globe that were then translated into local languages to publicize the events in China.275 Over the course of the next few years, the GMD added a number of foreign propaganda channels. The GMD launched its “Chinese News Service” that issued English language publications in Canton.276 The official party paper Central Daily (Zhongyang ribao 中央日报) published in Hankou 汉口 in 1927 also had an English language edition, which relied on translations from the Chinese version and was edited, among others, by Lin Yutang 林语堂.277
The next incident that spurred widespread calls for better international propaganda was the Jinan Incident, known as the May Third Massacre (Wu San
Can’an 五三惨案) in Chinese, when GMD and Japanese troops clashed in 1927
in Shandong. Japanese troops ultimately purged GMD troops from the area, killing many of the soldiers. Although not all foreign papers took a decidedly anti-
271 Cf. David Strand, Rickshaw Beijing: City People and Politics in the 1920s (Berkeley and Los
Angeles: University of California Press, 1993), 182.
272
E.g. Zhou Lunchao 周伦超, “Ruhe yong xuanchuan gongfu” 如何用宣传功夫 [How to use the art of propaganda], Jingbao fukan 京报副刊 [Peking press supplement], nos. 195-224 (1925): 91.
273 Cf. Fang Hanqi, Zhongguo xinwen chuanbo shi, 208.
274 Sun Jingzhang 孙景章, “Yi ge yongli shao er shouxiao da de guowai xuanchuan fangfa” 一个
用力少而收效大的国外宣传方法 [A rarely used but very effective method to do propaganda abroad], Jingbao fukan 京报副刊 [Peking press supplement], nos. 195-224 (1925): 14.
275
Cf. Sun Yizhi and Zhong Xuanmin, “Shijieyu zai guoji xuanchuan shang zhi xiaoli,” 127.
276 The earliest publication I could find was from 1927. Chinese News Service, Special Issue
Regarding Hankow Incident (Canton: Chinese News Service, 1927).
277 Cf. Ding Ganlin 丁淦林, Zhongguo xinwen tushi 中国新闻图史 [Illustrated history of the
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Chinese stance, the Jinan Incident was considered a clear propaganda defeat.278 The number of articles calling for international propaganda was larger than in 1925,279 and the topic was treated like a well-established problem.280 One author commented after the incident that China was already well aware of the need to conduct international propaganda, but had difficulties putting this realization into practice.281
Another author suggested that the GMD should establish English language papers under direct control of the Central Propaganda Department. In addition, China should run papers and periodicals in the “world’s important capitals,” whose dual responsibility would be to “introduce Chinese culture and transmit Chinese news.”282
The GMD should also establish a proper news agency that would release news in both English and Chinese and subsidize private initiatives in return for pro-GMD propaganda.283 China also needed a decent newspaper that employed well-educated journalists. In order to ensure that there was enough personnel, Chinese universities had to add journalism departments.284 While the author argued that Chinese officials and politicians needed to learn to respect journalists, he also encouraged censorship of any items that were untrue or smeared China. Foreign journalists who were ill-intentioned (xin huai eyi 心怀恶 意 ) and permanently wrote against China should be deported.285
Individual journalists that were known to report favorably should be contacted. By
278 Cf. Wei, To Win the West, 63-77.
279 E.g. Huang Yankai 黄延凯, “Jinhou bendang zhengfu dui guoji xuanchuan gai zenyang” 今后
本党政府对国际宣传应该怎样 [What should this Party’s government do about international propaganda in the future], Guanche 贯彻 [Implementation], no. 7-8 (1928):18-22.
