Carolina Planning Vol. 14.1: Planning in Developing Countries

Carolina

Planning

A

Student-run

Publication of the University of

North

Carolina

Department

of

City

and

Regional Planning

Volume

14

Number

1

Spring

1988

Forum

Planning

from

the

Bottom

Up

Elizabeth

Morton

Heidi Walter Powell

Articles

Reflections

on

Donor

Coordination:

An

Attempt

to

Establish

a

Microcomputer-based Development

Project

Directory

in

Sudan

Dale Whittington Craig

Calhoun

Development

on

the

Urban

Fringe:

Recent

Chinese Experience

Simon

Powell 15

No

Voice,

No

Choice:

Community

Group

Involvement

in

London's

Metropolitan

Strategic

Planning

Process

Judith Allen 23

Population—

A

Key

Component

of

Planning Education

for

Developing

Countries

Linda Lacey 30

Commentary

Meeting

the

Needs

of

Developing

Countries:

Introducing a

New

Program

of

Study

Staff

Editor's

Note

Editor

Lynn

Favour

Editor Heidi Walter Powell

Associate Editor Paul

Kron

Associate Editor Elizabeth

Morton

Computer-generated coverdesign

by

the

Computer

Cartography

Laboratory,

Depart-ment

of Geography, University of

North

Carolina at

Chapel

Hill.

Graphics

by

Paul Kron.

Photography

contributions

from

Judith Allen, LindaLacey,

Simon

Powell, Research Triangle Foundation,

Marie

Walter

and

Dale Whittington.

Inourshrinkingworld,itisimportantforU.S. planningprofessionalstounderstandthedifficultiestheir counterparts face inother countries.European planning issuesmayresemblethosein theU.S., but the variety ofpolitical,socialandeconomic systemstheremaketheapproaches verydifferentfrom one another

and fromours.ThirdWorldplanningissuesincludepopulationcontrolandprovidingfoodandshelter,

whichmayseemfarremovedfromissuesweconsidertobeplanning-related.Buttheproblemsof

over-crowding,hungerandhomelessnessaffect ourpersonal andprofessionallives.

ThisissueofCarolinaPlanningexaminestheprofessioninavarietyof internationalcontextsandfrom

a variety of perspectives.Theproblems plannersfaceinother parts of theworld,andtheapproachesthey

havetaken, provideinsights into thewaywepracticeplanning intheUnitedStates.

TheinterviewwithVienneseProfessorWalter StohrandthefirstfeaturearticlebyDale Whittington

andCraigCalhounare applications-oriented, involving fieldwork.Stohrdiscussesthe collectionand anal-ysisofEuropeanlocaldevelopmentinitiatives—analternativeapproachtoeconomic development, which utilizes localresourcestobuild strongeconomies.Dale WhittingtonandCraigCalhounsharetheir

experi-encetryingtoestablishamicrocomputer-based developmentprojectdirectory fordonorcoordinationin Sudan.

Thenexttwoarticlesevaluateplanningproblems,albeitinverydifferent contexts.SimonPowellexamines

therelatedproblemsofplanningforindustrialdevelopmentontheurbanfringeofNanjing,China,and ofensuring agriculturalself-sufficiency.JudithAllendescribes theGreaterLondonCouncil's(GLC) chal-lengetoBritain's"conventionalwisdom,"whichseesplanning onlyas atoolforcontrollingdevelopment. Allen thenanalyzes the positive impact of theGLC'sapproachonLondon'sdisempowered groups.

Linda Laceytakes a prescriptiveapproachbyproposingnewwaysof teachingpopulationstudiesto plan-ners. SheillustratesinCommentarytheapplication ofsuchan approach throughthenewcurriculumat theDepartmentofCityand RegionalPlanning.

CarolinaPlanningstaffextends aspecialthankstotheNorthCarolinachapter of the

APA

whoseefforts have helpedincrease thejournal'ssubscribers. StaffalsothankscontributorstotheJohnParker TrustFund,

advertisersand regular subscribers fortheircontinuedsupport.

HeidiWalter Powell

Editor

CarolinaPlanningwelcomescomments andsuggestionsonthearticlespublishedandwill be

happytoacceptnewmaterial for future editionsfrominterestedpersons.Suchmaterialshould be submittedtothe Editor typewrittenanddoublespaced.

CarolinaPlanningispublished biannuallybystudentsintheDepartmentofCityandRegional

Planning, University ofNorthCarolinaatChapelHill, withthe assistance offundsfromthe

John A. ParkerTrustFund,Department ofCityandRegional Planning.

Thisissue(Volume14,No.1)succeedsVolume13,No.1.Subsequentissues willberenumbered 1 intheSpring; 2 inthefall.

^

SubscriptionstoCarolinaPlanningare available atan annualrateof$8.00,or$15.00fortwoyears.

Spring1988,Vol. 14, No. 1

Forum

Planning

from

the

Bottom

Up

An

Interview

with

Professor

Walter Stohr

Elizabeth

Morton

Heidi Walter Powell

WalterStohrisa professorofregionalplanning,

and

Director_ofthe InterdisciplinaryInstitutefor

Urban and

Regional

Studies, University of

Economics

(Wirtschaftuniversitat), Vienna, Austria.

He

iscurrentlyundertakinga compilation

and

analysisoflocal

economic development

initiativesinseveralregionsofEurope,

and

hasrecentlycompletedastudy

on

the impacts of industrial parks in the United States

and

abroad.

CP:

Please describe the"EuropeanPerspectives Project" that

you

are

working

on

for United Nations University.

STOHR:

UN

Universityislocated inTokyo, but itdoes researchworldwide.

The

study

which

was

contracted to

me

will

document

experiences

from

Europe.

The

goal is tosee

how

localor regionalcommunities havesuccessfully

restructured internally,

and

primarily out of their

own

initiative

and

resources, tocope withthechanging

inter-national division oflabor.

A

team

of twelve case-study authorsis

examining

what

experiences havebeen

made

in several

major

regions of

Europe

as a result of this

restructuring.

We

areconductingresearchinrural areas,

which

is the

most

common

area type in the analysis,

and

oldindustrial areas,

where

declining industrieshave

to be restructured

—

these are the

two major problem

areas.

We

alsolookatsmall-

and

intermediate-sizedcities

and

at

some

restructuring cases of large metropolitan areas

which

have very specific

problems

and

different potentials.

CP:

Could

you

give

some

examples ofthe types of

de-velopment

activities

you

have found?

STOHR:

We're looking at the actors within individual communities

who

haveinitiated thischangeprocess.We're considering the type of actor

and

how

he orshehasrelated tolocal institutional,politicalorsocialstructures in bring-ing about such a change.

The

precondition has always been

an

actor, butactorsvary

from

clergytoan entrepre-neur

who

became

more

thanjusta private entrepreneur, butasocialentrepreneur

—

hetried tostimulateactivities

in addition to his

own

enterprise.

Very

often the actor

would

bealocal authority. Forthe

most

part, successful

local authorities

were

in countries with

dynamic

local

governments

which had

recently introduced increasing

autonomy

forpolitical

and economic development

atthe

local level.

