What Every Engineer Should Know About Ethics

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title: Know About Ethics What_{Every Engineer Should Know} ; V. 35

author: Humphreys, Kenneth King. publisher: CRC Press

isbn10 | asin: 0824782089 print isbn13: 9780824782085 ebook isbn13: 9780585157788

language: English

subject Engineering ethics. publication date: 1999

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lcc: TA157.K52 1999eb ddc: 174/.962

subject: Engineering ethics.

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What Every Engineer Should

Know About Ethics

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Page ab WHAT EVERY ENGINEER SHOULD KNOW

A Series Editor

William H. Middendorf

Department of Electrical and Computer Engin-eering

University of Cincinnati Cincinnati, Ohio

1. What Every Engineer Should Know About Patents, William G. Konold, Bruce Tittel, Don-ald F. Frei, and David S. Stallard

2. What Every Engineer Should Know About Product Liability, James F. Thorpe and William H. Middendorf

3. What Every Engineer Should Know About Microcomputers: Hardware/Software Design, A Step-by-Step Example, William S. Bennett and Carl F. Evert, Jr.

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4. What Every Engineer Should Know About Economic Decision Analysis, Dean S. Shupe 5. What Every Engineer Should Know About Human Resources Management, Desmond D. Martin and Richard L. Shell

6. What Every Engineer Should Know About Manufacturing Cost Estimating, Eric M. Malstrom

7. What Every Engineer Should Know About Inventing, William H. Middendorf

8. What Every Engineer Should Know About Technology Transfer and Innovation, Louis N. Mogavero and Robert S. Shane

9. What Every Engineer Should Know About Project Management, Arnold M. Ruskin and W. Eugene Estes

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10. What Every Engineer Should Know About Computer-Aided Design and Computer-Aided Manufacturing: The CAD/CAM Revolution, John K. Krouse

11. What Every Engineer Should Know About Robots, Maurice I. Zeldman

12. What Every Engineer Should Know About Microcomputer Systems Design and Debugging, Bill Wray and Bill Crawford

13. What Every Engineer Should Know About Engineering Information Resources, Margaret T. Schenk and James K. Webster

14. What Every Engineer Should Know About Microcomputer Program Design, Keith R. Wehmeyer

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15. What Every Engineer Should Know About Computer Modeling and Simulation, Don M. Ingels

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Page ac 16. What Every Engineer Should Know About Engineering Workstations, Justin E. Harlow III 17. What Every Engineer Should Know About Practical CAD/CAM Applications, John Stark 18. What Every Engineer Should Know About Threaded Fasteners: Materials and Design, Alex-ander Blake

19. What Every Engineer Should Know About Data Communications, Carl Stephen Clifton 20. What Every Engineer Should Know About Material and Component Failure, Failure Ana-lysis, and Litigation, Lawrence E. Murr 21. What Every Engineer Should Know About Corrosion, Philip Schweitzer

22. What Every Engineer Should Know About Lasers, D. C. Winburn

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23. What Every Engineer Should Know About Finite Element Analysis, edited by John R. Brauer

24. What Every Engineer Should Know About Patents: Second Edition, William G. Konold, Bruce Tittel, Donald F. Frei, and David S. Stallard

25. What Every Engineer Should Know About Electronic Communications Systems, L. R. McKay

26. What Every Engineer Should Know About Quality Control, Thomas Pyzdek

27. What Every Engineer Should Know About Microcomputers: Hardware/Software Design, A Step-by-Step Example. Second Edition, Revised and Expanded, William S. Bennett, Carl F. Evert, and Leslie C. Lander

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28. What Every Engineer Should Know About Ceramics, Solomon Musikant

29. What Every Engineer Should Know About Developing Plastics Products, Bruce C. Wendle 30. What Every Engineer Should Know About Reliability and Risk Analysis, M. Modarres 31. What Every Engineer Should Know About Finite Element Analysis: Second Edition, Revised and Expanded, edited by John R. Brauer

