GARCIA V EXECUTIVE SECRETARY Facts:
On 27 November 1990, Cory issued EO 438 which imposed, in addition to any other duties, taxes and charges imposed by law on all articles imported into the Philippines, an additional duty of 5% ad valorem. This additional duty was imposed across the board on all imported articles, including crude oil and other oil products imported into the Philippines. In 1991, EO 443 increased the additional duty to 9%. In the same year, EO 475 was passed reinstating the previous 5% duty except that crude oil and other oil products continued to be taxed at 9%. Garcia, a representative from Bataan, avers that EO 475 and 478 are unconstitutional for they violate Sec 24 of Art 6 of the Constitution which provides: " All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments." He contends that since the Constitution vests the authority to enact revenue bills in Congress, the President may not assume such power of issuing Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478 which are in the nature of revenue-generating measures.
Issue:
whether or not EO 475 and 478 are unconstitutional Held:
Under Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution, the enactment of appropriation, revenue and tariff bills, like all other bills is, of course, within the province of the Legislative rather than the Executive Department. It does not follow, however, that therefore Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478, assuming they may be characterized as revenue measures, are prohibited to the President, that they must be enacted instead by the Congress of the Philippines. Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution provides as follows: "(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the Government." There is thus explicit constitutional permission to Congress to authorize the President "subject to such limitations and restrictions as [Congress] may impose" to fix "within specific limits" "tariff rates . . . and other duties or imposts . . . ."
ANTONIO ARANETA VS JUDGE RAFAEL DINGLASAN
Antonio Araneta is being charged for allegedly violating of Executive Order 62 which regulates rentals for houses and lots for residential buildings. Judge Rafael Dinglasan was the judge hearing the case. Araneta appealed seeking to prohibit Dinglasan and the Fiscal from proceeding with the case. He averred that EO 62 was issued by virtue of Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 671 which he claimed ceased to exist, hence, the EO has no legal basis.
Three other cases were consolidated with this one. L-3055 which is an appeal by Leon Ma. Guerrero, a shoe exporter, against EO 192 which controls exports in the Philippines; he is seeking to have permit issued to him.
L-3054 is filed by Eulogio Rodriguez to prohibit the treasury from disbursing funds [from ’49-‘50] pursuant to EO 225.
L-3056 filed by Antonio Barredo is attacking EO 226 which was appropriating funds to hold the national elections.
They all aver that CA 671, otherwise known as AN ACT DECLARING A STATE OF TOTAL
EMERGENCY AS A RESULT OF WAR INVOLVING THE PHILIPPINES AND AUTHORIZING THE PRESIDENT TO PROMULGATE RULES AND REGULATIONS TO MEET SUCH EMERGENCY or simply the Emergency Powers Act, is already inoperative and that all EOs issued pursuant to said CA had likewise ceased.
ISSUE: Whether or not CA 671 has ceased.
HELD: Yes. CA 671, which granted emergency powers to the president, became inoperative ex proprio
vigore when Congress met in regular session on May 25, 1946, and that Executive Orders Nos. 62, 192,
225 and 226 were issued without authority of law. In setting the first regular session of Congress instead of the first special session which preceded it as the point of expiration of the Act, the SC is giving effect to the purpose and intention of the National Assembly. In a special session, the Congress may “consider general legislation or only such subjects as he (President) may designate.” Such acts were to be good only up to the corresponding dates of adjournment of the following sessions of the Legislature, “unless sooner amended or repealed by the National Assembly.” Even if war continues to rage on, new legislation must be made and approved in order to continue the EPAs, otherwise it is lifted upon reconvening or upon early repeal.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS VERA
G.R. No. L-45685 November 16 1937 En Banc [Non Delegation of Legislative Powers]
FACTS:
Cu-Unjieng was convicted of criminal charges by the trial court of Manila. He filed a motion for
reconsideration and four motions for new trial but all were denied. He then elevated to the Supreme Court of United States for review, which was also denied. The SC denied the petition subsequently filed by Cu-Unjieng for a motion for new trial and thereafter remanded the case to the court of origin for execution of the judgment. CFI of Manila referred the application for probation of the Insular Probation Office which recommended denial of the same. Later, 7th branch of CFI Manila set the petition for hearing. The Fiscal filed an opposition to the granting of probation to Cu Unjieng, alleging, among other things, that Act No. 4221, assuming that it has not been repealed by section 2 of Article XV of the Constitution, is nevertheless violative of section 1, subsection (1), Article III of the Constitution guaranteeing equal protection of the laws. The private prosecution also filed a supplementary opposition, elaborating on the alleged
unconstitutionality on Act No. 4221, as an undue delegation of legislative power to the provincial boards of several provinces (sec. 1, Art. VI, Constitution).
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is undue delegation of powers. RULING:
Yes. SC conclude that section 11 of Act No. 4221 constitutes an improper and unlawful delegation of legislative authority to the provincial boards and is, for this reason, unconstitutional and void.
The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows: "This Act shall apply only in
those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have provided for the salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than those now provided for provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be
appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the direction of the Probation Office."
The provincial boards of the various provinces are to determine for themselves, whether the Probation Law shall apply to their provinces or not at all. The applicability and application of the Probation Act are
entirely placed in the hands of the provincial boards. If the provincial board does not wish to have the Act applied in its province, all that it has to do is to decline to appropriate the needed amount for the salary of a probation officer.
The clear policy of the law, as may be gleaned from a careful examination of the whole context, is to make the application of the system dependent entirely upon the affirmative action of the different provincial boards through appropriation of the salaries for probation officers at rates not lower than those provided for provincial fiscals. Without such action on the part of the various boards, no probation officers would be appointed by the Secretary of Justice to act in the provinces. The Philippines is divided or subdivided into provinces and it needs no argument to show that if not one of the provinces — and this is the actual situation now — appropriate the necessary fund for the salary of a probation officer, probation under Act No. 4221 would be illusory. There can be no probation without a probation officer. Neither can there be a probation officer without the probation system.
EMMANUEL PELAEZ VS. THE AUDITOR GENERAL
FACTS:From September 4, 1964 to October 29, 1964 the President of the Philippines issued executive orders to create thirty-three municipalities pursuant to Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code. Public funds thereby stood to be disbursed in the implementation of said executive orders. Suing as a private citizen and taxpayer, Vice President Emmanuel Pelaez filed a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction against the Auditor General. It seeks to restrain from the respondent or any person acting in his behalf, from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of the executive orders aforementioned.
