4.3 What is Valid Knowledge and How do we Access it?
Generally there is a tendency not to reflect on the way we think (Haverland and Yanow, 2012). However, theories are based on underlying, though not necessarily explicit, epistemological and ontological assumptions (ibid.).
Assumptions and choices about ontology and epistemology have significant consequences for the conduct and outcomes of research (Blaikie, 2007). As Moses and Knutsen (2012, p.2) point out, ‘underneath any given research design and choice of methods lies a researcher’s (often implicit) understanding of the nature of the world and how it should be studied’. In light of this I discuss the epistemological and ontological approaches which underpin this research.
Ontology refers to the nature of social reality: is it a ‘given’ (objectivism) or is it created by the meaning human beings bestow through their interaction with it (constructivism)? Epistemology is concerned with theory of knowledge, that is, how can we gain knowledge of the social world and/or social reality? Is it through the application of the methods of the natural sciences (‘positivism’) or through seeking the subjective meaning of social action (‘interpretivism’)?
Linked to ontological and epistemological positions are the types of methodologies and methods used by researchers. Grix (2002) summaries it as follows: what is out there to know about (ontological position), what and how can we know it (epistemological position), how can we go about gaining this knowledge (methodology), and what particular tools and techniques can we use to acquire it (methods). Assumptions and choices about these need to be made clear for a number of reasons: so that the links with methodology and methods are understood; to help avoid confusion when discussing theoretical debates
about social issues; and to be able to understand the position of others as well as defend our own.
In this research I largely adopt an interpretivist approach in so far as I believe that knowledge is a social reality which is value-laden and comes to light through individual interpretation. As Snape and Spencer (2003, p.17) describe it ‘the researcher and the social world impact on each other; facts and values are not distinct and findings are inevitably influenced by the researcher's perspective and values, thus making it impossible to conduct objective, value free research, although the researcher can declare and be transparent about his or her assumptions’.
Epistemology is concerned with how we can study reality; some believe that we are part of that knowledge whilst others believe we are external to it. I see knowledge as essentially subjective, as something that is interpreted by individuals. Therefore, my methodological approach is an interpretivist one. In other words, I believe that we cannot understand why people do what they do, or why particular institutions exist and operate in particular ways, without knowing how those involved interpret and make sense of their world. As a result of this, I use a qualitative rather than quantitative methodology in this research. To describe the difference between these, at its simplest, quantitative researchers employ measurement and qualitative researchers do not (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). However, many quantitative and qualitative researchers differ with respect to their ontological and epistemological foundations.
Quantitative research entails a deductive approach whereby theories are tested.
It incorporates the practices and norms of the natural sciences, and positivism in particular, and embodies a view of social reality as external and objective. By contrast, qualitative research emphasises an inductive approach, with a focus on the generation of theories and the ways in which individuals interpret their social world, and sees social reality as created by individual’s perceptions (Neuman, 2005; Ritchie and Lewis, 2010; Seale, 1999; Silverman, 2000).
Qualitative research also tends to provide ‘thick’ description and to study particular rather than typical accounts (Green and Thorogood, 2013). In this
research I attempt to ‘study things in their natural settings, attempting to make sense of, or to interpret, phenomena in terms of meaning people bring to them’
(Denzin and Lincoln, 2011, p.3) through the use of a qualitative methodology.
I locate my theoretical position broadly within the critical tradition. Critical research approaches challenge taken-for-granted norms and aim to expose structures of power and domination, how these operate and in whose interests (Cannella and Lincoln, 2009). Such approaches explicitly assess social practices and institutional arrangements and often in terms of equity or social justice.
Another important feature of a critical perspective is that it is seen as providing a practical guide for transforming society. Critical research tends to view social science as playing an oppositional role in political terms by challenging
‘common sense’ views which can be distorted by ideologies which are socially generated in order to obscure injustice and its causes. Mills (1968) described common sense as norms and assumed knowledge, and encouraged people to not simply accept what was going on around them, but rather to question it and ask why things happen in the way they do. Common sense is usefully differentiated from what Bauman (1990) calls ‘responsible speech’, characterised by being corroborated by available evidence as opposed to
‘provisional, untested guess’ (p.8). Arguably, good social research is in essence about a way of challenging dominant ways of thinking, that is, challenging
‘common sense’ understandings. It is fundamentally concerned with moving beyond ourselves and outside of our own experience. The ongoing debate about the role of social science posits, on the one hand, that its purpose is to identify solutions to contemporary problems and, on the other, its purpose is to challenge dominant ways of thinking and, in effect, ‘destabilise’ existing power relations (ibid.). I situate myself within the parameters of the latter argument, with a concern that if research overly concentrates on seeking solutions, issues may become ‘de-politicised’, by focusing on more immediate term solutions or
‘quick fixes’ which address symptoms rather than on underlying causes.
Therefore, this research is interested in uncovering ideas about leadership practices and institutional arrangements within the community sector in
can be taken for granted and prevent people from seeing the causes and impact of inequalities.
As discussed in Chapter Two: Community Development, Collaboration and Leadership - What the Literature Tells Us, the leadership for collaboration literature, along with many new and post-industrial theories, tend to be directed at improving what Komives and Dugan (2010) describe as ‘the common good’ and are underpinned by a sense of social responsibility (p.114).
It is for this reason that I draw on these theories as they are congruent not only with the broad aims of community sector groups but also with my own interests and beliefs about the value of leadership. These theories also chime with my critical interpretivist perspective. As Komives and Dugan (ibid., p.112) argue
‘social constructivism, critical theory, postmodernism and feminist theory have all played important roles in shaping contemporary leadership theory and are characterised by the degree to which they give voice to historically marginalised populations, capture the complexities of social interactions, and address power dynamics’ (ibid., p.112). Similarly, leadership theories that focus on narratives and meaning making come from an interpretivist approach which does not view leadership as some objective phenomenon, behaviour or trait which can be measured but more as a social construct which has a ‘use value rather than a truth value’ (Kay, 1996). Such bodies of theory resonate with my interests, particularly those around the empowerment of traditionally excluded people and challenging the dominant voices.
To summarise, as a researcher, I identify with the critical interpretivist approach. I believe the kind of change required is radical and structural and therefore I focus in particular on recent approaches which take account of the complexity and subjectivity of the field and of a growing interest in a constructivist epistemology.