Memory's Image

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Memory's Image

B

y

Ruth Frost MFA

Submitted in fulfillment of the

requjrements for th

e degree of

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Signed statement of originality

This Thesis contains no material, which has been accepted, for a degree or diploma by the University or any other institution. To the best of my knowledge and belief, it incorporates no material previously published or wriuen by

another person except where due acknowledgement is made in the text.

Ruth Frost

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Signed statement of authority of access to copying.

This Thesis may be made available for loan and limited copying in accordance with the

Copyright Act 1968.

Ruth Frost

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Abstract

How can the process of memory be represented in visual terms? This project investigated the nature of autobiographical or recollective memory-using photographically derived, computer environments as a visual art form; and is based on some of the wealth of material written about 'memory' or 'memories' and recollection. My aim was to consider this material and use it as a basis for generating work that visually explored the attributes of

memory; that evoked the sensation of remembering one's past and, in particular, memories of childhood.

In researching the experience of recollective memory I identified the

memory image as pivotal. In brief, I proposed that central to the experience of remembering is the occurrence of a memory image. But when people say, 'I remember,' what are they actually seeing? Is there a visual language

of memory that is shared by us all? How might we see memory in our mind's eye? Secondly, what is the nature of this encounter? Could this experience be described as interactive? Would some form of interactivity be a useful addition to the work?

In considering the issue of interactivity as a viable option for the experience of remembering, I was to find firstly, that the process is primarily reacti ve-whether undertaken voluntarily or involuntarily- a cue provokes and we react Secondly, the interactive element I had questioned was vastly different to that which I had originally conceived. Instead of a trigger for an image it was an engagement with the image. Rather than being the cause of an action, the interactivity comes as we embroider and place it in a context We weave the fragments together to tell

a

story.

Interestingly, as I reviewed the visual characteristics of the memory image I found no clear demarcation. It appeared to be highly subjective, with comments ranging from unclear, tittle or no color and hazy, to highly detailed and vivid. In a similar manner the size and position of the image in space varied. The most important element for me was the notion of these images as small fragments of experience rather then complete episodes in themselves.

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In resolving how to evoke an experience of remembering, my work shifted from a screen-based CD-ROM style presentation to video installation.1

I

moved from the use of still photographs to the utilization of full screen digital video as I struggled to represent the memory image in a dynamic rather than static form- as remnants of lived experience rather than frozen instances of time. The thesis exhibition presents the viewer with these fragments. Interaction is present less in the triggering of the memory than

in the associations- in the narrative that is constructed and woven from remnants. Although the imagery does, at times, reference glimpses from my own childhood, I have also been concerned to evoke a more generic

representation of the memory image.

It is my hope that this project will contribute to an understanding of the visual nature of the memory image and its role in the experience of remembering.

I feel the work is separated from the more general field of video installation, e.g., Pipilotti Rist or Mariko Mori, in Lhal it docs nol engulf, surround or immerse. I see it more as a vehicle for contemplation.

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Acknowledgements

A very special thank you Lo David Stephenson, Anne MacDonald, Leigh Hobba, Patricia Scott,

Jonathan Holmes and Bill Hart for their support and advice, and to Robin Pettard for

support and specific help with Lingo programming. Thanks also to Greg Burke, Aaron Horsley and Michael Knott for help and

assistance. Finally I would like to thank my

partner, Phil Ben,

and

my son,

Sam, fo

r gi

ving

me the time and the space to complete this project.

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cv

121

3. List of Illustrations 124

4. Extract from Journal. Results of Compression Tests (July) 130 5. Directions for Director Movie Projectors 145

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1 3

PART ONE

INTRODUCTION TO THE PROJECT

I had no tangible memories of a childhood. A few glimmers-my mother died when I was two and a half, I remember the confusion and fear. I vaguely recall scenes from my father's remarriage perhaps a year and a half later. I have been described as a person without a past. Until recently l possessed none of llte usual memorabilia that accompanies a life- no photographs, no happy-snaps, no family myllls. My life, it seems, began with my first year of high school. At age twelve a light is turned on. Memory functions.1

In retrospect it was this experience that started me on my current endeavor.

The frustration of not being able to remember large parts of

m

y

childhood (except in confused tangles), and my attempts to fuse some sort of a sense offamily history, resulted in a desire to know more about the workings of recollection?

This research project explores the nature of autobiographical or recollective memory. How can the process of memory be represented in visualtem1s? By generating work that engages with tbe visual attributes of the memory image I have tried to evoke the sensation of remembering one's past. In researching the experience of autobiographical memory I identified the memory image as pivotal. But when people say, 'I remember,' what are they actually seeing? Is there a visual language of memory that is shared by us all? How might we see memory in our mind's eye? Secondly, what is the nature of this encounter? Could this experience be described as interactive? Would some form of interactivity be a useful addition to the work?

My interest in the memory image developed slowly. It evolved out of the unspoken rather than the spoken- what was hinted at but not said. As I questioned people about their recollections of childhood I realized I was being told small stories. They were about places, events, actions or people, some with quite involved contexts and narrative- others less so. Although imagery was implied no one told me what his or her memories actually

Unpublished catalogue for my exhibition, Saf-e House, at aGOG, Canbcn-a, 1995. Interestingly as the work progressed more of my own memories did surface and through my research I discovered that childhood amnesia is quite a common occurrence.

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looked like. I examined my own recollections. Often what came to mind first was a vague personal time-l:ine put together from information supplied

by other people. It was material at second hand and made the pictures that I carried in my mind all the more poignant and precious. I rather naively assumed that the appearance of these images implied an interaction and that this occurred at the level of triggering a memory image. I was to find the procedure a lot more subtle and complex.

In Part One of this exegesis I give a general introduction to the background behind the project and look at previous work. This is followed, in Part Two, by a discussion of my reading in areas relating to the study of memory. In this section I look at some of the theories describing the process of

remembering and recollection and consider the experiential aspect of this. Part Three is devoted to research on the visual characteristics of the memory image. In Part Four I discuss my own intentions in relation to the fields of still photography, new media and video installation. I acknowledge in particular the influences of Gary Hill, Bill Viola and ScruTiny and associates, although Ifeel my work is distinct in its concentration on evoking the experience of the recollective memory image. Part Five takes into consideration the development of my ideas and practice and finally, in Part Six I form my conclusions.

Background

Looking back at my still photographic work completed prior to this project, I can see many connections. My interest in the techniques of layering, blending and collage have developed from an early use of conventional photomontage, to layering objects on glass, to a more recent use of seamless digital manipulation. Similarly, in earlier work, the process of collecting imagery in order to create discreet photographic environments is

comparable to the method I use now of assembling 'collages' of digital video clips that comprise a piece. My attempts to immerse the spectator in the experience of the work have evolved from still photographic techniques for surrounding the viewer, such as large-scale and sequencing.

