City, University of London Institutional Repository
Citation
:
Susen, S. (2017). Hermeneutic Bourdieu. In: L. Adkins, C. Brosnan & S.
Threadgold (Eds.), Bourdieusian Prospects. (pp. 132-159). UK: Routledge. ISBN
9781138845084
This is the accepted version of the paper.
This version of the publication may differ from the final published
version.
Permanent repository link:
http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/16199/
Link to published version
:
Copyright and reuse:
City Research Online aims to make research
outputs of City, University of London available to a wider audience.
Copyright and Moral Rights remain with the author(s) and/or copyright
holders. URLs from City Research Online may be freely distributed and
linked to.
City Research Online:
http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/
[email protected]
Hermeneutic Bourdieu
Simon Susen
The main purpose of this chapter is to examine the extent to which Pierre Bourdieu may be described as a ‘hermeneutic sociologist’. As demonstrated in the following analysis, Bourdieu draws upon the intellectual tradition commonly known as ‘hermeneutics’.1 Here, ‘hermeneutics’ is conceived of as a
methodological approach concerned, above all, with the interpretive facets of human existence. As is widely acknowledged, the history of hermeneutics can be traced back to ancient Greek philosophy. During the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, it established itself as an influential field of biblical studies, before being broadened to include the textual exploration of classic cultures and ancient civilisations. With the arrival of German romanticism and idealism, hermeneutics entered a new period, in which it was converted into an increasingly philosophical endeavour. In this context, the narrow preoccupation with the reading of texts was gradually replaced by the wide-ranging engagement with the species-constitutive status of symbolic forms – especially with regard to communication, understanding and language. In the modern era, hermeneutics designates an essential reference point in the humanities and social sciences – primarily, in continental European and Anglo-Saxon currents of critical enquiry.
Given his in-depth engagement with the aforementioned disciplines and modes of sociological exploration, it should not come as a surprise that hermeneutics represents a constitutive component of Bourdieu’s undertaking. Yet, in the literature, one finds little in the way of a systematic discussion of the place that hermeneutics occupies in Bourdieu’s oeuvre.2 Indeed, the hermeneutic aspects of
Bourdieu’s writings are largely overlooked by both his supporters and his detractors. This analytical oversight makes it difficult, if not impossible, to do justice to the epistemic complexity of Bourdieu’s plea for a reflexive sociology.
As shall be argued in this chapter, Bourdieu may be regarded as a ‘hermeneutic’ – or, at least, ‘hermeneutics-inspired’ – thinker insofar as his work is marked by a profound interest in the nature of ‘interpretation’. Bourdieu’s sustained concern with the interpretive facets of social life has major implications for his conception of human existence.3 As a thorough examination of his writings reveals, Bourdieu
conceives of ‘interpretation’ as a socio-cognitive process that is crucial not only to procedures of sociological investigation, conducted by experts, but also, in a more fundamental sense, to quotidian practices, performed by ordinary agents. In order to illustrate this, the chapter sheds light on ten significant elements underlying the ‘hermeneutic Bourdieu’. As elucidated in this study, the hermeneutic spirit per- vading Bourdieu’s research programme is reflected in the fact that he stresses the (1) socio-relational, (2) practical, (3) unconscious, (4) situational, (5) doxic, (6) contingent, (7) meaning-laden, (8) experiential, (9) resourceful and (10) power- laden constitution of human existence. By way of conclusion, the chapter draws attention to some key questions arising from the critical analysis of these ‘hermeneutic’ elements, notably in terms of the pivotal role they play in both sociological enquiry and everyday life.
1. Socio-relational
Bourdieu studies human existence in terms of its socio-relational constitution. On this account, the human world can be conceived of as a universe of ‘social relations’ (1977[1972]). On the one hand, it is a product of ‘a process of continuous creation’ (ibid.: 189). As such, it is structured by the embodied practices performed by purposive entities. On the other hand, it contains ‘within itself the principle of its own continuation’ (ibid.: 189) and, thus, ‘frees agents from the endless work of creating or restoring social relations’ (ibid.: 189). As such, it structures the environment in which circumstantially constrained subjects undertake their actions, thereby shaping quotidian performances as well as those who carry them out. Bourdieu urges us to resist the theoreticist tendency to abstract human practices from the concrete contexts in which they take place.4
In order to overcome the scholastic pitfalls of idealism, formalism and transcenden- talism, it is essential to be aware of the detrimental consequences resulting from ‘the ignorance of the social conditions of production and circulation’ (Bourdieu 1980a: 54).5 Only insofar as we take into account the
agency. In short, Bourdieu’s approach can be characterised as a hermeneutics of
social relations.6
2. Practical
Bourdieu proposes to explore human existence in terms of its practical consti- tution. In opposition to ‘hermeneutic idealism’ (Bourdieu 1980a: 53; cf. ibid.: 58, 62, 158, 161), which fails to grasp the empirical constellations generated by symbolically mediated interactions, Bourdieu seeks to do justice to the fact that human life is inconceivable without the unfolding of social practices. From a reflexive-sociological perspective, the intellectual exercise of aiming ‘to under- stand for the sake of understanding’ (ibid.: 53)7 delivers little in the way of
social-scientific enlightenment. By contrast, one of the principal points of a ‘pragmatic hermeneutics’ (see Bourdieu 1980a: 62) is to acknowledge that human understanding constitutes a fundamental social practice. Irrespective of whether one focuses on the interpretive activities undertaken by laypersons or on those accomplished by experts, the multiple ways in which humans relate to reality are possible only as value-laden performances by means of which understanding- seeking agents convert the givenness of the world into a state of affairs that is not simply always already ‘out there’ but – at least potentially – always still to be suffused with meaning. Before transforming themselves into subjects capable of speech and reflection, humans are capable of action and intervention. According to Bourdieu, it is by virtue of their sens pratique ‘within’, rather than their sens
théorique ‘about’, the world that agents invent the socio-cultural parameters of
their existence (cf. Bourdieu 1997b: 63–64). In short, Bourdieu’s approach can be described as a hermeneutics of practice.8
3. Unconscious
Bourdieu posits that one of the most powerful dimensions of human existence is its
unconscious constitution. As socio-historically situated entities, we are constantly
immersed in background horizons, upon whose symbolic resources we draw when attributing meaning to, engaging with and acting upon reality. To a considerable extent, traditions operate ‘behind our backs’: we permanently reproduce – and, potentially, transform – behavioural, ideological and institutional patterns of value- laden encounters with the world. Regardless of whether our background involvement takes place in the preparative ‘back stages’ or in the performative ‘front stages’ of our compartmentalised lives, the following of traditions constitutes, to a substantial degree, an unconscious process, carried out in ways that escape – largely or, often, completely – the awareness of those submerged in them. Even – or, perhaps, especially – the most powerful vehicle of human consciousness (i.e.
language) is impregnated with multiple dimensions, expressions and layers of our
Coping with the complexities of social life would be unsustainably demanding if we had to call particular aspects of our existence into question all the time and if, consequently, we were unable – or, possibly, unwilling – to take part in the intuitive compliance with daily routines. Our unconscious permits us to take the apparent givenness of subjects and objects, which lies at the core of our being-in- the-world, at face value. In fact, our capacity to take foundational aspects of our existence for granted is vital to our ability to convert ourselves into fully fledged inhabitants of the universe. Our enclosure in the world is contingent upon our preparedness to participate in the quotidian construction of reality by mobilising the species-constitutive resources of humanity.
