What Constitutes Commensurability?

Marx uses analogies (e.g. a weight analogy and a geometrical analogy) in order to explain what constitutes commensurability between products in respect o f a common dimension:

A sugar-loaf possesses weight, but we can neither take a look at this weight nor touch it. In order to express the sugar-loaf as a weight, we put it into a relation o f weight with the iron. In this relation, the iron counts as a body representing nothing but weight. Quantities o f iron therefore serve to measure the weight o f the sugar, and represent, in relation to the sugar-loaf, weight in its pure form, the form o f manifestation o f weight (ibid., pp. 148-9). If both objects lacked weight, they could not enter into this relation. ‘When we throw both o f them into the scale, and therefore that, taken in the appropriate proportions, they have the same weight (ibid.).

If we speak o f the distance as a relation between two things, we presuppose something “intrinsic”, some “property” o f the things themselves, which enables them to be distant from each other (Marx, 1972, p. 143). We suppose both o f them to be contained in space, to be points o f space. Thus we equalise them as being both existences o f space, and only after having them equalised sub specie

spatii we distinguish them as different points o f space. To belong to space is their unity (ibid.). When we speak o f the distance between A and B, we presuppose that they are points (or lines) in space. Having been reduced to points, and points o f the same line, their distance may be expressed in inches, or feet, etc. The element the two commodities A and B have in common is, at first sight, their exchangeability. They are “exchangeable” objects. As “exchangeable” objects they are magnitudes o f the same denomination. But this “their” existence as “exchangeable” objects must be different from their existence as values in use (ibid., p. 161).

M arx’s arguments refer to commensurability in respect o f a common dimension. Two different things (i.e. sugar and iron, point A and B) are commensurable and ‘exchangeable’ in terms o f a common dimension o f homogeneous property (i.e. length, weight). Marx considers that the common element o f commodities, which ‘cannot be a geometrical, physical, chemical or other natural property o f commodities’ (Marx, 1976 [1867], p. 127), but can be abstracted from their natural properties when they are exchanged, is labouring activity. Whilst many heterodox economists accept this argument, many have failed to really unpack what this entails. Many have failed to ask (let alone answer) the question: what kind o f labouring activity? Fleetwood (2000) reminds us not only that commodities are different entities, but also that the labouring activities that produced them are different activities: gunsmithing is a completely different activity from tailoring. Hence guns and coats are, by their natures, incommensurable entities in the sense that they are products o f individual, concrete and particular (henceforth ICP) labour. ICP labour cannot, therefore, be the common property and hence cannot render incommensurable entities commensurable. However, as well as being products o f ICP labour, they are also products o f social, abstract and universal (henceforth SAU) labour. They are produced by SAU labour in a sense that one undertaking o f ICP labour is socially related to many other such undertakings via the commodities produced. The individual concrete and particular nature o f the various undertakings is abstracted via the market, and hence that ICP labour doubles into a unity o f itself and universal labour.

Whilst ICP labour cannot render incommensurable entities commensurable, SAU labour can because it relates the labours o f individual producers by abstracting from the concrete particularity o f their labouring activities. SAU labour itself, however, has no material distinctiveness. It cannot manifest itself as empirically observable labour ‘embodied’ in a commodity because only hours o f ICP labour are observable, and hence measurable. SAU labour is reflected in the bodily shape o f a commodity. To summarise, therefore, what constitutes commensurability is SAU labour, which can be abstracted from ICP labour via the market. Commensurability between SAU labour products are transformed from incommensurability between ICP labour products through the following metaphysical process:

(1) As use-values, ICP labour products are both qualitatively and quantitatively different from one another. ICP labour cannot render incommensurable entities commensurable. There is no basis o f commensurability between use-values.

(2) As values, SAU labour products are qualitatively identical with one another. SAU labour makes incommensurable entities commensurable, and transforms them into commodities.

(3) As exchange-values, commodities are quantitatively equal with each other. A commodity reflects a certain socially necessary magnitude o f SAU labour, which makes commodities not only commensurable, but also commensurate.

As we have seen, the SAU labour is presupposed by exchanging products: when we exchange products, we presuppose the SAU labour on a metaphysical ground as a homogeneous property to constitute commensurability between heterogeneous products. The metaphysical presupposition follow s to the actual possibility o f exchange. Whilst it may have come as a surprise that M arx’s account o f money and the commensuration o f seemingly incommensurable entities, motivates us in the direction o f discourse, this is nevertheless the case. The following section takes M arx’s account, and augments it with contemporary Critical Realism realist thinking on discourse. In brief, commensuration is a process o f social practices in their

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articulation with other non-discursive moments.