PIRACY
PEOPLE V. LOL-LO SARAW Facts:
A boat in which there were eleven men, women and children arrived between the islands of Buang and Bukid in the Ducth East Indies and was subsequently surrounded by six vintas manned by twenty four moros all armed. They first asked for food but once on the boat, took themselves all of the cargo, attacked some of the men and brutally violated two of the women. All of the persons on the boat placed on it holes were made on it with the idea that it would submerge, but after eleven days of hardship they were succoured. Two of the moro marauders were Lol-lo and Saraw who later returned their home in Sulu, Philippines where they were arrested and charged with the crime of piracy.
Issue:
Did the court of first instance in the Philippines have jurisdiction over Lol-lo and Saraw? Held:
Yes, piracy is a crime not against any particular state but against all mankind. It may be punished in the competent tribunal of any country where the offender may be found or into which he may be carried. Nor does it matter that the crime was committed within the jurisdictional three-mile limit of a foreign state. Lol-lo who raped one of the women was sentenced to death. There being the aggravating circumstance of cruelty, abuse of superior strength and ignominy.
PEOPLE V. TULIN Facts:
A cargo vessel owned by the PNOC shipping and transport corporation, loaded with barrels or kerosene, regular gasoline and diesel oil was absorbed by 7 fully armed pirates. The pirates including the accused Roger P. Tulin, Virgilio Loyola and Andres Infante detained the crew and completely took over the vessel. The vessel was directed to proceed to Singapore where the cargoes where unloaded, transferred and sold under the direct supervision of accused Cheong San Hiong. Thereafter, the Bessel returned to the Philippines. All the accused were charged with qualified piracy or violation of PD 532. The accused Cheong argues that the trial court erred in convicting and punishing him as an accomplice when the acts allegedly committed by him were executed outside the Philippine waters and territory.
Issue:
Whether or not the Philippines is without jurisdiction to try a crime committed outside the Philippine waters and territory.
As regards the contention that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of accused, appellant Hiong since the crime was committed outside the Philippine waters suffice it to state that unquestionably, the attack on M/T Tabangco and its cargo were committed in PH waters, although the captive vessel was later brought to Singapore where its cargo was off-loaded and such transfer was done under accused-appellant Hiong’s direct supervision.
Although PD 532 requires that the attack and seizure of the vessel and its cargo be committed in PH waters. The disposition by the pirates of the vessel and its cargo is still deemed part of the act of piracy. Hence, the same need not to be committed in Philippine waters.
PEOPLE V. CATANTAN Facts:
The Pilapil brothers Eugene and Juan were fishing in the sea around 3 kilometers away from the shores of Tabogan, Cebu. Suddenly, another boat caught with them. They were later identified as the accused Emilio Catantan and Jose Ursal alias “Bimbo”. They boarded the pump boat of the Pilapils and pointed his gun at Eugene. They hogtied Eugene and covered him up and ordered Juan to ferry them to Daan Tagobon using their pump boat. However, as they went farther out into the open sea the engine stopped running. They saw another boat operated by Juanito and ordered the Pilapil brothers to approach the boat. Catantan boarded Juanito’s pump boat and ordered him to take them to mungaz. Pilapil brothers took the change and escaped. The regional trial court found Catantan and Bimbo guilty of violating PD 532.
Issue:
Whether or not Emilio Catantan violated PD 532 and not grave coercion. Held:
There were piracy and not grave coercion where as part of the act of seizing their boat. The occupants of the vessel were forced to go elsewhere other than their place of destination. This case falls squarely within the concept of piracy. While it may be true that Eugene and Juan were compelled to go elsewhere other than their place of destination, such compulsion was part of the act of seizing their boat.
ARBITRARY DETENTION
ASTORGA V. PEOPLE Facts:
The offended parties together with SPO3 Andres Cinco Jr and SPO1 Rufo Capoquian were sent to the Island of Daram Western Samar to conduct intelligence operations on possible
illegal logging activities. There they met petitioner Astorga, the Mayor of Daram, who turned out to be the owner of the boats found at around 4:30 to 5:00pm being constructed at Brgy. Locob-Locob. A heated altercation ensued between petitioner and the DENR team. Petitioner called for reinforcement and moments later, a boat bearing ten armed men, some wearing fatigues arrived at the scene. The DENR team was then bought to petitioner’s house in Daram, where they had dinner and drinks. The team left at 2:00am.
Issue:
Whether the petitioner is guilty of Arbitrary Detention. Held:
Petitioner Astorga is acquitted of the crime of Arbitrary Detention on the ground of reasonable doubt. The determinate factor in Arbitrary detention, in the absence of actual physical restraint, is fear. The court find no proof that petitioner instilled fear in the minds of the private offended parties. Furthermore, he admitted that it was raining at that time. Hence, it is possible that the petitioner prevented the team from leaving the island because it was unsafe for them to travel by boat.
CAYAO V. DEL MUNDO Facts:
An administrative complaint was filed by Fernando Cayao with the office of the Court Administrator for charging Judge Justiano Del Mundo with abuse of authority, Cayao, a bus driver overtook another bus and as a consequence, Cayao almost collided head on with an oncoming owner-type jeepney owned by Judge Del Mundo. Cayao was brought by the policemean in the Sala of Judge Del mundo and was compelled by Judge Del Mundo to choose from 3 alternative punishment: a) to face charge of multiple homicide b) revocation of is driver’s license c) to be put in jail for 3 days. Cayao chose confinement for 3 days and was forced to sign a “waiver if detention” by Judge Del Mundo.
Issue:
Whether or not Judge Del Mundo is guilty of the charge of warrantless arrest and arbitrary detention.
Held:
Judge Del Mundo used and abused his position of authority in intimidating the complaint as well as the members of the police force into submitting to his excesses. The complaint was not accorded any of the basic rights to which an accused is entitled. Cayao was deprived from the presumption of innocence, the right to be heard by himself and counsel, the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him as well as the right to an impartial and public trial.
MILO V. SALONGA Facts:
Accused Captain Tuvera Sr. was charged with Arbitrary Detention together with other private persons for maltreating petitioner Valdez and for deliberately depriving the same of his constitutional liberty without any legal ground. Accused respondent then filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute the elements of said crime and that the proofs adduced at the investigation are not sufficient to support the filing of the information. Petitioner Assistant Fiscal Milo filed an opposition, averring that the accused respondent was not a public officer who can be charged with arbitrary detention.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused respondent, being a barrio captain, can be liable for the crime of arbitrary detention
Held:
Yes, the public officers liable for arbitrary detention must be vested with authority to detain or order the detention of persons accused of a crime. One need not to be a police officer to be chargeable with arbitrary detention. It is accepted that other public officer like judges and mayors who act with abuse of their functions, may be guilty of this crime. A perusal of the powers and functions vested in mayors would show that they are similar to those of a barrio captain except that in the case of the latter, his territorial jurisdiction is smaller.