32. What Every Engineer Should Know About Accounting and Finance, Jae K. Shim and Nor-man Henteleff

33. What Every Engineer Should Know About Project Management: Second Edition, Revised and Expanded, Arnold M. Ruskin and W. Eu-gene Estes

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34. What Every Engineer Should Know About Concurrent Engineering, Thomas A. Salomone 35. What Every Engineer Should Know About Ethics, Kenneth K. Humphreys

ADDITIONAL VOLUMES IN PREPARATION

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Page i

What Every Engineer Should

Know About Ethics

Kenneth K. Humphreys, P.E., C.C.E. Consulting Engineer

Granite Falls, North Carolina

MARCELDEKKER, INC.

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This book is intended to be a practical guide and textbook for students and practicing engineers and to explain in succinct terms the codes of ethics of the engineering profession, legal re-quirements of ethical practice, and ethical di-lemmas faced by engineers. These didi-lemmas are illustrated by case studies drawn from the de-cisions of the National Society of Professional Engineers' Board of Ethical Review and other sources. A few of the more spectacular news-making events of recent years are discussed (e.g., the Challenger Disaster and the Hyatt-Re-gency Hotel collapse in Kansas City), but, un-like some other books on the subject, these are not the major focus of the book. These headline-making issues, while of great public interest, rarely involve the types of ethical dilemmas commonly encountered by engineers. What Every Engineer Should Know About Ethics con-centrates instead on the types of problems en-gineers more commonly encounter on a daily

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basis. The book is not a philosophical treatise, rather it is intended to be a practical reference work, both for the practicing engineer and the engineering student. It is designed for ready use as a text for undergraduate and graduate engin-eering ethics courses and as a supplemental text for courses which incorporate units on engineer-ing ethics.

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I extend my sincere appreciation to the various individuals and engineering societies that have contributed to the preparation of this volume. In particular, I thank Mr. Russell C. Lindsay, Dr. Leonard Ferenz, and Dr. Peter J. Rutland for their significant contributions. Mr. Lindsay is a registered professional engineer and is President of PARC Engineering Associates, Asheville, North Carolina. Dr. Ferenz is a Faculty Associ-ate with the Center for Professional Ethics, University of North Carolina at Charlotte, Char-lotte, North Carolina. Dr. Rutland hails from the opposite side of the word as Chief Executive Officer, Waiariki Institute of Technology, Rotarua, New Zealand.

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Within the book, I have acknowledged the pro-fessional societies that have contributed to the book in various ways. Two societies, however, deserve particular mentionthe National Society of Professional Engineers (NSPE) and the Pro-fessional Engineers of North Carolina (PENC). NSPE has granted permission for

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Page iv me to freely draw upon and include case studies from their Board of Ethical Review and other NSPE documents. I am deeply grateful to NSPE for their support.

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I am chairman of the PENC Ethics Steering Committee and am a regular contributor of art-icles to the Ethics Corner section of its

magazine, the Professional Engineer, The Magazine of North Carolina Engineering. Mr. Lindsay is a member of the Ethics Steering Committee of PENC and also contributes art-icles to the magazine. PENC has given its full support to the development of this book and has permitted the use of much material from these articles in the book. The material is woven throughout the text and accordingly is not al-ways specifically credited to PENC. However, it is reasonable to say that were it not for PENC, the idea for this book would never have come about and, without its agreement to let me use the material from the articles, the job of com-pleting the book would have been much more difficult.

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Last, I want to acknowledge the invaluable sup-port and critical editorial eye of my wife Betsy. Without her encouragement I would never have begun this effort, and without her support I would not have been able to complete it.

KENNETH K. HUMPHREYS, P.E., C.C.E.

