Weak institutions 151

Besides lacking sovereign authority the state was also undermined by its weak institutions, especially the government and the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF). This made it very difficult for the government to reach a consensus on policy issues. It also

152 meant that, even it if the government had managed to agree on a foreign policy direction, it was unable to implement it due to its weak institutions. The weak institutions reflect divisions between the March 8 and the March 14 Alliances. During the war, the March 14 alliance held the majority in the Siniora-led government after winning 72 out of 128 seats in the 2005 general elections. The 24-member cabinet that was formed included 15 members of the March 14 Alliance, six members of the March 8 Alliance and three independents. March 8 members of government included the President, Emile Lahoud, the Foreign Minister, Fawzi Salloukh, and the Speaker of Parliament, Nabih Berri and two Hizballah MPs, Muhammad Fneish and Trad Hamadeh. March 14 Members of the government included the Prime Minister, Fouad Siniora, Minister of State Michel Pharaon and the Minister of Industry, Pierre Gemayel. This fracturing led Salloukh to argue that during the war ‘there was nothing called the state, there were different factions of the state and each faction had its own interest’ (Salloukh, 2009a).

The fragmented government was visible during the war because it was divided over its foreign policy direction and objectives. Even though March 14 held the majority, the government still had to balance between March 8 and March 14 members of the government as well as Hizballah before any decisions could be taken. The March 14 dominated government had to be careful not to alienate other groups when making decisions because of fears it would lead to civil unrest and the collapse of the government, as seen during the civil war. The Opposition’s ability to cripple the government was seen in the aftermath of the 2006 war, when March 8 members of the cabinet paralysed the government by resigning in protest over its policies. Therefore, even though March 14 held the majority in the Siniora government the Opposition were still able to obstruct events. It could do this by: refusing to cooperate and not turning up to Ministerial meetings; mobilising its supporters to stage mass demonstrations, as seen in the downtown sit-in protests from December 2006 to May 2008; or by creating civil unrest as seen in the troubles in May 2008.

The presence of members of Hizballah in the government also affected the way Israeli responded to the kidnapping. At the start of the war Israel blamed the Lebanese government for the kidnapping on the grounds there were two Hizballah MPs in the

153 Lebanese cabinet when the kidnapping took place and because the Lebanese government had failed to disarm Hizballah in the run up to the war as detailed in UNSCR 1559 (Daily Star, 2006). On 12 July, Ehud Olmert described the kidnapping as ‘an act of war’ and argued, ‘we were attacked by a sovereign country. […] the Lebanese government, which Hizballah is part of, is trying to upset regional stability’ (Olmert, 2006). However, Israel soon changed its position and on 16 July, the Israeli cabinet released an official report stating that, despite having engaged in military operations in Lebanon, its war was with Hizballah and not the Lebanese government. It said, ‘Israel is not fighting Lebanon but the terrorist element there, led by Nasrallah and his cohorts, who have made Lebanon a hostage and created Syrian and Iranian sponsored terrorist enclaves of murder’ (Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006f). Daniel Ayalon, Israeli Ambassador to the US, argued at the start of the war that the Lebanese government needed to exercise its sovereign authority over Hizballah if it wanted to be considered a viable entity. He argued ‘if they do not control Hizballah, we will have to do the work. […] if they do not keep peace and quiet on our northern border, they cannot have impunity’ (Online News Hour, 2006).

Divisions between members of the March 8 and March 14 alliances are seen in other state institutions, including the LAF. This was apparent during the war when the military was not deployed to protect Lebanon from Israeli attacks and the country was defended by a Hizballah-led alliance. This shows the government’s inability to use state tools to defend against a sovereign attack on its territory. It meant that the government had to resort to diplomatic rather than military means to defend its country and to rely on external allies to help it end the conflict. During the war, the LAF was not deployed for several reasons. First, there was a fear in the government that mobilising it would have given Israel a justification to indiscriminately bomb all of Lebanon and it would have escalated the war from one between a state and a sub- state actor into a war between two states. Secondly, it is possible that March 14 members of the government did not want to deploy the LAF against Israel because they wanted to give Israel time to defeat Hizballah so that it would be removed from the Lebanese political scene, bolstering their domestic position.

154 different sectarian loyalties. There is a strong fear that it would break up along confessional lines if it was deployed in a conflict situation, which would most likely lead to civil war. Data about the sectarian breakdown of the LAF is highly sensitive and there are no reliable official figures. However, in a Wikileaks cable dated 1 April 2010, Elias Murr, the Minister of Defence, revealed that the Shi’a made up 58% of the army in 2006. He also revealed that this had changed and that by April 2010 the army was made up from 25% Christian, 25% Shi’a and 50% from Sunni’s and Druze. He argued that this showed that in 2010 the Shi’a no longer posed a threat to the stability of the LAF (The Mideastwire Blog, 2010). This shows that during the 2006 war the Shi’a made up the greatest proportion of the LAF. There was therefore a high chance that they would have refused to engage in activity that undermined Hizballah’s interests and in doing so would have incapacitated the LAF and split it along sectarian lines. In this case, internal divisions within the state’s apparatus restricted the government’s decision-making capacity and the decision over whether or not to deploy the army was based on sectarian factors and not the needs of the Lebanese state.