PEOPLE V. GARCIA Facts:
Carlos Garcia, Patricio Botero and Luisa Miraples were accused of illegal recruitment. It was alleged that they represented themselves as incorporators and officers of Ricorn Philippine International Shipping Lines, Inc. and that Ricorn is a recruitment agency for seamen. It was later discovered that Ricorn was never registered with the securities and exchange commission and that it was never authorized to recruit by the POEA. Both were convicted but Botero appealed.
Issue:
Whether or not Botero is a mere employee of Ricorn. Held:
No, it was proven by evidence that he was introduced to the applicants as the vice president of Ricorn. When he was receiving applicants, he was receiving them behind a desk which has a nameplate representing his name and his position as a vice president of Ricorn Philippine International Shipping Lines, Inc.
REBELLION OR INSURRECTION
Facts:
Following the issuance by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo of Presidential
Proclamation No. 1017 on 24 February 2006 declaring a "State of National Emergency," police officers arrested Crispin Beltran on 25 February 2006, while he was en route to Marilao, Bulacan, and detained him in Camp Crame, Quezon City. An inquest was held and Beltran was later charged with rebellion before the RTC. Beltran moved for a judicial determination of probable cause.
Issue:
Whether or not Beltran can be charged with Rebellion Held:
No. Rebellion under Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code is committed —
By rising publicly and taking arms against the Government for the purpose of removing from the allegiance to said Government or its laws, the territory of the Republic of the Philippines or any part thereof, or any body of land, naval, or other armed forces or depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives.
The elements of the offense are:
1. That there be a (a) public uprising and (b) taking arms against the Government; and 2. That the purpose of the uprising or movement is either —
(a) to remove from the allegiance to said Government or its laws: (1) the territory of the Philippines or any part thereof; or
(2) any body of land, naval, or other armed forces; or
(a) to deprive the Chief Executive or Congress, wholly or partially, of any of their powers and prerogatives.
Thus, by its nature, rebellion is a crime of the masses or multitudes involving crowd action done in furtherance of a political end. The evidence before the panel of prosecutors who conducted the inquest of Beltran for Rebellion consisted of the affidavits and other documents. The bulk of the documents consists of affidavits, some of which were sworn before a notary public, executed by members of the military and some civilians. Except for two affidavits, executed by a certain Ruel Escala (Escala), dated 20 February 2006, and Raul Cachuela (Cachuela), dated 23 February 2006, none of the affidavits mentions Beltran. In his affidavit, Escala recounted that in the afternoon of 20 February 2006, he saw Beltran and other individuals on board a vehicle which entered a chicken farm in Bucal, Padre Garcia, Batangas and that after the passengers alighted, they were met by another individual. For his part, Cachuela stated that he was a former member of the CPP and that (1) he attended the CPP's "10th Plenum" in 1992 where he saw Beltran; (2) he took part in criminal activities; and (3) the arms he and the other CPP members used were
purchased partly from contributions by Congressional members, like Beltran, who represent party-list groups affiliated with the CPP.
The allegations in these affidavits are far from the proof needed to indict Beltran for taking part in an armed public uprising against the government. What these documents prove, at best, is that Beltran was in Bucal, Padre Garcia, Batangas on 20 February 2006 and that 14 years earlier, he was present during the 1992 CPP Plenum. None of the affidavits stated that Beltran committed specific acts of promoting, maintaining, or heading a rebellion as found in the DOJ Resolution of 27 February 2006. None of the affidavits alleged that Beltran is a leader of a rebellion. Beltran's alleged presence during the 1992 CPP Plenum does not automatically make him a leader of a rebellion.
In his Comment to Beltran's petition, the Solicitor General points to Fuentes' affidavit, dated 25 February 2006, as basis for the finding of probable cause against Beltran as Fuentes provided details in his statement regarding meetings with Beltran and the other petitioners attended in 2005 and 2006 in which plans to overthrow violently the Arroyo government were allegedly discussed, among others. However, what the allegations in Fuentes' affidavit make out is a case for Conspiracy to Commit Rebellion, punishable under Article 136 of the Revised Penal Code, not Rebellion under Article 134. Attendance in meetings to discuss, among others, plans to bring down a government is a mere preparatory step to commit the acts constituting Rebellion under Article 134. Even the prosecution acknowledged this, since the felony charged in the Information against Beltran in the criminal case is Conspiracy to Commit Rebellion and not Rebellion. The Information merely alleged that Beltran, San Juan, and others conspired to form a "tactical alliance" to commit Rebellion. Thus, the RTC Makati erred when it nevertheless found probable cause to try Beltran for Rebellion based on the evidence before it.
PEOPLE V. SILONGAN Facts:
On March 16, 1996, businessman Alexander Saldona went to Sultan Kudarat with three other men to meet certain macapagal Silongan. They arrived in the morning and were able to talk to Macapagal concerning the gold nuggets that purportedly being sold by the latter. The business transaction was postponed and continued in the afternoon due to the death of Macapagal’s relative and he has to pick his brother in Cotabato City. Around 8:30 pm. As they headed to the highway, Macapagal ordered the driver to stop. Suddenly, 15 armed men appeared. Alexander and his other companions were tied up and blindfolded. He described the abductors as Macapagal’s brothers. Alexander’s companion were able to escape but Alexander was released after the payment of P12,000,000 ransom.
Issue:
Whether it is necessary that there is actual payment of ransom in the crime of kidnapping. Held:
No, it is not necessary for the crime to be committed. At least one overt act of demanding ransom is enough. What the law requires is the purpose of extorting money as ransom.
PEOPLE V. OLIVA Facts:
Lorenzo Oliva, father of the complainant M, was charged with rape and was convicted of the said crime. Accused filed an appeal questioning the testimony of his daughter M and further alleged that it was not him who had raped his daughter but his brother-in-law, Benjamin, who has committed the act.
Issue:
Whether or not the testimonies and credibility of the complaint witness is in doubt and questionable.
Held:
Courts usually give credence to the testimony off a girl who is a victim of sexual assault particularly if it constitutes incestuous rapes, because normally no person would be willing to undergo the humiliation of public trial and to testify on the details of her ordeal, were it not to condemn injustice. The grave man of rape is carnal knowledge of a woman under any circumstances provided by law. In addition, mere denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, has no weight in law and cannot be given any greater evidentiary value than the positive testimony of a rape victim.
PEOPLE V. LOVEDIORO Facts:
Elias Lovedioro with three other companions fatally shot SPO3 Jesus Lucilo while the latter was walking along Burgos St. Albay public market. The victim died on the same day from massive blood loss. On November 6, 1992, Elias Lovedioro was then charged of the crime of murder and was subsequently found guilty. Lovedioro then appealed the decision contesting the verdict of murder instead of rebellion. It was confirmed by the prosecution’s principal witness that Lovedioro was a member of the New People’s Army (NPA).
Issue:
Whether or not the accused-appellant committed rebellion or murder. Held:
The killing of the victim, as observed by the solicitor general, offered no contribution to the achievements of the NPA’s subversive claims, in fact there were no known acts of the victim’s that can be considered as offending to the NPA. Evidence shows that Lovedioro’s allegation of membership to the NPA was conveniently infused to mitigate the penalty imposable upon him.
