Ihis is typified for many critics by the lack of attention in OD to the problem of power. As early as 1969, Bennis was lamenting that OD
’Systematically avoids the problems of power, or the politics of change’ q
As a consequence, Bennis argued, the OD practitioner has no ’model to guide his practice under conditions of
distrust, violence and conflict. Essentially this means that in a pluralistic power situation, in
situations not easily controlled, Organisational Development may not reach its desired g o a l s ’^
32
Strauss , in 1976, reiterates this charge, quoting
Bennis' words, despite noting some increased attention to 58
this negle c t e d area. Lack of a t tention to p o w e r realities is seen as the result of an unrealistic c o m m i t m e n t to
values of openness and a u t h e n t i c i t y s t i g m a t i s e d b y Bennis
33 34
as ’l o v e / t r u t h 1 and b y Goodge as 'love/trust' values.
The consequence of this value-set is that the OD p r a c t i t i o n e r gives insufficient a t tention to the
p o l i t i c a l processes of b r i n g i n g about change, a point 35
argued b y F r i e d l a n d e r and B r o w n , and b y P e t t i g r e w in his attempt to r e m e d y this:
’One of the themes n o t i c e a b l y absent f r o m m u c h of the w r i t i n g on o r g anisational change is the
political context of the i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t ’s w o r k ) . 1
T h ese writers v i e w OD as essentially p o w e r l e s s to effect change.
The radical critics of OD w o u l d have d i f f i c u l t y in r e c o g n i s i n g the OD consultant as an ’u n d e r d o g ’ , w h e n their quarrel is with its insidious power to d e l i v e r
employee groups over to mana g e r i a l control. N e v e r t h e l e s s , it is possible to r e concile these two images in a
synthesis w h i c h views a decep t i o n prac t i s e d on o n e 1s s e l f as a deception p r a c t i s e d all the more e f f e c t i v e l y on
o t h e r s .
As M a n n h e i m puts it, in defining ’i d e o l o g y 1 (where he m eans ’deceptions w h i c h legitimise the status q u o ’ as opposed to ’w i s h f u l represen t a t i o n s w h i c h t h r e a t e n the status q u o ’):
'ruling groups can in their thinking become so intensively interest-bound to a situation that they are simply no longer able to see certain facts which would undermine their sense of domination. There is implicit in the word
'ideology' the insight that in certain situations the collective unconscious of certain groups
obscures the real condition of society both to itself and to others and thereby stabilizes it.'^y
OD can, therefore, be double-edged - the more so as its basic assumptions, or values, resonate with values deep
in Western liberal-democratic culture.
'Every period in history has contained ideas
transcending the existing order, but these did not function as Utopias; they were rather the appropriate ideologies of this stage of existence as long as they were 'organically' and harmoniously integrated into
the world-view characteristic of the period*, g
If we turn back to the content of OD consultants' ideas, away from the mechanism of idealisation, we can see how” the humanist ideals of O D , genuinely h e l d , may serve an
ideological function.
2»3«The Ideals of OD
39
Tranfield's original respondents described their ideal organisations along strikingly similar lines. They all saw the desirability of maximising human fulfillment, and the possibility ofachieving this within the framework of
(reformed) organisations. This belief, which has been
4
o
aptly named "organisational humanism" , is a core value in OD. People have a capacity for, a need, and a right to the full development of their abilities; work should
provide opportunities for the full use of their moral, intellectual, aesthetic, as well as of their material productive capacities.
This belief infuses a whole host of technologies and programmes in which social and behavioural science consultants and trainers work.
* 1Collabaration in Work Settings’ (CWS) is yet another approach to reshaping the working
environments of human beings. As such, CWS joins a list familiar to readers of this journal (Journal of Applied Behavioural Science), some of the more familiar entries being Organisation Development
(OD), Sociotechnical Systems (STS), Human Resource Development (HRD), and Quality of Working Life (QWL). While there are variations in these approaches,
they share two underlying premises; (l) work must meet the needs of individuals for material survival and the needs of organisations for material growth and productivity; and (2) work must meet the needs of human beings for learning, self-validation, and
personal growth in all activities in which they engage. Most oganisational theorists and
practitioners believe it possible to consummate a marriage of these two premises.
