Connectivity
“People want their damn e-mail. Everybody has seen Star Trek. It’s like everybody’s a starship captain and they’re fighting the Klingons and they want to be able to pull a communicator out of their pocket like that—boom” (Evans Corp. researcher Albert Daoust quoted in Chase, 2000).
3
Introduction
The discussion that follows outlines the necessary conditions for the rise of North America as the innovative core of UC.55 The focus of this chapter is on a few key
moments, institutions, and technologies––including the competition for wireless data standards, patents, and portable computing devices––with the goal of setting the stage for the rise of RIM and the “BlackBerry solution.” Herein, I want to highlight the
contingency of RIM’s relative success in commercializing wireless data. This success reflects the convergence of established political economic interests (IBM, Motorola, Intel, Rogers, Ericsson, Apple), technological innovations (patents, standards), and myths
about the prospective economic and cultural importance of UC. In so doing, I will describe the technological antecedents of UC, including important political economic factors that allowed RIM and the BlackBerry to become prominent. Mapping these
55 The focus of this chapter is the North American market—the primary birthplace of IMDs, including the
smartphone and the tablet. Yet, the effective creation of this market is itself embedded in global ICT research, development, and supply chains. It is therefore important to first note that the pivot of global innovation in mobile technologies has shifted from Europe (using 2G GSM networks) to North America (under 3G). For the foreseeable future, American companies Apple and Google likely will continue to define the competitive dynamics of the IMD market, and thus the overall limitations (and potentials) of the era of ubiquitous connectivity.
antecedents will better contextualize why the BlackBerry was an essential component in the mass adoption of UC by both organizations and individual consumers.
Like other widely adopted communications technologies, the early development of UC was fraught by a tension between a search for industry-wide standardization and the quest to secure lucrative patents. This tension was reflected not only in the
development of network infrastructure, but also in the devices themselves. Perhaps not since the early battles over telephone and wireless telegraphy, has the competitive search for patents shaped the evolution of a technological system so directly (Wu, 2010; Duhigg & Lohr, 2012).
This chapter is composed of three themes: the commercialization of wireless data and standards; the role of patents and intellectual property in structuring innovation in the technical development of ubiquitous connectivity; and the development of
mobile/portable computing in the consumer marketplace.
3.1
Wireless Data Networks: ARDIS (DataTAC) and Mobitex
The development of a common standard for two-way wireless data transmission had been underway by incumbent telecommunications and hardware companies well before RIM began developing its devices in the late 1990s. In general, the development of these standards is often not only costly for a company but also very risky: by the time a satisfactory technical standard has been established the corporate entities developing it may not find partners within the supply chain to invest in the new technology particularly in the absence of an existing market demand. Although the technology was limited, by the early 1990s it was commonly accepted that wireless data networks (that is, wireless
networks using packet-switching technologies)56 would become commercially successful (Lindmark et al., 2004; Merrill, 1994; Meyers, 1998; Rogers, 2008). In 1993 analysts were projecting annual revenue from wireless data transmission services to reach $13 billion USD by 2000 (Shaffer, 1993). At the time, the parcel delivery service UPS was pushing to create a wireless data network to remotely track and coordinate the movement of packages and transports. Despite high-cost, the UPS network served as a vehicle for promoting the wider adoption of such networks (Blake, 1993). The Internet boom catalyzed further interest and investment in wireless data networks culminating in the marketing of 3G as the grand arrival of the truly mobile Internet (Edwards, 1998).
Arguably the earliest wireless data network, ARDIS (advanced radio data information service), emerged out of the cooperative effort of Motorola and IBM.
