Long Term Defence Study

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WWW.FORSVARSMAKTEN.SE

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Long Term Defence Study

2014-09-10

LtCol Johan Hansson – SwAF HQ

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Long Term Defence Studies

Three main objectives:

• To identify uncertainties.

• To create some scenarios which demonstrates the coming challenges rather than an exact forecast.

• To develop a flexible, robust and adaptive Defence Force which can meet the coming challenges.

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Two concepts – identical method

Perspective Study

Has the objective to fulfil the need for a political decision basis, when government so requests, e.g. in their preparation of Defence Bills or related to the work in the Parliamentary Defence

Commission.

Long Term Military-Strategic Analysis

Forms the base for internal decisions by the Supreme Commander, concerning the direction of the Armed Forces, e.g. the yearly Armed Forces Strategic Directional Document.

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Armed Forces directional documents

10 years

”Beyond and beside”

current plans

”Beyond and beside”

current political directives

”Now”

Perspective Study - Aim and role

The aim is to identify changes or trends, both externally and within the Armed Forces, leading to a potential need to change the strategic directives to the Armed Forces, and in what ways this should be done.

The role is to identify “crossroads” and study different alternatives and plausible development of the future, beyond and beside defence policy decisions and current plans.

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Defence Review Process

2013

Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4

2014

Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4

2015

Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4

General Election

Defence Bill to the Parliament

Budget Proposal

PerP Study

Defence Commission

Report 1

Planning Instrux

Defence Commission

Report 2

Budget Proposal

Budget Proposal SwAf

Answer

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5

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6 1. The significance

of Asia

2. The significance of the Arctic region

3. The development of the trans-Atlantic link

4. USA focussing towards Asia

5. The European influence

8. Energy dependence

9. Globalization and focus on sustainable flows / choke-points

Global Strategic Trends

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7. Ecological challenges 6. The Western influence in the Middle East

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3 ?

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3. Russian military reform – non contact war

1. Un-coordinated Europé with less military spending

2. US drawdown in Europe

Europe

US

Russia

Increased Russian military capabilty and freedom of action 4. US and China in ASIA – in-

creased focus on military capabilities.

The Military Balance

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Military Technology Trends

Long range strike weapons

Cyber

Unmanned system Cyber capacity

Space based capacities Cooperative Engagement

Capability

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Military Technology Trends

Cyber

Capability

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Military Technology Trends

Cyber

Capability

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Military Technology Trends

Cyber

Capability

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Force Development

Cooperative Engagement Capability

CEC – Cooperative Engagement Capability

Air Sea Battle

Requirements – examples:

Exact time sync between nodes Navigation according to WGS 84

Radars with ability for continuous tracking Low sensitivity to jamming

Position

Distance to target Bearing to target Doppler

Fast data links:

Parallel high speed transmission and sensor fusion

Position

Distance to target Bearing to target Doppler

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”Conclusions” - Change in use of military force

Long range weapon systems Unmanned systems

Unconventional capabilities

Lower threashold - military force

System of systems / CEC OODA

Cyber

Computer &

communication Technologies

Space

Stealth

Automation EWS

(DEW) Sensorfusion &

signalprocessing

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Means:

Long distance weapons Means:

Cyber warfare

Target:

Command and Control

Target:

Tech. infrastructur

Target:

- Lines of communications - Military strategic important areas

Means:

Mission based standing units

Future Caracter of Conflict in Our Area

A future armed attack involving Sweden, will seek to defeat our Armed Forces from a distance, before exposing its own personnel to danger. It can

be done through specific target selection and precision strikes with non- contact warfare, special operations and cyber operations. Infrastructure and

nodes, especially civil and military headquarters, logistics hub, air bases and ports are expected to be particularly vulnerable to kinetic and electronic

warfare. Not least because of its vulnerability and links to their physical and electromagnetic signatures.

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Long Term Study – concept

Missile Defence

Cyber Space CEC Drones

Koncept – Re-Active

• Endurnace

• Secure Inrastructure

• Cyber Defence

Koncept – Pro Active

• Offensive

• Long Distance Missiles

• Cyber

• Operative Depth

Koncept – Active

• Manouvre Warfare

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The Strategic Challange

How to create a credible threshold effect with the armed forces as an instrument?

Capabilities

Treshold

Geography

Strategic context & sitution

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Future Character of Conflicts

A future operational commander will most likely be much concerned with cyber and

‘e‐dimensions’ as he will with traditional environmental factors. This may necessitate a rebalancing of our environmental focus over the next 20 years, more towards the virtual environments.

Attacks in the future could come from a greater variety of different sources: from seemingly harmless civilians such as ‘hactivists’ in cities far from an operational theatre that may elect to disrupt operations and homeland infrastructure and from

‘swarm’ attacks in any environment that may be initiated and launched through the Internet, including social media; to increasingly automated conventional or ballistic missile attack but also ‘swarm’ attacks from unmanned systems.

Our strategic communications will need to be increasingly agile in response to the likely tempo of activity.

The future operating environment will be more uncertain; more dynamic; more demanding and more complex, from physical to virtual aspects. It will require ever more agile forces, that can adapt and operate in dynamic ways across all

environments – including once committed – exploiting the latest ‘means’ against an array of threats and challenges.

2* Workshop Question

How will technological parity impact the operating environment?

What will be the vulnerabilities of ‘high-end’ technologies in the operating environment?

What aspects of the operating environment will challenge the ability to better understand the adversary?

What impact will unmanned/automated systems have on the operating environment?

What impact will increasing urbanisation, particularly on the littoral, have on the operating environment?

In what ways will an adversary seek to directly influence the UK population?

What will constrain an actors’ ability to reconstitute capability in the operating environment?

What will the impact of cyber activity in the operating environment?

What countermeasures will be seen against unmanned systems?

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Thank You!

LtCol Johan Hansson – SwAF HQ