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1 Problem-Solving in Engineering Ethics

* Case Study

An engineer with a firm specializing in electron-ics manufacturing is asked by management to design and develop a new generation of radar detectors for private consumption. The newest generation of stealth detectors is to alert drivers to the presence of police radar and laser traps while at the same time cloaking use of the detectors.

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Now, let us suppose our engineer has misgiv-ings about developing such a device. His reas-oning is as follows: Radar detectors, as the name implies, are most often used by drivers to detect radar. Radar, of course, is any of a group of electronic devices used by the highway patrol to gauge the speed of traffic on the roadways. Drivers generally use such detectors to alert them to the use of radar. Because radar detectors are used by drivers primarily to exceed posted speed limits, which is an illegal act, some states have made their use illegal. Thus, in order to discover the use of illegal radar detectors, law enforcement officers employ electronic devices designed to detect the use of radar detectors. The device that our engineer is being asked to develop is one that will alert the user that such counter-measures are being used without it be-ing detected.

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Now, imagine further that our engineer believes that speed limits are a reasonable limitation on personal freedom because they help secure the safety of other persons traveling on or nearby the roadways, such as pedestrians or the drivers and occupants of other vehicles. Let us also sup-pose our engineer believes that the device he is being asked to develop will be used almost ex-clusively to break what he considers to be just laws. Troubled, he expresses his concerns to management.

*By Dr. Leonard Ferenz, Center for Professional and Applied Ethics, The University of North Carolina at Charlotte, Charlotte, North Carolina

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Management tells our engineer that there are significant profits in such a device and that he should get to work on the project or find another job. The dilemma for our engineer, then, is whether to serve his own and his employers' in-terests by doing what he is told and, thereby, keep his job or serve the public interest by refus-ing to participate in the development of a device that will help enable activities that are a threat to public safety.

Introduction

Similar dilemmas could face engineers being asked to cover-up, ignore, or under-report the existence of toxic wastes, structural defects, design flaws, or any other potential health or safety hazards. Under such circumstances, what is the right thing to do?

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The solution in the above case may seem obvi-ous. But the reader may be assured that

whatever his or her opinion at the present time, there will be others with a different opinion about what to do in this case. Indeed various types of professionals, including engineers, of-ten express significant differences of opinion when faced with cases requiring an ethical solu-tion. The objective before us in this chapter, therefore, is to provide a framework for recon-ciling differences of opinion as we address the question, What is the right thing to do? in cir-cumstances involving ethical issues in the en-gineering profession.

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There are many ways to consider the question, What is the right thing to do? From an economic perspective, the right thing to do is whatever is the most profitable. From a personal interest perspective, the right thing to do is whatever maximizes one's own well being. There may be religious perspectives, political perspectives, so-cial perspectives, etc. However, the perspective to be considered in this chapter is the moral, or ethical, perspective. We want to know what is the morally correct, or right, thing to do when faced with situations involving questions of right and wrong, good and evil, virtue and vice.

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What we will not do in this chapter, however, is to lay out a particular set of moral rules or pro-mote a particular moral viewpoint. This chapter does not attempt to provide the right answers to specific moral problems. What we are con-cerned with here is a practical and workable method for dealing with moral problems in spe-cific cases. In medicine, moral decision-making involving specific persons in real-life circum-stances is called clinical ethics since it generally involves ethical decisions involving patients in a clinical setting. In this chapter, we will be devel-oping a method for solving ethical problems in specific cases that is the engineering equivalent of clinical ethics in medicine. We will refer to this simply as case ethics.

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Our chapter begins with a short list of ethical terms and definitions. This list is designed to equip the reader with a decent understanding of ethical terms, not only for the benefit of this dis-cussion but also to facilitate meaningful moral deliberation and discussion with others. In this list I have tried to avoid much of the

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Page 3 jargon that occurs in academia and have concen-trated on terms that the reader would most likely run across in the literature on professional ethics.