CP:

You'vestressedtheimportance ofinternal develop-ment,

and

have described

two

types of external inputs

which

tend to increase dependency: central

government

and

large multiregional or multinational enterprises. Is oneof these the"lesserof

two

evils"?

Do

depressed regions have

more

room

forinnovation

and

flexibility

under

one

set of external conditions?

STOHR: One

cannot generalize

by

saying that

one

is

betteror

worse

than theother. In the centrally planned countries,

two

of

which

areincludedin thisstudy

(Hun-gary

and

Poland), the central

government

isalways the

major

initiatorof

development

atthelocallevel, butthe

government

has brought about a

dependency

of local

communities

which

has to a great extent stifled their ability to act out of their

own

initiative. This also very often

happens

with multinational companies. Multina-tional

companies

—

thetypicalcaseisa

company

town

—

will

become

such a

dominating

factor in a local

com-munity

that

no

otherinitiativescan

emerge

successfully.

m

7United ) CT^ Kingdom'-n

? Norway I I

. ^^\) Sweden /

f^ \ Poland

/*^H

\»_ y-KHungary Finland

2?V

J iBasque

f J Region 1 C Spain

J *

o°

tf

1 ltaly\

V^

\SS>> o

r-O

E=t

willbetolerated

and which

canmobilize

human

and

other resourcesfor localdevelopmentsuccessfully.

The

same

can be applied to large

company

towns. There are

ways

in

which

alocal

community

cantry tobenefit

from

the multi-national

company

without

becoming

completely depen-dent

on

it

by

using it as a catalyst for introducing

new

technologies

which

localfirmscantakeadvantageof.

So

thequestionhereveryoftenis:

How

can

we

promote

the

involvement of local firms in servicing or initially

con-tractingorsubcontractingwith

MNCs,

ratherthanleaving these

companies

to get all theirinputs

from

outside the region.

CP:

How

isthe

"community

interest"usuallyrepresented

innegotiations as areas try toattract

new

high-tech

and

industrialdevelopment?Specifically,

do

you

feelthe

com-munity

as a

whole

has been served

by

the presence of Research Triangle Park?

STOHR:

Most

often, local or regional authorities will

negotiatewithexternal firms

—

thatisthe

normal

pattern.

The

negotiator

may

also be a separate

company

set

up

for development. In Research Triangle Park, Triangle J Councilof

Governments

substitutesforor representslocal

government

innegotiations.

My

impressionofResearch TriangleParkisthatit

was

abletoattractlarge enterprises,

both public

and

private. This is important for creating a

new

image

and

for starting high-technology activities in

North

Carolina, sincethe state has traditionally

had

a different

image

and

different

dominant

sectors.

The

questionis:

How

broad

hasthiseffect

become

and

how

broad

willit

become?

ResearchTrianglePark seemstobe

comprised of a large

number

of enterprises that close themselvesoff

from

theoutside; theytrynottointerrelate

with other enterprises, while benefitting

from

local

re-sources like university knowledge.

Once

they get this

knowledge, however, they

want

tomonopolizeit, refusing to sharewith neighboringenterprises. This is

one

ofthe dangersof attractinglargecorporations. Itmight be

pos-sible to establish a

number

of facilities within Research Triange Park to establish

which

would

beable to house small-

and medium-sized

enterprises, sort-of

on an

incu-batorbasis, toestablish relations

and

offer services to the

large enterprises.

The

small-

and

medium-sizedenterprises

would

thereby

become

beneficiaries of

some

of the

in-novations that the large enterprises are developing in

Research Triangle Park.

The

incubator could be within thepark,adjacentto, or outside the park.This

would

pro-vide a type of spillover or multiplier

which

would

cer-tainly

broaden

theimpactofsucha researchtechnology park.

CP:

Have

local

development

endeavors been successful inutilizinglocallyavailable resources, ratherthan attempt-ing to create or attract high-tech industries?

STOHR:

Many

of the case studiesthat

we

have analyzed

in the

European

context

show

that thepanaceaof

intro-ducing high-technologyindustriesisoftennotconsidered

by

local

communities

asthe

most

importantaspect.

The

most

important aspect is to transform existing sectors,

retraining theirtraditional strengths, but adapting

them

to

modern

requirements

and

toexistingworld market

con-ditions. Localities

must

transform

and

modernizeexisting

enterprises

and

find

new

forms of cooperation

among

Spring1988, Vol. 14, No. 1

existingenterprises

which

would

permit

them

to

become

competitivewithout beingclosed

down

and

replaced

by

high-technology firms.

There

are a

number

of success

storieseveninsectorsconsideredasdecliningin industri-alized countries.

The

Italiantextileindustry,forexample, has

had

a

marvelous

successstory. Afterinitialclosures,

the Italians

modernized

small

and

decentralized plants

which

today arecompletely competitive becausethey've

changed

theirtechnology

and

they've

changed

their prod-uct mix.

They

are

now

making

very

good money.

They've

become

profitabledespite strongcompetition

from

East Asianfirmsin textiles

and

similarsectors. They've been abletocarveoutfunctions

which

the

low-wage

countries cannot fulfill.

CP:

What

do

you

think ofindustrialrecruitment as

an

economic development

strategy

and

how

prevalentisit?

STOHR:

Industrial recruitment has been the

dominant

strategy of localcommunitiesthat try tooutbidother

com-munitiesto attractoutsidefirms.Usuallytheonlycriteria

which communities

specified

were

that firms be large,

powerful

and

willing tocreate a large

number

ofjobsin

thearea.

The

types of jobs that

would

be created,

and

the types of entrepreneurial functions that

would

be transferred to the area

were

usually overlooked.

These

have turned outtobe keyelements. Ifa firmoffers only routinejobswithout providing

any

key entrepreneurial

functions,it

may

havea negativeeffect

on

thecommunity.

The

firm

may

draw

labor

from

othersectors

—

agriculture orservices

—

becauseit

may

pay

slightlyhigher wages. But

itdoes notcreate

any

developmentalpotential. Itisvery important forlocal

communities

to

make

arrangements with suchenterprisestolocatekeyentrepreneurial func-tions like research

and development

or marketing or headquarter functions.

These

are certainly the essential

functionsthat, ifattracted tothearea, bring

much

greater benefits because they are creating quality jobs

and

the determination of

company

policyis

much

more

accessible tolocal employees.Ifafirmperforms onlyroutine

func-tions,thelocal

community

merely

implements

what

was

decided

somewhere

else.

One

therefore,

by

definition

be-comes

more

dependent

on

outside decisionmakers. It is importantforlocalcommunitiesto

become

awareof these keyissuesso thattheycanadvocatefortheir interests in

negotiationswithoutsidefirms.Indefiningtheirinterests,

communities

should notlook onlyatthe

number

of jobs or

magnitude

ofcapitalinvested, butatthe types of jobs

and

types of investment that will be

made.

Such

qualitative issues have very often

been

overlooked.

CP:

What

are

some

advantages

and

disadvantages of using qualitative

development

indicators?

STOHR:

Qualitative measures are not substitutes for quantitativemeasures.

They

shouldbe usedtogether,

and

one

can quantify

many

of the qualitative criteria.