Untitled 198617 was a series of five large-scale black and white photographs depicting fantasized street views. Each image was 183 x 305cm. The size was important, as I wanted people to feel the possibility of walking into the

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Fig. I. Ruth Frost, Untitled 198617, silver gelatin photograph, 183x305cm.

depicted scenes. I gathered together specifically photographed images, assembling them and drawing into the final collage with oil-sticks and other media. The results were re-photographed so that I could have a seamless, smooth, photographic surface. I had decided to experiment with the use of collage for two reasons. Firstly, although based on an actual experience, these images were imaginary. I felt that collage gave me a license for imagination, not possible in the single print. Secondly, the idea of the so-called believable or truthful photographic image as a construct was important. What I was trying to do in quite a literal way was to draw a parallel between the construction of the photograph and our own fabrication of reality/truth. Both to an extent are contrived and distorted. Underlying much of my work at the time was the relationship that the photograph has with illusion and reality. The fact that they were photographs, even though collaged and drawn into, created a tension. It was important that the work had a direct anchoring in reaJity, so that it became, in effect, not a total fantasy created solely from imagination but involved a tension between the real and unreal, fiction and fact

Untitled 1988189 took this theme further. It consisted of a series of thirteen large-scale black-and-white photographic portrajts. The prints were 213 x 91.5cm, making the figurative images life-size and adding a mirror-like quality to the experience of viewing them. The work was based on a concept of the human subject as .a fluid, changing entity- a being itself constructed from dream, fantasy and myth. It dealt with the notion of this subject as image- an identity trapped and alienated within its own

[image:11.497.100.434.61.244.2]

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Fig.2. Ruth Frost, Untitled 1988/89, silver gelatin photograph, 213 x 91.5cm.

construction. This time the layering was done with wet tissue paper and chemicals. The tissue was placed onto the photographic paper and the

chemicals splashed across it as I exposed the print, partially disintegrating the figure. Once more I made mockups from the ensuing forms and drew into them before re-photographing.

Light and Lunatic Foliage (1991) and Syllables of Fear and Tenderness (1993) were both inspired by magic realist fiction and poetry and by the writings of Luce Irigary. In each series of work I was trying to make environments that gave visual fonn to what I perceived as this more tactile, sensual, 'female' sensibility. Once again the images were constructed, but the process had become important only as a means to an end.

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Light and Lunatic Foliage consisted of a series of hand-colored black-and -white images; each 146 x 96cm. I still used the technique of collage and drawing, however I supplemented this by placing objects and plants onto layers of glass and re-photographing the collage through these.

Fig.3. Ruth Frost, Light and Lunatic Foliage, 1991, hand-colored silver gelatin photograph, 146 x 96cm.

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I used the same technique in Syllables of Fear and Tenderness. These were hand-colored Liquid-Light images, each 57 x 49cm.4

The work, although not entirely successful, was a turning point for me. It marked a shift. away from more abstract concerns and themes, to recognition of the importance of the personal in my work.

Fig.4. Ruth Frost, Syllables of Fear and Tenderness, 1993, hand-colored, liquid-light photographs, 57 x 49cm.

My last body of work prior to commencing this PhD was my first attempt to employ the image in a less traditional way and dealt directly with issues of my own childhood memories. In 1994 I started using the computer to compose my images. At the time it felt like a logical step. I had been collaging and constructing with the camera. The computer (or more

specifically the program PhotoShop) was recommended as a way to make the process easier. Of course this was not the case, as I was merely presented

Liquid Light is a liquid photographic emulsion that can be painted onto various surfaces. An image can then be exposed and developed as for a normal black-and-white print.

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with a new set of problems. PhotoShop however, did give me a tool for layering and blending imagery in ways that had previously not been possible.

Fig.S. Rulli Fros/, Untitled,.fi"om /he series Childhood Memories- 95 Megabytes. 1994195, computer manipulated photographs on polished nickel silver, 12.6xl /.9cm.

Childhood Memories-95 Megabytes (1994/95) was the result of these experiments. The title was drawn from the concept of computer memory. At the time I had 95 megabytes worth of imagery. The work was an attempt to visually reconstruct a personal history for myself using scavenged family snapshots. I was trying to take possession of my childhood-personalize it - re-inhabit it-reinvent it. The imagery was loosely based on

Spanish/Mexican ex-voto images because of their naivete and connotations

of miracles and intervention. I combined photographs of house interiors with the one picture I possessed of myself as a child, as well as images of plants and insects. At times I placed objects directly onto the scanner. I manipulated, blended and 'cooked' on the computer. The resulting

colored, highJy charged imaginary images were transferred onto polished

nickel silver plates. They were quite small ( 12.6 x ll.9cm) and tactile and, with their burnished metal surface, vaguely reminiscent of early

daguerreotypes. I sat them on clear Perspex shelves. I was intrigued by the

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potential clash between the technology used and the domesticated palpable

imagery I sought.

Fig.6. Ruth Frost, Untitled.from the series Safe House, 1995, computer manipulated photographs on polished nickel silver, 12.6xl 1.9cm.

Childhood Memories became incorporated into a larger body of work called Safe House (1995). I continued to use the technique of blending images I

had photographed with family snapshots, and transferring them onto the

nickel silver plates. By this stage I had found more childhood photographs to use and there was less obvious fantasy.

Fig.7. Installation view of images from Safe House.

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5

6

This then was the stage my work had reached before I embarked on my current undertaking. At the time I had a strong desire to do more with the imagery. I felt it needed sound and movement. I was becoming concerned with enhancing the encounter with the work itself. I wanted to engage the viewer in a more encompassing manner. My use of the word memory

started to mean the recollection of past events and experiences .

. . . (W]e carry in our minds the remains of distant experiences that tie us to the past in a special way. Places that have long ceased to exist and people who have disappeared from our lives continue to survive in our recollections, sometimes as ghostlike phantoms we can barely fathom and sometimes as crystal-clear portraiL'l with all the vibrancy of the here and now. 5

My interest shifted towards the experience of remembering. How might this be evoked, what was involved?

The phenomenal experience of memory is an ill-defined area. One person who has systematically included sensory information in his research is

William Brewer. He claims that it is visual imagery that is regularly experienced with remembering; thoughts, emotions and auditory imagery

are also encountered, but much less frequently.6 Although I do invoke sound in my work I feel that individuaJ thoughts, actions and emotions are too introspective to be adequately dealt with. Similarly, the sensations of taste, smell or touch, although recognized as sometimes occurring during recollection, cannot be sufficiently invoked. It is visual imagery or the

mental picture that has been identified as the dominant sensation during

recollection and this is where I have concentrated my efforts.

Another area that is currently the subject of a great deal of research is the

veracity of autobiographical memory. This is a valid area of interest but has little to do with my investigation of the experience of remembering and, consequently, I have barely touched on the debates surrounding this issue. Donald Spence highlights my feeling on the matter when he concedes that

DanielL Schacter, Searching for Memory: Vle Brain, the Mind and the Past, New York: Basic Books, 1996. p. 15.