Next, we look at various options available to en-gineers to address ethical issues in their profes-sional practices. Foremost among these is the Code of Ethics for Engineers, developed by the National Society of Professional Engineers. There are a number of concerns that have been raised with regard to such professional codes of ethics in general and this one in particular. We will take a brief look at some of the more im-portant of these concerns.

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Then, we will look at a problem-solving method for case analysis in ethics that has had tremend-ous success in varitremend-ous professional settings. It is a method that can be used by individuals alone or in consultation with others. Finally, we will look at the role of ethics committees in case consultation, policy formation, and review, and as a forum for ethical deliberation. The use of ethics committees as an approach to solving eth-ical problems arising in the professions has sev-eral important implications. We will take a brief look at these and then offer some concluding thoughts.

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In contemporary literature, the term ethics often refers to reflective and theoretical perspectives of right and wrong, what dictionaries call moral philosophy. It also refers to the system or code of morals practiced by a particular person, group, or profession. The term morality refers generally to actual principles of conduct prac-ticed by individuals or groups of individuals or to ethics. Because of the obvious overlap in the meaning of these terms, we generally find both being used interchangeably in the literature. For this reason, the words morality and ethics will be treated as synonyms in this chapter.

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In their broadest and most familiar meaning, morality and ethics are concerned with many forms of belief about good and bad, right and wrong, appropriate and inappropriate human be-havior, rights, virtue, and vice. Morality and eth-ics are studies of what we ought to do and how we ought to behave from a moral viewpoint, as opposed to an economic, religious, political, or prudential viewpoint. From these perspectives, what we ought to do may be very different from what we ought to do from a moral perspective. For example, if I want to get to an important in-terview on time, it might be prudent for me to exceed the speed limits as I drive to my appoint-ment. I ought, in this case, to speed. However, if it's morally wrong to speed, then the moral thing to do is not speed. In this case, as is often the case, there is a difference between what I ought to do morally, the so-called moral ought, and what I ought to do to further some non-moral

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goal (such as an economic goal), which is some-times referred to as the prudential ought.

The kinds of situations that are particularly chal-lenging in ethics are those that involve an ethic-al dilemma. An ethicethic-al dilemma exists whenever moral reasons or considerations can be offered to support two or more opposing courses of

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action. For example, respect for individual self-determination could be offered as a moral reas-on to support a persreas-on's decisireas-on not to wear seatbelts while respect for the value of human life might be used to support, or justify, mandat-ory seatbelt laws.

An ethical dilemma is not the same as an ethical issue. An ethical issue is a general topic or prob-lem involving moral rules, principles, and norms. For example, physician-assisted suicide is an ethical issue in medicine; vendor/supplier policies, perks, and gifts are ethical issues in business; and weapons research is an ethical is-sue in engineering. The reason these topics are ethical issues, of course, is because of important differences of opinion and disagreement con-cerning what is morally correct.

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Much of the discussion in ethics involves the use of some key concepts and principles. To il-lustrate, consider whether an individual should have the right to refuse life-saving medical treat-ments. Today, one could argue that patients do have a legal right to accept or refuse life-saving medical treatment, as recognized in such legisla-tion as the Patient Self-Determinalegisla-tion Act of 1990 (1). But many would argue that what makes this legislation defensible from a moral point of view is the overriding importance of a moral principle, the so-called principle of autonomy. According to this principle, the ac-tions and decisions of autonomous persons ought to be respected. Thus, the reason patients have a right to accept or refuse medical treat-ment is because the principle of autonomy de-mands that we respect the actions and decisions of autonomous persons.

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On the other hand, many would argue that we have moral obligations to promote the good of others and to preserve human life whenever pos-sible. The principle of beneficence demands that we promote the good of others. The good, as is often defined when discussing this principle, in-cludes the preservation of life.