One

would

try toquantifyqualitativecriteriainorderto

make

a

more

objective evaluation. In the past, however,

re-searchershave excludedqualitative characteristicsbecause theycould not be evaluated withsufficiently rigid

quan-titativetests.Ifacharacteristicisimportant, itissensible

toforgo the"rigid criterion"

and

includesomething

which

may

be methodologically less

demanding

but

which

would

stillservean importantfunctioninevaluatingsuch a project.

CP:

How

might

one

measure

qualitative characteristics

over time? If

one were

interested in

examining

changes

inculture, forexample,

how

would

onetestorprove such

an

hypothesis?

STOHR:

Culture might be a "soft" area in this respect;

however, even within the

economics

field

you

have a

number

of qualitativecriteria

which

have notbeen taken

into considerationin the past. For example,

an

area

ex-periencing a decline ofindependentfirms

and an

increas-ing

number

ofbranchplantsneedstobeconsidered.

Such

factors indicate that the

autonomy

of theregional

econ-omy

isgraduallybeingdebilitated. Similarly, if

one

looks

atthe qualificationstrataof theworkforce,

one

sees that there are large increases in

employment,

but they all

happen

inonly

one

stratum

—

maybe

theleast qualified orthe

most

qualified only,

which happens

very oftenin

high-technologyzonessuchasSilicon Valley.

Once

alerted to this

phenomenon,

one

would

askthe question:

"What

happens

ifthelabor

market

begins

demanding

the

inter-mediate qualifications?"

One

would

then try todevelop

activities

which

would

give

employment

to a less

bifur-catedlabor

market

thanthat

which

often results

from

a high-technologyindustry.

Another

qualitative character-isticis

how

much

research

and development

money

firms

in the region are spending. If

one

calculates the rate of

total

R&D

expenditures

compared

to total expenditures of theseenterprises,

one

gets a qualitativecharacteristic

measured

in quantitative terms.

CP:

Have

you found

a greaterdegreeof similarity

among

types of areas you'vedefined, suchas "rural"or"old in-dustrial," or within individual countries?

What

sorts of

similarities

and

differenceshave

you found

among

local

development

initiatives?

STOHR:

There are

more

similar characteristics

among

areas of similar type. Rurallocal

development

initiatives will probably resemble

one

another

more

closely than theywill initiatives in old industrial areas in their

own

areas

between European

countrieswill be

more

similar with those of other areas.

There

are certain nationally determinedrestrictions

and

advantages.Nationalpolicy,

for instance, or national constitutional conditions, will restrict or

promote

possibilities existing in all types of

areas.

A

highlycentralized political

and

administrative structure will probably have a negative impact

on

the

development

ofall types oflocal initiatives. In a

decen-tralized federalcountry

on

theotherhand, allareas

would

benefit

from

theincreased

autonomy

oflocal

and

regional

authorities, irrespective of area type.

CP:

Might

you

not have other

problems under

such a decentralizedsystem; forexample, theemergenceof

com-pany towns which

you

spoke of earlier?

STOHR:

Ithink

company

towns

would

cutacross

coun-tries.

Company

towns

would

normally

emerge

insparsely

settled areas with

no

other

economic

activities besides agriculture

and

maybe some

localsupportservices.These

would

generallybe rural, peripheral areas.

Sweden,

for

instance, hassuch

communities

initsnorthernmost

terri-tories

where

iron

mining

dominates the

economy.

No

other

economic

activity of

any magnitude

exists there.

CP:

What

common

development

problems

do

such

pe-ripheralareasface?

Have you found any

particularly inno-vative local

development

initiatives in peripheral areas?

STOHR:

If

one

definesperipheralareas asthosewithout easy access to

major

population centers or

economic

activities, this

means

that they are marginal to existing markets,

and

in thisrespectarehandicapped.

On

theother hand, withregardtolocalinitiatives,ithas been observed thatthis distanceprovides

them

withgreater

maneuver-ability.

That

is, thecentral

government

tendstoexertless control. InScandinavia, thisperipheral locationhasbeen considered an advantage becauseithas givenlocal

com-munities

more

of

an

"actionradius"todevelopinititatives

on

their

own. There

are, therefore, advantages

and

dis-advantages.

The

artistousetheadvantagestospecialize inproducts

which

do

not need extensive transport

net-works.Forinstance,particularly inhigh-technologyfields,

airhas

become

the

most

important

medium

for

transpor-tation.

One

cantryto developa strategy

which

satisfies

both requirements.

Scandinaviapresents

an

interesting

example

of

an

at-tempttobringcomputer-based

homework

intoperipheral areas

where one

canlink

up

computersfairly easily.This enables residents to remain in dispersed settlement

pat-terns inperipheral locations.

Another example

of

an

innovative initiative is

from

Scotland

—

theconcept of a

community

cooperative.These are cooperatives

which

aregeared notonlyto

one

sector

Initiatives inScandinavia's peripheral areasenableresidents toremain indispersed settlements.

—

they aremultisectoral.

They

try toincludenotonly pro-duction, but service activities

and

social services.

They

are therefore multifunctional

and

multisectoral. InHungary,therural localcooperatives are established

on

aterritorialbasis.

They

can

employ

all types of activ-ities,notonlyagricultural,butmanufacturing

and

service activities. In thisrespect, theyare similar toa

multisec-toral complex, but theyhave a territorial

bond

and

are thereforeinterested indevelopingthatterritorialunitwith whatever sector activity

seems

feasible

and

promising. Thisisquite different

from

theaverage cooperative,

which

is usually only

an

agricultural, manufacturing or

mar-keting cooperative.

These

traditional cooperatives are linked primarily to international markets; their

major

allegiances are with such markets rather than with the

local

community

orterritorial unit.

A

similar

example

is

the

Basque

Mondragon

cooperative. Here, a territorial identity is also the basis for thecooperativefederation, a

whole

system of cooperatives.

The

goal is to develop

broad

packagesofactivitieswithinthe

community

rather thantospecialize in fields

which

areonly

world

market-oriented buthave

few

local linkages

and narrow

multi-pliers.

CP:

What

are the current attitudes internationally,

re-garding the

promotion

of these kinds of

development

activities?

STOHR:

In

many

European

countries,

and

also in the United States, it has

been

considered properto separate governmentalactivities

from

private enterpriseactivities

—

and

forunderstandablereasons.However, the

sue-Spring1988, Vol. 14, No. 1

cessful inthesemiconductorindustrybecausethe govern-ment,in thiscase theMinistryof InternationalTrade

and

Industry, isintegratedwithprivate industry.Togetherthey developed a

common

strategy ofsectoral development, particularly in the

computer

industry,

which

has given Japanese industrytremendous advantagesoverU.S. indus-try.

An

imitation of theJapanese

model

currently

under

negotiationinthe U.S. isSematech,

which

isthefirstjoint

venture

between

the U.S.

government

and

private enter-prise.In this project, thefederal

government

would

team

up

with about a

dozen

computer

firms to create a joint

computer development

center.

CP:

What

can

and

shouldbetheroleofnational govern-mentsinstimulating thetype ofinternaldevelopment

you

advocate?