William F. Brewer, "Memory for Randomly Sampled Autobiographical Events." in Remembering Reconsidered: Ecological and Traditional Approaches to the Study of Memory, Ulric Neisser and Eugene Winograd (eds.), Cambridge, England: Can1bridge University Press, 1988, p. 67.

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7

the truth of memories may not be the same as the truth of the world. They can be both true and false. 'True with respect to its inner content, a faithful report of a moment of time, and false with respect to a certain slice of the outside world. '7

To begin my current research I felt that the following questions needed to be addressed. Firstly, what did I mean by the term autobiographical memory? Secondly, what are the processes involved in remembering? Thirdly, what are the visual characteristics of the memory image? How is it recalled? And lastly, could that experience be described as interactive? I have attempted to answer these questions in the following chapters.

Donald P. Spence, "Passive Remembering," in Remembering Reconsidered: Ecological and Traditional Approaches to the Study of Memory, Ulric Neisscr and Eugene

Winograd (eds.). p. 316.

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PART

T

WO

AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL OR RECOLLECTIVE

MEMORY

Introduction

In this chapter I discuss some of the many theories that abound in the area of memory research. I do not pretend to be an expert but rather have drawn together various arguments to try and elucidate answers to four of the questions raised in the introduction. These were: what did I mean by the term autobiographical memory; what are the processes involved in

remembering; how are memories recalled; and lastly, could that experience be described as interactive?

In brief, I further define autobiographical memory to include the term recollective memory, described as a reliving of an earlier phenomenal experience. I inquire into the actualities of how and why events are remembered. In the section on recall I investigate voluntary and

involuntary retrospection. The former involves a strategy of deliberate

sea

r

c

hin

g

whi

le the l

a

tter i

s typified

by a m

emory

tha

t s

uddenly appears, as

if out of nowhere. It seems to be generally agreed that the retrieval of memories involves a cue that prompts or provokes. In the case of voluntary memory these can be quite deliberate and specific; with involuntary

memory, however, the process is far more vague. Prompted by our

encounters with the environment jn general the specific cues arc hard or generally impossible to pin down or ascertain. Both types of recall may be involved but I would argue that involuntary recollective memories are a phenomenon experienced frequently by most people; and, that the

experience of remembering is primarily reactive; whether undertaken voluntarily or involuntarily- a cue provokes and we react.

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8

9

10

II

What Is Autobiographical Memory

In the case of autobiographical memory that material consists of events that we have personally experienced- or, to put it another way, of our pe11;onal experience.c; of events.8

To gain a better understanding of what I was dealing with I needed to gain a

rough working knowledge of the characteristics of autobiographical

memory. In fact it was only as I started to negotiate the terms that I realized

that my use of the word 'memory' had a specific name (i.e.

autobiographical memory) and that not all remembering is necessarily autobiographical. Consider, for example, the type of memories that might be drawn on to learn new skills. Procedural memory allows us to acquire

these. An implicit memory reveals itself without conscious knowledge that one is remembering anything at all. Semantic memory contains our general knowledge.9 Semantic memories are 'the abstracted words, concepts, and

rules stored in our long term memory whose context of acquisition was long ago forgotten. '10

Endel Tulving coined this term when he differentiated

between semantic and episodic memory; the latter one preserves the

experiential aspect of an event. An episodic memory is about a specific

event that occurred at a particular time and place. Autobiographical memories are generally perceived as episodic (with some reservations).11

What then is autobiographical memory? Autobiographical memories are

about our selves, about our particular experiences of events. Martin Conway

outlines their characteristics as having a strong relationship to the self, they

Ulric Neisser, "Nested Structure in Autobiographical Memory," in Autobiographical Memory, David C Rubin (ed.), Cambridge, Cambridgeshire: Cambridge University Press, 1986, p. 71.

SeeSchacter, Searching for Memory, p. 17, pp. 134-135 and pp. 161-162 for a general description of these terms.

Gordon H. Bower, "A Brief History of Memory Research," in The Oxford Handbook of Memory, Endel Tulving and Fergus Craik (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 22.

For example William Brewer states that this definition is too broad, since episodic is also used to describe the laboratory testing of memory. See Brewer, "What is

Autobiographical Memory," in Autobiographical Memory, David C Rubin (ed.), p. 33. Martin Conway also argues against the term. He proposes that autobiographical memories contain both semantic and episodic knowledge. See Martin A. Conway, "Autobiographical Memory," in Memory, Elizabeth Ligon Bjork and Robert A Bjork (eds.), San Diego: Academic Press, 1996, p. 166. I think the argument here is about the organization of memory rather than the processes involved. Tulving's emphasis is on semantic and episodic memory as two separate systems but he does not deny that the act of remembering involves the use of both. See Endel Tulving, Elements of Episodic Memory, Oxford, Oxfordshire: Clarendon Press, 1983, pp. 66-68.

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13

14

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contain multiple types of knowledge (sensory-perceptual details and a more abstract, factual knowledge) and he stresses that these are personal

interpretations rather than veridical records.11 William Brewer gives the most succinct description. In previous works, he categorized autobiographical memory into four basic types.13 (1) The 'personal memory' (others would call this episodic), or the recollection of a specific 'incident from one's past'. (2) In addition to the personal memory an incident can also be

preserved as an 'autobiographical

fact'

or

'non-image representation

'.

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Generic personal memories, which results from exposure to a set of repeated

events. These can also include imagery but not necessarily of a specific experience. (4) A 'self-schema', which he describes as generic, 'non -imaginal' knowledge about one's self.

Since then Brewer has further refined and focused his thinking. He now uses the term recollective memory (as opposed to personal) to describe the remembrance of a particular episode from a person's past, and sees this as a

subclass of the larger set of autobiographical memories. Recollective memory 'typically appears to be a "reliving" of the individual's phenomenal experience during that earlier moment.' 14 It can contain

information about behavior, location, people, objects, thoughts and

emotions. This is mostly expressed as a mental image although at times other types of imagery (for example, auditory imagery) can accompany it. There is a strong belief in the veracity of the image generated and, that the incident was personally experienced.15 Because of its connection with

ind

ividual remembered

experience

and imagery,

this

is

a

l

so

where

I have

focused my efforts. Thjs was, in fact, what I had imagined when I so

casually used the term 'memory'.

Conway, "Autobiographical Memory," in Memory, Bjork and Bjork (eds.), pp. 166-169.

Brewer, "Memory for Randomly Sampled Autobiographical Events." in Remembering Reconsidered, Neisser and Winograd (eds.), pp. 22-23. See also, Brewer, "What is Autobiographical Memory," in Allloviograpl!ical Memory, David C Rubin (ed.), pp. 34-35.

Brewer, "What is Recollcctive Memory?" in Remembering Our Past: Studies in Autobiographical Memory, David C. Rubin (ed.), Cambridge, New York, N.Y., U.S.A.: Cambridge University Press. 1995, p. 60.