280 E.g. in Long Sheng, “Guoji xuanchuan yu Shanghai guoji dianxunshe,” 1. 281 Ibid.
282 Huang Yankai, “Jinhou bendang zhengfu dui guoji xuanchuan gai zenyang,” 21. 283 Cf. ibid., 21-22.
284 In fact, a number of Chinese universities had begun setting up journalism departments starting
in the early 1920s. The first Chinese university to set up a news department was Shanghai’s St. John’s University, which created such a department in 1920 and hired American D.D. Patterson to serve as its head. In 1924, the American M.E. Votaw became head of the department. Overall, the department had about 40 to 50 students. Classes were conducted in English. In 1921, Xiamen University also established a News/Journalism Department. In the first year, there was only one student, with the number increasing to six in 1922. In 1923, Beijing Pingmin University also established a News/Journalism Department, headed by Xu Baohuang and with the head of the Jiangbao as one of the professors. The curriculum did not only include classes, but also an internship at a newspaper. Beijing Yanjing University (1924), Beijing Minguo University (1924), Beijing Guoji University (1924), Shanghai Southern University (1925),284 Shanghai Hujiang University (1926), Shanghai Guanghua University (1926), Shanghai Dasha University (1926), and Fudan University (1929),284 followed suit. Cf. Fang Hanqi, Zhongguo xinwen chuanbo shi, 214-215.
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establishing contacts with well-established Western news agencies, China could ensure that pro-China messages were transmitted to Western papers in their home countries.286
In 1928, the GMD set up the Central Broadcast Station (Zhongyang
guangbo diantai 中央广播电台 ), which broadcasted news provided by the
Central News Agency, but did not have a very strong signal.287 In the same year, the GMD established an International Division (Guojike 国 际 科 ) within its Central Propaganda Department. This was both the result of the Jinan Incident and of the GMD’s desire to strengthen its own position after having established itself in Nanjing.288 As the division lacked organization and its work was directed by the same people that were also in charge of domestic propaganda, however, it was not very successful. Many texts were translated directly from Chinese, focused on Party doctrines and praised the GMD. In sum, these propagandists paid no attention to the question how to appeal to foreign target audiences and how to reduce the “propaganda flavor” of their publications.289
Thus, the GMD faced a similar dilemma in the 1930s as the CPC would face later starting in the post-Mao period, namely trying to conduct propaganda targeted at Western audiences through structures set up with the help of the Soviet Union, based on the Soviet model and intended primarily for domestic propaganda.
Just like in 1925, the episode also triggered a number of popular initiatives. In July 1928, the Shanghai International News Agency (Shanghai guoji tongxunshe 上海 国际通 讯 社 ) was founded.290 Also in reaction to China’s treatment by Japan in 1928 and the international take on the events, returned overseas exchange students launched the China Critic (Zhongguo pinglun
zhoubao 中国评论周报), dubbed “the only Chinese owned and edited English
weekly,” in Shanghai in May 1928.291
286 Cf. ibid., 22.
287 Cf. Gan Xianfeng, Zhongguo duiwai xinwen chuanbo shi, 45. 288 Cf. Wei, To Win the West, 81, 85.
289
Cf. ibid., 85-88.
290 Long Sheng, “Guoji xuanchuan yu Shanghai guoji tongxunshe,” 1.
291 Cf. William Sima, “Re-introducing The China Critic” ChinaHeritage Quarterly, nos. 30-31
(September 2012),
http://www.chinaheritagequarterly.org/features.php?searchterm=030_editorial2.inc&issue=030, accessed February 18, 2013. Lin Yutang had his own column called “The Little Critic,” launched in 1930.
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Ill. 2.I: “A comparison
of international
propaganda.” 292
A cartoon from 1931 after Japan had invaded Manchuria shows the imbalance between Japanese and Chinese international propaganda as it was seen in China at the time. On the left side of the stage, the cartoon shows a Japanese man with a sword hidden behind his back, though the attempt to conceal it is not very pronounced. He holds a black megaphone to amplify his “black propaganda” message. The Japanese is small, has “traditional” Japanese hairstyle, a shirt resembling a kimono, no pants, and Japanese sandals. On the right side of the stage is a Chinese, who is notably taller than his Japanese counterpart and resembles Sun Yat-sen in terms of his hairstyle, moustache, and clothing and is clearly a “modern” man. He is holding his white megaphone in the wrong direction, so that the message is diminished rather than amplified. His other hand is clearly visible. Both the Japanese and the Chinese are performing in front of a Western audience (as shown by their clothes and especially their top-hats) of five people who are facing the Japanese propagandist and listening to him.
In 1931, with the occupation of Manchuria and the impending hearing before the League of Nations, concerns about international propaganda again surged. The League of Nations dispatched the Lytton Commission in spring