STOHR:

Ina departure

from

past practices,governments

would

nottry tocreatejobsdirectly in ruralorold indus-trialareas, or onlyattract capital totheseareas through

capital incentives. This policy has proven to be very short-sightedbecauseit

assumes

thatcapital

and

jobs are

homogenous

factors

—

neitheris. Itis

much

more

impor-tant for central

government

to

improve

access to

com-munications to rural or old industrial areas about

new

technologies,bothregardingworld marketconditions

and

potential niches of

unmet

demand

which

might be local-ly filled,

and

also about organizational

management

practices.

The

government

should be

more

involved in facilitatinginformationaccessthantryingtointervene

by

givingcapitalor

employment

incentives inanunqualified way.

Another

important step

would

be to

promote

the formationofinnovativestructures. In Japan, thecentral

government

has

promoted

the establishment of local

private-public-university partnerships, tripartite

partner-ships, asthe basis oflocalinnovation

and

development. If suchlocal partnerships are provided, the

government

is willing to co-finance

an

applied research center, for

instance, for local industry, particularly forlocal

small-and medium-sized

enterprises.

CP:

What

approach

can areas lacking the resources to

developatripartitepartnership taketostimulate

develop-ment?

STOHR:

The

Basque

cooperative,

Mondragon,

hasbeen verysuccessfulinlinking

up

withforeign universities in

the U.S.

and

inFrance,

from which

it

draws

basicresearch data.

The

cooperative then transformsthe technologies

initscenter forapplied technological innovation, for use within

members'

own

regional contexts. Distance

from

a university can often be bridged quite successfully

by

transferringinformationwhich, ifwell-organized, canbe

sufficientforabriefperiod. Inthelong-run, suchanarea

would

certainlyneedtodevelopits

own

local university orresearch

and

training functionsunderauniversity-like label. But if this is not possible initially, there are

substitutes, as the case studies have

shown.

CP:

What

are theprospects forhigh-tech

development?

Do

you

see

any

new

innovations or trendseither inthe technology itself, or the spatial patterns that

emerge

as a result?

STOHR:

Microelectronics

development

isextremely im-portant,butthereare

new

developments suchas biotech-nologies

and

new

materials

which

arealsovery important.

The

Japanese have identified five areas of innovation

which

they promote.

One

is microelectronics; a second iscomputers; a thirdis

new

materials, suchasceramics; a fourthisbiotechnology;

and

finallytelecommunications. Microelectronics isakey innovative element, both

tech-nologically

and

spatially.Itpermitstheefficientoperation of small

machines

and

small firms,

which

are flexible

enough

toproducefordifferentiated

demand.

Small-

and

medium-sizedenterprisescan then be verycompetitivein

a decentralized pattern.

Such

"flexible automation" is spatially important becauseitcanbeestablished outside of the largeagglomerations,

where

small-

and

medium-sized firms dominate.

Microcomputer-based

Development

Project

Directory

in

Sudan

Dale

Whittington

Craig

Calhoun

The

World

Bank and

USAID

have

encouragedthecoordination of Third

World donor

organizations as aworthwhile

and

feasibleendeavor.

However,

the authors' experience in

Sudan

illustratesthat, despite theavailabilityof

microcom-puters

and

the tacit agreement of the

donor

organizations themselves,

donor

coordination is noteasily obtained.

In the

summer

of 1987, the

government

of

Sudan

ex-pelled several private voluntary aid organizations

from

thecountry

and

prohibited

them from

futureoperations

in Sudan.

The

international press reported thisevent as another inexplicable

example

of erratic behavior

by

an Africangovernment. Infact,these

and

other aid organiza-tions

had

been operating in

Sudan

as if there

were

no

sovereign

government

inthecountry. Representatives of these donors

were

flying in

and

out of

Khartoum,

the country's capital, without the slightest pretense of co-ordinatingtheir activitieswiththe

Sudanese government

orother aid organizations.

The

recentaction of the

gov-ernment

of

Sudan was an

understandable attempt to

obtain at ieast

some

minimal

knowledge

of

and

control over

donor

activities.

Ironically, the

World Bank

recently cited

Sudan

as a country

which

has

made

significantprogressinimproving

donor

coordination (IBRD, 1984, p. 42).

Our

own

work

in

Sudan

suggests, however, that the

problem

of

donor

coordinationisindeedserious

and

islikely toprove

much

more

intractablethan is

commonly

realized. Inthe

sum-mer

of 1984,

we

initiated a project in

Sudan funded by

theUnitedStates

Agency

for International

Development

(USAID)

to

work

withthe

Sudanese

MinistryofFinance

and Economic

Planning

(MOFEP).

The

purpose of the project

was

to establish microcomputer-based decision support

and

management

information systems.

One

of

several

components

of our effort

was

to create a

com-puterizeddatabaseofallongoing,planned

and

completed

development

projects in

Sudan which would

assist the

MOFEP,

and

thedonors withtheplanning

and

manage-ment

of

development

assistance.

The

Ministry

and

USAID

conceivedof thisproject as apreliminarystep to

promote

donor

coordination;it

was

toprovideafast, easy

way

for a

donor

to find out

what

otherdonors

had done

or

were

doingina particular sec-tor or region. This article describes the failure of the donorstoprovidetheinformationrequired forthis

proj-ect data base to function effectively.

We

offer several

explanationsof thedonors'failure tocooperate with the

MOFEP

and

discuss the implications ofthis experience for future attempts at

donor

coordination.

Background

There has for

some

time

been

a

growing

awareness

among

both bilateral

and

multilateral donors that lack of

donor

coordination isa

major

problem. It is at least

partlyresponsible for thefailureofAfrican

economies

to effectively utilize their

development

assistance. In its

report

Toward

Sustained

Development

in

Sub-Saharan

Africa, the

World

Bank

paints acomprehensive, sobering picture of theregion's

economic

problems,

and

outlines a series of policy measures necessary for its

economic

rehabilitation.

Two

of the report's central

recommenda-tionspertaintotheneedfor

improved

national

economic

management and donor

aid coordination.

The

reportcalls for

more

strategic

and

flexiblepublic sectorplanning

by

national governments. In addition, it calls for explicit

commitments from both

donors

and

recipient

govern-ments

to

implement

their responsibilitiesunder an agreed

economic

recoveryprogram. Specifically, the

World Bank

callsfor (1) strengthening

management

information

sys-temsinplanning

and

finance ministriesinorderto facil-itate timely policy analysis

and

strategic planning,

and

(2) providing high-quality technical assistance to those

Spring1988, Vol. 14, No. 1

AFRICA

The

World

Bank

reportpaysparticular attentiontothe need for

improved

donor

coordination.

Aidadministrationisaparticularlyimportantareafor institutional reform. Basicinformation on aid flows

isoften lacking; responsibility fordonorcontactand

negotiationisunclear;linksseldomexistbetweenthe plan, the budget, sector ministries, project entities, and donoractivities. . ..The weaknessesof

uncoordi-natedaid are increasinglyrecognizedbyAfrican gov-ernments and donors.

More

consultative groups,

UNDP-sponsoredroundtables,andotherarrangements have beensetuptocoordinateaid. .. .However,

con-sultative groups have generally suffered from two majorweaknesses. First, the commitments

made

by both governmentsanddonorson programcontentand financialsupport have notbeenfirmenough. Second,

thegroupshavefailed togetmoreinvolvedin detail

—

priorities and assistance for particular sectors,

pro-grams,andprojects,orspecificchangesinpricingand

other incentive policies (IBRD, 1984, pp. 39-43).