To be sure, our distinctly human – and, arguably, historico-generative – resources manifest themselves in numerous forms of capital: social, cultural, educational, linguistic, political, economic and symbolic capital – to mention only a few.9 When making use of, competing for or exchanging relationally contingent
resources, however, we do so, for the most part, unconsciously. The unconscious constitution permeating key domains of our existence is a sine qua non of the emergence, development and functioning of social life. The dispositional composition of habitus reflects the positional configuration of interactionally created fields. The homological relationship between habitus and field would be unsustainable without agents’ competence to use their sens pratique, rather than their sens théorique, when navigating their way through their monde empirique. Bourdieu reminds us, then, that sociologists need to be critical of the various social
functions of the unconscious – especially with respect to their power to generate
culturally codified mechanisms of perception, appreciation and action. In short,
Bourdieu’s approach can be regarded as a hermeneutics of the unconscious.10
4. Situational
From a Bourdieusian perspective, human existence needs to be grasped in terms of its situational constitution. In fact, every human performance is spatiotem- porally situated. Placed in both space and time, human agents are embodied entities. As such, their practices are embedded not only within the materially con- stituted and symbolically mediated spheres of their environments but also within the physiologically arranged and phenomenologically experienced boundaries of their own bodies. The former are illustrated in the consolidation of positionally structured fields; the latter are reflected in the emergence of dispositionally organised forms of habitus. Situatedness, however, is a double-edged sword: on the one hand, it is empowering to the extent that it permits people to undertake actions by drawing upon the resources they encounter within different sets of circumstances and within their own bodies; on the other hand, it is
disempowering to the extent that it obliges people to carry out actions within the
structural limits of the positional and dispositional determinacy pervading every aspect of their corporeal immersion in constantly shifting realities.
agency, constitute the underlying parameters for what can and cannot be done in terms of both the opportunities and the constraints with which people are confronted when relating to, engaging with and acting upon reality. As situated beings, we are continuously involved in the world:12 involved in referring to it, in
taking part in it, in attributing meaning to it and – perhaps, most significantly – in shaping it. Tautologically speaking, it is due to our spatiotemporal situatedness that we are involved in being involved in processes of involvement. The ‘spaces of possibilities’13 that we inhabit, as well as the ‘bodies of possibilities’14 in which
we are trapped, constitute socio-ontological preconditions for ‘the experience of our inclusion in this world’ (Bourdieu 1997b: 64).15 Far from being reducible to a
monolithic state of affairs, however, our situatedness in the universe possesses multiple dimensions: social, cultural, political, ideological, economic and geographic – to mention but a few. To exist within the world as a human subject means to be situated in reality as an embodied carrier of agency, with a positionally variable and dispositionally adjustable sense of both freedom and necessity. In short, Bourdieu’s approach can be considered a hermeneutics of the
situational.16
5. Doxic
For Bourdieu, human existence possesses, inevitably, a doxic constitution. As such, it is shot through with common sense, grounded in the taken-for-granted- ness that agents attach to the objective, normative and subjective dimensions of their lives. As immersive entities, we make sense of the world through the construction of materially embedded and symbolically mediated realities. Before we encounter the world, we are always already situated in it. Before we have – or think we have – experiences of rational or emotional disclosure, we are always
already enclosed in a universe that presents itself to us as the focal reference point
of our daily perceptions, appreciations, reflections, interpretations and actions. Doxa – that is, the taken-for-grantedness of particular aspects of our existence based on common sense – permits us to draw upon largely ‘unconscious presuppositions’ (Bourdieu, Chamboredon and Passeron 1968: 105)17 and ‘pre-
constructions that are inherent in the routine of everyday discourse’ (Bourdieu 1982b: 34).18 Thus, it enables us to convert our relation to the world into a
meaning-laden encounter without compelling us to question the validity, let alone the legitimacy, of the symbolic resources that we mobilise in order to make sense of our experience of reality.
(Vorurteil) turns into an advantage (Vorteil) when it bestows those who reinforce it with the self-granted privilege to do how they please simply because it pleases them. Doxa provides a treasure trove of unjustified justifications, which may well be justifiable, but which do not need to be justified as long as they equip agents with the capacity to establish an intuitively regulated relation to themselves and to their environment.
‘Illusio is field-specific doxa’ (Susen 2007: 191, italics in original). As such, it
epitomises a worldview that emerges out of one’s immersion within a social microcosm, whose idiosyncratic logic of functioning makes it different from other arenas of interaction within the societal macrocosm. ‘Illusio is that way of
being in the world, of being occupied by the world’ (Bourdieu 2000[1997]: 135,
italics in original), of being situated in and surrounded by assemblies of actualities without questioning, let alone denying, their legitimacy. As ‘the undiscussed condition of discussion’ (Bourdieu 1997b: 122),19 it converts the
apparent givenness of the rules governing particular fields of social reality into a source of taken-for-grantedness. Illusio makes us believe that the field is everything and that, consequently, the world is the field (see Susen 2007: 191). Without the field- specific doxa of illusio, we would find it difficult, if not impossible, to buy into the underlying logic of relationally constructed domains of interaction, whose partial ubiquity converts our encounters with the world into context-laden experiences of existential contingency. Doxa is there to be there, that is, it is there to suffuse the ‘thereness’ of the world with the ceaseless search for meaning, undertaken by those who inhabit it as hermeneutic beings. In short, Bourdieu’s approach can be understood as a hermeneutics of doxa.20
6. Contingent
From a Bourdieusian angle, one of the most noteworthy features of human exist- ence is its contingent constitution. Contingency permeates all aspects of social reality, including its seemingly most consolidated dimensions. Symbolically mediated representations of the objective, normative and subjective facets of our existence are no less contingent than the elements to which they are supposed to refer. To conceive of ‘every scientific theory […] as a historically constituted and temporary code […] for an era’ (Bourdieu, Chamboredon and Passeron 1968: 47)21 requires accepting that even evidence-based claims to epistemic validity
by apparent substances and substantial appearances, that is, by representational realities and real representations – nothing is ever forever.
What can be constructed can be deconstructed and, if required, reconstructed. The social world is in a constant state of flux, because those who shape and are, in turn, shaped by it incessantly act upon – and, hence, either reproduce or transform – it. Contingency is built so deeply into the condition of humanity that every form of sociality seems to be little more than a transient epiphenomenon of a perpetually shifting horizon of agency, which serves as the background to the theatre of role plays performed by field-embedded entities. The existential challenge with which all human agents are confronted is whether or not they are
able, rather than willing, to live with contingency (see Susen 2015a: esp. ch. 4). It is wishful thinking to believe that we can escape contingency; the more interesting question, in this respect, is what we do (and how we deal) with it. As a resource, contingency can be exploited by us, permitting us to face up to the radical openness of history. As an obstacle, contingency may paralyse us, leading us to abandon the search for ontological security. In short, Bourdieu’s approach can be interpreted as a hermeneutics of contingency.22
7. Meaning-laden
From a Bourdieusian point of view, the nature of human existence cannot be grasped without accounting for its meaning-laden constitution. The clear-cut distinction between ‘facts’ and ‘values’ collapses if we recognise that all social
facts are value-laden just as all values are fact-laden.23 In other words, the world
of social facts is permeated by values, just as the world of social values is pervaded by facts. From the perspective of naïve realism, ‘facts speak for
themselves’ (see Bourdieu, Chamboredon and Passeron 1968: 56). From the vantage point of critical realism, by contrast, ‘facts do not speak’ (ibid.: 56)24 at
all. Indeed, the ‘blind evidences’ (ibid.: 77)25 – that is, the tacit assumptions upon
which we rely in order to function as culturally competent entities – become ‘blinding evidences’ (ibid: 77)26 to the degree that we fail to acknowledge that the
meanings we project upon the world – especially those that we take for granted – can be called into question.