Facts:
About March 15, 1945, Amado Hernandez and other appellant were accuse of conspiring, confederating and cooperating with each other, as well as with the thirty-one (31) defendants charged in the criminal cases of CFI of Manila.
They were accused of being members of PKP Community Party of the Philippines which was actively engaged in armed rebellion against the government of the Philippines. With the party of HUKBALAHAP, they committed the crime of rebellion causing murder, pillage, looting plunder, etc. enumerated in 13 attacks on government forces or civilians by HUKS.
Issue:
Whether or not the crime of rebellion can be complexed with murder, arson, or robbery. Held:
The court ruled that murder, arson, and robbery are mere ingredient of the crime of rebellion as means “necessary” for perpetration of the offense. In Hernandez Doctrine, rebellion cannot be complexed wit common crimes such as killings, destruction of property, etc., committed on the occasion and in furtherance thereof. Rebellion constitutes ONLY ONE CRIME.
PEOPLE V. DASIG Facts:
Appellants Rodrigo Dasig, Edwin Nunez and six others were charged together of shooting Redempto Manadtad, a police officer, as he died while performing duties. Dasig confessed that he and the group of Edwin Nunez killed Pfc. Manadtad. He likewise admitted that he and Nunez were members of the Sparrow unit and their aliases were “Armand” and “Mabi”. The extra-judicial confession of appellant was signed by him on every page thereof with the first page containing a certification likewise signed by him. However, Dasig contends that it is legally defective. He claimed that the custodial interrogation was done while he was very sick.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused-appellant is liable for extra-judicial killing of the deceased and participated in the act of rebellion.
Held:
Yes, accused Rogelio Dasig is found guilty of participating in an act of rebellion beyond reasonable doubt and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of 8 years imprisonment.
SEDITION
PEOPLE V. CABRERA Facts:
Police officers conducted a buy-bust operation against appellant after receiving information from residents of Sitio Galaxy, Tangke, Talisay, Cebu and a report from a confidential asset of the illegal drug activities of appellant. At about 4:30 p.m., poseur-buyer, together with the confidential asset, approached appellant who was standing outside his house. PO1 Palconit gave appellant two marked P50.00 bills, while the latter handed to him two plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance. Thereupon, PO1 Palconit made the pre-arranged signal by touching his head with his right hand. His back-ups then rushed to the scene and simultaneously therewith PO1 Palconit arrested the appellant. He then put the markings "EC" on the two plastic sachets and brought the same to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory for forensic examination.
The chemistry report from the PNP Crime Laboratory later revealed that the white crystalline substance with a total weight of 0.11 gram inside the two plastic sachets marked with "EC" tested positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a dangerous drug.
Issue:
Whether or not there is compliance with Section 21 of the implementing rules of RA 9165 Held:
With regard to the non-compliance by the police officers with Section 21 of the Implementing Rules of RA 9165 as alleged by appellant in his Supplemental Brief, particularly the lack of physical inventory of the seized specimen and the non-taking of photograph thereof, the Court notes that appellant raised the same only in this appeal. The records of the case is bereft of any showing that appellant objected before the RTC regarding the seizure and safekeeping of the shabu seized from him on account of the failure of the police officers to maintain an unbroken chain of custody of the said drugs. The only time that appellant questioned the chain of custody was before the CA but not on the ground of lack of physical inventory or non-taking of photograph, but on the alleged gap between the time of confiscation of the specimen and the time of its submission to the PNP Crime Laboratory. But even then, it was already too late in the day for appellant to do so.
Appellant should have raised the said issue before the trial court. In similar cases, the Court brushed aside the accused's belated contention that the illegal drugs confiscated from his person were inadmissible because the arresting officers failed to comply with Section 21 of RA 9165. "Whatever justifiable grounds may excuse the police officers from literally complying with Section 21 will remain unknown, because [appellant] did not question during trial the safekeeping of the items seized from him. Objection to evidence cannot be raised for the first time on appeal; when a party desires the court to reject the evidence offered, he must so state in the form of an objection. Without such objection, he cannot raise the question for the first time on appeal.
PEOPLE V. UMALI Facts:
The complex crime of which appellants Narciso Umali, were found guilty was said to have been committed during the raid staged in the town of Tiaong, Quezon, between 8:00 and
9:00 in the evening of November 14, 1951, by armed men. The raid took place resulting in the burning down and complete destruction of the house of Mayor Marcial Punzalan including its content valued at P24,023; the house of Valentin Robles valued at P10,000, and the house of one Mortega, the death of Patrolman Domingo Pisigan and civilians Vicente Soriano and Leocadio Untalan, and the wounding of Patrolman Pedro Lacorte and five civilians.
During and after the burning of the houses, some of the raiders engaged in looting, robbing one house and two Chinese stores; and that the raiders were finally dispersed and driven from the town by the Philippine Army soldiers stationed in the town led by Captain Alzate. Issue:
Whether or not the accused-appellants are liable of the charges against them of complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, frustrated murder, arson and robbery?
Held:
Yes. The appellants were guilty of sedition, multiple murder, arson, frustrated murder and physical injuries. For the crime of sedition each of the appellants is sentenced to 5 years of prision correctional and to pay a fine of P4,000; for each of the three murders, each of the appellants is sentenced to life imprisonment and to indemnify the heirs of each victim in the sum of P6,000; and for the arson, for which we impose the maximum penalty provided in Article 321, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code, for the reason that the raiders in setting fire to the buildings, particularly the house of Punzalan they knew that it was then occupied by one or more persons, because they even and actually saw an old lady, the mother of Punzalan, at the window, and in view of the aggravating circumstances of nighttime, each of the appellants is sentenced to reclusion perpetua and to pay the indemnities mentioned in the decision of the lower court. It shall be understood, however, the pursuant to the provisions of Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code the duration of all penalties shall not exceed 40 years. In view of the heavy penalties already imposed and their long duration, the court finds it unnecessary to fix and impose the prison sentences corresponding to frustrated murder and physical injuries; however, the sums awarded the victims (Lacorte, Ortega, Anselo, Rivano, Garcia and Lector), by the court below will stand. With these modifications, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs. PEOPLE V. NABONG
Facts:
The appellant is an attorney and he had been retained to defend one Juan Feleo against a charge of sedition that had been preferred against him. Feleo was in those days a recognized leader of the communists in Nueva Ecija, and was related by marriage to the appellant. After Feleo had been arrested and taken away, Ignacio Nabong delivered a speech in a meeting. In the course of this speech Nabong criticized the members of the Constabulary. While Nabong was talking his words were attentively listened to by deputy fiscal Villamor, as well as Captain Cacdac and Lieutenant Arambulo, all of whom understood the Tagalog language. At the same time Captain Cacdac and Lieutenant Arambulo took notes of the substance of this part of the speech.