Such

increasedinvolvement

by donors

inthe details of aidadministrationisdependent

upon

improved

accessto

information

on

both

government and donor

development activities.

Our

project

was an

attempt to

work

toward

improvements

in these areas in Sudan.

The World

Bank'scallfor

improved

donor

coordina-tion

and

public sector planning certainly preceded the publication ofthisreport,

and

Sudan

was one

of thefirst countriesin Sub-SaharanAfrica toinitiateseriousefforts

alongtheselines.

At

thesixthConsultative

Group

Meeting for

Sudan

heldinParisinJanuary1983, severaldonors, including theUnited States

and

the

European Economic

Community

(EEC),calledfortheformationofsubgroups ofdonors

and government

representatives, organized

by

sector,

which

would

meet

in

Khartoum

and monitor

the implementationofSudan's

economic

recoveryprogram.

The

idea forthese sectorsubgroups developed

from

the

World

Bank'scountry implementation reviewprocess,in

which

Bank

and government

representatives

meet

to

review progress

on

Bank

investment programs.

At

the January 1983Consulative

Group

meeting, thechief

World

Bank

representative

and chariman

of the Consultative

Group

reaffirmed the Bank'ssupportfor such monitor-ingactivities

and welcomed

the inclusion of otherdonors

in such discussions.

The

discussions held during this Consultative

Group

meetingledtotheestablishment oftheJointMonitoring

Committee (JMC)

in1983.

The

JMC

was

chaired

by

the Minister ofFinance

and Economic

Planning

and

included the resident representatives of the

World

Bank,

Interna-tional

Monetary Fund and

concerneddonors. Its

primary

purpose

was

toprovide alocal

forum

for

more

detailed discussions of

how

donor

assistancecouldbe better co-ordinated with Sudan's

economic

policies

and

investment program. It

was

originallyenvisionedthatthe

JMC

would

meet

quarterly in

Khartoum,

and

the

JMC

Secretariat,

consisting ofstaff

from

theplanning

wing

of the

MOFEP,

would

prepare progress reports

and

analyses for the quarterlymeetings

and

fortheannualConsultative

Group

meeting.

The

JMC

met

three timesin 1983

and by

theseventh Consultative

Group

Meeting

in

December

1983, it

was

clear tothe

donors

thatadditional technicalstaff

needed

to be assignedto the

JMC

Secretariatif the

work

of the

JMC

was

to be productive. Getting

donors

and

govern-ment

representatives together

was

beneficial, but they

needed

information

and

analysis

on

the

problems

they weretodiscuss. Still,

members

of the seventh Consultative

Group

Meeting wereenthusiasticaboutthe potential con-tribution of the

JMC. The

chairman's report notes that

there

was

a consensus that the

JMC

was

performing a usefulfunction

and

that donors should supportit inthe

coming

year.

The

representative of the Netherlandssaid that the

JMC

was

a

good

start toward

donor

coordina-tion in

Sudan and

thatitmight haveapplicability inother Africancountries.

The

EEC

representativesupportedthe

work

of the

JMC

and hoped

that the coordinationthat

had

been started

would

be intensified

and

extended.

Finally, the

Sudanese

Minister of Finance

and Economic

Planningatthe timepromiseda strengthening of the

_JMC

and

notedthatthelocal

donor

representatives

would

need timelyinformation

on

commitments and

disbursements

from

theircentral offices in order to support its work.

severalmatterstoexamine, the

most

importantof

which

was

aiddisbursement.

The

Minister of

MOFEP

suggested thatacomprehensive reviewof

donor

disbursement pro-cedures

needed

to be conducted in order to understand the reasons for the

slowdown

in disbursement of

com-modity

aid.

The

representativesof the

Arab

Fund and

the African

Development

Bank

expressed the

view

that the

issue of undisbursed project assistance should be

ex-amined

toseeif

ways

couldbe

found

toincrease theflow ofpreviously

committed money,

and

also

recommended

thatthistaskbegiventotheJointMonitoringCommittee. Thus, in

December

1983, there

was

ostensibly strong supportfor

improved

donor

coordinationin

Sudan

and

for the

work

of the

JMC,

when

quiteindependently

we

proposed

to the

USAID

Khartoum

mission director that a

microcomputer

data base of

development

projects in

Sudan

beestablished.

Our

initialidea

was

tocreateadata base using commercially available software (dBase III); eachrecordinthedata base

would

contain variouskinds ofinformation

on

aspecific

development

project. Users couldeasily search the projectdatabases for projects of acertaintype(e.g.,allagricultural

and

irrigationprojects

in a particular region, or all energyprojects

funded

by

Western

European donors

which

are behind schedule).

As

originally envisioned, this computerized project directory

was

to serve

two

primaryobjectives.First, a cen-tralized, easily accessibleprojectdata base

would

provide an overview of donor-financed

development

activities,

and promote

the dissemination ofinformation

on

proj-ects

among

donors.

The

MOFEP

staff could prepare reports in response to specific requests

from donors

or

government

agencies for projectinformation.

Although

conceptually simple, theimportance of this objective of information storage

and

dissemination should not be underestimated.

The

institutional

memory

of

donor

or-ganizationsincountriessuchas

Sudan

isquiteshort

due

to brief staffassignments, so there isan urgent needfor basicdata

on

projectactivities. Paperrecords arepoorly maintained,

and

projectreports arenotwidelycirculated.

The

secondobjective,

and

ultimately the

more

impor-tant one,

was

to begin to establish a project data base

which

would

supportan

improved

planning

and

budget-ingsystem withinthe

MOFEP.

An

up-to-date, centralized project data base is essential for (1) the preparation of the

development

budget, (2) sectoral planning, (3) the estimation of recurrent costs,

and

(4)projectmonitoring

and

evaluation.

One

major

goal

was

toprovidethe

Min-istrywith an early

warning

systemfor implementation

and

financial

problems

on development

projects.

The

needfor a centralized setofdata

on development

projects

was

widely recognized within the

MOFEP

and

the

donor community.

The

April, 1984

World

Bank

report, Sudan: Planning

and

BudgetingforRecovery,

by

R. Ridker, called for the establishment of a centralized projectdirectory,

and

actually

proposed

two

projectdata

forms

for useinsystem design

and

data collection.

The

MOFEP

itself

had

made

several attemptstocollect

proj-ectdata,

and

various

forms

were

availableinthe Minis-try. For example,

when

we

began

our project in the

summer

of 1984,

we

were

shown

a collection of hand-writtenindex cards

which

containedlimitedproject

infor-mation. Inaddition, the

UNDP

Advisorstothe

MOFEP

had

drafted

forms

tobe used to collect information

on

project activities.

This discussiondemonstratesthat, althoughthe

com-puterization of a project directory

may

have been

some-what

originalin

Khartoum,

theneedfora centralfileof information

on development

projects

was

widely recog-nized, both

by

the

MOFEP

and

the

donor community.