Ibid., pp. 60-61.

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16

17

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What are the Processes Involved

Most memory theorists embrace the v.iew that we store a variety of attributes about an event, including its meaning within a context, its sensory qualities, the

environment in which the event occurred, and our thoughts and emotions at the time. The trace lies dormant, along with a vast number of traces for other events.16

How does one remember? Memory is typically described as a three-stage process of encoding, storage and retrieval.17

Encoding refers to the initial acquisition or placing of information into memory. The encoding process leaves a residue or memory trace (sometimes called an engram) in the nervous system, which conserves the effects of experience across time. If an event is to be retained in a durable form it must be encoded by associating it in a meaningful way with knowledge that already exists in memory. Daniel Schacter calls this elaborative encoding and notes that this is not done with most of our day to day experiences.18

Conway's discussion of the process stresses the segmentation of ongoing happenings and the importance of self-relevance and personal interpretation in registering an incident. For Conway, experience can only ever be selectively encoded. In fact, if the event cannot be integrated with existing knowledge structures or 'current themes and goals of the self', it may not be captured at all}9

Storage refers to the maintenance of these memory traces. One of the more influential models of this process surmises memory as a series of mental stores. A very basic description of this involves information from the environment entering the system and flowing through to a limited capacity short-term memory where it hovers briefly. At this stage it can either be completely lost or transferred from short-term to a separate long-term memory (encoding).20

Autobiographical memory is seen as part of this long-term memory complex.

Carla C. Chandler and Ronald P Fisher, "Retrieval Process and Witness Memory," in Memory, Bjork and Bjork (eds.), p. 494.

Henry L Roediger and Melissa J Guynn, "Retrieval Processes," in Memory, Bjork and Bjork (eds.), p. 197.

Schacter, Searching for Memory, p. 45.

Conway, "Autobiographical Knowledge and Autobiographical Memories," in

Remembering Our Past: Studies in Autobiographical Memory, David C. Rubin (ed.), pp. 86-87.

I am indebted to Scott C. Brown, and Fergus Craik, "Encoding and Retrieval of Information," in The Oxford Handbook of Memory, Tulving and Craik (eds.), p. 93, for this description.

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21

13

Increasingly, theorists are positing alternative frameworks, although the expressions •short-term' and 'long-term' are often kept for convenience. Scott Brown and Fergus Craik refer to a levels-of-processing view, which emphasizes the role of perception in memory, particularly in the encoding process. This view proposes that rather than being held in a number of different stores, incoming stimuli are processed to different levels-'from "shallow" or sensory levels to .. deep", or meaningful levels. '21

However one might choose to regard these opinions what is agreed, is that the more deeply or elaborately the information is processed, and the more frequently it is rehearsed, the better it will be retained. In a twelve-year

study of her own memories Marigold Linton noted that it was features such as emotion, importance, and how often the memory was rehearsed, that ensured its continuing existence.:u

To accept a level-of-processing view also questions whether short-term and long-term memory are indeed separate systems. To this end James Nairne describes short-term memory as a portion of permanent (or long-term) memory that is currently active.23

Memory here is seen in neural terms. Our memories as 'patterns of connections among nerve cells,'24 _represented in the brain by complex networks of neurons. Here, everything we perceive is represented as a unique set of activated neurons, which will fade unless it has emotional significance or can be associated with things we already know. These patterns of connection become more deeply embedded with repeated activation. Permanent knowledge is represented by the strength of attachments between the different neurons that participate in encoding an experience.

Most of the knowledge and experiences that accumulate in a

lifetime lie dormant, undisturbed, in the human mind. Occupying

the immediate 'present', we find only fragments of knowledge

-Ibid, p. 94.

Marigold Linton, "Ways of Searching the Contents of Memory," in Autobiographical Memory, David C Rubin (ed.), p. 64.

James S. Nairne, "Short-Term/Working Memory," in Memory, Bjork and Bjork (eds.),

p. 103. He is not the only one to do so. See Gordon H. Bower, "A Brief History of Memory Research," in The Oxford Handbook of Memory, Tulving and Craik (eels.), p. 22.

Dr. Barry Gordon quoted in "Memory" by Geoffrey Cowley and Anne Underwood, Newsweek, 15 June 1998, p. 51.

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25 26

27

thoughts and images that subjectively appear to be in an active

state.25

In this model something in the environment (the cue) stimulates the relevant portions of permanent memory and a pattern of activity results-the sho rt-term memory trace. This happens anytime we recall something from memory. This is the process of remembering. These are our memories.

Organ

i

zation

of Autobiograp

hi

ca

l

Memory

How then is this information bound together and organized in long-term memory? Again, opinions are varied but the concept of an hierarchy seems widely accepted. Conway's representation is of three layers of knowledge; lifetime periods, general events and event-specific knowledge (ESK).26 Lifetime periods or themes are lengthy segments of life assumed to contain general personal knowledge and usually measured in periods of years (e.g. when I went to

Art

School). These can be used to generate cues that access associated general events. General events are prolonged records of

extended and repeated episodes occurring over weeks and months which, in

turn

, ca

n be used to access more event-specific knowledge, or individual

episodes, including sensory-perceptual details (or imagery). ' ... [A]cross the three layers of knowledge, hierarchical knowledge structures may be formed such that cues available in a lifetime period index a particular, usually large, set of general events that in turn index other general events and ESK.'v

As well as being applied to the structure of autobiographical memory as a whole, individual episodes or events are also seen as being structured in an hierarchical way. Ulric Neisser sees memory traces (he uses the term mental representations) as being 'nested' into one another in the same way that events in real life are nested one within the other. He refers to the higher levels in the hierarchy as context and the lower levels as details and describes our use of memory in directed recall as either moving 'downward from

Nairne, "Short-Term/Working Memory," in Memory, Bjork and Bjork (eds.), p.102. Conway, "Autobiographical Memory," in Memory, Bjork and Bjork (cds.), pp. 170-176. See also Stephen 1 Anderson and Martin A. Conway, "Representations of Autobiographical Memories," in Cognitive Models of Memory, Martin A Conway (ed.), Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1997, p. 241.

Conway, "Autobiographical Memory." in Memory, Bjork and Bjork (eds.), p. 176.

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28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36

context or upward from particulars. '28 Brown and Craik use the term levels.29 The lower or shallower tevels represent the sensory aspects of an event and the higher or deeper levels represent the more derived aspects-the significance, meaning, or context. They hypothesize that stimuli

encoded only in terms of their sensory features will not be remembered well, and that those encoded in terms of meaning will be better retained.30

Schemas, Summarizations and Generic Memories

... [f) he notion that memories in general are supported and shaped by schematic structures is now very widely accepted.31

'Schemas capture clusters of organized expectations and represent abstract knowledge about some domain. •32

They are our mental representations of the general characteristics of things and are posited as playing a major role in our memories of events.33 As we experience similar events our

autobiographical information is reorganized and transformed. This allows

us to process large amounts of information by summarizing consistencies and regularities in our experience.34 It becomes harder to recall the individual episodes. What is recalled is an underlying structure. Neisser calls these generic memories (he also uses the term repisodic35) and

emphasizes that they can persist even after the loss of the separate events that gave rise to them.36 Sometimes what seems to be the most recent

occurrence, or an isolated memory, remains accessible but these memories,

Neisser, "What is Ordinary Memory the Memory of?" in Remembering Reconsidered,

Neisser and Winograd (eds.), p 364.