Issue:
Held:
Yes. The language used by the appellant clearly imported an overthrow of the Government by violence, and it should be interpreted in the plain and obvious sense in which it was evidently intended to be understood. It was the purpose of the speaker, beyond a doubt, to incite his hearers to the overthrow of organized government by unlawful means. The words used by the appellant manifestly tended to induce the people to resist and use violence against the agents of the Constabulary and to instigate the poor to cabal and meet together for unlawful purposes. They also suggested and incited rebellious conspiracies, thereby tending to stir up the people against the lawful authorities and to disturb the peace of the community and the order of the Government. It is not necessary, in order to be seditious, that the words used should in fact result in a rising of the people against the constituted authorities.
DIRECT ASSAULTS
GELIG V. PEOPLE Facts:
Petitioner Lydia Gelig impugns the decision promulgated by the court of appeals that set aside the decision of RTC. Lydia was convicted of committing the complex crime of direct assault with unintentional abortion but the court of appeals found her guilty of the crime slight physical injuries. On July 17, 1981, Lydia slapped Gemma in the cheek and pushed her causing her to fall and hit a wall divider. As a result, Gemma suffered contusion in her maxillary area and continued experiencing abdominal pain and started bleeding two days after the incident. Gemma later on suffered incomplete abortion.
Issue:
Whether or not the honourable court of appeals erred in finding that the petitioner can be convicted of slight physical injuries under the information changing her for direct assault with unintentional abortion.
Held:
Lydia Gelig was liable for direct assault and not unintentional abortion. It is clear from the foregoing provision that direct assault is an offense against a person in authority. One mode of committing it is; without public uprising, by attacking, employing force or seriously intimidate or resist any person in authority or his agent. Gemma, being a public school teacher, belongs to the class of persons in authority. Gelig was not liable for unintentional abortion for the absence of proof that such incident was the proximate cause of her slapping and pushing.
RIVERA V. PEOPLE Facts:
Ruben Rodil sustained injuries and was brought to the hospital for being ganged up by the accused Edgardo Rivera and his brother Esmeraldo Rivera. Because of fist blows and coup injury, Ruben sustained slight injuries. The trial court found the accused guilty of the crime of frustrated murder. An appeal was made by the accused, but the court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision with modification, changing the crime to attempted murder. Issue:
(1) Whether or not the court of appeals was correct in modifying the crime from frustrated to attempted murder
(2) Whether or not there was an intent to kill.
Held:
(1) Yes, article 6 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some causes other his own desistance.
(2) Yes, the court declared that evidence to prove intent to kill in crimes against persons may consist, inter alia, in the means used by the malefactors, the nature, location, and number of wounds sustained by the victim.
PEOPLE V. ABALOS Facts:
In the evening of March 20, 1983, while acciised Tiburcio Abalos and his father were having a heated argument, a woman shouted “police officer, help us! Somebody is making trouble here.” The victim P/Pfc. Labine,, then appeared at the scene and asked Major Abalos what’s happening. The victim saluted Abalos when the latter turned around to face him. As Major Abalos levelled his carbine at Labine, accused hurriedly left and procured a piece of wood which is about two inches thick. He then swiftly returned and unceremoniously swung with that wooden piece at Labine from behind, hitting the policeman at the back of his head. Labine collapsed and sustained head fracture. The trial court found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of complex crime of direct assault with murder.
Issue:
Whether or not the court erred finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of direct assault with murder.
Held:
The appellant committed the second mode of committing direct assault. The elements of which are that there must be attack, use of force, or serious intimidation or resistance upon authority or his agent; that the assault was made when the said person was performing duties. In this case the victim was performing his duties, that is, he was maintaining peace and order during the fiesta in barangay. The killing in the instant case constituted the felony of murder qualified by alevosia.
PEOPLE V. DURAL Facts:
On January 31, 1988, while two prosecution witnesses were on their way to Tupadahan, they head gunshot and immediately hide. From the place they were hiding, they saw three armed men firing upon the two Capcom soldiers. The three gunmen positioned themselves as to immobilize the two Capcom soldiers. Two days after, eyewitnessed voluntarily went at the Capcom headquarters to narrate what they have witnessed, consequently the investigator brought them at the Capcom headquarters at Bicutan then at the camp Panopio Hospital. At the said hospital, they identified one of the three gunmen referring to accused Dural who shot two Capcom soldiers.
Issue:
Whether or not appellants are guilty of direct assault. Held:
Yes, the Supreme Court held that there is no doubt that appellant Dural and the two other gunmen knew that the victims, T/Sgt. Carlos Pabon and CIC Renato Mahiglot, were members of the Philippine Constabulary detailed with the CAPCOM as they were then in uniform and riding an official CAPCOM car. The victims were agents and persons in authority. The crimes he committeed are two complex crimes of murder with direct assault upon an agent of the person in authority.
ILLEGAL POSSESSION AND USE OF FALSE TREASURY OR BANK NOTES AND OTHER INSTRUMENTS OF CREDIT
TECSON V. CA Facts:
On April 28, 1990, a buy-bust operation was held by the Central Bank Operatives in order to capture a certain Mang Andy who is involved in a syndicate engaging in the business of counterfeit US dollar notes. Labita and Marqueta (members of the buy-bust operation team) acted as poseur-buyer, approached Mang Andy inside the Jollibee restaurant. When the civilian informer introduced them to Mang Andy, the latter was convinced and drew 10 pieces of US dollar notes from his wallet. At that moment, Labita and Marqueta introduced themselves as Central Bank operatives and apprehended Mang Andy whom they later identified as herein petitioner, Alejandro Tecson.
Petitioner denies liability for the crime of illegal possession and use of false treasury bank notes and other instruments of credit as defined in Art, 168 of the Revised Penal Code. According to him, to make him liable under the said provision, his possession of counterfeit dollar notes should be coupled with intent to use. In other words, petitioner contends that possession without intent to use counterfeit US dollar notes would not make him criminally liable.
Issue:
Whether or not from the facts of the case, Alejandro Tecson is liable under Art. 168 of the Revised Penal Code
Held:
It is true that in Art. 168, possession of fake dollar notes must be coupled with intent to use the same by a clear and deliberate overt act in order to constitute a crime. However, from the facts of the case it can be inferred that the accused had the intent to use the fake dollar notes. In the course of the entrapment, petitioner’s natural reaction from the seeming interest of the of the poseur-buyer to buy fake US dollar notes constitutes an overt act which clearly shows his intent to use or sell the counterfeit US dollar notes. It is worthy to note that prior to the buy-bust operation, the civilian informer had an agreement with the petitioner to arrange a meeting with the prospective buyers. It was actually the petitioner who planned and arranged said meeting and what the informer did was only to convince the petitioner that there are prospective buyers. Clearly therefore, prior to the buy-bust operation, the petitioner had already the intention to sell fake US dollar notes and from that fact alone he cannot claim that he was only instigated to commit the crime. The petitioner also failed to overcome the legal presumption that public officers regularly perform their official duties.