In our opinion, however, the actualphysical processing

and

management

oftherecords forapproximately250 on-going,donor-financeddevelopmentprojects

and

750loans

and

grants proved a

major impediment

to

both

simple dataanalysis

and improved

planning

and

budgeting pro-cedures.

A

computer

data base

was

the

most

practical

way

to efficiently

manage

this

much

information ina timely manner. Inthe

summer

of 1984,

we

arrivedin

Khartoum

to attempt to create such a data base.

Data

Collection Efforts

The

development

ofthesoftwareforthe project

direc-tory

was

quite straightforward.

By

farthe

most

difficult

part of establishing the project directory

was

the

collec-tion ofthedata toputinto thesystem. There

were

three primaryplaces

where

projectdata couldbelocated:

donor

offices, theMinistry ofFinance

and Economic

Planning

Spring1988, Vol. 14, No. 1 11

itselfandtheimplementingagencies. Thissectiondescribes

the efforts to collect data

from

the

donor community.

At

the July1984meetingof theJointMonitoring

Com-mittee, the Undersecretary of Planning formally

an-nounced

that

USAID

had

agreed tofund our project to establish a microcomputer-based

development

project data base.

He

requested the donors' assistance in this

work, reminding

them

ofdiscussionsalong theselines at

the

December

1983 Consultative

Group

Meeting.In

Au-gust1984, togetherwithstaff

from

the Secretariat of the

JMC,

we

personally visited the representatives of the

major

bilateral

and

internationaldonorsin

Khartoum

to

explain thenatureof the

proposed

projectdirectory

and

to elicit theirhelp in completing

two

data

forms

which

had

been designed to collect information

on

donor-financed

development

projects.

We

paid personal visits

to the

Khartoum

representatives of thefollowing donors:

UNDP,

World

Bank,

EEC,

France, United

Kingdom,

Fed-eral Republic of

Germany,

Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Switzerland

and

USAID.

These visits

were

followed

up

by

a formal written request to twenty-two

donors

from

theUndersecretaryofPlanningin

August

1984,in

which

he requested their assistance in completing these

two

forms. Inadditiontotheeleven

donors

noted above, this

letter

was

sent to the

Embassy

of

Denmark,

African

Development

Bank,

OPEC

Fund

forInternational Devel-opment,

Kuwait

Fund

for

Arab

Economic Development,

Islamic

Development

Bank,

Abu

Dhabi

Fund

for

Eco-nomic and

SocialDevelopment,

Abu

Dhabi Government,

Saudi

Fund

for

Development,

Arab

Fund

for

Economic

and

SocialDevelopment,

UNCDF

and

International

Fund

for Agricultural

Development.

Tothe bestofour knowledge, theUndersecretary never received a replytohisletter

from

the

World

Bank,

UNDP,

EEC,

Federal Republic of

Germany,

Italy, Netherlands, Switzerland,

Kuwait

Fund

for

Economic

Development,or the

Arab Fund

for

Economic and

Social

Development.

Contrary to theexpectations of theWestern donors,

by

far the

most

complete, thorough

and prompt

responses werereceived

from

the

Arab

donors.

Most

of the

major

Western donors never even botheredto

answer

the

Under-secretary's letter; even

among

the respondents, several

replied in a superficial

and

incomplete manner.

In

November

1984

and

in January 1985,

we

again

visited the

Khartoum

officesof

many

of these donorsto

request theircooperationin this effort.

The

Undersecre-tary ofPlanning also sent afollow-up letter in January 1985, noting the importance of this

work

for the

JMC.

By

the

summer

of 1985, theUndersecretary

had

received only

two

replies to hissecondrequest for projectprofiles

fromthedonors: aletterfromtheFederalRepublic of

Ger-many

informingtheundersecretarythatthey didnothave

timetofillouttheforms,

and two

projectdataforms

from

the Swiss Embassy.

What we

find extraordinary about this experience is

that themajorityof the

donors

didnotevenfeelobliged

to

answer

theUndersecretary'sletters,aseemingly simple

courtesy.Perhapsthe experiencewiththe

World

Bank

best

illustratesthelack of

donor

cooperationinthiseffort.

As

noted, thiseffort

was

directlyresponsiveto

World Bank

policy objectives in

Sub-Saharan

Africa.

The World

Bank's

own

mission to

Sudan

in

March

1984 called for theestablishmentofacomputerized data baseinSudan.

World

Bank

staffinboth

Khartoum and

Washington were contacted personally

on

severaloccasionsto

make

specific

suggestions for changes in the project directory.

These

were

incorporated into the system design.

World Bank

staffcontinually

promised

tocooperatewiththe

MOFEP

and

USAID

to support this effort. Yet the

World Bank

did not complete the data

forms

nor did it

answer

the letters

from

the Undersecretary.

Reasons for the Donors' Failure to

Cooperate

In their recent book,

Does

Aid

Work?

(1986), Robert

Cassen

and

his associates note three

main

reasons for donors' reluctancetoundertakemeaningfulaid coordina-tion efforts:

a. Coordination is likely to impair the

freedom

with

which donors

can pursuetheir political

and

commer-cial interests through their aid programs.

b.

Donors

know

thatthere arebothideological

and

tech-nicalsubjects

on which

they arelikely todisagree,

and

aid coordination

would

create conflicts.

c.

Aid

coordination canbecostlyinadministrative time

and money.

Although

theseexplanationscertainlyhavemerit, based

on

ourexperiencein

Sudan

the

problem

of

donor

coor-dination seems likely to be

more

invidious than these reasons suggest.

We

found

both related

and

additional explanations for the failure of the donors to cooperate withthe

MOFEP

and

USAID

toestablishacentral deposi-toryofinformation

on

projects.

We

havecategorized

them

into threegroups:(1)reasonsinternaltothe

donor

bureau-cracy, (2) donors' impressions of the external planning environment,

and

(3) donors' impressions of the

micro-computer

technology itself.

Each

of these explanations

was

informally profferedto us

by donor

representatives themselves in follow-up interviews

we

conducted in the

summer

of 1985.

First, even if donors' intentions are good, there is a varietyoforganizational pressures

which

mitigate against

to

promote

aid coordination.

There

are

few

bureaucratic incentives to individuals within

donor

bureaucracies to

work

with other donors.

As

the

World Bank

hasnoted,

donor

coordination is administratively

demanding and

time

consuming

and

itisrarelyrewardedintermsof pro-fessional evaluation or

promotion

(1984, p.43). Both

ex-ecutives

and

juniorstaff areevaluated

by

central offices

which

havelittleawareness ofefforts

by

their field staff to

work

withotherdonors.Infact,central officepersonnel evaluation procedures often fostercompetition

between

donors.

An

enterprising

program

officer

who

letsothers

know

some

ofhis"best"projectideas

may

well find

them

funded

by

other donors.

On

the otherhand,

many

donors

make

most

of their

major

programming

decisionsat the

central headquartersso that individualsinthefield typi-callyfeelthereislittletheycan

do

to

promote

donor

coor-dination, evenifthey

wanted

to.Finally, thedonors'field

officesare typicallyunderstaffedrelative tocentral

head-quarters,

and

the individuals

from

whom

we

requested assistance

were

often extremely busy.