ISSUE:
Whether the executive orders are null and void, upon the ground that the President does not have the authority to create municipalities as this power has been vested in the legislative department. RULING:
Section 10(1) of Article VII of the fundamental law ordains:
“The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus or offices, exercise general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed.”
The power of control under this provision implies the right of the President to interfere in the exercise of such discretion as may be vested by law in the officers of the executive departments, bureaus, or offices of the national government, as well as to act in lieu of such officers. This power is denied by the Constitution to the Executive, insofar as local governments are concerned. Such control does not include the authority to either abolish an executive department or bureau, or to create a new one. Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not merely fail to comply with the constitutional mandate above quoted, it also gives the President more power than what was vested in him by the Constitution.
The Executive Orders in question are hereby declared null and void ab initio and the respondent permanently restrained from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said Executive Orders or any disbursement by the municipalities referred to.
Francisco Tatad v. Secretary of Energy [Nov. 5, 1997]
“Equal Protection” – Oil Deregulation Law
FACTS:
The petitions challenge the constitutionality of RA No. 8180 entitled “An Act Deregulating the Downstream Oil Industry and For Other Purposes.” The deregulation process has two phases: (a) the transition phase (Aug. 12, 1996) and the (b) full deregulation phase (Feb. 8, 1997 through EO No. 372). Sec. 15 of RA No. 8180 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power to the President and the Sec. of Energy because it does not provide a determinate or determinable standard to guide the Executive Branch in determining when to implement the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry, and the law does not provide any specific standard to determine when the prices of crude oil in the world market are considered to be declining nor when the exchange rate of the peso to the US dollar is considered stable.
ISSUE:
w/n the provisions of RA No. 8180 and EO No. 372 is unconstitutional.
sub-issue: (a) w/n sec. 15 violates the constitutional prohibition on undue delegation of power, and (b) w/n the Executive misapplied RA No. 8180 when it considered the depletion of the OPSF fund as factor in fully deregulating the downstream oil industry in Feb. 1997.
HELD/RULING:
(a) NO. Sec. 15 can hurdle both the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. RA No. 8180 provided that the full deregulation will start at the end of March 1997 regardless of the occurrence of any event. Thus, the law is complete on the question of the final date of full deregulation.
Sec. 15 lays down the standard to guide the judgment of the President—he is to time it as far as practicable when the prices of crude oil and petroleum in the world market are declining and when the exchange rate of the peso to the US dollar is considered stable.
Webster defines “practicable” as meaning possible to practice or perform, “decline” as meaning to take a downward direction, and “stable” as meaning firmly established.
(b) YES. Sec. 15 did not mention the depletion of the OPSF fund as a factor to be given weight by the Executive before ordering full deregulation. The Executive department failed to follow faithfully the standards set by RA No. 8180 when it co0nsidered the extraneous factor of depletion of the OPSF fund. The Executive is bereft of any right to alter either by subtraction or addition the standards set in RA No. 8180 for it has no powers to make laws.
Datu Michael Abas Kida v. Senate of the Philippines, et al.,
G.R. No. 196271, October 18, 2011
I. THE FACTS
Several laws pertaining to the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) were enacted by Congress. Republic Act (RA) No. 6734 is the organic act that established the ARMM and scheduled the first regular elections for the ARMM regional officials. RA No. 9054 amended the ARMM Charter and reset the regular elections for the ARMM regional officials to the second Monday of September 2001. RA No. 9140 further reset the first regular elections to November 26, 2001. RA No. 9333 reset for the third time the ARMM regional elections to the 2nd Monday of August 2005 and on the same date every 3 years thereafter.
Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have been held on August 8, 2011. COMELEC had begun preparations for these elections and had accepted certificates of candidacies for the various regional offices to be elected. But on June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted, resetting the next ARMM regular elections to May 2013 to coincide with the regular national and local elections of the country.
In these consolidated petitions filed directly with the Supreme Court, the petitioners assailed the constitutionality of RA No. 10153.
II. THE ISSUES:
1. Does the 1987 Constitution mandate the synchronization of elections [including the ARMM elections]?
2. Does the passage of RA No. 10153 violate the three-readings-on-separate-days rule under Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution?
3. Is the grant [to the President] of the power to appoint OICs constitutional? III. THE RULING
[The Supreme Court] DISMISSED the petitions and UPHELD the constitutionality of RA No. 10153 in
toto.]
1. YES, the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of elections.
While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress has to synchronize national and local elections, the clear intent towards this objective can be gleaned from the Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII) of the Constitution, which show the extent to which the Constitutional Commission, by deliberately making adjustments to the terms of the incumbent officials, sought to attain synchronization of elections. The Constitutional Commission exchanges, read with the provisions of the Transitory Provisions of the Constitution, all serve as patent indicators of
the constitutional mandate to hold synchronized national and local elections, starting the second Monday of May 1992 and for all the following elections.
In this case, the ARMM elections, although called “regional” elections, should be included among the elections to be synchronized as it is a “local” election based on the wording and structure of the Constitution.
Thus, it is clear from the foregoing that the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of elections, including the ARMM elections.
2. NO, the passage of RA No. 10153 DOES NOT violate the three-readings-on-separate-days requirement in Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
The general rule that before bills passed by either the House or the Senate can become laws they must pass through three readings on separate days, is subject to the EXCEPTION when the President certifies to the necessity of the bill’s immediate enactment. The Court, in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, explained the effect of the President’s certification of necessity in the following manner:
The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the bill on separate days. The phrase "except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment, etc." in Art. VI, Section 26[2] qualifies the two stated conditions before a bill can become a law: [i] the bill has passed three readings on separate days and [ii] it has been printed in its final form and distributed three days before it is finally approved.
In the present case, the records show that the President wrote to the Speaker of the House of Representatives to certify the necessity of the immediate enactment of a law synchronizing the ARMM elections with the national and local elections. Following our Tolentino ruling, the President’s certification exempted both the House and the Senate from having to comply with the three separate readings requirement.
3. YES, the grant [to the President] of the power to appoint OICs in the ARMM is constitutional
[During the oral arguments, the Court identified the three options open to Congress in order to resolve the problem on who should sit as ARMM officials in the interim [in order to achieve synchronization in the 2013 elections]: (1) allow the [incumbent] elective officials in the ARMM to remain in office in a hold over capacity until those elected in the synchronized elections assume office; (2) hold special elections in the ARMM, with the terms of those elected to expire when those elected in the [2013] synchronized elections assume office; or (3) authorize the President to appoint OICs, [their respective terms to last also until those elected in the 2013 synchronized elections assume office.]