CLEMENTE V. PEOPLE Facts:
The petitioner, Martinez, was charged with violation of Article 168 of the Revised Penal Code. The petitioner gave a fake P 500.00 bill to Francis de la Cruz to buy a bottle of soft drink from the Manila City Jail bakery but was refused because it was found out that it was fake. So, Francis de la Cruz reported the matter to jail officers. Consequently,the jail guards conducted a surprise inspection and found out 23 more fake 500 bills in the wallet of the accused. The defense of the accused was the defense of frame up.
Issue:
Whether all the elements of the crime of Illegal possession and use of false treasury or bank note in this case are present
In this case, the Supreme Court, citing People v. Digoro, reversed and set aside the findings of the lower courts and acquitted petitioner of the crime of Illegal possession and use of false bank notes defined and penalized under Article 168 of the Revised Penal Code. In Digoro, possession of false treasury or bank notes alone, without anything more, is not a criminal offense. For it to constitute an offense under Article 168 of the RPC, the possession must be with intent to use said false treasury or bank notes. In the case at bar, the prosecution failed to show that petitioner used the counterfeit money or that he intended to use the counterfeit bills. Francis dela Cruz, to whom petitioner supposedly gave the fake P500 bill to buy soft drinks, was not presented in court. According to the jail officers, they were only informed by Francis dela Cruz that petitioner asked the latter to buy soft drinks at the Manila City jail bakery using a fake P500 bill. In short, the jail officers did not have personal knowledge that petitioner asked Francis dela Cruz to use the P500 bill. Their account, however, is hearsay and not based on the personal knowledge.
HOW FORGERY IS COMMITTED
HERNANDEZ V. HERNANDEZ Facts:
PMRDC entered through its president into various agreements with co-respondents Home Insurance & Guaranty Corporation (HIGC) and Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP), in connection with the construction of the Isabel Homes housing project in Batangas and of the Monumento Plaza commercial and recreation complex in Caloocan City. PMRDC entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) whereby it was given the option to buy pieces of land owned by petitioners. Petitioners insist that the obligation of PMRDC to deliver back the TCTs arises on its failure to exercise the option to purchase the lands according to the terms of the MOA, and that the deliberate refusal of PMRDC to perform such obligation gives ground for the rescission of the MOA. This thesis is perched on petitioners argument that the MOA could not have possibly been novated by the DAC because Demetrios signature therein has been forged
Issue:
Whether or not there was forgery in this case Held:
No. Firmly settled is the jurisprudential rule that forgery cannot be presumed from a mere allegation but rather must be proved by clear, positive and convincing evidence by the party alleging the same. The burden to prove the allegation of forgery in this case has not been conclusively discharged by petitioners because first, nothing in the records supports the allegation except only perhaps Demetrios explicit self-serving disavowal of his signature in open court.
Facts:
On July 29, 1986, a complaint for quieting of title was filed by respondents spouses Roman Salvador and Filomena Bravo against petitioners Tamani et, al. over a 431 sq. m. parcel of land located at Solano, Nueva Vizcaya. They were co-ownders of an undivided land. On August 17, 1959, Tamani allegedly sold the disputed property to Milagros Cruz. RTC rendered decision ruling in petitioner’s favour. Court of Appeals issued a decision ruling in favour of the respondents.
Issue:
Whether or not court of appeals erred in overturning the factual findings of RTC. Held:
Yes, even though the discussion of CA is binding, they are recognized exceptions, among which is when the findings of the trial court and appellate court is conflicting. The CA was thus correct when it declared that the judge must conduct his own independent examination of signature. While it was improper for the RTC to solely rely on Sorra’s credentials. Her superior credentials, compared to that of Albacea, give added value to her testimony. Wherefore, premises considered, the petition is granted.
FALSIFICATION BY PUBLIC OFFICER, EMPLOYEE, NOTARY PUBLIC OR ECCLESIASTICAL MINISTER
GUILERGAN V. PEOPLE Facts:
Petitioner Guillergan, a Lieutenant Colonel in the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), directed Master Sergeant Edna Seclon (Seclon), Chief Clerk of the Comptrollers Office, to cause the preparation of the payrolls of their civilian intelligence agents (CIAs) with supporting time record and book. Each time the processing unit returned the payrolls for lack of signatures of the payees, Guillergan would direct Technical Sergeant Nemesio H. Butcon (Butcon), the Budget and Fiscal Non-Commissioned Officer, to affix his initial on the Remarks/Sig column of the payrolls to complete the requirements and facilitate the processing of the time record, book, and payrolls.
Issue:
Held:
Yes. The elements of falsification of documents under paragraph 1, Article 172 are: 1) the offender is a private individual or a public officer or employee who did not take advantage of his official position; 2) the offender committed any of the acts of falsification enumerated in Article 171;and 3) the falsification was committed in a public or official or commercial document.All of the foregoing elements of Article 172 are present in this case. Guillergan was a public officer when he committed the offense charged. He was the comptroller to the PC/INP Command in Region 6. His work as comptroller did not include the preparation of the appointments and payrolls of CIAs. Nor did he have official custody of the pertinent documents. His official function was limited to keeping the records of the resources that the command received from Camp Crame.
GALEOS V. PEOPLE Facts:
On February 14, 1994, in the Municipality of Naga, the accused, a former Municipal Mayor and Construction and Maintenance Man of the Office of the Municipal Engineer, in such capacity, falsified a public document, consisting of a Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities, Disclosure of Business Interests and Financial Connections and Identification of Relatives In the Government Service, as of December 31, 1993, filed by accused Rosalio S. Galeos and subscribed and sworn to before accused Paulino S. Ong, wherein accused made it appear therein that they are not related within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity thereby making untruthful statements in a narration of facts, when in truth and in fact, accused very well k[n]ew that they are related with each other, since accused Rosalio S. Galeos is related to accused Paulino S. Ong within the fourth degree of consanguinity, the mother of accused Rosalio S. Galeos [being] the sister of the mother of accused Paulino S. Ong.
Issue:
Whether or not Galeos is liable of publication of public document. Held:
YES. Petitioners were charged with falsification of public document under Article 171, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code. Such crime is committed in any of the following acts: 1.) Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature or rubric; 2.) Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did not in fact so participate; 3.) Attributing to persons who have participated in an act or proceeding statements other than those in fact made by them; 4.) Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts. The elements of falsification in the above provision are as follows: (a) the offender makes in a public document untruthful statements in a narration of facts; (b) he has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him; and (c) the facts narrated by him are absolutely false.26
In addition to the afore-cited elements, it must also be proven that the public officer or employee had taken advantage of his official position in making the falsification. In falsification of public document, the offender is considered to have taken advantage of his official position when (1) he has the duty to make or prepare or otherwise to intervene in
the preparation of a document; or (2) he has the official custody of the document which he falsifies.27 Likewise, in falsification of public or official documents, it is not necessary that there be present the idea of gain or the intent to injure a third person because in the falsification of a public document, what is punished is the violation of the public faith and the destruction of the truth as therein solemnly proclaimed.28
All the elements of falsification of public documents by making untruthful statements have been established by the prosecution.