Brown and Craik, "Encoding and Retrieval of Information," in The Oxford Handbook of Memory, Tulving and Craik (eds.), p. 94.

Ibid., p. 95.

Ulric Neisser and LisaK. Libby, "Remembering Life Experiences." in The Oxford Handbook of Memory, Tulving and Craik (eds.), p. 315.

Bower, "A Brief History of Memory Research," in The Oxford Handbook of Memory, Tulving and Craik (eds.), p. 24.

I am indebted to Neisser for this description. "What is Ordinary Memory the Memory

of?" in Remembering Reconsidered, Neisser and Winograd (eds.). p. 357. Lawrence Barsalou provides additional support for this in his discovery that

summarization features in autobiographical memory more than specific incidents. See Lawrence Barsalou, '1'he Content and Organization of Autobiographical Memories," in Remembering Reconsidered, Neisser and Winograd (eds.), p. 203.

Neisser, "Nested Structure in Autobiographical Memory," in Autobiographical Memory David C Rubin (ed.), p. 79. Also see Neisser, "John Dean's Memory: A Case Study,"

in Memory Observed: Remembering in Natural Contexts, Ulric Neisscr (ed.), San Francisco: W.H. Freeman, 1982, p. 158.

Neisscr, "What is Ordinary Memory the Memory of?" in Remembering Reconsidered,

Neisser and Winograd (eds.), p. 360.

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37

38

39

he claims, can be deceptive 'for although it seems to represent only a single

episode, we may actually be using it to stand in for an entire extendure.' 37

This includes the generic images mentioned by Brewer, which result from

repeated exposure to similar experiences.38

Craig Barclay stresses the importance of schemas in the remembrance of our

everyday activities and explains that we interpret and fit our

autobiographical recollections to suit.

People do not simply forget the details of everyday events ... Instead, when infonnation is remembered, acquired

autobiographical self-knowledge drives the reconstruction of plausible, but often inaccurate. elaborations of previous

experiences. Memories for most everyday life events are, therefore, transformed, distorted, or forgotten.39

Schemas are likewise used to explain the transference of individual episodes

into semantic memory. Linton describes how her personal memories are

transformed and abstracted into a more generalized semantic knowledge.

'As similar events are repeated, the specific configurations - the patterns

that

link

familiar elements to form unique episodes - themselves become a

well-established potentially confusable part of semantic knowledge. '40

Forgetting

Generic memories and schemas are named as one of the prime reasons that

we forget the individual instances of our lives. Neisser cites interference

among similar items as being a major cause of everyday forgetting.

Neisser, "Nested Structure in Autobiographical Memory," in Autobiographical

Memory, David C Rubin (ed.), p. 79. His use of the tenn extendure has been adopted from Marigold Linton and is an activity or situation in which an individual is repeatedly involved or which happens over a considerable period of time. See his explanation on p. 74.

Brewer, "What is Autobiographical Memory," in Autobi,Qgraphical Memory, David C Rubin (ed.), p. 30.

Craig R. Barclay, "Schematization of Autobiographical Memory," in Autobi,Qgraphical Memory, David C Rubin (ed.), p. 89.

Linton, "Transformations of Memory in Everyday Life," in Memo1y Observed, Ulric Neisser (ed.), p. 81.

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41

43

44 4S

'When a number of experiences are very much alike, their common

structure tends to become salient even as their individual characteristics are

forgotten. '41 A second reason is that the memory traces or engrams themselves, may have disappeared.41 The strength of connections between

neurons that represent a particular experience might also become weakened

if that trace is not maintained and rehearsed over time. Conway notes that it

is the indices to ESK which become degraded and lost, it is more unusual to

forget the general events of our lives.43 Initial encoding may be at issue

here too-how deep was the elaboration? Or, if we think of the hierarchical

structures previously mentioned, an event may be encoded at different levels

with the meaning and context more deeply encoded than other more

vulnerable sensory aspects. A third reason why we may be totally oblivious

to parts of our past is that we simply do not encounter the relevant cues or

stimulus capable of triggering them.

Memory Retrieval

Tulving ... emphasized that remembering is a product of information from two sources: encoded information or 'memory traces' and retrieval information.44

Whether or not an event can be remembered often depends on the cues that are used to stimulate or search memory. Tulving defines retrieval cues as

those especially salient 'aspects of the individual's physical and cognitive

environment that initiate and influence the process of retrieval.' 45 He claims that 'all retrieval is always cued'. In real life (as opposed to the laboratory)

these cues are perceived or made manifest in our continual interchange with

our surroundings.

Encoding and retrieval are intrinsically bound together. Successful retrieval

of a memory relies to a large extent on whether information in the retrieval

Neisser, "What is Ordinary Memory the Memory of?" in Remembering Reconsidered,

Neisser and Winograd (eds.), pp. 360-361. See also Michael C. Anderson and James H.

Neely, "Interference and Inhibition in Memory Retrieval," Memory, Bjork and Bjork (cds.), pp. 237-302.

Gordon Bower describes a progressive decay or erosion of the synaptic changes in the brain that had encoded the original experience. See Bower, "A Brief History of Memory Research," in The Oxford Handbook of Memory, Tulving and Craik (eds.), p. 12. Conway, "Autobiographical Knowledge and Autobiograph.ica.l Memories," in Remembering Our Past, David C. Rubin (ed.), p. 72.

Roediger and Guynn, "Retrieval Processes," in Memory, Bjork and Bjork (cds.), p. 231. Tulving, Elements of Episodic Memory, p. 171.

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t\6 47 48 49 50 51 52

cue was incorporated into the initial encoding or memory trace. Schacter

asserts that the 'likelihood of later recalling the event depends on the extent

to which a retrieval cue reinstates or matches the original encoding; 46 _cit_in_g

as most important the ability of the cue to restore the subjective perception

of that event.47 This could also include factors such as a person's mental

state at the time of encoding and reinstating the context (i.e. revisiting the

scene).48 Conway's description of retrieval in autobiographical memory is

one of a complicated process of effortful construction across layers of

knowledge and often characterized by wrong information, false starts and

blockages.49 He describes this process as dynamic; as taking time to evolve,

and as resulting in 'complex mental representations'. He does

acknowledge, however, as does Tulving, that at times this process may take

place unconsciously, in the background, allowing the emergence of

seemingly spontaneous memories.50

C

on

s

tru

ct

ion

Remembering is not there-excitation of innumerable fixed, lifeless and fragmentary traces. ll is an imaginative reconstn1ction, or construction, built out of the relation of our attitude towards a whole active mass of organized past reactions or

experience, and to a little outstanding detail which commonly appears in image or in language fonn.51

There are a number of issues involved with remembering as an act of

construction. Firstly, the idea of memory as a construct is seen in

opposition to memory as a copy of reality- where a personal memory is

seen as a veridical copy of the original event.51 _A_s_{Neisser ha}_{s o}_bserved_,_a

memory of an incident is dependent on what was perceived, rather than on

Schaefer, Searching for Memory, p. 60.