The meaning-bearing construction of reality contains multiple dimensions: First, as meaning-creating entities, we produce meaning ‘about’ the world:
the creation of meaning is a constitutive component of the symbolic
production of society. Second, as meaning-projecting entities, we attribute
meaning ‘to’ the world: the projection of meaning is pivotal to the symbolic
organization of society. Third, as meaning-perceiving entities, we absorb
meaning ‘from’ the world: the perception of meaning is a sine qua non of the
symbolic internalization of society. Fourth, as meaning-interpreting entities,
we process meaning ‘beyond’ the world: the interpretation of meaning is vital to the symbolic subjectivization of society. Fifth, as meaning-reciprocating
is the driving force of the symbolic ritualization of society. Finally, as
meaning-fusing entities, we merge meaning ‘through’ the world: the fusion
of meaning lies at the heart of the symbolic unification of society.
(Susen 2013c: 203–204, italics in original)27
Meaning enables us to convert realms of facticity into domains of comprehensi- bility. The provinces of meaning that we generate, and tap into, when establishing a symbolically mediated relation to reality are vehicles of signification, which are under constant reconstruction as they need to adapt to changing environments and situations.
Three spheres of human existence are crucial to the construction of meaning:
objectivity, normativity and subjectivity. As subjects capable of speech and
reflection, we raise three main types of validity claims: first, assertive and con-
stative validity claims, in relation to ‘the’ world of objectivity; second, regulative
and evaluative validity claims, in relation to ‘our’ world of normativity; and,
third, expressive and individuative validity claims, in relation to ‘my’ world of
subjectivity. Thus, meaning is constructed with respect to the ‘natural’, ‘social’ and ‘personal’ realms of our existence.
When seeking to grasp the sociological significance of meaning in terms of the pivotal role it plays in the unfolding of everyday life, two epistemic levels are crucial:
• on the one hand, the internal level, referring to the production of meaning from the point of view of those who generate and experience it as ordinary people (‘from the inside’);
• on the other hand, the external level, referring to the analysis of meaning from the point of view of those who describe and scrutinise it as critical researchers (‘from the outside’).28
In this sense, we are dealing with a ‘cycle of reciprocity’ (Bourdieu 1980a: 178):29
both as ordinary agents and as specialised scientists we need to co-articulate, if not reconcile, ‘the truth that one may barely call subjective’ (ibid.: 178)30 and ‘the
truth that one calls objective’ (ibid.: 178).31 The double-hermeneutic task with
which we are confronted, therefore, consists in exploring the meaning-laden constitution of human existence both ‘within’ and ‘beyond’ the sphere of everyday life: the attempt to convert meaning into an object of study constitutes a meaning-laden act itself. In short, Bourdieu’s approach can be comprehended as
a hermeneutics of meaning.32
8. Experiential
For Bourdieu, a crucial facet of human existence can be found in its experiential
constitution, that is, in the innumerable ways in which the world can be
experienced by its hermeneutically equipped inhabitants. Human beings relate to
It is through their habitus – that is, through an apparatus of objectively external- ised, normatively naturalised and subjectively internalised dispositions – that members of humanity attribute meaning to, engage with and shape reality. The schemes of perception, appreciation and action that are built into field-specific forms of habitus are relationally constituted reflections of the social conditions of production that permeate their horizons of daily experience. Surely, from a Bourdieusian standpoint, one of the key tasks of critical social science is to resist ‘the illusion of immediate evidence [and] the temptation to universalise uncon- sciously a singular experience’ (Bourdieu, Chamboredon and Passeron 1968: 100).33 Instead of relying on common sense and on the first-hand experiences upon
which it may be based, reflexive investigators need to be suspicious of ordinary preconceptions and contextualise the practices from which they emanate.
In scientific enquiry, experience is a curious affair. On the one hand, it may be conceived of as a source of objective and context-transcendent knowledge, whose validity rises above the spatiotemporal specificity of historically contingent constellations of sociality. On the other hand, it may be regarded as a source of
subjective and context-immanent knowledge, whose validity depends on the
acceptability attributed to it by particular agents, within specific sets of circum- stances, and on the basis of idiosyncratic parameters. The former view tends to be endorsed by positivist approaches, which are guided by the ambition to generate objectively reliable, universally valid and empirically substantiated knowledge. The latter view tends to be advocated by interpretivist approaches, which insist upon the perspective-, value- and context-ladenness of all knowledge claims. Rather than opposing these two traditions of investigation to one another, however, the challenge consists in combining and cross-fertilising them (cf. Susen 2011d: esp. 49–53, 69, 73–75, 78).
A central aim of the Bourdieusian project is to overcome counterproductive antinomies in the social sciences.34 Arguably, one of the most fundamental, and
also most ruinous, oppositions that has shaped and, to some extent, polarised debates and controversies in the social sciences since they have come into existence is the epistemic antagonism between objectivism and subjectivism, which is both reflected and embedded in the aforementioned canonical rivalry between positivism and interpretivism.35 Whichever of these currents of thought
one may favour, it is vital to recognise that experience constitutes a foundational dimension of human existence (cf. Susen 2007: 297–301). As such, it represents a precondition for the very possibility of social life. For there is no society without a lifeworld, that is, there is no social world without an experienced world
(monde vécu or Lebenswelt). The world of human beings is a world of
experiences, which serve as the ultimate reference point for the ceaseless reinvention of their species-distinctive condition, known as ‘humanity’. In short, Bourdieu’s approach can be conceived of as a hermeneutics of experience.36
9. Resourceful
Bourdieu proposes to examine human existence by shedding light on its resource- ful constitution. Particularly important in this regard is the analysis of different types of capital: social capital, cultural capital, educational capital, linguistic capital, political capital, economic capital and symbolic capital – to mention but the most significant variants. Crucial for the functioning of power dynamics, especially in highly differentiated societies, is the interconvertibility37 of capital:
access (or non-access) to one type of capital may increase (or decrease) one’s chances of acquiring another form of capital. While every social field is relatively autonomous in that it possesses an idiosyncratic logic of functioning, every type of capital is relatively self-sufficient in that it provides a specific kind of resource. Yet, just as social microcosms are – at the same time – relatively independent and relatively interdependent, so are different sorts of capital. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the analysis of the foundational status of social capital. None of the other types of capital could exist without social capital. In fact, all types of capital are derivatives of social capital, since they are relationally constructed and depend on the existence of interactional networks. In order to obtain cultural capital, one needs to be part of a group whose members share a given set of values, conventions and traditions. In order to receive educational capital, one needs to be exposed to the learning processes that are formally or informally provided by fellow human beings – notably by family members and friends, as well as by teachers, trainers and instructors. In order to have access to linguistic capital, one needs to be immersed in a language community. In order to cultivate political capital, one needs to enter the arena of deliberating subjects. In order to accumulate economic capital, one needs to participate in the game of competing for assets and wealth. In order to get hold of symbolic capital, one needs to gain recognition from those who are in a position to confirm one’s status and to decipher the value of the field-specific currency employed to represent it. In brief, there is no capital without social capital. The emergence of any form of capital hinges upon having access to some minimal amount of social capital.