GONZALUDO V. PEOPLE Facts:
In 1985, Ulysses Villaflor took one Rosemarie Gelogo as her mistress into his house in Bacolod City. After Ulysses’ death, said mistress offered to sell the 2-storey for P80,000.00 to herein petitioner Gonzaludo but the petitioner was not interested so he introduced Gelogo to Spouses Canlas. Gelogo ang Gregg Canlas executed a Deed of Sale and it was witnessed by Gonzaludo. Gelogo represented herself as the lawful owner of the house by using the name of Rosemarie Villaflor.
Issue:
Whether or not of the complex crime of Estafa thru Falsification of Public Document having conspired with Gelogo
Held:
No. For an accused to be convicted of the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public document, all the elements of the two crimes of estafa and falsification of public document must exist. To secure conviction for estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, the Court has time and again ruled that the following requisites must concur: (1) that the accused made false pretenses or fraudulent representations as to his power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; (2) that such false pretenses or fraudulent representations were made prior to or simultaneous with the commission of the fraud; (3) that such false pretenses or fraudulent representations constitute the very cause which induced the offended party to part with his money or property; and (4) that as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage. In this case, the third element is absent. While it may be said that there was fraud or deceit committed by Rosemarie in this case, when she used the surname "Villaflor" to give her semblance of authority to sell the subject 2-storey house, such fraud or deceit was employed upon the Canlas spouses who were the ones who parted with their money when they bought the house. However, the Information charging Rosemarie of estafa in the present case, alleged damage or injury not upon the Canlas spouses, but upon private complainant, Anita Manlangit. Since the deceit or fraud was not the efficient cause and did not induce Anita Manlangit to part with her property in this case, Rosemarie cannot be held liable for estafa.
However, petitioner was found guilty of conspiring with Rosemarie to falsify, that is, by making untruthful statement in the narration of facts in the deed of sale, by declaring
Rosemarie to be the owner of the house subject of such sale and signing as "Rosemarie Villaflor" instead of her real name, Rosemarie Gelogo, in order to sell the same to the Canlas spouses. It is established by evidence beyond reasonable doubt that Rosemarie committed the crime of falsification of public document.
GARCIA V. CA Facts:
The accused, being in possession of a receipt for P 5,000 dated January 21, 1991 issued by one Alberto Quijada, Jr. as partial down payment of the sale of a house and lot to accused, made alterations on the said receipt and made it appear that it was issued on January 24, 1991 in the amount of Fifty Five Thousand Pesos (P55,000.00) when in truth and in fact, the said accused fully well knew that the receipt was only for the amount of Five Thousand Pesos.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of Falsification under Article 171 of the RPC Held:
: Yes. The elements of the crime of falsification under Article 171 (6) of the Revised Penal Code are: (1) that there be an alteration (change) or intercalation (insertion) on a document; (2) that it was made on a genuine document; (3) that the alteration or intercalation has changed the meaning of the document; and (4) that the changes made the document speak something false. When these are committed by a private individual on a private document the violation would fall under paragraph 2, Article 172 of the same code, but there must be, in addition to the aforesaid elements, independent evidence of damage or intention to cause the same to a third person. Given the admissions of Avella that she altered the receipt, and without convincing evidence that the alteration was with the consent of private complainant, the Court holds that all four (4) elements have been proven beyond reasonable doubt. As to the requirement of damage, this is readily apparent as it was made to appear that Alberto had received P50,000 when in fact he did not.
MACHINATION IN PUBLIC AUCTION
OANI V. PEOPLE Facts:
During the school year 1988-1989, the Panabo High School in Panabo, Davao del Norte, headed by its Principal, Leopoldo Oani, implemented the free secondary school program of the government. During the period of November 1, 1988 to December 31, 1989, the high school received the amount of P648,532.00 from the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) for Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses (MOOE).[1] Of the said amount, P551,439.13 was earmarked for the purchase of various supplies, materials and
equipment. On March 1, 1990, the DECS Secretary received a letter from the Parents Teachers Association of the Panabo High School regarding the investigation of Principal Oani and Bonifacio Roa, the Resident Auditor regarding, among other things, the alleged overpricing of 12 fire extinguishers for P15,000.00 each. The Regional Office of the COA then issued Assignment Order No. 90-137 dated March 2, 1990 to a team of auditors, composed of Jaime P. Naranjo, as Chairman, and Bienvenido Presilda and Carmencita Enriquez, as members.
The amount of P55,000.00 was certified as available for the purpose. Instead of conducting a public bidding, Oani decided to purchase the fire extinguishers from the Powerline Manufacturing Industry (Powerline, for brevity) for P54,747.00. Powerline was owned by Francisco Cunanan and had its business address at Km. 5, Carnation St., Buhangin, Davao City. The enterprise was authorized by the Department of Trade and Industry to manufacture and refill stored pressure type (Light Pink only) mono-ammonium phosphate for ABC fires.
On June 27, 1989, Oani approved Purchase Order No. 2 for nine units of fire extinguishers and requested Powerline to deliver the supplies. Upon delivery thereof, Oani approved a disbursement voucher in favor of the supplier for the amount of P54,747.00. The supplier acknowledged receipt of the said amount through check.
The members of the Audit Team that conducted a re-canvass for fire extinguishers of the same brand and features as those supplied by Cunanan discovered that each unit could be purchased for only P2,970.00, inclusive of 10% allowance. The purchase of the nine units of fire extinguishers was, thus, overpriced by P23,040.00.
Issue:
Whether or not the guilt of the petitioner was proven beyond reasonable doubt to convict him of violation of RA 3019.
Held:
Yes. The Certification is dated January 1988, making it appear that it had been issued before the subject fire extinguishers were purchased on June 27, 1989. However, Cunanan could not have executed the Certification in January 1988 because paragraph 4 thereof indicates that it was issued pursuant to COA Circular No. 91-368. It bears stressing that COA Circular No. 91-368 was issued only on December 19, 1991, long after Cunanan signed the Certification. In fine, Cunanan could not possibly have issued a certification pursuant to an administrative circular which did not as yet exist. Hence, no such certification was issued on June 27, 1989, the most plausible explanation being that it was executed and signed by Cunanan only after December 19, 1991. Besides, the petitioner never submitted the certification when the auditing team conducted its investigation. If the certification was indeed issued as early as January 1988, the petitioner should have submitted the same to the auditing team. The trial court saw through the petitioners chicanery and declared in its decision:
Accused Oani submitted for the purpose a Certification dated 10 July 1988 issued by the Panabo Fire Station, Panabo, Davao and the Certification dated January 1988, issued by a certain Francisco R. Cunanan, proprietor of Powerline, that the latter is an exclusive
distributor of the purchased fire extinguishers and that no subdealer was appointed to sell the same.