Ibid, p. 61.

See Brown, and Craik, "Encoding and Retrieval of lnfonnation," in The Oxford Handbook of Memory, Tulving and Craik (eds.), pp. 100-101 for a description. Anderson and Conway, "Representations of Autobiographical Memories," in Cognitive Models of Memory, Conway (ed.), p.219.

Anderson and Conway, "Representations of Autobiographical Memories," in Cognitive Models of Memory, Conway (ed.), pp. 242-243. Tulviog, Elements of Episodic Memory, p. 33.

Sir Frederic C. Bartlett, Remembering, London: Cambridge University Press, 1932, p. 213.

Robert Buckhout declares this a nineteenth century belief that implies what we see has a direct correlation to the physical world. See Robert Buckhout, "Eyewitness

Testimony," in Memory Observed, Neisser (ed.), p. 116.

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S3

54 .ss

56 51

what actually happened.S3 In addition, the encoding process itself involves

associating infom1ation with what is already stored in memory. ' ... [O]ur

memories are built on our elaboration's ... '54

Secondly, there is the notion of the retrieval of a memory as being an act of

construction. How do we remember? Does a cue somehow activate a

quiescent engram in the mind - is this all a memory is? Neisser, in equating

the hierarchicaJ storage structure of memory to the nested structure of

reality, says that it is our knowledge of this structure in reality that makes

construction in remembering almost inevitable. Even though most of the

information at every level is probably forgotten we are still confident of

their existence.

Recall is almost always constructive. No matter how well you remember an event, the information available will not specify all the context that once gave it meaning or all the molecular

actions that were once nested inside it. If you care to try, you can bujld on what remains ... 55

Tulving also emphasizes remembering as a constructive activity 'that uses

components from episodic memory (the engram) as well as semantic

memory (the cue) ... .s6 In other words the retrieval cue combines with the

engram to create something else. 57

Conway differentiates between autobiographical knowledge and

autobiographicaJ memories asserting that 'autobiographical memories are

not stored in long-term memory, but rather are constructed on the basis of

knowledge sampled from the autobiographicaJ knowledge base.'58 Here,

our memories are not discreet whole elements stored in long-term memory

Neisser, "Nested Structure in Autobiographical Memory," in AuJobiographical

Memory, David C. Rubin (ed.), p. 74. Conway further reinforces this, reOecting that it

is the self that directs attention and determines which event features are strongly

encoded. See Conway, "Autobiographlcal Memory," in Memory, Bjork and Bjork (eds.), p. 168.

Schacter, Searching for Memory, p 56 .

Neisser, "Nested Structure in AutobiograpbjcaJ Memory," in Alllobiographical

Memory, David C Rubin (ed.), p. 78.

Tulving, Elements of Episodic Memory, p. 180.

Sec Elizabeth F. Loftus and John C. Palmer, "Reconstruction of Automobile Destruction," in Memory Observed, Neisscr (cd.).

Conway, "Autobiographical Knowledge and Autobiographical Memories," in Remembering Our Past, David C. Rubin (ed.), p. 76.

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59 60

61

62

but are forged during the process of retrieval. They are 'constructed rather

than retrieved. '59

In these accounts sensory details and images as well as meaning, context,

narrative etc. are linked to form a personal memory during the process of remembering rather than being inherently in existence.

Invo

lu

ntary Memory

The past is hidden somewhere outside the realm, beyond the reach of intellect, in

some material object (in the sensation which that material object will give us) which we do not suspect. And as for that object, it depends on chance whether we come upon it or not before we ourselves mustdie.60

Many of the ideas that have been thus far considered draw heavily upon

voluntary recall, where one is either trying to remember a specific incident

or engaged in a deliberate search of memory. Proust likened the act of

voluntary memory to looking at a picture book or at snapshots. To him,

this was 'intellectual' memory and a mediocre substitute, containing nothing of the experience and sentiment of a past moment.61 Interestingly

Ernest Schachtel, in formulating his hypothesis for childhood amnesia,

echoes this sentiment. He refers to adult memory as conventional and

cliched. 'Conventionalization is a particular form of what one might call

schematization of memory. Voluntary memory recalls largely schemata of

experience rather than experience. '62 In other words both Proust and

Sc

h

ac

ht

el

i

den

tif

y

t

he

pro

d

uct

o

f v

ol

u

n

ta

r

y

r

e

ca

ll

as t

ota

ll

y

lac

kin

g any o

f

the qualities of the original experience- a ghostly, stifled reflection at best.

I should stress here that by involuntary memory I mean a recollective

memory brought about by involuntary recall; for Proust, these involuntary

memories completely recreated a former experience with imagery, thoughts,

and emotions. It was as if, for an instant, he lived simultaneously in the past and the present. 'The marine dining room of Balbec ... had sought to

shatter the solidity of the Guennantes mansion, to force open its doors, and

Ibid., p. 85.

Marcel Proust, Remembrance ofThings Past, Vol. 1, trans. C.K. Scott Moncrieff, New York: Random House, 1924-1925, p. 34.

Marcel Proust, Remembrance ofThin:gs Past, Vol. 2, trans. C.K. Scott Moncrieff and Andreas Mayor, New York: Random House, 1927-1930, p. 1015.

Ernest G. Schachtel, Metamorphosis, New York: Basic Books, 1959, p. 294.

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63 64 6S 66 67 70 71

for an instant had made the sofas around me sway and tremble. '63

Esther

Salaman's portrayal of involuntary memory is similar. 'There is another

kind of memory of experience, which comes unexpectedly, suddenly, and

brings back a past moment accompanied by strong emotions, so that a 'then'

becomes a 'now'. '64 And Donald Spence implies a comparable shift in

reality when he queries whether involuntary memories may be unknowingly

substituted for lived experience.65

I should stress here that these accounts do vary in intensity. Proust, for

example, seems to border on hallucination, while Salaman (who incidentally

accuses him of exaggeration) claims no difference in vividness between her

voluntary and involuntary memories. The contrast for her was in the

accompanying emotions and the suddenness or the surprise element involved.66 At the very least one could say that involuntary memories are

associated with mental imagery, and that they can involve additional

impressions.