The conversion (or, in many cases, the reconversion) of one type of capital into another type of capital allows for the translation (or, more commonly, the retrans- lation) of one sort of resource into another. just as agents are able to move from field to field and just as they are equipped with the multifunctional capacity to be immersed simultaneously in several fields, they are able to make use of different types of capital in different contexts and, if necessary, draw upon different types of capital at the same time. Social agents, then, are ‘plural actors’38 to the extent
that they are capable of mobilising different resources in different settings. The
field constitutes an asymmetrically organised arena of positionally structured
dispositionally structured resources; capital denotes an objectively externalised and subjectively internalised stock of both positionally and dispositionally struc- tured resources. We perceive, appreciate and act upon the world in accordance with the field-, habitus- and capital-specific resources that are at our disposal. In the grand scheme of things, the ultimate resource for human agents is humanity itself. Yet, resources are not only differentiated, in terms of varying sources of power, but also unequally distributed, in terms of diverging degrees of access to power. In short, Bourdieu’s approach can be referred to as a hermeneutics of
social resources.39
10. Power-laden
Bourdieu posits that, as critical social scientists, we need to study human exist- ence by uncovering its power-laden constitution. In fact, human existence is ‘laden’ in a number of ways – all of which are, ultimately, related to the exercise of power (see Susen 2014a: esp. 21–24; and Susen 2015a: esp. 117–118). • It is context-laden in the sense that, as embodied entities, we are embedded in
spatiotemporally contingent sets of circumstances.
• It is value-laden in the sense that, as cultural entities, we are exposed to the overt or subtle influence of behavioural, ideological and institutional codes, patterns and conventions.
• It is meaning-laden in the sense that, as interpretive entities, we are immersed in the universe of understanding – seeking to make sense of the objective, normative and subjective dimensions of reality, to which we relate through symbolically constructed vehicles of comprehensibility.
• It is perspective-laden in the sense that, as biased entities, we approach, attribute meaning to and interact with the world from the particular places that we occupy in the universe, mobilising the dispositional resources that we have acquired throughout our lives when encountering not only other subjects and objects but also ourselves.
• It is interest-laden in the sense that, as purposive entities, we pursue – con- sciously or unconsciously – context-dependent strategies, in order to influence the ways in which we are positioned in relation to other human and nonhuman entities, thereby confirming that our actions are motivated by both species-constitutive and species-divisive concerns.
• It is tension-laden in the sense that, as contradictory entities, we are, on a daily basis, confronted with the pressures, discrepancies, disagreements and conflicts that pervade the relationships we establish not only with others but also with ourselves – representing a quotidian exercise of adjustment and readjustment to the varying circumstances of our lives.
Power can be regarded as a constitutive component of human existence (see Susen 2014a).40 As such, it permeates every aspect of our lives, including the
seemingly mundane dimensions of our everyday actions and interactions. From a Bourdieusian point of view, one of the core features built into social power dynamics is what may be described as ‘the dialectics of recognition (reconn-
aissance) and misrecognition (méconnaissance)’.41
The ‘individual and collective misrecognition of the truth of the objective “mechanisms” of the exchange’ (Bourdieu 1980a: 179, italics in original)42
between different types of capital lies at the heart of power dynamics in field- differentiated social formations. We may draw a distinction between ‘the
institutionally organised and guaranteed misrecognition’ (ibid.: 191, italics in
original)43 provided by solidified sets of structures and configurations, on the one
hand, and the ephemeral and spontaneously emerging moments of misrecognition
created within short-lived encounters and situations, on the other. Irrespective of whether we are dealing with institutional or behavioural, official or unofficial, public or private, visible or invisible, obvious or subtle, large-scale or small-scale, global or local, collective or individual forms of misrecognition, the daily production of social power dynamics is inconceivable without the conscious or unconscious complicity of those involved in them. Those who have the upper hand – that is, the ‘dominant’ forces in a particular field – have an interest in
disguising the source of their empowerment. Those who lack the influence to
shape the agenda – that is, the ‘dominated’ forces in a particular field – have an interest in unmasking the source of their disempowerment.
Paradoxically, processes of misrecognition involve processes of recognition
(see Susen 2007: 138–141; see also Bourdieu 1977[1972]: 165–168). If a power mechanism remains mis- or unrecognised by those who sustain it, it is recognised with the prospect of it continuing to exist until it reaches a crisis point, brought about by those who wish to subvert it. In every social formation, one encounters ‘a kind of legitimizing self-affirmation through which power makes itself known and recognized’ (Bourdieu 1980a: 226–227).44 The epitome of the self-affirmative
capacity to legitimise oneself by virtue of social recognition is symbolic power.45
Symbolic power is this ‘power to secure recognition of power’ (ibid.: 226, italics
in original)46 as a result of its simultaneous recognition and misrecognition. As a
recognised force, its presence is affirmed and reaffirmed by those caught up in its reproduction. As a misrecognised force, its presence is disguised, or at least misrepresented, by those who have an interest in shaping social constellations in such a way that they contribute to its reproduction. One of the key functions of dominant ideologies is to make us recognise (anerkennen) power without recognising (erkennen) it.47 A critical hermeneutics of power, therefore, seeks to
Conclusion
This chapter has examined the extent to which Bourdieu may be described as a ‘hermeneutic sociologist’. As demonstrated in the previous analysis, Bourdieu’s approach is based on several presuppositions associated with the intellectual tradition commonly referred to as ‘hermeneutics’. Far from being reducible to a monolithic explanatory framework, founded on a dogmatic understanding of sociology in particular and of social research in general, Bourdieu’s hermeneutics is multifaceted, touching upon numerous elements that lie at the core of human existence.
Bourdieu can be characterised as a ‘hermeneutic’ – or, at least, ‘hermeneutics- inspired’ – thinker insofar as his work is marked by a profound interest in the nature of interpretation. Perhaps one of the most noteworthy features of ‘Bourdieusian hermeneutics’ is that it conceives of interpretation as a socio-cog- nitive process that is crucial not only to procedures of sociological investigation, conducted by experts, but also, in a more fundamental sense, to everyday reflexive practices, performed by ordinary agents. Bourdieu’s fine-grained understanding of interpretation may be regarded as a sign of the fact that his ‘critical sociology’ is, in some respects, much closer to Luc Boltanski’s ‘sociology of critique’ than most commentators are willing to admit (see Susen 2014[2015], 2015c).
This chapter has aimed to shed light on ten elements that are central to the conceptual architecture of the ‘hermeneutic Bourdieu’ – specifically, the (1) socio-relational, (2) practical, (3) unconscious, (4) situational, (5) doxic, (6) contingent, (7) meaning-laden, (8) experiential, (9) resourceful and (10) power- laden constitution of human existence. It shall be the task of this concluding section to reflect on some key questions arising from the ‘hermeneutic’ elements that permeate Bourdieu’s oeuvre.
1 Hermeneutics of social relations: Bourdieu emphasises the socio-relational
constitution of human existence. Yet, we need to account for the fact that social life constitutes a dynamic conglomerate of ontological, rather than merely relational, elements – that is, of structurally organised components that do exist.
2 Hermeneutics of practice: Bourdieu stresses the practical constitution of
human existence. The preponderance of our sens pratique ‘within’ the world,
as opposed to our sens théorique ‘about’ the world, makes the unfolding of
of interaction that matter most to the genuine empowerment of both individual and collective subjects.
3 Hermeneutics of the unconscious: Bourdieu draws attention to the pivotal
role that different forms of the unconscious play in shaping human existence. We cannot escape the ubiquitous presence of the socio-cultural background horizons in which we find ourselves immersed. No less important, however, are the conscious ways in which we attribute meaning to, engage with and act upon reality when mobilising the resources inherent in the different types of
rationality by means of which we influence – if not, generate – historical
developments in accordance with the interests we pursue not only as members of social fields but also as members of humanity.