After a careful evaluation of the respective evidences submitted by the parties on this issue, the Court finds for the People and brushes aside as incredible the claims of the defense, particularly of the accused Oani. It appears that the theory of the accused that bidding and canvass may be dispensed with in view of the exclusiveness of Powerline in the manufacture and distribution of the purchased fire extinguishers, finds no leg to stand on, at the least, or a mere afterthought, at the most. The penultimate paragraph of the said certification of Powerline proprietor, Francisco R. Cunanan, states,
THAT, I am executing this Certification pursuant to Article 7, section 442 of the Government Auditing Rules & Regulations (GAAM Volume I under COA Circular No. 91-368 governing the procurement from Duly Licensed Manufacturers and Exclusive Distributors).
CRIMES RELATIVE TO OPIUM AND OTHER PROHIBITED DRUGS
PEOPLE V. MORALES Facts:
Roldan Morales was charged in two separate Informations before the RTC with possession and sale of methylamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu). The trial court and the Court of Apelas found Morales guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession and illegal sale of dangerous drugs.
Issue:
What is the nature of appeal in criminal cases? Held:
Appeal in criminal cases possess a unique nature. The appeal throws the whole case open for review and it is the duty of the appellate court to correct, cite and appreciate errors in the appealed judgment whether they are assigned or unassigned. On the basis of such review, we find the present appeal meritorious.
Prevailing jurisprudence uniformly hold that the trial courts findings of fact, especially when affirmed by the CA, are, as a general rule, entitled to great weight and will not be
disturbed on appeal. However, this rule admits of exceptions and does not apply where facts of weight and substance with direct and material bearing on the final outcome of the case have been overlooked, misapprehended or misapplied. After due consideration of the records of this case, evidence presented and relevant law and jurisprudence, we hold that this case falls under the exception.The identity of the corpus delicti in this case was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. There was likewise a break in the chain of custody which proves fatal to the prosecution’s case. Thus, since the prosecution has failed to establish the element of corpus delicti with the prescribed degree of proof required for successful prosecution of both possession and sale of prohibited drugs, we resolve to ACQUIT Roldan Morales.
PEOPLE V. PERALTA Facts:
Elmer Peralta was arrested after the District Drug Enforcement Group (DDEG) staged a by-bust operation with one police officer (SPO1 Alberto Sangalang) acting as poseur-buyer. An informant introduced the police officer to Peralta and the former informed Peralta that the police officer was a dance instructor in need of shabu for himself and his fellow dance instructors so they could endure the long nights. The police officer gave Peralta a marked P500.00 bill for a sachet of shabu. At a signal, Sangalang told his informant to go out and buy cigarettes. On seeing the informant come out of the house, the police back-up team rushed in. They arrested accused Peralta, took the marked money from him, and brought him to the police station. Meanwhile, the sachet of shabu was marked "AS-1-210702" and taken to the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory for testing. The contents of the sachet tested positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. The prosecution presented the police officer. He alone testified for the government since it was thought that the testimonies of the other police officers would only be corroborative. The prosecution also dispensed with the testimony of the forensic chemist after the parties stipulated on the existence and due execution of Chemistry Report D-332-02, which showed that the specimen tested positive for shabu.
Issue:
Whether or not the prosecution presented ample proof that the police officers involved caught accused Peralta at his home, peddling prohibited drugs.
Held:
NO. The elements of the sale of illegal drugs are a) the identities of the buyer and seller, b) the transaction or sale of the illegal drug, and c) the existence of the corpus delicti. With respect to the third element, the prosecution must show that the integrity of the corpus delicti has been preserved. This is crucial in drugs cases because the evidence involved—the seized chemical—is not readily identifiable by sight or touch and can easily be tampered with or substituted. The prosecution must establish the chain of custody of the seized prohibited drugs. It must present testimony about every link in the chain of custody of such drugs, from the moment they were seized from the accused to the moment they are offered in evidence. But here the prosecution failed to show the chain of custody or that they followed the procedure that has been prescribed in connection with the seizure and custody of drugs. To begin with, the prosecution did not adduce evidence of when the sachet of shabu was marked. Consequently, it could have been marked long after its seizure or even after it had been tested in the laboratory. While the records show that the sachet bore the markings "AS-1-210702," indicating that Sangalang probably made the marking, the prosecutor did not bother to ask him if such marking was his. Sangalang identified the seized drugs in a manner that glossed
over the need to establish their integrity. Since the seizing officer usually has to turn over the seized drugs to the desk officer or some superior officer, who would then send a courier to the police crime laboratory with a request that the same be examined to identify the contents, it is imperative for the officer who placed his marking on the plastic container to seal the same, preferably with adhesive tape that usually cannot be removed without leaving a tear on the plastic container. If the drugs were not in a plastic container, the police officer should put it in one and seal the same. In this way the drugs would assuredly reach the laboratory in the same condition it was seized from the accused. Further, after the laboratory technician has tested and verified the nature of the powder in the container, he should seal it again with a new seal since the police officer’s seal had been broken. In this way, if the accused wants to contest the test made, the Court would be assured that what is retested is the same powder seized from the accused. The prosecutor could then ask questions of the officer who placed his marking on the plastic container to prove that the suspected drugs had not been tampered with or substituted when they left that officer’s hands. If the sealing of the seized article had not been made, the prosecution would have to present the desk officer or superior officer to whom the seizing officer turned over such article. That desk officer or superior officer needs to testify that he had taken care that the drugs were not tampered with or substituted. And if someone else brought the unsealed sachet of drugs to the police crime laboratory, he, too, should give similar testimony, and so on up to the receiving custodian at the crime laboratory until the drugs reach the laboratory technician who examined and resealed it.
PEOPLE V. GUTIERREZ Facts:
At around 5:00 p.m. on June 16, 2003, while on duty at the Drug Enforcement Unit of the Pasig City Police Force, SPO3 Matias received information via telephone from a concerned citizen that a certain alias Nick, later identified to be appellant, was peddling shabu along San Agustin Street, Barangay Palatiw, Pasig City. On the instructions of SPO3 Matias, PO1 Espares and PO1 Mapula proceeded to, and surveilled, the area and confirmed the information. SPO3 Matias thus formed a buy-bust team, which he headed, with PO1 Espares as poseur-buyer, and PO1 Mapula and PO1 Michael Familara (PO1 Familara) as members. Five marked twenty-peso bills were given to PO1 Espares as buy-bust money. The team thereafter went to the target area and met with a confidential asset who was to assist them in the operation. While the other members of the team were strategically positioned, the asset, accompanied by PO1 Espares, approached appellant and asked him Pare, meron ka ba diyan? Bibili kami. Bibili ako ng piso. Apparently not having heard the entire utterances, appellant replied, Magkano ba bibilhin mo? (How much are you buying?), to which PO1 Espares replied Piso lang, eto pera at the same time tendering the buy-bust money which appellant took and placed in his right front pocket. Appellant then drew from his pants back pocket a black plastic case, opened it and took one plastic sachet containing a white crystalline substance which he handed to PO1 Espares. PO1 Espares thereupon executed the pre-arranged signal, apprehended appellant, and confiscated the black plastic case which appellant was holding. The case yielded a pair of scissors, an unsealed plastic sachet containing traces of white crystalline substance, and five empty plastic sachets. Heeding the pre-arranged signal, the other members of the team closed in to assist PO1 Espares who then marked all the seized items including the plastic sachet containing the substance subject of the sale. Appellant was brought to the police station wherein the confiscated items were surrendered to an investigator.