3.1. 1st option: Holdover is unconstitutional since it would extend the terms of office of the incumbent ARMM officials We rule out the [hold over] option since it violates Section 8, Article X of the Constitution. This provision states:
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. [emphases ours]
Since elective ARMM officials are local officials, they are covered and bound by the three-year term limit prescribed by the Constitution; they cannot extend their term through a holdover. xxx.
If it will be claimed that the holdover period is effectively another term mandated by Congress, the net result is for Congress to create a new term and to appoint the occupant for the new term. This view – like the extension of the elective term – is constitutionally infirm because Congress cannot do indirectly what it cannot do directly, i.e., to act in a way that would effectively extend the term of the incumbents. Indeed, if acts that cannot be legally done directly can be done indirectly, then all laws would be illusory. Congress cannot also create a new term and
effectively appoint the occupant of the position for the new term. This is effectively an act of appointment by Congress and an unconstitutional intrusion into the constitutional appointment power of the President. Hence, holdover – whichever way it is viewed – is a constitutionally infirm option that Congress could not have undertaken.
Even assuming that holdover is constitutionally permissible, and there had been statutory basis for it (namely Section 7, Article VII of RA No. 9054) in the past, we have to remember that the rule of holdover can only apply as an available option where no express or implied legislative intent to the contrary exists; it cannot apply where such contrary intent is evident.
Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, made it explicitly clear that it had the intention of suppressing the holdover rule that prevailed under RA No. 9054 by completely removing this provision. The deletion is a policy decision that is wholly within the discretion of Congress to make in the exercise of its plenary legislative powers; this Court cannot pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation, except where an attendant unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion results.
3.2. 2nd option: Calling special elections is unconstitutional since COMELEC, on its own, has no authority to order
special elections.
The power to fix the date of elections is essentially legislative in nature. [N]o elections may be held on any other date for the positions of President, Vice President, Members of Congress and local officials, except when so provided by another Act of Congress, or upon orders of a body or officer to whom Congress may have delegated either the power or the authority to ascertain or fill in the details in the execution of that power.
Notably, Congress has acted on the ARMM elections by postponing the scheduled August 2011 elections and setting another date – May 13, 2011 – for regional elections synchronized with the presidential, congressional and other local elections. By so doing, Congress itself has made a policy decision in the exercise of its legislative
wisdom that it shall not call special elections as an adjustment measure in synchronizing the ARMM elections with
the other elections.
After Congress has so acted, neither the Executive nor the Judiciary can act to the contrary by ordering special elections instead at the call of the COMELEC. This Court, particularly, cannot make this call without thereby supplanting the legislative decision and effectively legislating. To be sure, the Court is not without the power to declare an act of Congress null and void for being unconstitutional or for having been exercised in grave abuse of discretion. But our power rests on very narrow ground and is merely to annul a contravening act of Congress; it is
not to supplant the decision of Congress nor to mandate what Congress itself should have done in the exercise of its legislative powers.
Thus, in the same way that the term of elective ARMM officials cannot be extended through a holdover, the term cannot be shortened by putting an expiration date earlier than the three (3) years that the Constitution itself commands. This is what will happen – a term of less than two years – if a call for special elections shall prevail. In sum, while synchronization is achieved, the result is at the cost of a violation of an express provision of the Constitution.
3.3. 3rd option: Grant to the President of the power to appoint ARMM OICs in the interim is valid.
The above considerations leave only Congress’ chosen interim measure – RA No. 10153 and the appointment by the President of OICs to govern the ARMM during the pre-synchronization period pursuant to Sections 3, 4 and 5 of this law – as the only measure that Congress can make. This choice itself, however, should be examined for any attendant constitutional infirmity.
At the outset, the power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the limitations on or qualifications to the exercise of this power should be strictly construed; these limitations or qualifications must be clearly stated in order to be recognized. The appointing power is embodied in Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, which states:
Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. [emphasis ours]
This provision classifies into four groups the officers that the President can appoint. These are:
First, the heads of the executive departments; ambassadors; other public ministers and consuls; officers of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, from the rank of colonel or naval captain; and other officers whose appointments are vested in the President in this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law; Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; and
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone.
Since the President’s authority to appoint OICs emanates from RA No. 10153, it falls under the third group of officials that the President can appoint pursuant to Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. Thus, the assailed law facially rests on clear constitutional basis.
If at all, the gravest challenge posed by the petitions to the authority to appoint OICs under Section 3 of RA No. 10153 is the assertion that the Constitution requires that the ARMM executive and legislative officials to be “elective and representative of the constituent political units.” This requirement indeed is an express limitation whose non-observance in the assailed law leaves the appointment of OICs constitutionally defective.
After fully examining the issue, we hold that this alleged constitutional problem is more apparent than real and becomes very real only if RA No. 10153 were to be mistakenly read as a law that changes the elective and
representative character of ARMM positions. RA No. 10153, however, does not in any way amend what the organic
law of the ARMM (RA No. 9054) sets outs in terms of structure of governance. What RA No. 10153 in fact only does is to “appoint officers-in-charge for the Office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and
Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly who shall perform the functions pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have qualified and assumed office.” This power is far
different from appointing elective ARMM officials for the abbreviated term ending on the assumption to office of the officials elected in the May 2013 elections.
[T]he legal reality is that RA No. 10153 did not amend RA No. 9054. RA No. 10153, in fact, provides only
for synchronization of elections and for the interim measures that must in the meanwhile prevail. And this is how
RA No. 10153 should be read – in the manner it was written and based on its unambiguous facial terms. Aside from
its order for synchronization, it is purely and simply an interim measure responding to the adjustments that the synchronization requires.
CASE DIGEST: ABAS KIDA V. SENATE G.R. No. 196271, : October 18, 2011
DATU MICHAEL ABAS KIDA, in his personal capacity, and in representation of MAGUINDANAO FEDERATION OF AUTONOMOUS IRRIGATORS ASSOCIATION, INC., et al., Petitioners, v. SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President JUAN PONCE ENRILE, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, et al., Respondents.
On August 1, 1989 or two years after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, Congress acted through Republic Act (RA) No. 6734 entitled "An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao."The initially assenting provinces were Lanao del Sur,Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-tawi.RA No. 6734 scheduled the first regular elections for the regional officials of the ARMM on a date not earlier than 60 days nor later than 90 days after its ratification.