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Now, consider an ethical dilemma involving these two principles. Imagine that a practicing Jehovah's Witness is brought into the emergency room after sustaining injuries in an automobile accident. He is an adult, he is bleeding to death, and he refuses to accept a life-saving blood transfusion. Assuming the patient is clear-headed and capable of making an informed de-cision, what should the emergency room physi-cian do? Should the physiphysi-cian respect the patient's refusal, as demanded by the principle of autonomy, or transfuse the patient against his will, as demanded by the principle of benefi-cence? As you can see, this case poses an ethical dilemma because moral reasons or considera-tions can be offered to support two opposing courses of action. We can describe that dilemma as a conflict between the moral principles of autonomy and beneficence.

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Notice, however, that being able to describe an ethical dilemma in terms of such principles as autonomy and beneficence does not solve the ethical dilemma. It is not obvious in this case, for example, whether respect for the autonomy of the Jehovah's Witness should override our ob-ligations of beneficence or vice versa. In

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Page 5 fact, we often find that autonomy will override beneficence in one case but not in an-other depending upon the circumstances of the case. Because there is no apparent hier-archy or ranking of moral principles and their corresponding duties, they are generally considered to be prima facie; that is, at first sight each principle is binding at all times in all cases. It is the particular circumstances of the case that will cause one of these principles to override another.

While describing an ethical dilemma in terms of its competing moral principles will not solve the dilemma, it does help identify important moral values and interests that are at stake. To this end, the following list includes a brief description of the more commonly used moral principles and duties in contemporary discussions of ethics. Note that each of these principles, or action-guides, generates corresponding duties, listed immediately to the right of each principle. Also be aware that the order in which these principles occur in the following list should not be considered as an indication of moral rank or priority since each principle is prima facie.

Principle Corresponding Duty

the principle of autonomy

respect the autonomy of others the principle of

nonmaleficence

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the principle of beneficence

promote the good of others

the principle of justice give others what is due or owed to them; give others what they deserve

the principle of truth-telling

disclose all relevant information honestly and intelligibly; do not intentionally deceive

the principle of promise-keeping

be faithful to just agreements; honor contracts

The principle of autonomy requires that we respect the autonomy of others. It asserts a right of noninterference and correlatively an obligation not to constrain or interfere with the autonomous actions of others. It is based on the idea that persons possess autonomy; that is, that they are free, self-governing, and self-determining beings. An individual is autonomous in the absence of internal or external constraints that would compromise the ability to act voluntarily toward a chosen course of action or to fulfill a chosen life-plan.

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The principle of nonmaleficence requires that persons do not intentionally, or deliber-ately, do harm to others. According to the nineteenth century philosopher John Stuart Mill, we can cause evil to others by both our actions and our inactions (2). General us-age of this principle refers only to harms caused through actions, that is, positive acts, or commissions, and not through our inactions, or omissions. For example, the duty of nonmaleficence requires that we forebear from inflicting harm or injury on others by stealing from them or assaulting them, but it does not require that we rescue a person who is drowning. Thus, the principle of

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nonmaleficence is sometimes referred to as a negative injunction since it tells us what not to do.

The principle of beneficence is based upon the concept of beneficence, which involves produ-cing benefits and promoting the good for others. The principle of beneficence is a positive injunc-tion that imposes obligainjunc-tions both to provide be-nefits and to prevent and remove harms. Ac-cording to a primary text in medical ethics, the principle of beneficence asserts the duty to help others further their important and legitimate in-terests and, more specifically, it asserts the duty to confer benefits and actively to prevent and re-move harms (3). Philosopher William Frankena combines obligations of nonmaleficence with those of beneficence. According to Frankena (4), the principle of beneficence imposes four duties:

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1. One ought not to inflict evil or harm (what is bad)

2. One ought to prevent evil or harm 3. One ought to remove evil

4. One ought to do or promote good

According to either interpretation, the principle of beneficence requires the prevention of evil through our inactions. Thus, we would be re-quired according to this principle to rescue someone who is drowning.

