Code o f Safe Working Practice also recommends use o f full body harness instead o f safety belt (without belt spring) for working at a height o f 2 meters or more or for working over the side (MCA, 2006).

it differently, this also reiterates the importance of acknowledging the role of workers sharing their experiences and skills in contributing to the management of safety.

Summary

This chapter thus shows that the managers and seafarers in the two case studies were operating with fundamentally different understandings of their company’s SMSs. The managers assumed a great degree of stability in the seafarers’ work environment and believed that shipboard tasks could be carried out safely by following a set of fixed procedures. Their focus on implementing these procedures was also influenced by the ever- changing workforce at sea who did not enjoy the continuity of knowledge in the workplace. As a result of these, managers felt it necessary to take a top-down approach to managing OHS which paid emphasis on passing down instructions to the seafarers and ensuring that they complied with the company’s procedures. However, the analysis also revealed that the managers’ top-down approach to ensure compliance combined with the distance from the workplace resulted in bureaucratising the whole system. The purpose of following a bureaucratic system not only facilitated managerial control but also assisted in the commercial as well as regulatory modes of inspection.

On the other hand seafarers relied heavily on their experiences and skills in working safely in an active and dynamic environment on ships. They found the generic set of risk assessments too limiting and as a bureaucratic overlay. Moreover, the shipboard risk assessment which in theory provided an opportunity for seafarers to make use of their professional knowledge was in practice yet another form of bureaucratic exercise. The main reason why managers’ and seafarers’ perceptions were in conflict was because the level of seafarers’ participation that was required under the formal procedures left no room for the seafarers to bring in their professional skills and work experiences. Yet, seafarers due to various pressures of work complied with the bureaucratic requirements which had limited connection with the actual shipboard work practices. Moreover, the distance from the management offices made the seafarers feel alienated from the managers and more specifically from their ways of managing OHS.

As a consequence, in the two organisations there was limited participation from the seafarers in the management of OHS. In the review of the literature such lack of participation, however, was found as a major impediment to effective management of

workplace safety. Authors, such as Gallagher et al. (2003) and Walters and Frick (2000) have discussed how workers’ knowledge and expertise can offer practical help in finding hazards and in the ways to mitigate them, and can also bring in workplace democracy - all contributing to the effective management of OHS. The importance of workers’ participation was also discussed from the perspective of the perception of risk. The review of the literature in section 2.2.1 also pointed out how risk was perceived differently by different groups of people. There it argued why workers should be particularly involved in the assessment of risk (Somers, 1995; McLain, 1995).

However, in the maritime context it was noted that the ISM Code made no explicit reference to the role of seafarers in the practice of risk assessment instead it placed all its focus on managerial initiatives to safeguard risk (see discussion on section 2.1.1). From these findings too it can be seen that neither of the two SMSs promoted the involvement of seafarers in risk assessment nor was it practised in the two organisations.

Moreover, the discussion in this chapter also raises question on whether the implementation of the ISM Code contributed in providing support to captains on discharging his responsibilities with regard to safety and the protection of the marine environment. The analysis of the data showed that the captains did not believe that their colleagues in the management units offered adequate support for the purpose. However, as pointed out in section 1.3.2, one of the main objectives of the Code was to create a mechanism in managing OHS that provided captains with active support from their management units.

The discussion in this chapter pointed out a number of other concerns that influenced the practice of risk assessment in the two companies. These were:

• The im pedim ents to upw ard risk com m unication due to shipboard hierarchical arrangements

• seafarers’ fear o f crim in alisation as a result o f not fu lfillin g com p an y’s bureaucratic requirements

• com m ercial and regulatory in sp ectors’ indirect pressure on com pliance with com pany’s bureaucratic requirem ents

Chapter 6: Incident Reporting

Introduction

This chapter discusses the practice of incident (and near-miss occurrence) reporting in the two companies studied. Incident reporting, as described in the literature review (section: 2.3.2), is one of the main elements in SMSs. It requires workers to report to their managers on unintended OHS events, such as work related injuries. It provides an opportunity for managers to analyse the factors causing such events and use the analysis as a tool to improve the effectiveness of the existing policies, procedures and instructions in their companies. This element also helps managers quantify the number of these instances by, for example, comparing fatality figures over a period of time. Moreover, it also allows managers to fulfil their statutory obligation by reporting such incidents to their regulatory authorities, i.e. the flag states in the case of maritime industry.

This chapter is organised into three broad sections. First, it outlines the general requirements of incident reporting as laid out in the SMSs of the two companies. The second section focuses on the practice of incident reporting from the perspectives of managers by drawing on interview data and documentary analysis conducted at the two management offices. It points out the roles managers play in facilitating incident reporting and analysing the reports, and examines the influences affecting their practice. The third section uses documentary analysis, interviews, informal conversations and ethnographic observations on board four research voyages to analyse seafarers’ practice of incident reporting and point out the factors that influence their practice. The discussion is presented by synthesising the companies’ requirements and the views on the practices from the two perspectives.

6.1 Incident Reporting procedures in the two case studies

Both companies in their safety and environment policies stated that their principal objective was to provide a safe working environment. Preventing incidents, such as personal injuries and pollutions, was thus on top of their agenda. However, they also recognised that the need for setting up procedures so that they could respond to any such eventuality in a professional manner. Both companies laid down policies, procedures and instructions on how to report incidents, analyse them and learn from the analysis so as to prevent

recurrence. These instructions required captains to promptly report all such incidents to managers by using the telephone before sending in reports on incident reporting forms by facsimile or e-mail. On receiving these reports the superintendents and managers were required to take appropriate action and if required bring them to the notice of the company’s senior management team.

In both organisations the importance of preventing incidents was also considered the key to successful business. At several places in the SMSs it was pointed out that company’s success was heavily dependent on the fleet’s standard of safety and pollution prevention. They highlighted that safety or pollution-related incidents, or deficiencies reported by Port State Control or Oil Major Inspectors were all damaging to the company’s image and their business prospects. One of the two companies, for example, identified a set of Key Performance Indicators to self-evaluate the performance of each ship in its fleet and use the system to promote and market its business. Using around ten indicators, it produced a weighted score sheet in which incident frequency rates and Port State Control and Oil Major Inspection deficiency rates were given the maximum importance.

One of the two companies also took an additional initiative to reduce Loss Time Injuries (LTI) in the fleet by running a safety incentive scheme which kept count of the days since the previous LTI occurred on every ship in the fleet. It regularly promulgated this information to the entire fleet. The purpose of the exercise was to appreciate the seafarers’ safe working practice. As a token, the managers also rewarded the ships with gold, silver and platinum award certificates - depending on the degree of their achievements. These certificates were required to be displayed at prominent locations in the management office and also on public notice board of the ships which received these awards.

However, informal discussions with the senior officers of this company later revealed its limited success. During the interviews they pointed out that as the incident-free award was awarded to the ship and not to the individual seafarers they did not consider it as their achievements. Moreover, the seafarers also pointed out that on most occasions every time they returned from leave they were assigned duty on different ships in the fleet. As a result, they never developed ownership of these awards.