How do these memories emanate? An altered state of consciousness seems

to be a prerequisite for their emergence.67 Salaman refers to this

condition.68

But Spence implicates Proust's encounters if we take into

account his definition of this shift in consciousness as a lapse of attention;

perhaps one could say that the mjnd is arrested.69 As well as a shift in

consciousness, there is a catalyst. Occasionally this is an obvious cue. For

example, to add another fragment in response to a conscious memory, as

happened with Salaman.70 Or they may be triggered by such diverse items

as the 'sound of a voice', 'a patch of sunlight' or a 'buzzing fly' .71 Many

of Proust's memories were triggered by a physical sensation. The taste of a

Madeleine cake; the feel of paving stones under his feet; the touch of a

Proust, Remembrance of Things Past, Vol. 2, trans. Moocrieff and Mayor, p. 1003. Esther Salaman, A Collection of Moments: A Study of Involuntary Moments, Harlow: Longman, 1970, p. 11.

Spence, "Passive Remembering," in Remembering Reco11sidered, Neisser and Winograd (eds.). Although his discussion centers on autobiographies 1 feel it is relevant.

Salaman, A Collection of Moments, p. 22.

Spence, "Passive Remembering," in Remembering Reconsidered, Neisser and Winograd (eds.), p. 321.

Salaman, A Collection of Moments, p. 28.

Spence, "Passive Remembering," in Remembering Reconsidered, Neisscr and Winograd (eds.), p. 315.

Salaman, A Collection of Moments, p. 24.

Ibid., p. 17.

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7l 73 74 7$ 76 77 78

napkin. Each provoked a 'sensation common to past and present,' which

resulted in a flood of memory.72

AJan Richardson notes that most of us have encountered the sudden

appearance of a long forgotten past event in a strongly imagined form and he names the contact senses (smell or touch) rather than distance senses like

sight or hearing as the stimulus.73 I think, (as does Schachtel), that the

emphasis should simply be on the senses. Taste, touch, smell, sight, the hearing of a sound or even the occurrence of a particular body posture.'"

Gaston Bachelard assumes something similar of the body when he claims memories as being physically inscribed in us. 'The feel of the tiniest latch

has remained in our hands, '75 as though 'we ourselves were dissolved in this

fluid of the past. '76 And Proust too, reminds us of the body's retrospection, of the way it preserves pieces of the past. ' ... (A]nd my body, the side upon which I was lying, loyally preserving from the past an impression which my mind should never have forgotten brought back before my eyes the

glimmering flame of the night-light in its bowl of Bohemian glass. '77

These confusing gusts of involuntary memory seem somehow more mysterious

than our strategic searches. They seem to appear out of nowhere; they pop into our mind. With memories that are cued by the senses or diverse contact

with the environment, it may be hard at times to determine the source, and

this is even more true for memories triggered by a particular body posture or touch. Perhaps the answer is simply that one stumbles by chance on a cue, however vague it may be, that reinstates an aspect of a coded engram

enabling the memory to be retrieved. Perhaps physical sensations, or the senses, are more likely to trigger appropriate sensory fragments in memory.

In Walter Benjamin's discussion of Proust, he alludes to an observation by Freud concerning memory, 'memory fragments are often most powerful

and most enduring when the incident which left them behind was one that never entered consciousness. '78 In other words only that which is not

Proust, Remembrance ofTI!iltgs Past, Vol. 2, trans. Moncrieff and Mayor, p. 1003. Alan Richardson, Menta/Imagery, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969, p. 138. Schachtel, Metamorphosis, pp. 311-312 and p. 315.

Gaston Bachelard, The Poetics of Space, trans. Maria Jolas, Boston: Beacon Press, 1994, (1958), p. 15.

Ibid., p. 57.

Proust, Remembrance ofThings Past, Vol. 1, trans. C.K. Scott Moncricff, p. 5. Walter Benjamin, Illuminations, edited and with an introduction by Hannah Arendt, trans. Harry Zolm, NewYork: Schocken Books, 1969, cl968, p. 160.

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79 80 81 82

83

consciously experienced can become part of what bas been defined as

involuntary memory. Is this what Proust_refers to when he declares that it is

what the mind has forgotten that is recalled to us most vividly?79 Schachtel

also cites Freud when he uses the phrase 'memory traces of the

unconscious' and describes their apparent immunity to voluntary recall.80

It is as though they touched directly tl1e unconscious memory trace, the record left behind by a total situation out of the past, whereas voluntary recall tries to approach and construct this indirect[y, coached and deflected by all those ideas, wishes, and needs which tell the present person how the past could, should or might have been.81

As previously stated he attributes lhe recovery of these traces to the

repetition of a past sensation. Whatever the cues one acknowledges, what is

being posited here is that the process of involuntary recall somehow taps

directly into remnants of an actual event as opposed to a more constructed

and

sty

li

ze

d schemata of

that experience.

Proust has elevated involuntary memory to almost legendary proportions,

but is there really a difference between voluntary and involuntary

recollections-apart from the fact that the former is 1ntended and the latter

is not? Dorthe Berntsen's study of the two forms found that involuntary

memories referred more to specific events and were less rehearsed then

those elicited voluntarily.sz They occurred more frequently when attention

was 'diffuse' and were often triggered by quite particular external cues

deemed central to the context of the remembered event (Proust's 'sensation

common to past and present').83 What Berntsen is saying is that the two

ways of recollecting- voluntary or involuntary- will engender quite

different memories. Voluntary recollection usually involves written or

verbal language as cues and these are often too indJstinct or general to

access specific fragments. Conversely, the many 'accidental, situational

cues' encountered in everyday life are often too exclusive to elicit a

summarized event. She concluded that involuntary retrieval is far more

Proust, Remembrance of Things Past, Vol. 1, trans. C.K. Scott Moncrieff, p. 488.

Schachtcl, Metamorphosis, p. 309.

Ibid., p. 312.

Dorthe Berntsen, "Voluntary and Involuntary Access to Autobiographical Memory," Menwry, 1998, 6 (2), p. 128.

Ibid., p. 135.

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84 85 86

likely to access individual incidents (and by implication sensory fragments

or imagery) than voluntary retrievaJ.84

I likewise find it conceivable that voluntary recall may find it easier to access

'top down' hierarchies and may completely miss surviving fragmentary

details (if they are still there), especially when we think in terms of a cue

needing to provoke the subjective perception of an event. The more

sensually oriented cues, however, should stimulate sensory infonnation in a

more direct manner. Much has also been made of an altered state of

consciousness. but Berntsen points out that diffuse rather than focused

attention simply allows more details to enter consciousness rather than it

being important in its own right.85 What distinguishes one from the other is

the product of the recall. If I am reminiscing or trying to remember a

particular event, what usuaiJy comes to mind are facts, an internal

monologue or story, or sometimes an image, usually a familiar one.