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The principle of justice generally requires doing what is fair, or just. For example, according to the philosopher John Rawls, justice as fairness requires that we promote the good of the least well-off in society prior to the good of those who are better off until all enjoy equal shares of the good. According to Rawls, inequities in the distribution of goods are justifiable only to the extent that they further the interests of the least well-off in society (5). So, for example, if chil-dren suffering from life-threatening genetic dis-eases were considered the least well-off in soci-ety, they would have the prior claim on society's resources. Thus we would be justified in re-warding geneticists and biochemists dispropor-tionately to other professionals in society if their work was the most likely to improve the well being of these least well-off members of society.

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Rawl's is just one version of a conception of justice called egalitarianism. Other competing conceptions of justice include various forms of utilitarianism (which focuses on securing the greatest good for the greatest number of persons in society), libertarianism (a kind of laissez faire approach to economic distributions), so-cialism, Marxism, and various equality of op-portunity models. While the social and econom-ic impleconom-ications of each of these models differ significantly, they all involve what persons de-serve or can legitimately claim on the basis of certain morally relevant properties, such as age, merit, productivity, social status, economic status, etc.

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The principle of honesty, or truth-telling, obvi-ously requires telling the truth when asked but it can also be interpreted more stringently. In which case, truth-telling also requires full and impartial disclosure of any information that could be considered legitimately important to others.

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Page 7 The principle of fidelity, or promise-keeping, re-cognizes an obligation to honor just agreements and to keep promises freely entered into and de-liberately made.

Returning to the case at the beginning of this chapter, we can now use these principles to de-scribe the ethical dilemma that faces our engin-eer. On the one hand, our engineer will have ob-ligations of fidelity to honor the terms of his em-ployment contract, which may require that he accept assignments suited to his expertise. Ac-cording to the principle of beneficence, he also has obligations to promote the good of others, including his employers, the people he works with, and certainly his own family. If the good of these others is at risk if he should quit or if the financial security of his family is at risk if he loses his job, then beneficence would enjoin him or her to accept the assignment.

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The principle of beneficence, however, asks us to consider the good of all others, not just fam-ily or employers. Considering the good of the public in general, our engineer may feel that the good of many others would be best served by re-fusing to work on a device whose sole purpose, he believes, would be to allow law-breakers to avoid detection when speeding. Moreover, the principle of autonomy might be invoked here to defend the position that our engineer's decision should be respected. However, the principle of autonomy also tells us that we should respect the freedom of others to be self-determining. One could argue along these lines that people should be free to purchase whatever products they like as long as the purchasing in itself presents no risk of harm to others. One might ar-gue that how the product is used, or misused, later is the business of the purchaser, not the seller and certainly not the designer.

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Familiarity with this list of principles and duties can provide a very effective way to describe various ethical considerations. However, that alone will not solve the ethical dilemma. In fact, we have even seen that the very same principles can be offered to support opposing courses of action. In view of the fact that there are no obvi-ous solutions to such ethical difficulties, we should consider the professional codes of ethics that govern engineering practices.

Professional Codes of Ethics for Engineers. 64/999

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The Model Guide for Professional Conduct de-veloped by the American Association of Engin-eering Societies (AAES) and the Code of Ethics for Engineers of the National Society of Profes-sional Engineers (NSPE) are the two dominant codes affecting the engineering profession. Both appear in the Appendix along with several other codes developed by other engineering-related organizations. The AAES's Model Guide in-cludes 10 briefly stated Canons of Professional Conduct. The Code developed by the NSPE is certainly longer and more detailed. It includes six Fundamental Canons, five lengthy Rules of Practice, and nine equally lengthy Professional Obligations. The NSPE, with its 54 constituent state and territorial engineering societies, is the umbrella organization that is

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con-Page 8 cerned with non-technical and professional mat-ters for engineers. The principles of the NSPE Code are generally mandated by law or regula-tion for those persons registered to practice un-der current state registration laws. Moreover, in the 1950s, the NSPE established a Board of Eth-ical Review whose job it is to review cases sub-mitted to the Board by engineers, public offi-cials, ethicists, educators, and members of the general public.