Thereafter, R.A. No. 9054 was passed to further enhance the structure of ARMM under R.A. 6734. Along with it is the reset of the regular elections for the ARMM regional officials to the second Monday of September 2001.
RA No. 9333was subsequently passed by Congress to reset the ARMM regional elections to the 2ndMonday of
August 2005, and on the same date every 3 years thereafter. Unlike RA No. 6734 and RA No. 9054, RA No. 9333 was not ratified in a plebiscite.
Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have been held onAugust 8, 2011. COMELEC had begun preparations for these elections and had accepted certificates of candidacies for the various regional offices to be elected.But onJune 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted, resetting the ARMM elections to May 2013, to coincide with the regular national and local elections of the country.With the enactment into law of RA No. 10153, the COMELEC stopped its preparations for the ARMM elections.
Several cases for certiorari, prohibition and madamus originating from different parties arose as a consequence of the passage of R.A. No. 9333 and R.A. No. 10153 questioning the validity of said laws.
OnSeptember 13, 2011, the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the implementation of RA No. 10153 and ordering the incumbent elective officials of ARMM to continue to perform their functions should these cases not be decided by the end of their term onSeptember 30, 2011.
The petitioners assailing RA No. 9140, RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 assert that these laws amend RA No. 9054 and thus, have to comply with the supermajority vote and plebiscite requirements prescribed under Sections 1 and 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9094 in order to become effective.
The petitions assailing RA No. 10153 further maintain that it is unconstitutional for its failure to comply with the three-reading requirement of Section 26(2), Article VI of the Constitution.Also cited as grounds are the alleged violations of the right of suffrage of the people of ARMM, as well as the failure to adhere to the "elective and representative" character of the executive and legislative departments of the ARMM. Lastly, the petitioners challenged the grant to the President of the power to appoint OICs to undertake the functions of the elective ARMM officials until the officials elected under the May 2013 regular elections shall have assumed office. Corrolarily, they also argue that the power of appointment also gave the President the power of control over the ARMM, in complete violation of Section 16, Article X of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
A. Whether or not the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of elections
B. Whether or not the passage of RA No. 10153 violates the provisions of the 1987 Constitution HELD:
Court dismissed the petition and affirmed the constitutionality of R.A. 10153 in toto. The Court agreed with respondent Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) on its position that the Constitution mandates synchronization, citing Sections 1, 2 and 5, Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of the 1987 Constitution. While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress has to synchronize national and local elections, the clear intent towards this objective can be gleaned from the Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII) of the Constitution,which show the extent to which the Constitutional Commission, by deliberately making adjustments to the terms of the incumbent officials, sought to attain synchronization of elections.
The objective behind setting a common termination date for all elective officials, done among others through the shortening the terms of the twelve winning senators with the least number of votes, is to synchronize the holding of all future elections whether national or local to once every three years.This intention finds full support in the discussions during the Constitutional Commission deliberations. Furthermore, to achieve synchronization, Congressnecessarilyhas to reconcile the schedule of the ARMMs regular elections (which should have been held in August 2011 based on RA No. 9333) with the fixed schedule of the national and local elections (fixed by RA No. 7166 to be held in May 2013).
InOsme v. Commission on Elections, the court thus explained:
It is clear from the aforequoted provisions of the 1987 Constitution that the terms of office of Senators, Members of the House of Representatives, the local officials, the President and the Vice-President have been synchronized to end on the same hour, date and year noon of June 30, 1992.
It is likewise evident from the wording of the above-mentioned Sections that the term ofsynchronizationis used synonymously as the phraseholding simultaneouslysince this is the precise intent in terminating their Office Tenure on the sameday or occasion.This common termination date will synchronize future elections to once every three years (Bernas, the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Vol. II, p. 605).
That the election for Senators, Members of the House of Representatives and the local officials (under Sec. 2, Art. XVIII) will have to be synchronized with the election for President and Vice President (under Sec. 5, Art. XVIII) is likewise evident from the x x xrecords of the proceedings in the Constitutional Commission. [Emphasis supplied.] Although called regional elections, the ARMM elections should be included among the elections to be synchronized as it is a "local" election based on the wording and structure of the Constitution. Regional elections in the ARMM for the positions of governor, vice-governor and regional assembly representatives fall within the classification of "local" elections, since they pertain to the elected officials who will serve within the limited region of ARMM. From the perspective of the Constitution, autonomous regions are considered one of the forms of local governments, as evident from Article Xof the Constitution entitled "Local Government."Autonomous regions are established and discussed under Sections 15 to 21 of this Article the article wholly devoted to Local Government.
Second issue: Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, acted strictly within its constitutional mandate. Given an array of choices, it acted within due constitutional bounds and with marked reasonableness in light of the necessary adjustments that synchronization demands. Congress, therefore, cannot be accused of any evasion of a positive duty or of a refusal to perform its duty nor is there reason to accord merit to the petitioners claims of grave abuse of discretion.
In relation with synchronization, both autonomy and the synchronization of national and local elections are recognized and established constitutional mandates, with one being as compelling as the other.If their compelling force differs at all, the difference is in their coverage; synchronization operates on and affects the whole country, while regional autonomy as the term suggests directly carries a narrower regional effect although its national effect cannot be discounted.
In all these, the need for interim measures is dictated by necessity; out-of-the-way arrangements and approaches were adopted or used in order to adjust to the goal or objective in sight in a manner that does not do violence to the Constitution and to reasonably accepted norms.Under these limitations, the choice of measures was a question of wisdom left to congressional discretion.
However, the holdover contained in R.A. No. 10153, for those who were elected in executive and legislative positions in the ARMM during the 2008-2011 term as an option that Congress could have chosen because a holdover violates Section 8, Article X of the Constitution. In the case of the terms of local officials, their term has been fixed clearly and unequivocally, allowing no room for any implementing legislation with respect to the fixed term itself and no vagueness that would allow an interpretation from this Court. Thus, the term of three years for local officials should stay at three (3) years as fixed by the Constitution and cannot be extended by holdover by Congress.
RA No. 10153, does not in any way amend what the organic law of the ARMM(RA No. 9054) sets outs in terms of structure of governance.What RA No. 10153 in fact only does is to"appoint officers-in-charge for the Office of the
the functions pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have qualified and assumed office."This power is far different from appointing elective ARMM officials for the
abbreviated term ending on the assumption to office of the officials elected in the May 2013 elections. It must be therefore emphasized that the law must be interpreted as an interim measure to synchronize elections and must not be interpreted otherwise.