The

second set of explanations concerns the donors' perceptions of theirexternalplanningenvironment. Given the pressures

on

their time,

donor

representatives

were

forcedto

make

a

judgment

astothelikelihood of success ofoureffort toestablishacomputerizedprojectdatabase,

and

the effectiveness of such a system if it

were

estab-lished.

Too

often, the subjective probability assigned to

both of these events

was

low.

The

likelihood that

we

would

succeedincreating thesysteminthefirstplace

was

perceived to below, in part becauseeach

donor

felt the otherdonors

would

notcooperate.Therefore, individual donors

saw

little reason to participate in the data

col-lection effort themselves.

The

Western bilateral donors,

in particular, felt that the

Arab donors

would

not

coop-erate. Thisisaclassic "freerider"

problem which

we

had

hoped

to address

by

reaching a collective agreement in

the

JMC

to supportthis effort. In the end, however, the

JMC

failed to meet regularly. Moreover, little informal pressure could,be exerted

on donors

who

did not

par-ticipate.

The

donorsalso

had

littleregard for theefficacyof the planning

wing

oftheMinistry.

To

many

donor

represen-tatives, the planning

wing

was

so ineffective as to be

irrelevant to theirobjectives. Theirprimaryinterest inthe Planning Ministry

had

become

finding theeasiest, fastest

means

of getting theirprojects

approved

and

theirfunds disbursed.

An

effectiveplanningoperationinthe

MOFEP

would

inevitablyentaillessdiscretion

on

thepart of the donors in

programming

their aid and, in the short run

at least, this

was

perceivedtobe anobstacle totheiraid

program

rather than a necessary step in institutional

development. It

was

thus not clear to donors that the

The capital cityof Sudan, Khartoum.

MOFEP

wanted

theeffort tosucceed.

As

one

representa-tive of a private voluntary organization put it, I don't reallythink youwillbeableto establishthis microcomputerdatabase,butwhathappensifyoudo? I see more problems for

me

than advantages.

Why

should I want to give the Planning Ministry the

in-formation to meddlein ouraffairs?

Another

relatedreasonforthedonors'failure to

coop-erate

which

pertained totheir impressionof the external planningenvironment

was

that the project

was

perceived

to be too closely tied to

USAID.

For the planning

wing

ofthe

MOFEP

tohaveacentralizeddata baseof

develop-ment

projects

was bad

enough;for

USAID

tobetheonly

donor

with suchcentralizedinformation

was

even worse.

At

the July1984

JMC

meeting, thisproject

was announced

to thedonors.

Both

USAID

and

MOFEP

representatives assured the other donors that the data in the project directory

would

beavailabletoall.

However,

thedonors' skepticism is understandable in

an environment

where

dataisscarce

and

istypicallytreatedas proprietary.There

was

a fear that the planning

wing

of

MOFEP,

and

in-directly

USAID, would

have

much

greater access to the projectdatabase. Forat least

one

donor

representative, there

was

alsoan underlying apprehension aboutcreating the institutional capabilityin

what

was

then a military dictatorshiptocreate

and

manage

centralizeddatabases.

(This concern

was

not entirely unwarranted. Within a matterofjust afew

weeks

afterthe creation of the

new

Management

InformationSystemUnitinthe

MOFEP,

one of the

USAID-supplied

computers

was

commandeered

by

the security police

whose

stated objective

was

to set

up

a data base of automobile license plates in

Khartoum).

A

third setofreasons for thedonors' lack of coopera-tion relates to theirimpressionsof the technologyitself.

Spring1988, Vol.14, No. 1 13

they

were

not. Forthisreason, they

were

unable to

real-isticallyevaluate the

magnitude

of thesoftware

develop-ment which

we

proposed

and

the likelihoodthatit

would

succeed.

Many

had had

frustratingexperienceswith main-frame computers of

some

sort

and

tendedto extrapolate

theirhorrorstories to microcomputers.

We

encountered a

wide

rangeof skeptical

comments

about computersin general.

At

least five individuals independently offered us that sage advice, "garbagein; garbage out," implying

thatthe

whole

effort

was

futile.

The

message

was

really thatcomputerswere

an

inappropriatetechnologyinsuch a data-poor environment; that this

was

simply another

example

of a capital-intensive technology being

pushed

by

donors without regard to the needs

and

capabilities

of thelocaleconomy.

We

disagreewiththislineof

reason-ing, but it certainly deserves serious examination (see

Calhoun,

Drummond

and

Whittington, 1987).

Incontrastto

hardware

issues, several

donor

represen-tativesfelt thatthesoftwaredevelopmentapplications

we

proposed

were

far too sophisticated. Inreality, the

soft-ware development

was

theeasiest,

most

tractable

and

least time

consuming

part ofourassignment.Maintaining

soft-ware

and

training people in itsuse,

on

the other hand, is an important issue.

Implications for Future

Donor

Coordination Efforts

To

date, the

campaign

for

donor

coordinationhasbeen carried out at a fairly superficial level. It is

one

more

exercise in

what

Robertson (1985)hastermedthe"ritual ofplanned development."

Many

of thedonorsthat

rheto-ricallycallforcoordinationsimply

do

not

want

it.

More-over,

many

Western

donors

adopta patronizing attitude towardsthe

whole

process.Theirattitudeisalso asource ofmisunderstandingabouttheir

own

and

others' perfor-mance.

At

thecenter of thispatronizingattitudeisabelief in their

own

bureaucraticefficiency

and

intheinefficiency

of the host country's bureaucracy.

Although

donors suchas the

World Bank

supportthe idea of

improved donor

coordination, their

representa-tives

do

notreally

know

what

this entails intermsofdata

management

and

analysis.

Most

donor

coordination

efforts have not proceeded

beyond

the level of general discussions because

donors

place data

management

de-mands upon

theministriesoffinance

and

planning

which

eventhedonors themselves

do

not

know how

toaddress.

Few donor

representativeshave thought seriouslyabout

how

they

would

manage

theflowof

paperwork

associated with

hundreds

of millions of dollars of aid

from

thirty

donor

agencies

—

allwithdifferentaccountingprocedures, currencies

and

priorities

—

withthe limitedbudget

avail-able to a minister of finance or planning in an

aid-dependent

economy

such as Sudan's.

Ironically, donors'

demands

for information

on

the

recipientgovernment's

development

projects

and

policies

may

begreatestprecisely in thosecases

where

the

govern-ment

isleastabletorespond

and where

the

development

plans are least likely to be effective.

Such

demands

can contribute to the destruction of host country planning

institutions(Morss, 1984).Thissuggeststousthatthefield

staff of

donor

agencies concerned with aid administra-tion need to spend less time giving advice to ministries of finance

and

planning about data

management

and

planning

problems which

they themselves have never

faced,

and

more

time actually

working

withthese

bureau-cracies to

improve

their

management

information

and

decisionsupportsystems. Inourexperience,

many

ofthe staffofthe

MOFEP

want

to

do

abetterjob

managing and

coordinating

donor

assistance,butitisacomplicatedtask with

which

they need help

—

particularly in the area of

microcomputer

applications.

Donors

tendtoberatethem, butofferlittle inthe

way

ofideasorconcreteassistance.