4 Hermeneutics of the situational: Bourdieu proposes to study human existence
by focusing on its situational constitution. Surely, it is essential to recognise that every human performance is spatiotemporally situated. It is no less fundamental, however, to examine society in terms of its quasi-transcen-
dental features, that is, in terms of its species-constitutive characteristics,
which – by definition – rise above the cultural specificities of particular historical contexts or communities.
5 Hermeneutics of doxa: Bourdieu insists upon the doxic constitution of human
existence. Doxa – that is, the taken-for-grantedness of the objective, normative and subjective dimensions of our being based on tacit acceptance – serves the vital sociological function of equipping human agents with a sense of ontological security when endeavouring to construct liveable realities. Yet, we must not underestimate the crucial role of critical capacity
in bringing about individual and social developments in accordance with rationally motivated, discursively mediated and intersubjectively negotiated concerns, considerations and arguments.
6 Hermeneutics of contingency: Bourdieu is eager to unearth the contingent
constitution of human existence. Critical social scientists need to scrutinise the far-reaching implications of the fact that all aspects of social reality are impregnated with contingency. It is no less significant, however, to face up to the considerable influence exercised by structural forces of necessity, whose inner workings largely escape our everyday perceptions and ordinary under- standings of reality. Even more challenging, in this respect, is the sociological task of grasping the relationship between contingency and necessity by conceding that the tension between mechanisms of determinacy and processes of indeterminacy is built into the unfolding of history.
7 Hermeneutics of meaning: Bourdieu’s hermeneutics-inspired reflections are
whether we do so symbolically or materially – are often out of sync with the ‘worlds’ that we inhabit and experience. Indeed, when we notice a minor or major discrepancy between ‘world’ and ‘reality’ we become aware of the relative autonomy enjoyed by behavioural, ideological and institutional patterns shaping the course of human agency.
8 Hermeneutics of experience: Bourdieu underscores the experiential consti-
tution of human existence. There are countless ways in which the world can be experienced by its hermeneutically equipped inhabitants. In this respect, a central issue that critical social scientists need to address concerns the question of the extent to which not only human ‘worlds’ but also human ‘experiences’ can be described as ‘objective’, ‘normative’ and ‘subjective’. Not only are we constantly immersed in objectivity, normativity and subject- ivity, but, in addition, our experiences are always – simultaneously –
objective, normative and subjective. Every human experience is at once
‘objective’, in that it takes place in space and time, ‘normative’, in that it is shaped by our exposure to culture, and ‘subjective’, in that we are its unique carriers. In short, both the existence and the experience of our three founda- tional worlds of immersion are at once objective, normative and subjective. Realists will emphasise the ‘objective’, constructivists the ‘normative’, and perspectivists the ‘subjective’ dimensions of our experience of the world. Instead of establishing an epistemological hierarchy between these three dimensions, however, we need to account for their simultaneously exercised power in shaping our being-in-the-world. Such a multi-layered conception of human experience permits us to avoid the pitfalls of objectivist, normativist or subjectivist reductionism.
9 Hermeneutics of social resources: Given his emphasis on the socio-
ontological centrality of different forms of capital, Bourdieu seeks to unearth
the resourceful constitution of human existence. Yet, just as he fails to differ-
entiate between ‘foundational’, ‘contingent’ and ‘ephemeral’ fields, he offers little in the way of distinguishing between ‘foundational’, ‘contingent’ and ‘ephemeral’ types of capital, let alone of habitus. There are no ‘foundational’, ‘contingent’ and ‘ephemeral’ fields without ‘foundational’, ‘contingent’ and ‘ephemeral’ types of capital and habitus. We cannot grasp the nature of universally empowering life conditions unless we identify the specificity of universally empowering resources. In other words, a genuinely critical sociology needs to confront the challenge of providing criteria by which it is possible to distinguish between empowering and disempowering life forms. In order to accomplish this task, sociology needs to acknowledge the socio- ontological significance not only of field-dependent resources but also of species-constitutive resources, that is, of the resources that make us human.
10 Hermeneutics of power: Bourdieu has no illusions about the power-laden
reject the idealist view that human lifeworlds can be portrayed as pristine realms of love, cooperation and solidarity, as well as the fatalist view that human lifeworlds can be reduced to bleak cages of self-interest, competition and anomie. Instead, it needs to endorse a realist stance that is prepared to explore both the bright and the dark sides of humanity, thereby facing up to the contradictory forces that shape the tension-laden development of social reality.
In light of the preceding reflections, it becomes evident that any serious attempt to grapple with ‘Bourdieusian prospects’ needs to account for the hermeneutic dimensions that, owing to their omnipresence in the daily construction of symbol- ically mediated realities, are built into the intricate challenge of contributing to the pursuit of a critical sociology.
Acknowledgements
I am grateful to Lisa Adkins, Caragh Brosnan and Steven Threadgold for their detailed and useful comments on a draft version of this chapter.
Notes
1 On the concept of hermeneutics, see, for example: Baert (2003); Bubner (1988[1971, 1973, 1976, 1980, 1984]); Corcuff (2002); Frank (1989); Gadamer (1965); Garz (2000); Ginev (1999); Grondin (1994); Habermas (1987[1981]); Habermas (1988[1967/1970]); Harrington (2001); Heller (1989); Kelly (1990); Kögler (1996); Kögler (1996[1992]); Lafont (1997); Lafont (1999[1993]); Outhwaite (1987); Susen (2007: 22, 41, 44n.49, 54–57, 90–94, 115, 125, 127n.22, 239, 270n.21, 305, 306); Susen (2013a); Thompson (1981); Wachterhauser (1994); Waizbort (2004).
2 See, for example: Corcuff (2002); Frank (1989); Susen (2007: 157, 215, 239, 240, 262); Susen (2011d: esp. 52, 60, 61, 69, 74, 78); Susen (2011c: 402); Susen (2013b: 196, 197); Susen (2013c: 222, 223, 229, 231n.15); Susen (2013d: 325, 328, 337, 338, 355, 356, 357, 359, 361, 362, 363, 374).
3 On Bourdieu’s ‘hermeneutic’ – or, at least, ‘hermeneutics-inspired’ – account of
human existence, see, for example: Bourdieu (1977[1972]: 171–172, 177–197); Bourdieu (1980a: 53–55, 62–66, 103, 113, 135, 161, 178–179, 186–188, 191–207, 211–219, 226–227, 244); Bourdieu (1982b: 10, 34); Bourdieu (1982d: 8–9); Bourdieu (1982e: 15); Bourdieu (1982g: 79n.17); Bourdieu (1982h: 171–186); Bourdieu (1984: 6); Bourdieu (1994a: 190); Bourdieu (1997b: 21–26, 44–45, 64, 67, 118, 120–123, 181, 184, 206); Bourdieu (1999: 334); Bourdieu, Chamboredon and Passeron (1968: 30, 38, 56, 70, 100–105); Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992c: 143–144). See also, for example: Susen (2013c: 222, 223, 229, 231n.15); Susen (2013d: 325, 328, 337, 338, 355, 356, 357, 359, 361, 362, 363, 374).
9, 10, 15, 16, 22, 24, 30–31, 36, 39, 56, 64, 66, 68, 75–76, 80, 88, 90–100, 113, 115, 116, 125, 130, 131, 136–137, 139, 141–145, 149, 160, 164–165, 265); Bourdieu (2001b: 15, 33); Bourdieu (2001a: 8, 78, 91, 108, 160); Bourdieu (2005[2000]: 209); Bourdieu, Chamboredon and Passeron (1968: 69); Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992a: 71); Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992c: 141). See also, for instance: Bonnewitz (1998: 37); Herz (1996: 237); Wacquant (1992b: 47); Wacquant (1999: 275); Wacquant (2003b: 61–62, 65).