ANGARA vs ELECTORAL COMMISSION G.R. No. L-45081 July 15 1936
FACTS:
Jose Angara and Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor were candidates voted for the position of member of the National Assembly for the 1st district of Tayabas province.
On Oct 17 1935, the provincial board of canvassers proclaimed Angara as member-elect of the Nat'l Assembly for garnering the most number of votes. He then took his oath of office on Nov 15th. On Dec 3rd, Nat'l Assembly passed Res. No 8 which declared with finality the victory of Angara. On Dec 8, Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a motion of protest against the election of Angara, that he be
declared elected member of the Nat'l Assembly. Electoral Commission passed a resolution in Dec 9th as the last day for the filing of the protests against the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly. On Dec 20, Angara filed before the Elec. Commission a motion to dismiss the protest that the protest in question was filed out of the prescribed period. The Elec. Commission denied Angara's petition.
Angara prayed for the issuance of writ of prohibition to restrain and prohibit the Electoral Commission taking further cognizance of Ynsua's protest. He contended that the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the said Electoral Commissions as regards the merits of contested elections to the Nat'l Assembly and the Supreme Court therefore has no jurisdiction to hear the case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the controversy;
Whether or not The Electoral Commission has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction.
RULING:
In this case, the nature of the present controversy shows the necessity of a final constitutional arbiter to determine the conflict of authority between two agencies created by the Constitution. The court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the present controversy for the purpose of determining the character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral
Commission as "the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly." (Sec 4 Art. VI 1935 Constitution). It is held, therefore, that the Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the election protest filed by Ynsua.
GARCIA vs MACARAIG
39 SCRA 106 – Political Law – Separation of Powers
Judge Catalino Macaraig, Jr. took his oath as Judge of the CFI of Laguna and San Pablo City on June 29, 1970. The court, being one of the 112 newly created CFI branches, had to be organized from scratch. From July 1, 1970 to February 28, 1971, Macaraig was not able to assume the duties and functions of a judge due to the fact that his Court Room can not be properly established due to problems as to location and as to appropriations to make his Court up and running. When Macaraig realized that it would be some time before he could actually preside over his court, he applied for an extended leave (during the 16 years he had worked in the Department of Justice, he had, due to pressure of duties, never gone on extended leave, resulting in his forfeiting all the leave benefits he had earned beyond the maximum ten months allowed by the law). The Secretary of Justice, however, convinced Macaraig to forego his leave and instead to assist the Secretary, without being extended a formal detail, whenever he was not busy attending to the needs of his court.
Paz Garcia on the other hand filed a complaint alleging that Macaraig is incompetent, dishonest and has acted in violation of his oath as a judge. Garcia said that Macaraig has not submitted the progress of his Courts as required by law. And that Macaraig has received salaries as a judge while he is fully aware that he has not been performing the duties of a judge. Also questioned was the fact that a member of the judiciary is helping the the DOJ, a department of the executive oi charge of prosecution of cases. ISSUE: Whether or not Macaraig has acted with incompetence and dishonesty as Judge.
HELD: No. Macaraig’s inability to perform his judicial duties under the circumstances mentioned above does not constitute incompetence. Macaraig was, like every lawyer who gets his first appointment to the bench, eager to assume his judicial duties and rid himself of the stigma of being ‘a judge without a sala’, but forces and circumstances beyond his control prevented him from discharging his judicial duties.
On the other hand, none of these is to be taken as meaning that the Court looks with favor at the practice of long standing, to be sure, of judges being detailed in the DOJ to assist the Secretary even if it were only in connection with his work of exercising administrative authority over the courts. The line between what a judge may do and what he may not do in collaborating or working with other offices or officers under the other great departments of the government must always be kept clear and jealously observed, lest the principle of separation of powers on which our government rests by mandate of the people thru the Constitution be gradually eroded by practices purportedly motivated by good intentions in the interest of the public service.
The fundamental advantages and the necessity of the independence of said three departments from each other, limited only by the specific constitutional precepts on check and balance between and among them, have long been acknowledged as more paramount than the serving of any temporary or passing
governmental conveniences or exigencies. It is thus of grave importance to the judiciary under our present constitutional scheme of government that no judge of even the lowest court in this Republic should place himself in a position where his actuations on matters submitted to him for action or resolution would be subject to review and prior approval and, worst still, reversal, before they can have legal effect, by any authority other than the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, as the case may be. Needless to say, the Court feels very strongly that it is best that this practice is discontinued.
DEFENSOR – SANTIAGO vs COMELEC
270 SCRA 106
(G.R. No. 127325 - March 19, 1997)
FACTS:
Private respondent Atty. Jesus Delfin, president of People’s Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action (PIRMA), filed with COMELEC a petition to amend the constitution to lift the term limits of elective officials, through People’s Initiative. He based this petition on Article XVII, Sec. 2 of the 1987 Constitution, which provides for the right of the people to exercise the power to directly propose amendments to the Constitution. Subsequently the COMELEC issued an order directing the publication of the petition and of the notice of hearing and thereafter set the case for hearing. At the hearing, Senator Roco, the IBP, Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon, Public Interest Law Center, and Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino appeared as intervenors-oppositors. Senator Roco filed a motion to dismiss the Delfin petition on the ground that one which is cognizable by the COMELEC. The petitioners herein Senator Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Isabel Ongpin filed this civil action for prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against COMELEC and the Delfin petition rising the several arguments, such as the following: (1) The constitutional provision on people’s initiative to amend the constitution can only be implemented by law to be passed by Congress. No such law has been passed; (2) The people’s initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution, not to revision thereof. Lifting of the term limits constitutes a revision, therefore it is outside the power of people’s initiative. The Supreme Court granted the Motions for Intervention.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not Sec. 2, Art. XVII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision.
(2) Whether or not COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 regarding the conduct of initiative onamendments to the Constitution is valid, considering the absence in the law of specific provisions onthe conduct of such initiative. (3) Whether the lifting of term limits of elective officials would constitute a revision or anamendment of the Constitution.