Appellant was charged with illegal sale of 0.05 gram of shabu and illegal possession of paraphernalia fit or intended for smoking . . . or introducing any dangerous drug into the body by two separate Informations
Issue:
Whether or not accused violated Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act Held:
The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant, Nicolas Gutierrez y Licuanan, is ACQUITTED of the crime charged for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. At this juncture, the Court notes another lapse of the members of the buy-bust team their failure to comply with the procedural requirements of Section 21, Paragraph 1 of Article II of R.A. No. 9165 with respect to custody and disposition of confiscated drugs. There was no physical inventory and photograph of the shabu allegedly confiscated from appellant. There was likewise no explanation offered for the non-observance of the rule. Coupled with the failure to prove that the integrity and evidentiary value of the items adduced were not tainted, the buy bust teams disregard of the requirements of Section 21 is fatal.
It needs no elucidation that the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty must be seen in the context of an existing rule of law or statute authorizing the performance of an act or duty or prescribing a procedure in the performance thereof. The presumption, in other words, obtains only where nothing on record suggests that the law enforcers involved deviated from the standard conduct of official duty as provided for in the law. Otherwise, where the official act in question is irregular on its face, an adverse presumption arises as a matter of course.
PEOPLE V. QUE MING KHA Facts:
On May 16, 1997, members Central Police District received a phone call from an informant that a blue Kia Pregio van with plate number UPN 595 which was being used in the transport of shabu has been seen within the vicinity of Barangay Holy Spirit, Quezon City. A tem was immediately dispatched to the reported place.
Around 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, the team spotted the blue Kia van on the opposite side of the street going toward the direction of Commonwealth Avenue. Before reaching Commonwealth Avenue, in front of Andok's Litson Manok, the van hit. A concerned motorist picked up the boy and rushed him to the hospital.
When the police finally intercepted the van, they introduced themselves as police officers to the driver and passenger of the van and informed them that they committed the crime of reckless imprudence and asked for his driver's license. The police noted that Go was on the driver's seat while Que sat on the passenger's seat.
The police peered through the window of the van and noticed several sacks placed on the floor at the back of the van. They opened one of the sacks and noticed that it contained several plastic bags containing white crystalline substance.
The arresting officers thereafter forwarded the seized substance to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination. Each of the nine sacks contained 253 plastic bags which contained around one kilo of the white crystalline substance. Upon examination, the substance was found positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.5
Both Go and Que claim ignorance about the presence of shabu at the back of the van. Issue:
Whether appellants are guilty of violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act Held:
The Supreme Court found appellant Go guilty of transporting prohibited drugs, but acquitted appellant Que.
It has been established that Go was driving the van that carried the contraband at the time of its discovery. He was therefore caught in the act of transporting a regulated drug without authority which is punishable under the Dangerous Drugs Act. Section 15, Article III of the Dangerous Drugs Act penalizes "any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, dispense, deliver, transport or distributed any regulated drug."
To exonerate himself, Go claimed that he was not aware of the existence of the contraband at the back of the van. We are not persuaded. The crime under consideration is malum prohibitum. In such case, the lack of criminal intent and good faith do not exempt the accused from criminal liability. Thus, Go's contention that he did not know that there were illegal drugs inside the van cannot constitute a valid defense. Mere possession and/or delivery of a regulated drug without legal authority is punishable under the Dangerous Drugs Act
Regarding the criminal liability of appellant Que, the Supreme Court acquitted Que. Que had nothing to do with the loading and transport of the shabu. Not one reliable eyewitness pointed to him as having been with Go inside the van when it hit Elmar Cawiling. No less than the Solicitor General himself entertains doubt on the guilt of Que and recommends his acquittal. When the prosecution itself says it failed to prove Que's guilt, the Court should listen and listen hard, lest it locks up a person who has done no wrong.
In People v. Pagaura, the Supreme Court made a cautionary warning that "the court must be extra vigilant in trying drug cases lest an innocent person is made to suffer the unusually heavy penalties for drug offenses. In our criminal justice system the overriding consideration is not whether the court doubts the innocence of the accused but whether it entertains a reasonable doubt as to his guilt.
DIRECT BRIBERY
MARIFOSQUE V. PEOPLE Facts:
This is a petition for review on certiorari, which assails the September 23, 2002, decision and the January 3, 2003, Resolution of the Sandiganbayan finding petitioner Nazario Marifosque guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of direct bribery, defined and penalized under the 2nd paragraph of Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner averred that said money was not for him but as “reward money” for the police asset who demanded that he be given 350 pesos per cylinder tank. Petitioner further averred that he was only collecting on behalf of the police asset and that he already gave an advance of 1,000 pesos to said asset and only collecting the balance of 4,800.
The Sandiganbayan rendered a decision convicting petitioner of direct bribery. Issue:
Whether or not petitioner committed Direct Bribery? Held:
Yes. Petitioner cannot feign innocence and profess good faith since all the indicia point to his guilt and malicious intent. Petitioner did not introduce his asset or mention his name to Yu So Pong or his daughter at the time of the illegal transaction. His claim that he previously gave 1000 pesos to his asset, which purportedly represented a partial payment of the reward money, was not corroborated by his asset. One of the arresting CIS officers testified that petitioner attempted to give back the money to Yu So Pong when they were about to arrest him, which showed that he was well aware of the illegality of his transaction because had he been engaged in a legitimate deal, he would have faced courageously the arresting officers and indignantly protested the violation of his person, which is the normal reaction of an innocent man. His solicitous and overly eager conduct in pursuing the robbery incident, even though he was no longer on duty, betrays an intention not altogether altruistic and denotes a corrupt desire on his part to obtain pecuniary benefits from an illegal transaction. The petitioner's persistence in obtaining the monetary reward for the asset although the latter was no longer complaining about the 1000 pesos that he supposedly received earlier.
MANIPON V. SANDIGANBAYAN Facts:
The Sandiganbayan found accused Nathaniel S. Manipon, Jr., 31, guilty of direct bribery, dated September 30, 1981. Manipon came to this Court on petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the judgment of conviction. The Court dismissed the petition, "the question raised being factual and for lack of merit." 1 However, upon motion for reconsideration, the Court reconsidered its resolution and gave due course to the petition. 2 Nathaniel S. Manipon, Jr., a deputy sheriff of the Court of First Instance of Baguio City and Benguet, Branch IV, was assigned to enforce an order of the Minister of Labor.
Pursuant to that assignment, Manipon sent a notice to the COMTRUST garnishing the bank accounts of Dominguez. The bank agreed to hold the accounts. For one reason or another, Manipon did not inform the labor arbiter of the garnishment nor did he exert efforts to immediately satisfy the judgment under execution.