Commentators invariably relate this belief to the 1self-
L2
actualisation theory of Abraham Maslow
1Maslow’s 'heirarchy of needs' is the most widely taught view of motivation in North American ' business schools and provides the theoretical framework for much of organisation theory,
Thus, Maslow's theory has been a direct influence on
theorists like Chris Argyris, perhaps the most influential contemporary exponent of 'organisational humanism',and on other important mediators of this philosophy, such as McGregor and Li'kert.
In passing, one has to say that any adequate account of
'organisational humanism' would have to recognise other antecedents and progenitors than simply Maslow. A great many influences came together in the 'personal growth’ movement (as will be apparent when we set out the ideas and backgrounds of our subjects in due course). These contribute to a theory of the person, a theory of personal change, and, by extension, to a theory of organisational change. But not only are the influences diverse, there are certainly some that are contradictory, so that it is
44 a travesty to equate all with Maslow.
However, limiting our characterisation to the central
belief in the potential of man, and with the qualification that this belief is probably stronger within the American
4 5
tradition (of behavioural science), this still leaves us with the clash, some would say irreconcileable clash,
between humanism and utilitarianism in organisations.
The most succinct statement of this contradiction is to be found in a short article aptly e n t i t l e d C o l l a b o r a t i v e Worksettings: New Titles, Old Contradictions' by Morrow and
46
Thayer The contradiction is between a view of man as a consume'r of utilities and as a maximiser of his powers as a human being. Organisations, under capitalism, as
producers of goods and services, promote the idea of men (and women) as consumers. In turn, the latter's
satisfactions as consumers, translated through pricing and both stimulated and interpreted through promotion, and measured by the yardstick of profit, govern the conduct
of the firm. Workers, as producers, are d i s p e n s a b l e
a ccor d i n g to h o w the wants of consumers are t r a n s l a t e d into effective demand - ’dispensable* in the sense of b e i n g
'no longer required' if demand is absent, and in the w a y also labour is allocated to w here there is c u r r e n t l y
effective demand. C a p italist organisations thus d i s p o s e of work e r s as p r oducers in the most efficient (least-unit- cost) and r ational w a y poss i b l e in order to m a x i m i s e , in turn, their p ower as consumers to purch a s e "uti l i t i e s " f rom the payment of wages and salaries.
This theoretical justification of capitalist s o c i e t y and its organisations is the familiar u t i l i t a r i a n one. The
claim for the m a x i m i s a t i o n of powers, accor d i n g to M a c p h e r s o n pres e n t s "an almost opposite v i e w of m a n f rom that of the
47 Utilitarians":
'This claim is b ased on a v i e w of man's e s s ence not as a consumer of utilities but as a doer, a creator, an enjoyer of his h uman attributes. W h a t e v e r these u niq u e l y h u m a n attributes are taken to be, in this v i e w of m a n their exertion and development are s e e n as ends in themselves, a s atisfaction in them s e l v e s , not simply a means to consumer satisfactions. .. M a n is not a b u n d l e of appetites seeking s a t i s f a c t i o n s but
a b u n d l e of conscious energies seeking to b e exerted.
T his Tiumanist' belief, in 'self-actualisation' is p a r t of a long W e s t e r n humanist t radition going b a c k to Plato, Aristotle, and C h r i s t i a n n a t ural law, r e v i v e d in w e s t e r n l i b e r a l - d e m o c r a c y in the m o d e r n era b y J.S.Mill, and
finding expression, of course, in Marx. It is a core v a l u e in l i b e r a l -democratic society, of w h i c h M a s l o w is m e r e l y a recent interpreter.
There is thus a strong modern flavour about Mill turning to the idea of
• a network of co-partnerships in industry, or producers' cooperatives (which) might turn every worker into his own capitalist, and so enable the
system of enterprise to operate without the degradation of wage-labour'
Yet, just as organisational humanists may be supposed to have difficulty now in converting organisations from
utilitarian to humanistic values, so Mill, too, had difficulty rendering his democratic beliefs (in equality and in the
maximisation of human capacities) compatible with market values. The cooperative ideal, then as now runs, counter to the tide of capitalist development and cannot hope to turn "every worker into his own capitalist" without the economic system around it being changed by institutional force. Macpherson comments:
’The founding father of liberal-democratic theory, we are compelled to say, was able to rise above the market morality only because he did not understand the market society’__
50
The conflict between organisational rationality (efficiency) and humanism has been commented on by many. William G.