HELD:
Sec. 2, Art XVII of the Constitution is not self executory, thus, without implementing legislation the same cannot operate. Although the Constitution has recognized or granted the right, the people cannot exercise it if Congress does not provide for its implementation. The portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 which prescribes rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution, is void. It has been an established rule
that what has been delegated, cannot be delegated (potestas delegata non delegari potest). The delegation of the power to the COMELEC being invalid, the latter cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to implement the exercise of the right to people’s initiative. The lifting of the term limits was held to be that of a revision, as it would affect other provisions of the Constitution such as the synchronization of elections, the constitutional guarantee of equal access to opportunities for public service, and prohibiting political dynasties. A revision cannot be done by initiative. However, considering the Court’s decision in the above Issue, the issue of whether or not the petition is a revision or amendment has become academic.
MIRIAM DEFENSOR- SANTIAGO VS. COMELEC G.R No. 127325 March 19, 1997
FACTS:
On December 6, 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin, founding member of the Movement for People's Initiative, filed with the
COMELEC a "Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People's Initiative" citing Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution. Acting on the petition, the COMELEC set the case for hearing and directed Delfin to have the petition published. After the hearing the arguments between petitioners and opposing parties, the COMELEC directed Delfin and the oppositors to file their "memoranda and/or oppositions/memoranda" within five days. On December 18, 1996, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Maria Isabel Ongpin filed a special civil action for prohibition under Rule 65 raising the following arguments, among others:
1.) That the Constitution can only be amended by people’s initiative if there is an enabling law passed by Congress, to which no such law has yet been passed; and
2.) That R.A. 6735 does not suffice as an enabling law on people’s initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative.
ISSUE:
WON R.A. No. 6735 sufficient to enable amendment of the Constitution by people’s initiative.
WON RA 6735 was intended to include initiative on amendments to the Constitution, and if so WON the Act as worded adequately covers such initiative.
WON COMELEC Res. No. 2300 regarding the conduct of initiative on amendments to the constitution is valid, considering the absence in the law of specific provisions on the conduct of such initiative?
WON the lifting of term limits of elective national and local official, as proposed in the draft petition would constitute a revision of , or an amendment of the constitution.
WON the COMELEC can take cognizance of or has jurisdiction over the petition.
WON it is proper for the Supreme Court to take cognizance of the petition when there is a pending case before the COMELEC.
HELD:
NO. R.A. 6735 is inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution.
Under the said law, initiative on the Constitution is confined only to proposals to AMEND. The people are not accorded the power to "directly propose, enact, approve, or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution" through the system of initiative. They can only do so with respect to "laws, ordinances, or resolutions." The use of the clause "proposed laws sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed" denotes that R.A. No. 6735 excludes initiative on amendments to the Constitution.
Also, while the law provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum and for Local Initiative and Referendum, no subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This means that the main thrust of the law is initiative and referendum on national and local laws. If R.A. No. 6735 were intended to fully provide for the implementation of the initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it could have provided for a subtitle therefor, considering that in the order of things, the primacy of interest, or hierarchy of values, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution is far more important than the initiative on national and local laws.
While R.A. No. 6735 specially detailed the process in implementing initiative and referendum on national and local laws, it intentionally did not do so on the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution.
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is hereby declared void and orders the respondent to forthwith dismiss the Delfin Petition . TRO issued on 18 December 1996 is made permanent.
WHEREFORE, petition is GRANTED.
RUBI VS PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO
39 PHIL. 660 – POLITICAL LAW – DELEGATION OF POWERS – LIBERTY AND DUE PROCESS
Rubi and various other Manguianes (Mangyans) in the province of Mindoro were ordered by the provincial governor of Mindoro to remove their residence from their native habitat and to established themselves on a
reservation in Tigbao, still in the province of Mindoro, and to remain there, or be punished by imprisonment if they escaped. Manguianes had been ordered to live in a reservation made to that end and for purposes of cultivation under certain plans. The Manguianes are a Non-Christian tribe who were considered to be of “very low culture”.
One of the Manguianes, a certain Dabalos, escaped from the reservation but was later caught and was placed in prison at Calapan, solely because he escaped from the reservation. An application for habeas corpus was made on behalf by Rubi and other Manguianes of the province, alleging that by virtue of the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro creating the reservation, they had been illegally deprived of their liberty. In this case, the validity of Section 2145 of the Administrative Code, which provides:
With the prior approval of the Department Head, the provincial governor of any province in which non-Christian inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him and approved by the provincial board was challenged.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 2145 of the Administrative Code constitutes undue delegation. Whether or not the Manguianes are being deprived of their liberty.
HELD:
I. No. By a vote of five to four, the Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of this section of the
Administrative Code. Under the doctrine of necessity, who else was in a better position to determine whether or not to execute the law but the provincial governor. It is optional for the provincial governor to execute the law as circumstances may arise. It is necessary to give discretion to the provincial governor. The Legislature may make decisions of executive departments of subordinate official thereof, to whom it has committed the execution of certain acts, final on questions of fact.
II. No. Among other things, the term “non-Christian” should not be given a literal meaning or a religious
signification, but that it was intended to relate to degrees of civilization. The term “non-Christian” it was said, refers not to religious belief, but in a way to geographical area, and more directly to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization. In this case, the Manguianes were being reconcentrated in the reservation to promote peace and to arrest their seminomadic lifestyle. This will ultimately settle them down where they can adapt to the changing times.
The Supreme Court held that the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro was neither discriminatory nor class legislation, and stated among other things: “. . . one cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered with when the degree of civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own good and the general good of the Philippines. Nor can one say that due process of law has not been followed. To go back to our definition of due process of law and equal protection of the laws, there exists a law; the law seems to be reasonable; it is enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and it applies alike to all of a class.”
TUPAS vs Ople 137 SCRA 117
– Political Law – Delegation of Power – Administrative Bodies – Manner of Election and Selection of Representatives
The Trade Unions of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS) and the National Federation of Labor Unions (NFLU) are unions representing the agricultural and industrial sectors. They alleged they represent over a million workers all over the country. On the other hand, Batas Pambansa Blg. 697 is the implementing law of the constitutional provision which states that 3 sectors are to be represented (youth, agricultural labor, industrial labor).
Each sector must have four representatives, 2 from Luzon, one each from Visayas and Mindanao respectively. These sectors can submit their nominees to the President for approval/appointment through the Minister of Labor. TUPAS however questions the constitutionality of the said BP because it allegedly lacks duly published rules on accreditation, nomination and appointment of industrial labor representatives. Being so, TUPAS questioned the acts of BlasOple, then Minister of Labor, in accrediting certain nominations provided by other industrial labor groups. TUPAS claims that since there are no rules clearly stated in the BP on how the
nominations must be handled, the said law has provided undue delegation to the Minister of Labor and has left him with absolute discretion in carrying out the duty of accrediting such nominations. TUPAS did not submit their nomination within the given 20 day period of nominating their representation; they instead proceeded to question the constitutionality of the said BP and the legality of the acts of Ople. Because of their failure to submit their nominees, Ople did not accredit them.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is undue delegation of power to the Minister of Labor by BP 697.