5 My translation; original text: ‘l’ignorance des conditions de production et de circulation’.
6 On Bourdieu’s hermeneutics of social relations, see, for instance: Bourdieu (1977[1972]: 189); Bourdieu (1980a: 54); Bourdieu (1982a: 15); Bourdieu (1997b: 23, 206); Bourdieu (1998: 89).
7 Italics removed; my translation; original text: ‘comprendre pour comprendre’.
8 On Bourdieu’s hermeneutics of practice, see, for instance: Bourdieu (1980a: 53, 54, 55, 62, 65, 66); Bourdieu (1984: 6); Bourdieu (1997b: 63, 64, 67). See also, for example: Bohman (1999: 130, 137); Brubaker (1985: 754).
9 On Bourdieu’s conception of capital, see, for instance: Bourdieu (1975b); Bourdieu (1979); Bourdieu (1986); Bourdieu (2013[1978]). See also, for example: Albrecht (2002); Beasley-Murray (2000); Calhoun (1995); Gouanvic (2005); Herz (1996); Reay (2004); Robbins (2005); Shilling (2004); Sullivan (2001); Swain (2003); Urban (2003); Verter (2003); Wacquant (2004[1997]); Wacquant (2013).
10 On Bourdieu’s hermeneutics of the unconscious, see, for instance: Bourdieu (1980a: 113, 179, 188, 191, 200); Bourdieu (1982a: 15); Bourdieu (1982b: 10, 34); Bourdieu (1992b: 225); Bourdieu (1994a: 190); Bourdieu (1997b: 11, 21, 22, 23, 26, 44, 45, 181, 184); Bourdieu (1998: 89); Bourdieu (1999: 334); Bourdieu, Chamboredon and Passeron (1968: 30, 38, 70, 105); Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992c: 143–144); Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992d: 213). See also, for example: Accardo (1997: 49); Bohman (1999: 130, 137); Bouveresse (1995: 586–588); Chauviré (1995: 553); Monod (1995: 165, 169); Ostrow (2000[1981]: 302–308).
11 My translation; original text: ‘les conditions de possibilité’. 12 See Bourdieu (1997b: 23): ‘Nous sommes embarqués […]’.
13 On this point, see, for example, ibid., 180: ‘[…] l’espace des positions comme des espaces de possibles plus ou moins ouverts où s’annoncent, de manière plus ou moins impérative, les choses qui s’imposent à eux comme “à faire”’. In the English edition, the word ‘ouverts’ is translated as ‘wide’, rather than as ‘open’. See Bourdieu
(2000[1997]: 151): ‘as more or less wide spaces of possibles in which the things that offer themselves to them as “to be done” present themselves more or less compell- ingly’. On this point, see Susen (2007: 174–175, 198n.12).
14 On this point, see, for example, Bourdieu (1997b: 258): ‘L’habitus est ce “pouvoir- être” […]’. Translation: ‘Habitus is this “can-be” […]’. On this point, see Susen (2007: 185–186).
15 My translation; original text: ‘l’expérience de l’inclusion dans ce monde’ (translation modified).
16 On Bourdieu’s hermeneutics of the situational, see, for instance: Bourdieu (1980a: 191, 200); Bourdieu (1997b: 22, 23, 26, 44, 45, 64).
17 My translation; original text: ‘les présupposés inconscients’.
18 My translation; original text: ‘les préconstructions inhérentes à la routine du discours quotidien’.
20 On Bourdieu’s hermeneutics of doxa, see, for instance: Bourdieu (1980a: 113, 244); Bourdieu (1982b: 10, 34); Bourdieu (1984: 6); Bourdieu (1997b: 21–26, 118, 120, 123, 206); Bourdieu (1999: 334); Bourdieu, Chamboredon and Passeron (1968: 30, 58, 105). See also, for example: Accardo (1997: 49); Bonnewitz (1998: 80–82); Ostrow (2000[1981]: 302–308); Pinto (1998: 214, 216, 243); Susen (2007: 24, 138– 141, 146n.16, 153, 157, 159, 160, 178, 191, 215, 223, 224, 225, 226, 243, 251, 252, 253, 267, 309, 312).
21 My translation; original text: ‘toute théorie scientifique […] comme un code histori- quement constitué et provisoire […] pour une époque’.
22 On Bourdieu’s hermeneutics of contingency, see, for instance: Bourdieu (1999: 334); Bourdieu, Chamboredon and Passeron (1968: 47). See also, for example: Boltanski, Rennes and Susen (2010); Boltanski, Rennes and Susen (2014[2010]); Ostrow (2000[1981]: 302–308).
23 On this point, see, for example: Susen (2012b: 688, 694–695, 696); Susen (2014[2012]: 174, 179–180, 181).
24 My translation; original text: ‘les faits ne parlent pas’. 25 My translation; original text: ‘évidences aveugles’. 26 My translation; original text: ‘évidences aveuglantes’.
27 See also Susen (2013d: 356, 358, 371). On Bourdieu’s – hermeneutics-inspired –
account of the nature of meaning, see, for example: Bourdieu (1977[1972]: 171–172, 177–197); Bourdieu (1980a: 53–55, 62–66, 103, 113, 135, 161, 178–179, 186–188, 191–207, 211–219, 226–227, 244); Bourdieu (1982b: 10, 34); Bourdieu (1982d: 8–9); Bourdieu (1982e: 15); Bourdieu (1982g: 79n.17); Bourdieu (1982h: 171–186); Bourdieu (1984: 6); Bourdieu (1994a: 190); Bourdieu (1997b: 21–26, 44–45, 64, 67, 118, 120–123, 181, 184, 206); Bourdieu (1999: 334); Bourdieu, Chamboredon and Passeron (1968: 30, 38, 56, 70, 100–105); Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992c: 143–144). 28 On this point, see, for example: Boltanski, Honneth and Celikates (2014[2009]);
Celikates (2009); Susen (2011a).
29 My translation; original text: ‘cycle de réciprocité’.
30 My translation; original text: ‘la vérité que l’on peut à peine appeler subjective’. 31 My translation; original text: ‘la vérité que l’on appelle objective’.
32 On Bourdieu’s hermeneutics of meaning, see, for instance: Bourdieu (1977[1972]: 171–172, 177–197); Bourdieu (1980a: 53–55, 62–66, 103, 113, 135, 161, 178–179, 186–188, 191–207, 211–219, 226–227, 244); Bourdieu (1982b: 10, 34); Bourdieu (1982d: 8–9); Bourdieu (1982e: 15); Bourdieu (1982g: 79n.17); Bourdieu (1982h: 171–186); Bourdieu (1984: 6); Bourdieu (1994a: 190); Bourdieu (1997b: 21–26, 44– 45, 64, 67, 118, 120–123, 181, 184, 206); Bourdieu (1999: 334); Bourdieu, Chamboredon and Passeron (1968: 30, 38, 56, 70, 77, 100–105); Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992c: 143–144). See also, for example: Boltanski, Honneth and Celikates (2014[2009]); Brubaker (1985: 754); Celikates (2009); Ebrecht (2002: 225, 230–231, 234–239); Karsenti (1995: 664); Lewandowski (2000: 50, 54); Susen (2012b: 688, 694–695, 696); Susen (2011a); Susen (2014[2012]: 174, 179–180, 181); Susen (2013c: 203–204); Susen (2013d: 356, 358, 371).