In 1988, the NSPE also created the National In-stitute for Engineering Ethics (NIEE). NIEE is now an independent not-for-profit educational corporation. NIEE's mission is to provide oppor-tunities for ethics education and to promote the understanding and application of ethical pro-cesses within the engineering profession and with the public.

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Considering the general inclusion of the NSPE's more detailed Code of Ethics in state and territ-orial laws and/or regulations governing the prac-tice of engineering, our engineer in the opening case of this chapter would be well advised to consult the NSPE's Code for moral guidance. Indeed, there he would find that the first funda-mental canon that guides engineers in the fulfill-ment of their professional duties is to Hold para-mount the safety, health and welfare of the pub-lic (6).

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The word paramount is generally understood to mean the highest in rank, pre-eminent, or su-preme. This suggests, then, that engineers are expected to act in such a way that their profes-sional conduct will promote, preserve, and pro-tect public safety, health, and welfare and that this objective should be the over-riding concern of all engineering professionals. This would seem to suggest, then, that the engineer in our opening case must, if he is to comply with the requirements of the Code, refuse to work on the project, even at the risk of losing his job.

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This interpretation appears to be consistent with the opinions that have been offered by the NSPE's Board of Ethical Review in their consid-eration of several cases. The dominant theme that has emerged in the interpretation of this first canon is that engineers are not only al-lowed, but are required, to refuse to participate in projects that they believe jeopardize public health and safety. For example, in a decision in-volving a group of engineers who believed that certain machinery was unsafe, the Board de-termined that the engineers were ethically justi-fied in refusing to participate in the processing or production in question. We recognized in that case that such action by the engineers would likely lead to the loss of employment (7). This statement recognizes that the engineers are justi-fied in refusing to participate in a questionable project but does not state that they would be re-quired to refuse. The Board does take this addi-tional step, however, in an opinion involving an

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engineer faced with blowing the whistle where they concluded that the Code only requires [em-phasis added] that the engineer withdraw from a project and report to proper authorities when the circumstances involve endangerment to the pub-lic safety, health and welfare (8). In another case involving an engineer employed as the City Engineer/Director of Public Works and her con-cerns about the management of waste water from ponds containing domestic waste, the Board argues that the engineer has not merely an ethical right but has

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an ethical obligation to report the matter to the proper authorities and withdraw from further service on the project. The Board acknowledges the basic reality that the engineer who makes the decision to blow the whistle will in many in-stances be faced with the loss of employment (9). As suggested by these comments, it appears that the NSPE's Board takes very seriously the idea that public safety is paramount.

What this suggests in the present case is that our engineer is ethically required to refuse to parti-cipate in this project even at the risk of losing his job.

Merits and Drawbacks of Professional Codes of Ethics.

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One considerable advantage of professional codes of ethics is that they define what are con-sidered within the profession to be the moral re-sponsibilities of practitioners in the field. They do this by offering principles and rules of ethical behavior tailored to a particular profession. These guidelines help establish what can be termed the role-specific duties of members of the profession.

An additional benefit provided by the NSPE Board of Ethical Review and other professional organizations is the periodic publication of ad-visory opinions on non-technical matters that pose ethical problems. Advisory opinions are published for instructive purposes and to aid in the interpretation and application of the Code's ethical guidelines in these and other real-life situations. In addition to requests by mail or phone, anyone with Internet access can review the advisory opinions of the Board.