Developed in 1983 for use by IBM’s service division, ARDIS was a private mobile radio
56 RIM’s 1998 Annual Report positioned its own wireless device and services by differentiating between
circuit-switched and packet-switched networks. Specifically, circuit-switched networks do “not integrate well with the packet-based environments of office computing and the Internet” (RIM, 1998, p. 9). With an eye to highlighting the superiority of their own IP based products, the report offers this distinction between circuit and packet switched networks:
The Internet is an inexpensive communications backbone for two-way messaging because it eliminates the need for call centres and human operators to relay messages. It also eliminates airtime, long distance, and roaming charges usually associated with wireless voice
communications. The Internet also allows content such as stock quotes, weather, and news items to be selectively downloaded and efficiently delivered to a two-way messaging device. With packet technology, users are always connected and therefore receive real-time messages. By contrast, circuit-switched solutions are session-based rather than on-line, requiring users to call in to download messages on a periodic basis. Packet-switched, two-way messaging solutions have many other features which cannot be matched by voice-centric solutions which attempt to meet all wireless communication needs with a single device. Within the two-way packet switched segment of the wireless industry, no single dominant technology has yet emerged. Consumers therefore want access to devices that limit exposure to technological obsolescence by offering a wide choice of networks employing alternative technologies (emphasis added Rim, 1998, p.9).
(PMR) network for communicating with engineers and other field agents.57 Though one of the first wireless data networks developed, it was privately used until 1990 when Motorola made this standard public. The release of ARDIS for commercial development was paralleled by the introduction of Mobitex in North America by telecommunications carriers seeking to develop wireless data services, specifically, Rogers Cantel (in Canada) and Ram Mobile DATA (later Bell South/Cingular) (in the U.S.).58 Marketed under the brand name DataTAC, the ARDIS standard was adopted by carriers in ten countries by the end of the 1990s. Although technically developed and used before Mobitex for
organizational and labour management, ARDIS’ introduction as a commercially available wireless data network created competition between two main interests: device and
networking manufacturers on the one hand, and telecommunications carriers on the other. Like the competition for 2G standards in the United States (that delayed the overall development of the mobile voice market by creating wasted investment in a fractured national infrastructure), wireless data standardization was an essential step in the generation of more advanced functions and devices (Cringley, 1993).
The catalyst for the commercialization of ARDIS, Mobitex, was developed out of a partnership between Swedish Televerket (ST) and Ericsson as a potential global
standard for wireless data in the mid-1980s and was, in fact, the first public mobile data
57 Lindmark et al., explain the logistical and organizational importance of the ARDIS standard: “This
system had the purpose of facilitating computer-aided dispatching, parts ordering and tracking, as well as service contract entitlement checking for IBM field service engineers. In 1986, some 12,000 IBM engineers used it, a figure that rose to 25,000 in 1990, when it was expanded to cover about 400 cities. ARDIS became an effective tool for improving IBM’s service, in spite of limitations in the functionality of terminals and in roaming” (Lindmark et al., 2004, p. 300).
58 In the United States, ARDIS was bought by American Satellite Corporation in 1998, which later changed
communications system standard in the world (Linkdmark et al., 2004, p. 345).59 Initially, development of Mobitex was directed by ST—a Swedish government telecommunications agency later privatized in the 1990s and renamed TeliaSonera.
The creation of Mobitex as a public wireless data standard involved significant costs in resources and labour. Lindmark notes that, at the time it was launched in 1986, the development of Mobitex entailed a considerable effort, absorbing in the range of “200 man-years on the project” (Lindmark et al., 2004, p. 345). Despite the important technical innovations associated with Mobitex, the initial market interest in it was limited due to a lack of manufacturers for components of its infrastructure and software, the high upfront capital investments required by telecommunications carriers, the absence of a clear industry standard,60 and “low-computing competence,” meaning a relatively limited set of potential applications (Lindmark et al., 2004, p. 345). Developed specifically for commercial use (unlike ARDIS), by 1990 the Swedish Mobitex network was used internally and did not have any (external) paying customers.
59 It is important to note that the Swedish ICT industry was undergoing a prolonged period liberalization
with Ericsson aggressively moving into international markets. By 1995, the OECD ranked Sweden as the most liberalized telecommunications market (OECD, 1995). Swedish firms, Ericsson in particular, benefited from the widespread liberalization of telecommunications markets internationally (see Firth & Mellor, 1999).
60 A standard first involves the development of technical specifications for production and use, often
followed by the approval of an international standards organization (for example, the IEEE) or industry consortium (GSMA); second, the creation of a supply chain for components and infrastructure, and commercial adoption. Rapid and widespread adoption of a standard without formal approval by a
governing organization creates a “de facto” standard often tied to a specific corporate brand. In this respect, standards also can be tied closely to proprietary patents and intellectual property; a process that creates a rentier system for the commercialization of new technologies. The generally antagonistic relationship between these two processes—standardization and the patent system—have been particularly pronounced in the evolution of IMDs. As of this writing, patent suits among the major corporate interests—Google, Samsung, Apple—are set to frame the evolution of IMDs and related networks for the near future.
