What is a Smart Card?

An Introduction to An Introduction to Smart Cards and RFIDs Smart Cards and RFIDs

An Introduction to An Introduction to Smart Cards and RFIDs Smart Cards and RFIDs

Prof. Keith E. Mayes

[email protected] [email protected]

Director of the ISG - Smart Card Centre www.scc.rhul.ac.uk

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Learning

Learning Objectives (Objectives (MScMSc))

Identify the various types of smart cards, RFIDs and readers

Understand the main components of the cards and chips

Recognise the main strengths of the card

Consider the limitations and effect on usage

Understand the Issuer control of a card

Contrast the main uses of smart cards and associated security mechanisms

Compare a range of application development routes/cycles

Be aware of security threats to smart cards

Appreciate the importance of life cycle management

[Full list of Learning Objectives on www.scc.rhul.ac.uk]

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The Course Book The Course Book

What is a Smart Card?

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What Properties to we look for?

What Properties to we look for?

Tamper Resistant Security!!

For Information Storage

For Information Processing

Portability

Ease of Use

….and it is often very useful if we can have…

Multiple Value Added Applications

All this is achieve by a mixture of engineering and cryptographic techniques

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Magnetic Stripe Cards Magnetic Stripe Cards

Flagstar Bank Image

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Cards with Contacts are not Cards with Contacts are not

always smart always smart

Image from LA Phone Cards

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Smart Cards with Contacts Smart Cards with Contacts

[Gemplus Images]

Chip module interface via metal contacts Card reader makes physical contact

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Contact

Contact--less Smart Cardsless Smart Cards

[Gemplus Images]

Chip module interface via antenna Reader uses RF field

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Powering by Radio Powering by Radio

From “RFID Handbook”

A passive contact-less smart card/RFID is powered by electromagnetic induction – from a field produced by the reader

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Smart Card/RFID Trade

Smart Card/RFID Trade--offsoffs

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Tags

Tags -- Passive/Active Passive/Active

There are many different contact-less tag/device formats

The main classes are passive and active (powered)

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Coming Soon…

Coming Soon…

Near Field Communication Near Field Communication

The latest standards for mobile phones support Near Field Communications (NFC)

NFC is a equivalent to a contact-less interface for the phone

The phone can behave as a smart card or token

The phone can behave as the reader

<<Demo>>

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And in the Future?...

And in the Future?...

From Kodak patent

Digestible Tags!

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RAM

Wire- bonds EEPROM

ROM Processor

Source: ORGA Systems UK, “ORGA - Smart Cards Basics”

Smart Card Chip Smart Card Chip

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Examples of Smart Card Use Examples of Smart Card Use

Mobile Communication

^Banking

^Transport

Identity Cards

Physical Access Control

IT Access Control

Satellite TV chip card

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Chip Card Market by Application Chip Card Market by Application

in 2011 in 2011

Sourec Infineon

In 2011 over 6.5 Bn units shipped

By 2014 estimated to > 8Bn units

 Excludes RFID (+3 Bn?)

Revenue growth in all sectors

Memories growth in Transport sector

Micros growth in Payment and Embedded sectors

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Smart Cards and Mobile Smart Cards and Mobile

Communication Communication

Mobile Communication

Every GSM phone contains a Smart Card called a SIM

The SIM started life as a hardware security token for supporting authentication and encryption

Earlier analog systems had been cloned

The SIM became useful for storing additional information

Telephone numbers, SMS messages, communication settings..

The SIM/ME interface became richer

It was possible to host programs, menus and simple STK applications – usually implemented in a proprietary manner

SIMs today can be based on multi-application Java Cards

Wide range of applications are possible and new Vendor independent development routes are possible

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A3/8

A3/8 –– SIM ApplicationSIM Application

The SIM contents include

A3/8 algorithm

^IMSI

Secret key K_i

1-2kbytes memory for A3/8 implementation

The card receives a random number (RAND) from the network

The A3/8 algorithm computes a result (SRES) based on RAND & Ki

An encryption key K_cis also calculated and delivered to the phone

PHONE

..Searching..

SRES

Kc

SIM

A3/8 K_i

IMSI RAND

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Smart Cards in Banking Smart Cards in Banking

Swipe Cards

Swipe cards are widespread, simple and low-cost, relying on information embossed onto the card and stored on its magnetic stripe

Swipe Card Fraud

^Skimming

This is when the mag-stripe information from one card is simply copied

Counterfeiting

A counterfeit card would look like a normal embossed credit/debit card, but the mag-stripe info may be different

^{Chip Cards}

In order to combat Swipe Card fraud - Europay, Mastercard

& Visa came together to create the EMV specifications

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EMV

EMV –– OffOff--line Authentication line Authentication Static Data

Static Data

Issuer Private

Key S_I

Issuer Public Key

P_I

Issuer

CA Private

Key S_CA

CA Public

Key P_CA

Certification Authority

P_ICertified with SCA

Card to Terminal

^PIcertified by CA

+Data with digital signature

^Terminal

^{Uses P}CA to verify Issuers PI

Uses PIto verify data signature

Acquirer

Distributed to Acquirer (Resides in Terminal)

Terminal & Card Communication

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EMV

EMV –– OffOff--line Authentication line Authentication Dynamic Data

Dynamic Data

ICC - Private

Key S_IC

ICC – Public

Key P_IC

P_IC Certified

with S_I

Card to Terminal

^PICcertified by Issuer + PIcertified by CA +Data with digital signature

^Terminal

Uses PCAto verify Issuers PI

^{Uses P}Ito verify Card’s PIC

Uses PICto verify data signature Issuer

Private Key

S_I

Issuer

Issuer Public Key

P_I

CA Private

Key S_CA

CA Public

Key P_CA

Certification Authority

P_ICertified with SCA

Acquirer

Distributed to Acquirer (Resides in Terminal)

Terminal & Card Communication

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Attacks on Card Security Attacks on Card Security

^Logical

Repeated attempts (brute force)

^Overflow

Look for bugs/errors

^Physical

Probe circuit

Change tracks

Change voltages/ temperature etc

Side Channel

Monitor supply current or RF emissions

Timing attacks

DPA – Differential power analysis

DFA – Differential Fault Analysis

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Attacks (Logical) Attacks (Logical)

Attacks against the design of algorithms/protocols

Use or eavesdrop the normal interfaces

Various tools available to help attacks

RFID Sniffer

Key cracker

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Attacks: Physical Attacks: Physical

& Side

& Side--ChannelChannel

Direct physical attack on chip/circuit to monitor or modify functionality and data

Usually requires high skill level and specialist equipment

Probe station

FIB for track/circuit modification

Side channel attacks normally monitor leakage via power, emissions and/or timing

Requires modest skill and readily available equipment

In hardware security modules chip level physical protection include:

Physical barriers

Active shields

Circuit scrambling

Encrypted busses

Encrypted memories

Environment/fault sensors

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Physical & Side

Physical & Side--Channel Channel Attack Countermeasures Attack Countermeasures

Source Gemalto

Side Channel protection includes

Power smoothing

Additive noise

Randomised delays

Differential logic

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Smart Card Data Smart Card Data

<SIM Demo>

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Thank you…

Thank you…

Any Questions?

Any Questions?