HELD: No. The lack of merit of the contention that there is an unlawful delegation of legislative power is quite obvious. Appointment to office is intrinsically an executive act involving the exercise of discretion. What is involved then is not a legislative power but the exercise of competence intrinsically executive. What is more, the official who could make the recommendation is the Minister of Labor, an alter ego of the President. The argument, therefore, that there is an unlawful delegation of legislative power is bereft of any persuasive force.
To further test the validity of the said BP, and to avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which implies at the very least that the legislature itself determines matters of principle and lays down
fundamental policy. Otherwise, the charge of complete abdication may be hard to repel. A standard thus defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. The standard does not even have to be spelled out. It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole. Such standard is set forth with clarity in Article III, Section 6 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 697 which provides in full the limits and scope of the functions of the Minister of Labor in carrying out the said provisions.
TUPAS and NFLU were free to submit their nominations to the President by merely writing a letter coursed through respondent, and their nominees should have been submitted to the President. They did not do so. In fact, as of May 30, 1984, which was still within the 20-day period, they wrote a letter to Ople which in effect stated that they were not submitting any nomination and informing him that they were questioning the validity of Sections 4, 5, and 6 of BP 697. Hence, if petitioners were not able to submit any nominee they had no one to blame but themselves. And the law cannot be declared unconstitutional on such ground.
US vs Ang Tang Ho
43 Phil. 1 – Political Law – Delegation of Power – Administrative Bodies
In July 1919, the Philippine Legislature (during special session) passed and approved Act No. 2868 entitled
An Act Penalizing the Monopoly and Hoarding of Rice, Palay and Corn. The said act, under extraordinary
circumstances, authorizes the Governor General (GG) to issue the necessary Rules and Regulations in regulating the distribution of such products. Pursuant to this Act, in August 1919, the GG issued Executive Order No. 53 which was published on August 20, 1919. The said EO fixed the price at which rice should be sold. On the other hand, Ang Tang Ho, a rice dealer, sold a ganta of rice to Pedro Trinidad at the price of eighty centavos. The said amount was way higher than that prescribed by the EO. The sale was done on the 6th of August 1919. On August 8, 1919, he was charged for violation of the said EO. He was found guilty as
charged and was sentenced to 5 months imprisonment plus a P500.00 fine. He appealed the sentence countering that there is an undue delegation of power to the Governor General.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is undue delegation to the Governor General.
HELD: First of, Ang Tang Ho’s conviction must be reversed because he committed the act prior to the publication of the EO. Hence, he cannot be ex post facto charged of the crime. Further, one cannot be convicted of a violation of a law or of an order issued pursuant to the law when both the law and the order fail to set up an ascertainable standard of guilt.
Anent the issue of undue delegation, the said Act wholly fails to provide definitely and clearly what the standard policy should contain, so that it could be put in use as a uniform policy required to take the place of all others without the determination of the insurance commissioner in respect to matters involving the exercise of a legislative discretion that could not be delegated, and without which the act could not possibly be put in use. The law must be complete in all its terms and provisions when it leaves the legislative branch of the government and nothing must be left to the judgment of the electors or other appointee or delegate of the legislature, so that, in form and substance, it is a law in all its details in presenti, but which may be left to take effect in future, if necessary, upon the ascertainment of any prescribed fact or event.
VALENTIN TIO VS VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD
151 SCRA 208 – Political Law – The Embrace of Only One Subject by a Bill Delegation of Power – Delegation to Administrative Bodies
In 1985, Presidential Dedree No. 1987 entitled “An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board” was enacted which gave broad powers to the VRB to regulate and supervise the videogram industry. The said law sought to minimize the economic effects of piracy. There was a need to regulate the sale of videograms as it has adverse effects to the movie industry. The proliferation of videograms has significantly lessened the revenue being acquired from the movie industry, and that such loss may be recovered if videograms are to be taxed. Section 10 of the PD imposes a 30% tax on the gross receipts payable to the LGUs.
1. Section 10 thereof, which imposed the 30% tax on gross receipts, is a rider and is not germane to the subject matter of the law.
2. There is also undue delegation of legislative power to the VRB, an administrative body, because the law allowed the VRB to deputize, upon its discretion, other government agencies to assist the VRB in
enforcing the said PD.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Valentin Tio’s arguments are correct. HELD: No.
1. The Constitutional requirement that “every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof” is sufficiently complied with if the title be comprehensive enough to include the general purpose which a statute seeks to achieve. In the case at bar, the questioned provision is allied and germane to, and is reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of, the general object of the PD, which is the regulation of the video industry through the VRB as expressed in its title. The tax provision is not
inconsistent with, nor foreign to that general subject and title. As a tool for regulation it is simply one of the regulatory and control mechanisms scattered throughout the PD.
2. There is no undue delegation of legislative powers to the VRB. VRB is not being tasked to legislate. What was conferred to the VRB was the authority or discretion to seek assistance in the execution, enforcement, and implementation of the law. Besides, in the very language of the decree, the authority of the BOARD to solicit such assistance is for a “fixed and limited period” with the deputized agencies concerned being “subject to the direction and control of the [VRB].”
TOLENTINO V. SECRETARY OF FINANCE Facts:
The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods and properties as well as on the sale or exchange of services. RA 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code. There are various suits challenging the constitutionality of RA 7716 on various grounds.
One contention is that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution, because it is in fact the result of the consolidation of 2 distinct bills, H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630. There is also a contention that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings as required by the Constitution.
Whether or not RA 7716 violates Art. VI, Secs. 24 and 26(2) ofthe Constitution
Held:
The argument that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution will not bear analysis. To begin with, it is not the law but the revenue bill which is required by the Constitution to originate exclusively in the House of Representatives. To insist that a revenue statute and not only the bill which initiated the legislative process culminating in the enactment of the law must substantially be the same as the House bill would be to deny the Senate’s power not only to concur with amendments but also to propose amendments. Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application must come from the House of Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the members of the House can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. Nor does the
Constitutionprohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, so long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill.