Moreover, donors

do

notadequatelyappreciate thenature of the data

management demands

they themselves are placing

on

the

development

planning enterprise.

Calls for

improved

donor

coordinationarelikely tofail

unlessunderlyingorganizational

and

attitudinal issuesare addressed

more

directly

and

seriously. Part of the

prob-lem

issimply thatall donors

want

tocoordinate, but

no

one wants

to be coordinated. Based

on

our experiences

in Sudan,

we

believe future

improvements

in thearea of

donor

coordination

depend

in large part

upon more

explicit policy directives

from

top

management

in both

multilateral

and

bilateral

donor

agencies.

Almost

without exception, the

donor

representatives in

Khartoum

with

whom

we

dealt treated

donor

coordinationasa peripheral concern.Typically, theirprimaryresponsibility

was

tosee thatthebudgettargetsfortheiraidallocationswerespent,

notthat they

were

effectively coordinatedwithnational

government

priorities

and

the

work

of other donors.

Top managers

in

donor

agencies

must change

the

in-centive structure

which

theirstafffaces, inorderthattime spent

on

coordinationwithotherdonorsisrecognized

and

rewarded in personnel evaluations

and

advancement. Until then, real progressin

donor

coordination will be slow.

We

suggestthat

management

experiment with

ways

ofobtaining written evaluations ofstaffjobperformance

from

national

government

counterpartsinthe ministries with

which

theydeal.

Management

must

also realize that

donor

coordination efforts are time

consuming

and

re-quire a long-term

commitment

to the institutional

de-velopment

of both the

donor agency and

the national government. If serious attention isgiven to the issue of

REFERENCES

Calhoun,

C; Drummond,

W.;andD. Whittington.

"Computer-izedInformation

Management

inaSystem-Poor Environment: Design and Implementation of a Computer System for the

Sudanese PlanningMinistry."ThirdWorldPlanningReview,Vol. 9, No. 4, 1987. pp. 347-365.

Cassen, R.andassociates.DoesAidWork?Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986.

IBRD. TowardSustainedDevelopmentinSub-SaharanAfrica:

A

JointProgramof Action. Washington,

DC:

IBRD, September

1984.

Morss, E.R."InstitutionalDestruction ResultingfromDonor and

Project ProliferationinSub-SaharanAfrican Countries."World Development, 12(4). (1984). pp. 465-70.

Pinckey, T.C.;J.M. Cohon; andD.K. Leonard."Kenya'sUseof

MicrocomputerstoImproveBudgetingandFinancial Manage-mentinan OperatingMinistry:

An

UpdatedReport." Develop-mentDiscussion PaperNo. 169. Cambridge,

MASS:

Harvard Institute for International Development, 1984.

Robertson, A.F. People and the State:

An

Anthropology of

Planned Development. Cambridge: CambridgeUniversityPress,

1984.

Whittington, D.; C.Calhoun;andW.

Drummond.

DraftFinal

Report to

USA1D

KhartoumMission on the

Management

In-formation SystemProjectwith theMinistryofFinanceand

Eco-nomic Planning, Government of Sudan. Washington,

DC:

USAID, Contract No. 650-0071-C-00-4031, June1986.

DaleWhittington teachesinthenewconcentration.Planningin

Develop-ing Areas, inthe Department ofCityand Regional Planning at the University ofNorthCarolinaatChapelHill.Hismajorfieldsof research arepublicinvestment theoryandwaterresourceeconomicsin

develop-ing countries.

CraigCalhounteachesintheDepartmentofSociologyattheUniversity ofNorth CarolinaatChapelHill. Hisfieldsofresearchincludesocial theory andthesocialimplications ofcomputertechnologies.

HAMMKR

•

SlLKR

GkORGE

•

ASSOGIAI

KS

EconomicandDevkm>pmknt Consultants

1111 Bonifant Street•SilverSpring•Maryland•₂₀₉₁₀• 301/565-5200

Atlanta•Denver•SilverSpring•Wellington

ProfessionalServices

Civil, Environmental. Structural. Mechanical&ElectricalEngineering/

ComprehensivePlanning, Economic

&Community Development/

Commercial. Institutional& EducationalArchitecture

120N.BoylanAvenue Raleigh.NC

27603 919-828-0531

301W. 14th Street SuiteB Greenville,NC

27834 919-757-1096

^Wooten

Company

Engineering Planning

Spring 1988, Vol. 14, No. 1 15

Development

on

the

Urban

Fringe:

Recent

Chinese

Experience

Simon

G.

Powell

The

challengeof developing

on

the

urban

fringe takes

on

new

dimensionsin the changing

economic

climateof China. This article explores the difficulties planners face in trying to balance China's desire for increased industrial

growth

on the fringe with the politicalgoal of Chinese cities to maintain a self-sufficient agricultural base.

Introduction

In recent years, Western

media

reportshaveemphasized thedramatic reforms

which

havebeen sweeping contem-porary China, transforminga rigid, bureaucraticsocialist

systemintoaburgeoningmarket

economy

True,important advanceshave been

made

in

China

since1978

when Deng

Xiaopingconsolidatedhispower-base. Butas

many

foreign

firms, luredto

China by

theprospect of

one

billion con-sumers have discoveredto their cost,

China

is far

from

being a

market

economy.

The

realityof

economic

reform in

China

is a picture of

uneven and

patchydevelopment.

The

officialplanning system

—

despite

some

relaxations

—

stillcontrols the pro-duction

and

supplyof the

most

importantgoods

and

com-modities,

and

in

many

ways

remains as

unwieldy

now

asit

was

undertheMaoists. Itisin thiscontext—asystem

inastateofupheaval

—

thatcurrent

developments

on

the

urban

fringe

must

be placed.

Nanjing: the setting

One common

location ofrelativeprosperityinthe

cur-rent phaseof

development

is

on

the

urban

fringe.

The

extent

and

depth of

development

will vary

from

city to

city, butbeltsof significant ruralwealth aretobe

found

on

the outskirts of

most

Chinese cities.

Throughout

historyNanjing has

been

one

ofChina's

most

important cities. First settled in 472 B.C., Nanjing hasatvarious times

been

China'scapital. Situated

on

a plain in southwestern Jiangsu province, eastern China, Nanjingissurrounded

by

aterrainof

low

hills

and

rivers,

most

notably the Yangzi.

The

urbancoreissurrounded

by

suburbancitydistricts of

mixed

landuse

—

Dachang, Qixia,Yuhuatai

and

Pukou.

Beyond

thesuburbandistrictsarethefivedty-administered

rural counties

—

Jiangpu, Jiangning, Liuhe, Lishui

and

Gaochun

—

with 198,000hectares(ha) of cultivableland

(seeFigure1).

The

peripheryalso contains a diversity of mineralwealthincluding deposits ofiron,

gypsum,

lead,

zinc

and

manganese

aswell aslimestone

and

sandstone. Agriculture

and

ruralindustry arebothwelldeveloped.

Figure

1.

Nanjing

Municipality

LEGEND

INANJINGCITYCENTER

SATELLITETOWNS

SMALLTOWNS ANDRURALMARKETTOWNS PROVINCIALBOUNDARY

COUNTY BOUNDARY RAILWAYS