33 My translation; original text: ‘à l’illusion de l’évidence immédiate ou à la tentation d’universaliser inconsciemment une expérience singulière’.
(1994a: 169); Bourdieu (1994b: 3); Bourdieu (1995a: 8); Bourdieu (1995b: 120); Bourdieu (1997b: 16–17, 43, 77, 122, 157, 159–160, 163–167, 185, 225); Bourdieu (1998: 9, 110); Bourdieu (2005[2000]: 210–213); Bourdieu (2001b: 7, 24, 31); Bourdieu (2001a: 76, 151, 153); Bourdieu (2002b: 353); Bourdieu, Chamboredon and Passeron (1968: 34, 93–94, 101); Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992a: 66); Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992b: 121–122); Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992c: 151, 162).
On this point, see also, for example: Accardo (1997: 200, 229, 257–258); Addi (2002: 127, 131); Bohman (1999: 130); Boltanski and Thévenot (1991: 40); Bonnewitz (1998: 2, 12–13, 30–31, 59, 66); Bonnewitz (2002: 39); Bouveresse (1995: 580–581); Boyne (1993: 250); Bronckart and Schurmans (1999: 153, 155, 164); Brubaker (1985: 746, 749–753); Brubaker (1993: 221, 227); Calhoun (1995: 133, 144–145); Cicourel (1993: 94, 98–99); Corcuff (1996: 28, 30); Ebrecht (2002: 230); Evens (1999: 8–9); Fabiani (1999: 76); Heilbron (1999: 298); Héran (2000[1987]: 4, 10, 17–18); Jenkins (1992: 66); Lewandowski (2000: 50); Mouzelis (2000); Pinto (1998: 26, 55–56, 151); Susen (2007: 18, 149–157, 171, 172, 173, 174, 183, 217, 218, 239, 249, 250, 270n.21, 310); Susen (2011c: 368, 374, 393, 394, 402); Susen (2011d: esp. 80–81); Wacquant (1992a); Wacquant (2002[1993]: 37); Wacquant (2003a: 478); Wacquant (2011[2000/1995]: 97).
35 See Susen (2015a: esp. 48–63, 66, 68, 72, 79, 95, 140, 149, 151, 152, 160, 162, 166, 244, 245, 259, 260, 262).
36 On Bourdieu’s hermeneutics of experience, see, for instance: Bourdieu (1997b: 64); Bourdieu, Chamboredon and Passeron (1968: 70, 101). See also, for example: Ostrow (2000[1981]: 302–308); Susen (2007: 297–301).
37 On Bourdieu’s conception of interconvertibility see, for example, Bourdieu (1977[1972]: 178). See also, for instance: Adkins (2011: 348); Susen (2007: 178– 179); Susen (2011c: 390).
38 On this point, see, for instance: Boltanski and Thévenot (1991); Boltanski and Thévenot (1999); Ladrière, Pharo and Quéré (1993); Lahire (1998); Lahire (2004); Susen (2007: 90–94, 192–198); Susen (2010); Susen (2011a: 450, 453, 456); Susen (2012a: 300); Thévenot (2001); Thévenot (2006).
39 On Bourdieu’s hermeneutics of social resources, see, for instance: Bourdieu (1977[1972]: 172, 177–187, 195–197); Bourdieu (1979); Bourdieu (1980b); Bourdieu (1986). See also, for instance: Albrecht (2002); Beasley-Murray (2000); Calhoun (1995); Gouanvic (2005); Herz (1996); Reay (2004); Robbins (2005); Shilling (2004); Siisiäinen (2000); Sullivan (2001); Susen (2007: esp. ch. 5, 7, 8); Susen (2011b: esp. 176–184, 193–197); Susen (2011c: esp. 368, 370, 372, 375, 384–385, 387, 390, 398, 401–202, 406–407, 409); Susen (2011d: esp. 55, 62, 66, 68, 69, 70, 74, 78, 82); Susen (2013b); Susen (2013c); Susen (2013d); Susen (2014b: esp. 92–99, 103–105); Susen (2014[2015]: esp. 317–318, 330–334, 335); Susen and Turner (2011: xxii, xxvi–xxvii); Swain (2003); Urban (2003); Verter (2003); Wacquant (2004[1997]); Wacquant (2002[1993]).
40 See also, for instance: Browne and Susen (2014); Holloway and Susen (2013); Susen (2008a); Susen (2008b); Susen (2009); Susen (2011a); Susen (2012a); Susen (2015a: esp. 117–118); Susen (2015b).
(1994a: 165–166, 189, 234); Bourdieu (1997b: 114, 125, 135, 236, 283–288); Bourdieu (1998: 7–8); Bourdieu (2001a: 70, 112–113, 142); Bourdieu (2002a: 4); Bourdieu (2003: 85); Bourdieu and Boltanski (1975: 10–11, 16); Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992c: 147–148, 168). See also Susen (2007: 192–198). In addition, see ibid. (80, 138, 140, 141, 143, 144, 145, 202n.93, 293, 311). In addition, see Susen (2009).
42 My translation; original text: ‘la méconnaissance individuelle et collective de la vérité du “mécanisme” objectif de l’échange’.
43 My translation; original text: ‘la méconnaissance institutionnellement organisée et garantie’. See also Bourdieu (1990[1980]: 112).
44 My translation; original text: ‘une sorte d’auto-affirmation légitimatrice par laquelle le pouvoir se fait connaître et reconnaître’. See also Bourdieu (1990[1980]: 131). 45 On Bourdieu’s conception of symbolic power, see, for example: Bourdieu (1977a);
Bourdieu (1982a); Bourdieu (1992a); Bourdieu (1992[1977]); Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992c). See also, for instance: Addi (2001); Cicourel (2004); Hallett (2003); Honneth (1984); Jurt (2004); Kraemer (2002); Mauger (2005); Peter (2004); Susen (2007: 24, 133–147, 241, 250–253); Susen (2011b: 176, 180); Susen (2011c: 368, 370, 372, 390, 398, 399); Susen (2012b: 692n.27, 702); Susen (2013c: 211, 212, 213, 215, 215–218, 219, 226–230); Susen (2013d: 339, 342, 343, 344, 349, 356, 361, 370); Susen (2014a); Susen (2014[2012]: 185, 191, 200n.28); Terray (2003); Thompson (1992); Wacquant (2002[1993]).
46 My translation; original text: ‘pouvoir de faire reconnaître le pouvoir’. See also
Bourdieu (1990[1980]: 131).
47 On the concept of ideology, see Susen (2014b). See also, for example: Boltanski (2008); Bourdieu and Boltanski (1976); Bourdieu and Boltanski (2008[1976]); Quiniou (1996); Susen (2015a: esp. ch. 2); Wacquant (2002[1993]).
48 On Bourdieu’s hermeneutics of power, see, for instance: Bourdieu (1977[1972]: 171, 188, 189, 192, 195–197); Bourdieu (1980a: 103, 178, 179, 186, 187, 188, 191–207, 211, 215, 216, 219, 226–228, 244); Bourdieu (1987); Bourdieu (1990); Bourdieu (1992a); Bourdieu (1997b: 21, 22, 122); Bourdieu (1998: 89); Bourdieu and de Saint Martin (1982); Bourdieu and Eagleton (1992: 112). See also, for example: Accardo (1997: 49, 216–217); Bonnewitz (1998: 80–82); Cicourel (2004); Cronin (1996); Hallett (2003); Hartmann (2005); Kraemer (2002); Lawler (2004); Pinto (1998: 102– 105); Susen (2007: esp. ch. 5, 7, 8); Susen (2011b: 176–184, 193–197); Susen (2011c: 367, 369–373, 375–376, 378–382, 384–388, 391–392, 395–397, 399, 401, 403, 405– 406, 408–409); Susen (2011d: 55, 62, 66, 68, 69, 70, 74, 78, 82); Susen (2013b); Susen (2013c); Susen (2013d); Susen (2014a: esp. 21–24); Susen (2014b: esp. 92–99, 103–105); Susen (2014[2015]: esp. 317–318, 330–334, 335); Susen and Turner (2011: xxii, xxvi–xxvii); Thompson (1992).