Despite differing somewhat in their technical composition, “Mobitex and DataTAC addressed roughly the same applications and market segments” (Lindmark et al., 2004, p. 301), yet both were initially undersubscribed. In an effort to generate commercial interest, Televerket and Ericsson partnered as Eritel to promote Mobitex internationally to telecommunications carriers seeking a competitive edge in a potentially lucrative new market: wireless data services. Eritel’s marketing campaign targeted the North American market specifically, and convinced a few large incumbents of the commercial viability of Mobitex. Indeed, Mike Lazaridis, founder of RIM, had attended one of the many promotional events for Mobitex held in North America and recognized the possibility of wireless data as a future core area of business for his company
(Lazaridis, 2008). Using the clout of its parent companies, ARDIS also was marketed heavily to carriers around the world (Edwards, 1992). Both ARDIS and Mobitex became fixtures of trade shows, conventions, and other gatherings of business interests seeking a technological edge over competition (Trowbridge, 1992; Loudermilk, 1993; Wilson & Mason, 1993).
ARDIS and Mobitex are important in the genesis of UC not only because they ultimately dominated wireless data market when wireless email became technologically sophisticated and commercially lucrative but, also, because they both actively promoted UC to carriers, investors, and business consumers at the same time––planting the seeds for the future development of UC devices and infrastructure. In part, this initial push was
positioned to build on the popularity of paging services—a business that many carriers and component manufacturers were familiar with.61
The rollout of both ARDIS and Mobitex, as well as the development of the Cellular Digital Packet Data (CDPD) consortium (Edwards, 1993),62 generated
considerable business media coverage.63 Much of this centered on the mobile workforce. An article from Network World (a trade magazine focusing on “enterprise network strategies”) framed the importance of ARDIS and Mobitex for corporations in terms of creating flexible workflows that will “set workers free” (Eckerson, 1992). Email was identified early on as a potential driver in the uptake of enterprise wireless data services, with Mobitex specifically identified as a vehicle for wireless email since it used Internet protocol (IP) for routing data (Louderback, 1992; Trowbridge, 1993). As one author for
61 Though important to the larger story of UC, paging services and devices are not directly addressed in this
dissertation. For a detailed discussion see Lindmark et al., (2004, pp. 303). The marketing and technical parameters of most paging services limited the range of communication and curtailed the ability to develop more sophisticated platforms for two-way, packet-switched wireless data systems. Unfortunately, there are too few detailed academic treatise of pagers and paging services despite their global popularity before the growth of SMS texting. Revenue for paging services in the US reached $2.2 billion USD in 1993
(Donaldson, 1993). As components shrank in size and increased in processing power, pagers were quickly displaced (McCall, 2001) though they are still used in some markets. Paging technology was important for creating efficiencies in spectrum usage and sharing, as well as in the areas of battery-life, energy efficiency, and portability (Freeman, 1992).
62 The CDPD was a consortium comprising wireless carriers—including Ameritech Cellular, Bell Atlantic
Corp., Contel Cellular, Inc., GTE MobilNet, Inc., Southwestern Bell Mobile Systems—that had developed their own technical standard for wireless data transmission using the existing cellular infrastructure. CDPD reflected a combination of incumbent U.S. telecommunications carriers attempting to control the genesis of wireless data, as well as the public and commercial perception of the value of wireless data; however, because the standard was built on existing cellular infrastructure, the capacity was relatively limited in contrast to ARDIS and Motorola. In 1993, Motorola claimed patent infringement against the CDPD standard which stunted the adoption of their standard (Messmer, 1993). Nevertheless, the CDPD was used by carriers well into the 1990s in part due to its relatively low implementation costs (Edwards, 1998).
63 There were several other minor wireless data standards being championed at this point, including CDI
developed by Cellular Data Inc.; Apple Computer and French carrier Mtel were promoting a wireless data service known as Bebop in France and “personal communication service” in the U.S.; in addition to ARDIS, Motorola was developing a wireless data service using 66 orbiting satellites named Iridium (Cringley, 1993).