The next argument of the petitioners was that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings on separate days as required by the
Constitution because the second and third readings were done on the same day. But this was because the President had certified S. No. 1630 as urgent. The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the bill on separate days. That upon the certification of a billby the President the requirement of 3 readings on separate days and of printing and distribution can be dispensed with is supported by the weightof legislative practice.
Arturo Tolentino vs Secretary of Finance
Tolentino et al is questioning the constitutionality of RA 7716 otherwise known as the Expanded Value Added Tax (EVAT) Law. Tolentino averred that this revenue bill did not exclusively originate from the House of Representatives as required by Section 24, Article 6 of the Constitution. Even though RA 7716 originated as HB 11197 and that it passed the 3 readings in the HoR, the same did not complete the 3 readings in Senate for after the 1st reading it was referred to the Senate Ways & Means Committee thereafter Senate passed its own version known as Senate Bill 1630. Tolentino averred that what Senate could have done is amend HB 11197 by striking out its text and substituting it w/ the text of SB 1630 in that way “the bill remains a House Bill and the Senate version just becomes the text (only the text) of the HB”. Tolentino and co-petitioner Roco [however] even signed the said Senate Bill.
ISSUE: Whether or not EVAT originated in the HoR.
HELD: By a 9-6 vote, the SC rejected the challenge, holding that such consolidation was consistent with the power of the Senate to propose or concur with amendments to the version originated in the HoR. What the Constitution simply means, according to the 9 justices, is that the initiative must come from the HoR. Note also that there were several instances before where Senate passed its own version rather than having the HoR version as far as revenue and other such bills are concerned. This practice of amendment by substitution has always been accepted. The proposition of Tolentino concerns a mere matter of form. There is no showing that it would make a significant difference if Senate were to adopt his over what has been done.
PHILCOMSAT VS. ALCUAZ
180 SCRA 218; GR NO 84818 18 DEC 1989
Facts:
The petition before us seeks to annul and set aside an Order 1 issued by respondent Commissioner Jose Luis Alcuaz of the National Telecommunications Commission. Herein petitioner is engaged in providing for services involving telecommunications. Charging rates for certain specified lines that were reduced by order of herein respondent Jose AlcuazCommissioner of the National Telecommunications Commission. The rates were ordered to be reduced by fifteen percent (15%) due to Executive Order No. 546 which granted the NTC the power to fix rates. Said order was issued without prior notice and hearing. Under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 5514, petitioner was exempt from the jurisdiction of the then Public Service Commission, now respondent NTC. However, pursuant to Executive Order No. 196 issued on June 17, 1987, petitioner was placed under the jurisdiction, control and regulation of respondent NTC
Issue: Whether or Not E.O. 546 is unconstitutional.
Held: In Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. vs. Public Service Commission the Supreme Court said that although the rule-making power and even
the power to fix rates- when such rules and/or rates are meant to apply to all enterprises of a given kind throughout the Philippines-may partake of a legislative character. Respondent Alcuaz no doubt contains all the attributes of a quasi-judicial adjudication. Foremost is the fact that said order pertains exclusively to petitioner and to no other. The respondent admits that the questioned order was issued pursuant to its quasi-judicial functions. It, however, insists that notice and hearing are not necessary since the assailed order is merely incidental to the entire proceedings and, therefore, temporary in nature but the supreme court said that While respondents may fix a temporary rate pending final determination of the application of petitioner, such rate-fixing order, temporary though it may be, is not exempt from the statutory procedural requirements of notice and hearing. The Supreme Court Said that it is clear that with regard to rate-fixing, respondent has no authority to make such order without first giving petitioner a hearing, whether the order be temporary or permanent. In the Case at bar the NTC didn’t scheduled hearing nor it did give any notice to the petitioner
PHILCOMSAT VS. ALCUAZ
180 SCRA 218 – Political Law – Delegation of Power – Administrative Bodies
By virtue of Republic Act No. 5514, the Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT) was granted the authority to “construct and operate such ground facilities as needed to deliver telecommunications services from the communications satellite system and ground terminal or terminals” in the Philippines. PHILCOMSAT provides satellite services to companies like Globe Mackay (now Globe) and PLDT.
Under Section 5 of the same law, PHILCOMSAT was exempt from the jurisdiction, control and regulation of the Public Service Commission later known as the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC). However, Executive Order No. 196 was later promulgated and the same has placed PHILCOMSAT under the jurisdiction of the NTC. Consequently, PHILCOMSAT has to acquire permit to operate from the NTC in order to continue operating its existing satellites. NTC gave the necessary permit but it however directed PHILCOMSAT to reduce its current rates by 15%. NTC based its power to fix the rates on EO 546.
PHILCOMSAT now sues NTC and its commissioner (Jose Luis Alcuaz) assailed the said directive and holds that the enabling act (EO 546) of the NTC, empowering it to fix rates for public service communications, does not provide the necessary standards which were constitutionally required, hence, there is an undue delegation of legislative power, particularly the adjudicatory powers of NTC. PHILCOMSAT asserts that nowhere in the provisions of EO 546, providing for the creation of NTC and granting its rate-fixing powers, nor of EO 196, placing PHILCOMSAT under the jurisdiction of NTC, can it be inferred that NTC is guided by any standard in the exercise of its rate-fixing and adjudicatory powers. PHILCOMSAT subsequently clarified its said submission to mean that the order mandating a reduction of certain rates is undue delegation not of legislative but of quasi-judicial power to NTC, the exercise of which allegedly requires an express conferment by the legislative body.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is an undue delegation of power.
HELD: No. There is no undue delegation. The power of the NTC to fix rates is limited by the requirements of public safety, public interest, reasonable feasibility and reasonable rates, which conjointly more than satisfy the requirements of a valid delegation of legislative power. Fundamental is the rule that delegation of legislative power may be sustained only upon the ground that some standard for
its exercise is provided and that the legislature in making the delegation has prescribed the manner of the exercise of the delegated power. Therefore, when the administrative agency concerned, NTC in this case, establishes a rate, its act must both be non-confiscatory and must have been established in the manner prescribed by the legislature; otherwise, in the absence of a fixed standard, the delegation of power becomes unconstitutional. In case of a delegation of rate-fixing power, the only standard which the legislature is required to prescribe for the guidance of the administrative authority is that the rate be reasonable and just. However, it has been held that even in the absence of an express requirement as to reasonableness, this standard may be implied.
However, in this case, it appears that the manner of fixing the rates was done without due process since no hearing was made in ascertaining the rate imposed upon PHILCOMSAT.