References
Accardo, A. (1997) Introduction à une sociologie critique. Lire Bourdieu, Bordeaux: Le Mascaret.
Addi, L. (2001) ‘Violence symbolique et statut du politique chez Bourdieu’, Revue française de science politique 51(6): 949–964.
Adkins, L. (2011) ‘Practice as Temporalisation: Bourdieu and Economic Crisis’, in S. Susen and B. S. Turner (eds), The Legacy of Pierre Bourdieu: Critical Essays, London: Anthem Press, pp. 347–365.
Albrecht, S. (2002) ‘Netzwerke als Kapital. zur unterschätzten Bedeutung des sozialen Kapitals für die gesellschaftliche Reproduktion’, in j. Ebrecht and F. Hillebrandt (eds),
Bourdieus Theorie der Praxis: Erklärungskraft – Anwendung – Perspektiven, Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag, pp. 199–224.
Baert, P. (2003) ‘Pragmatism versus Sociological Hermeneutics’, Current Perspectives in Social Theory 22: 349–365.
Beasley-Murray, j. (2000) ‘Value and Capital in Bourdieu and Marx’, in N. Brown and I. Szeman (eds), Pierre Bourdieu: Fieldwork in Culture, Boston, MA: Rowman & Littlefield, pp. 100–119.
Bohman, j. (1999) ‘Practical Reason and Cultural Constraint: Agency in Bourdieu’s Theory of Practice’, in R. Shusterman (ed.), Bourdieu: A Critical Reader, Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 129–152.
Boltanski, L. (2008) Rendre la réalité inacceptable. À propos de “La production de
l’idéologie dominante”, Paris: Demopolis.
Boltanski, L. and Thévenot, L. (1991) De la justification. Les économies de la grandeur, Paris: Gallimard.
——— (1999) ‘The Sociology of Critical Capacity’, European Journal of Social Theory
2(3): 359–377.
Boltanski, L., Honneth, A. and Celikates, R. (2014[2009]) ‘Sociology of Critique or Critical Theory? Luc Boltanski and Axel Honneth in Conversation with Robin Celikates’, in S. Susen and B. Turner (eds), The Spirit of Luc Boltanski: Essays on the ‘Pragmatic Sociology of Critique’, trans. S. Susen, London: Anthem Press, pp. 561–589.
Boltanski, L., Rennes, j. and Susen, S. (2010) ‘La fragilité de la réalité. Entretien avec Luc Boltanski. Propos recueillis par juliette Rennes et Simon Susen’, Mouvements 64: 151–166.
——— (2014[2010]) ‘The Fragility of Reality: Luc Boltanski in Conversation with juliette Rennes and Simon Susen’, in S. Susen and B. Turner (eds), The Spirit of Luc Boltanski: Essays on the ‘Pragmatic Sociology of Critique’, trans. S. Susen, London: Anthem Press, pp. 591–610.
Bonnewitz, P. (1998) La sociologie de P. Bourdieu, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. ——— (2002) Pierre Bourdieu. Vie, œuvres, concepts, Paris: Ellipses.
Bourdieu, P. (1975a) ‘Méthode scientifique et hiérarchie sociale des objets’, Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales 1: 4–6.
——— (1975b) ‘La lecture de Marx. Quelques remarques critiques à propos de “Quelques remarques critiques à propos de ‘Lire le capital’”’, Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales 5–6: 65–79.
——— (1976) ‘Le champ scientifique’, Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales 8–9 [2–3]: 88–104.
——— (1977a) ‘La production de la croyance. Contribution à une économie des biens symboliques’, Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales 13: 3–43.
——— (1977b) ‘Remarques provisoires sur la perception sociale du corps’, Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales 14: 51–54.
——— (1977[1972]) Outline of a Theory of Practice, trans. R. Nice, Cambridge: Camb- ridge University Press.
——— (1980a) Le sens pratique, Paris: Minuit.
——— (1980b) ‘Le capital social’, Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales 31: 2–4. ——— (1980c) ‘L’identité et la représentation. Éléments pour une réflexion critique sur
l’idée de région’, Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales 35: 63–72.
——— (1982a) Ce que parler veut dire. L’économie des échanges linguistiques, Paris: Fayard.
——— (1982b) Leçon sur la leçon, Paris: Minuit.
——— (1982c) ‘Les rites d’institution’, Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales 43: 58–63.
——— (1982d) ‘Introduction’, in P. Bourdieu, Ce que parler veut dire. L’économie des échanges linguistiques, Paris: Fayard, pp. 7–10.
——— (1982e) ‘L’économie des échanges linguistiques’, in P. Bourdieu, Ce que parler veut dire. L’économie des échanges linguistiques, Paris: Fayard, pp. 11–21.
——— (1982f) ‘La production et la reproduction de la langue légitime’, in P. Bourdieu,
Ce que parler veut dire. L’économie des échanges linguistiques, Paris: Fayard, pp. 23– 58.
——— (1982g) ‘La formation des prix et l’anticipation des profits’, in P. Bourdieu, Ce que parler veut dire. L’économie des échanges linguistiques, Paris: Fayard, pp. 59–95. ——— (1982h) ‘Censure et mise en forme’, in P. Bourdieu, Ce que parler veut dire.
L’économie des échanges linguistiques, Paris: Fayard, pp. 167–205.
——— (1984) ‘Espace social et genèse des “classes”’, Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales 52–53: 3–14.
——— (1985) ‘Effet de champ et effet de corps’, Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales 59: 73–74.
——— (1986) ‘The Forms of Capital’, in j. Richardson (ed.), Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education, New York: Greenwood, pp. 241–258. ——— (1987) ‘Agrégation et ségrégation. Le champ des Grandes écoles et le champ du
pouvoir’, Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales 69: 2–50.
——— (1990) ‘Droit et passe-droit. Le champ des pouvoirs territoriaux et la mise en œuvre des règlements’, Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales 81–82: 86–96. ——— (1990[1980]) The Logic of Practice, trans. R. Nice, Cambridge: Polity.
——— (1992a) Language and Symbolic Power, j. Thompson (ed.), trans. G. Raymond and M. Adamson, Cambridge: Polity.
——— (1992b) ‘Thinking Relationally’, in P. Bourdieu and L. Wacquant, An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology, Cambridge: Polity, pp. 224–235.
——— (1992[1977]) ‘On Symbolic Power’, in P. Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power, j. Thompson (ed.), trans. G. Raymond and M. Adamson, Cambridge: Polity, pp. 163–170.
——— (1993[1984]a) ‘For a Sociology of Sociologists’, in P. Bourdieu, Sociology in Question, London: Sage, pp. 49–53.
——— (1993[1984]b) ‘The Paradox of the Sociologist’, in P. Bourdieu, Sociology in Question, London: Sage, pp. 54–59.
——— (1994a) Raisons pratiques. Sur la théorie de l’action, Paris: Seuil.
——— (1994b) ‘Stratégies de reproduction et modes de domination’, Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales 105: 3–12.
——— (1995a) ‘La cause de la science’, Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales
106–107: 3–10.