Fourthly, the Lebanese army lacked the military equipment and resources to fight an Israeli army equipped with all the latest military technology. This was confirmed by Elias Murr during a meeting of the Council of Ministers on 12 July 2006, when he asked the government for $36 million to ensure the army had enough ammunition for five days, because at the time they only had enough for one day (Pakradouni: 413). Michel Suleiman the Head of the Army also criticised the army’s limited resources during a Council of Ministers meeting on 18 July when he said that it has been reduced to ‘a simple organism of help and aid’ (Pakradouni: 421). Noe argues that if the Lebanese army had been properly equipped after Syria’s withdrawal in 2005 and if Hizballah’s ‘four bleeding wounds’ had been removed the 2006 war would not have happened, because there would have been no occupied land or prisoners to swap and therefore there would have been no support in Lebanon for Hizballah’s kidnapping (Noe, 2008: 5). Hizballah’s four bleeding wounds are: (i) Israel’s refusal to hand over maps of Israeli-planted landmines in south Lebanon; (ii) Israel’s refusal to return all Lebanese prisoners; (iii) Israel’s illegal flyovers of Lebanon; (iv) and Israel’s refusal to return all Lebanese occupied territory, most notably Shebaa Farms (Noe, 2008: 4).

155 However, the government did discuss the potential role of the army during the war. At the start of the fighting Michel Suleiman explained that the army would pursue two objectives during the conflict: it would fight back against a potential Israeli landing on Lebanon’s beaches and it would provide humanitarian assistance to any potential refugees (Pakradouni: 412-413). On the 14 July, President Lahoud met military units deployed in the field and displaced refugees and civilians and told them ‘don’t let the resistance fight alone’ showing his support for the March 8 alliance (Pakradouni: 419). Despite these appeals, the army never engaged in military activity, even though between thirty five and fifty soldiers were killed in Tyre and near the Ministry of Defence Building outside Beirut in Israeli attacks during the war (Hanna, 2010; UNSC, 2006b).

The decision over whether or not to deploy the Lebanese army in south Lebanon also revealed divisions within the Lebanese government. This was visible at a Council of Ministers meeting on 13 July, when Siniora issued a statement recommending that Hizballah should be disarmed and that the Lebanese army should be sent to south Lebanon. As described by Pakradouni, during the meeting, Muhammad Fneish and Emile Lahoud attacked the statement while Siniora and Marwan Hamade, backed by the Ministers Nayla Moawad, Ahmad Fatfat, Jhazi Aridi and Michelle Pharaon, defended it (Pakradouni: 415-416). Pakradouni explains that members of March 14 wanted the army to go to south Lebanon to reassert the Lebanese state’s sovereign authority over the area. Referring to Hizballah, Siniora argued that by doing this they would be able to stop different internal factions making and endorsing independent decisions over the country’s political direction. He was backed by Marwan Hamade who argued that the government needed to clarify, both within Lebanon and to external actors that it upholds the Lebanese Constitution, which ‘places the power of decision-making in the hands of the Council of Ministers and nowhere else’. He told Hizballah MP Muhammad Fneish that no internal Lebanese actors had the right to take Lebanon on a ‘path towards destruction’ and that Hizballah’s actions were justified (Pakradouni: 415-416).

156 believing it could lead to internal conflict. This is because it would threaten Hizballah’s position by limiting its authority in the area and raise fears that the army might try to disarm it. Lahoud said that the government should not deploy the army and risk internal conflict simply to please Israel29. He argued that Siniora’s statement was an attempt by March 14 to push March 8 into making concessions they were unable to get them to make before the war. Fneish also argued that deploying the army failed to solve anything and simply created a bigger problem. Due to these disagreements the text of Siniora’s statement was altered to include two important points. That any mention of the Blue Line and the international resolution would not oppose the Resistance’s right to recover occupied Lebanese territory; and that any decision to deploy the army in south Lebanon would not necessarily mean that it would be deployed up to the Israeli border (Pakradouni: 415-417).

Later in the war, the government made the decision to send the army to south Lebanon. Despite initial objections from members of the March 8 alliance, Nasrallah agreed to its deployment. On 9 August he argued that it would enhance state sovereignty and minimise the impact of non-Lebanese forces sent to the area that could be pursuing a hidden agenda (referring to UNIFIL). He argued that the decision to deploy the army would improve Lebanon’s position when negotiating for amendments to the draft UN resolution by showing that the government was at least trying to exert control over all its territory (Al Manar TV, 2006c). It is also possible that Nasrallah agreed to this because the Resistance had been weakened by Israel’s attacks and he wanted to end the war as soon as possible. He may have been concerned about losing support and legitimacy amongst the Lebanese if he was seen to be obstructing attempts to end the war and government efforts to exert its sovereign authority over Lebanese territory. When the army was deployed in south Lebanon after the war and in accordance with UNSCR 1701 the Lebanese state began ‘flying its flag’ for the first time after a long period over all Lebanese territory (Fattouh and Kolb, 2006: 96). Deploying the Lebanese army in south Lebanon showed Israel and the international community that the Lebanese state, at least theoretically, controlled

157 its territory.