Scott puts the practical (as opposed to the philosophical) case for suspecting any reconcilement of the two, as
follows:
'Whether deservedly or not, humanism adapted to the management process has the taint of manipulation.
It is difficult to imagine management using techniques like organisation development, sensitivity training, or job enrichment out of pure 'milk of kindness' ... One reason for paying humanist-type change agents consulting fees (is) they create and apply behavioural
technologies that management thinks are valuable for raising the efficiency of human resources - humanist technologies and technologists serve materialistic ends.
'The difficulty of applying humanism in this manner is that personal satisfaction and organisational efficiency are compatible only at a most superficial level. The kinds of satisfaction sought for man by true humanists are non-materialistic. Hence, any
attempt to mold humanism to the goals of organisations (as we know them) either will pervert the humanistic values or erode organisational rationality. We
cannot have it both w a y s .'^
Reconciling the logic of efficiency and the values of humanism, it seems, may only come about through
creating new forms of the old contradiction. Those which do so relatively effectively, it may be surmised, do so selectively and to the extent that the theory or programme resonates with a particular combination of values that are currently socially in favour. At the time, a theory or programme may seem to have solved the problem and
involve no major contradiction, but only insofar as it is (in Mannheim's words) an mappropriate"ideology
''organically' and harmoniously integrated into the world-view characteristic of the period'
52
Although it is easily dismissed by anyone with any sophistication in social science, on empirical and
5 3
conceptual grounds, (and,indeed, for all we know it may be an object of scorn and healthy scepticism among those to whom it is taught), Maslow's theory can be analysed in terms of its 'resonance' with non-psychological theories and values. A more pertinent example in due course will
be analysed, namely how the actual theories of consultants in this study were of and for their time.
The appeal of Maslow's theory is how it apparently
combines the motivation theories of Taylorism and Mayo, and goes one better. It embodies the values of utilitar ianism, a materialistic philosophy and psychology, at its base, and the values of humanism in its middle and upper reaches. Moreover, it avoids the separation between the 'logic of efficiency' and the 'logic of sentiment', which was Mayo's 'solution' to the opposition between utilitar
ianism and non-materialistic values. Where Mayo lodged these values in different classes, Maslow implies one and the same person may, at different times, act upon either set of values.
As such, Maslow's theory is appealing to those who want a more inclusive theory of personal psychology and
organisational behaviour, and it doesr't overtly offend values of equality in an open, mobile society. But it goes further than this.
Maslow's 'hierarchy of needs' can be viewed as a
psychological theory based on the neo-classical economist's principle of 'diminishing marginal utility'. As one set of needs become satisfied another set of needs comes to the fore.
Initially, the practical and moral problem the marginal utility theorist had to solve was that of justifying inequality and poverty in terms of aggregate social utility
(the u t i l i t a r i a n ’s measure o f all things). It might a ppear aggregate social utility (not to m e n t i o n social justice) is not served by a system that tolerates great w e a l t h and tbs indulgence of luxurious tastes w h e n the b a s i c needs of the poor for shelter and food are unsatisfied. The trick is to argue that as a m a n b e c o m e s r i c h e r his w a nts change, and are not comparable over time; one m a n ’s wants cease therefore to be comparable also w i t h another man's, since their wants are m e r e l y m a n i f e s t a t i o n s of the p art i c u l a r state of development of their i n d ividual needs at a point in time: "In maxim i s i n g utility (suggests
Macpherson) all wants are e q u a l ” ... "int e r - t e m p o r a l comparisons of utility are ruled o u t 11^
In practical terms this serves to disa g g r e g a t e utilities: the rich do not profit at the expense of the poor, since there is no evident connection b e t w e e n spending on
luxuries and the availability of b a s i c s . Or as M a c p h e r s o n puts i t , the theory of marginal u t i l i t y
’had the additional effect of d i verting a t t e n t i o n f r o m the quest i o n of the d i s t r i b u t i o n of the social prod u c t b e t w e e n social c l a s s e s . ’_ e
55
The situation m e r e l y reflects ’what the m a j o r i t y of p e o p l e w a n t ’ expressed through the market and their c o n t r i b u t i o n s