PC Week put it: “Wireless E-mail is not simply a replacement for beepers. Rather, it forms a messaging layer that gives a new immediacy to remote information exchange” (Louderback, 1992).64
Convincing carriers to buy into a given standard (in this case either ARDIS or Mobitex) was only one barrier to the commercial adoption of wireless data networks and services. Portable devices were an essential area of research and development, and a substantial barrier to this adoption (Hengel, 1994; Sweeney, 1997).
64 Mulling over the infinite possibilities offered by wireless email, Louderback’s considerations seem
antiquated now:
Imagine an all-day seminar or press conference. Right next to the water pitcher and the bowl of horribly sour candies is your E-mail appliance. Without disturbing anyone, and without getting up, you can let co-workers know just how bored you are. Or, if you're a reporter, you can file a story even before the press conference is over.
Have you ever been on the floor of a stock exchange? It gets very loud out there. Now imagine outfitting brokers with untethered E-mail. How much would you pay to be on your broker's A-1 E- mail list?
Even more exciting than these examples is the potential of RAM's soon-to-be-published API. Simple E-mail is only the tip of the iceberg once application developers start using packet-based messaging. Imagine a personal program running on your office PC, connected to some type of messaging slot. While on the road, you can use your custom packet-based appliance to send commands -- a database query, for instance, or a schedule update -- to that digital assistant, and it can send responses back to you. Like Xe rox's Paper Works but without the fax machine. (Louderback, 1992)
Figure 1: Motorola Marco designed for use on the ARDIS wireless data network65 In 1992, a year after Mobitex was deployed by RAM Mobile Data and Rogers (still with limited consumer interest), Rob J. Fraser, an engineer and Mobitex evangelist, outlined both the network specifications and potential uses of the Mobitex standard. His piece in the trade magazine Communications included this passage under the heading “The Personal Communicator”:
To provide an illustration of a personal communicator application, most of which have yet to be imagined, let's assume that Mike wishes to book a meeting with Sue next Tuesday at 10:00 a.m. Mike pulls out his palm-top communicator from his jacket pocket and accesses Sue's appointment calendar, stored in her
communicator. He sees “busy” or “open” on a calendar graphic, and sends a
65 The ARDIS network spawned a few early handsets, including Marco, a personal communicator produced
by Motorola and IBM “for in-house use.” Launched in 1984, “Marco had been turned into a broader-use wireless data network by 1990. General Magic offered Envoy, but the system required a stylus and tablet to enter messages and the machine’s ability to recognize handwriting was poor” (McQueen, 2010, p. 75).
request for Sue's open slot on Tuesday at 10:00 a.m. Sue has just completed a review of her stock portfolio-stored on her broker's computer-and is currently transferring funds from her brokerage account to her savings account. She now sees Mike's request and decides to cancel the request and book Mike's open slot for Thursday. Mike confirms, and the meeting is set. Both have access to a vast array of public and personal information, including weather, airline reservations, office mail, and fax communications through the Mobitex fax gateway (text messaging only). (Fraser, 1991, p. 2)
Fraser’s comments anticipate the birth of the personal digital assistant (PDA), which was still being developed in the R&D departments of several companies including Apple, HP, and Dell. Initially conceived of as a relatively limited network for secure two- way paging and mobile data to be used by police and firefighters (McQueen, 2010, p. 60), improvements in the Mobitex network advanced by U.S. telecommunications giant BellSouth in 1998 provided better “coverage, longer battery lifetimes and faster radio access establishment, thus being more cost-effective and increasing the competitiveness with PMR and paging networks” (Lindmark et al., 2004, p. 349). The crucial contract for RIM’s forthcoming Mobitex pagers (worth $90 million USD) on the part of BellSouth enabled the commercial development of RIM’s BlackBerry because of BellSouth’s size and substantial market share (it would later become a central component of the
reconstituted AT&T) (RIM, 1998, p. 2).66
The competition to develop a wireless data standard primarily was shaped by two industry consortiums. On the one hand, the ARDIS standard, which was jointly