Involuntary memories however, would seem to evoke imagery far more

frequently and, according to Berntsen, 'such memories appear to be an

everyday phenomenon for most people. '86

I do not wish to make a case for one theory as against the other; but rather

to acknowledge that involuntary memories are a common occurrence. I

would also stress that although voluntary retrieval may appear at first to be a

more laborious task, in essence the mechanisms are similar. Something still

springs to mind, although this may be repeated (Conway's cyclic retrieval)

until the search is concluded. And JastJy, the product of the recall may

differ.

To clarify the experiences of voluntary and involuntary memory Schacter

uses the term associative retrieval to describe an automatic triggering process

that uses the hippocampus and medial temporal lobe. Voluntary recall is

seen as a strategic retrievaL It uses areas of the prefrontal cortex to generate

hints and cues to interrogate the medial temporal system.

Ibid, pp. 135-137. Ibid., p. 136.

Dorthe Berntsen, "Involuntary Autobiographical Memories," Applied Cognitive Psychology, Vol. 10, 1996, p. 435.

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87

88

89

If the frontal system generates a cue that has a match in memory, the medial temporal system win automatically 'spit out' an engram that combines with tl1e cue. Without the aid of the frontal system the medial. temporal system must simply 'wait' for an appropriate cue to come along and make contact with a stored

engram.87

Here the difference between involuntary and voluntary recall is merely that

the former involves direct triggering (that is usually cued by the physical environment) and the latter involves internally generated cues.

Is Recollective Memory Interactive?

Long-term memory continuously interacts with the Oeeting slice of time that we

experience as the present. 88

Can the experience of recollective memory be described as interactive? One would certainly think so, especially if we take Tulving's description of recollection as being stimulated by our interaction with the environment. This is certainly where I first concentrated my efforts. But to interact is to act reciprocally: it implies a mutual exchange.

To return to active or voluntary remembering; even if one accedes to the

constructionist theories of memory previously referred to, I think that the experience is of immediacy and is more akin to that of involuntary

memory. It appears to be tacitly agreed that these processes mostly happen in the background without our awareness.89 Something triggers the mind and a response occurs even if this process is repeated many times. I would argue that even when undertaken voluntarily the experience of

remembering is mostly passive. The stimulus or cue, whether internal or external, provokes a reaction. The hippocampus spits out a mental picture or response~ we are in the presence of a memory image or more.

Schacter, Searching for Memory, p 68.

Roger Brown and Richard J. Hermstein, "Icons and Images," in Imagery, Ned Block

(ed.), Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1981, p. 44.

Anderson and Conway, "Representations of Autobiographical Memories," in Cognitive Models of Memory, Martin A Conway (ed.), pp. 242-243. TuJving, Elements of Episodic Memory, p. 33. Conway, "Autobiographical Knowledge and

Autobiographical Memories," in Remembering Our Past, David C. Rubin (ed.), pp. 81 -82. Brewer, "What is RecoUective Memory?" in Remembering Our Past, David C. Rubin (ed.), p. 24.

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90

91

9l

I would like to make a distinction between the experience of recollective

memory, which involves the initial recall of imagery or other details; and reminiscing, which involves communication and is verbal. Whether to others or ourselves our memories are usually told- a detail comes to mind and we verbally elaborate. Barclay describes bow we construct a personal history out of fragments of information and how this history is revised and changed over time. We build a sense of self from our autobiographical memories,

evaluating experiences and constructing stories.90 This gives meaning to our

lives. ' ... [R]eminiscing is a fundamental process for establishing our sense of self and our relationships with others ... '91 We organize, we rearrange and, most importantly, we learn appropriate narrative forms so that our anecdotes can be understood.

Rather than being a simple response to a cue or stimulus, the interaction

comes as we try to make sense of the fragments; as we bind and weave our interpretations; as we create our story.

In Conclusion

One possibility is that recollective experience is most powerfully felt when a memory extensjvely features ESK, and when ESK does not feature in the access of

autobiographical knowledge then remembering is characterised by a feeling of

knowing rather than an experience of remembering (Conway, 1992).91

So far I had ascertained what autobiographical (or for my purposes

recollective) memory was and the various ways in which it functioned. But

these procedures, although important and answering in part my original

questions, still left one major factor unaccounted for. It is the memory image that is nominated as paramount to the experience of recollective

memory.93 Without it we merely have an autobiographical fact- or

someone else's story- if that. Conway differentiates between a 'feeling of knowing' and the actual experience of remembering. It is highly specific

Barclay, "Autobiographical Remembering: Narrative Constraints on Objectified Selves," in Remembering Our Past, David C. Rubin (ed.), pp. 94-123.

Robyn Fivush, Catherine Haden, and Elaine Reese, "Remembering, Recounting, and Reminiscing: The Development of Autobiographical Memory in a Social Context." in Remembering Our Past, David C. Rubin (ed.), p. 342.

Conway, "Autobiographical knowledge and Autobiographical Memories" in Remembering Our Past., David C. Rubin (cd.), p. 89.

Tulving, Elements of Episodic Memory, p. 185. Brewer, "What is Rccollcctive Memory?" in Remembering Our Past. David C. Rubin (ed.). p. 60.

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knowledge (or to use Conway's term ESK) in the form of imagery and

sensory details that defines a memory as uniquely belonging to oneself; as

having been personally experienced. It is the memory image that enables us

to believe our memories. In the following chapter I investigate the visual

characteristics of this image.

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95 96

PART THREE

THE

MEMORYIMAGE

These questions presuppose assent to some sort of a proposition regarding the 'mind's eye' and the 'images' which it sees ... This points to some initjaJ fallacy ... It is only by a figure of speech that I can describe my recollection of a scene as a 'mental image' which I can 'see' with my 'minds eye' ... I do not ee it ... 94

Introduction

It is the memory image that enables us to believe our memories, but what does it look like? There is research available on mental imagery but very little description. Its orientation is more towards whether people do

experience imagery during recollection; what parts of the brain are utilized;

how visual imagery can aid in learning; how well it can be retained; or the

impact of images on other cognjtive tasks? Even in autobiography,

memories are often described in terms of what happened as opposed to what

they looked like. A lot of my exploration therefore has involved inference, gleaning the odd sentence, with extensive searching of my own memory.

Francis Galton did conduct a study published in 1880, which I will refer to frequenlly.95 His questionnaire was designed to tease out the different degrees of vividness inherent in mental imagery and, it addressed such questions as: Illumination- was the image dim or clear? Definition- how well defined were the objects? And colors-were they distinct or natural?

William Brewer has also consistently documented the sensory aspects of the memory image. In comparison to visual perception, he describes

recollective memory images as being 'dim', 'unclear' (although they may contain some detail), 'sketchy' and 'unsteady', with a point of view from either the original perspective or from an observer's position."

As quoted by Francis Gallon, "Statistics of Mental Imagery," Mind 5, July, 1880, p. 302.

Gallon, "Statistics of Mental Imagery," pp. 301-318.

Brewer, "What is Recollective Memo.-y?" in Remembering Our Past, David C. Rubin (cd.), pp. 60-61.