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Professional codes of ethics may also promote some uniformity in professional conduct and the manner in which ethical issues are addressed. For example, the NSPE's The Board of Ethical Review is composed of engineers from various disciplines who share a similar interest in en-couraging adherence to the highest principles of ethical conduct on behalf of the public, clients, employers, and the profession (10). If members of the profession do adhere to these principles or if their conduct is generally reflected in the judgments and opinions expressed by the Board, then we would expect to see some uniformity in the professional conduct of engineers generally. Not only might this lead to some uniformity in the way professionals address ethical matters, but it might also be seen as helping to establish a bond among professionals in the field.

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Lack of Specificity and Problem-Solving Capability

A common criticism of professional codes of ethics is that they tend to be too general, and therefore provide little guidance in specific cir-cumstances and situations involving true moral dilemmas. For example, AAES's Model Guide for Professional Conduct requires that Engin-eers are responsible for enhancing their

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professional competence throughout their ca-reers and for encouraging similar actions by their colleagues (11). But just what would be in-volved in doing this? What is actually expected of an engineer? Is the AAES suggesting that en-gineers should take continuing education

classes, subscribe to journals, participate in sem-inars and conferences, etc.? And how often?

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The NSPE's Code of Ethics for Engineers also seems rather general. For example, it requires that Engineers shall seek opportunities to parti-cipate in civic affairs; career guidance for youths; and work for the advancement of the safety, health and well-being of their com-munity. But the Code does not tell us what kinds of opportunities and how often, or how much of one's time is to be devoted to this pursuit. In ad-dition to being vague, this may be unrealistic and overly demanding depending on how much engineers are expected to do to fulfill this requirement.

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The NSPE's Code also requires, for example, that Engineers shall avoid the use of statements containing a material misrepresentation of fact or omitting a material fact (12). This injunction may be applied to advertising and would clearly prohibit false and misleading advertisements. But what it does not tell us is just what kinds of statements or advertisements are deceptive or misleading. We are all quite familiar with how successfully we can deceive others, not only by lying, but also by choosing not to disclose in-formation. According to this rule, engineers should not make false statements, but it is not clear what engineers are required to disclose nor what would be considered misleading.

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The more important criticism regarding the gen-erality of professional codes of ethics, however, is that they do not provide much guidance resolving important moral conflicts. For ex-ample, the NSPE Code requires that Engineers shall not disclose, without consent, confidential information concerning the business affairs or technical processes of any present or former cli-ent or employer, or public body on which they serve (13). Now, consider an engineer who is hired by a client to do an assessment of toxic waste disposal at the client's industrial facility. The engineer discovers that leaks from waste storage drums violate certain federal or state laws. The engineer reports this to the client who then thanks her, pays the consulting fee, and then ignores the report. Should the engineer re-port these violations to the proper authorities or remain silent? The engineer should clearly not remain silent according to the Code's statement that Engineers having knowledge of any alleged

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violation of the Code shall report thereon to ap-propriate professional bodies, and when relev-ant, also to public authorities, and cooperate with the proper authorities in furnishing such in-formation or assistance as may be required. Ob-viously, if the alleged violation was committed by a client, then the engineer is required to blow the whistle even though practices like the dis-posal of toxic waste are clearly among the busi-ness affairs of the client. The difficulty in inter-preting these two requirements in the Code is that we really do not know what is meant by confidential information. If waste management results are not confidential business, then there is no conflict between these requirements. But it is not clear in the Code itself what kinds of in-formation are confidential.

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Page 11 In this example, there appears to be an internal conflict in the requirements of the Code with no clear indication of which rule is overriding. Un-fortunately, there is no clear guidance on how to resolve the moral conflict between fidelity to one's client and obligations to the state. These concerns about a lack of specificity and

problem-solving ability are among the primary reasons many critics argue that professional codes of ethics are inadequate to guide profes-sional conduct.

Narrowness of Scope and Lack of Moral Commitment

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Another criticism of professional codes of ethics is that they are too narrow in scope and lack moral commitment. The AAES's Model Guide for example, insists that Engineers act in accord-ance with all applicable laws (11). At first sight, this seems not only prudent but reasonable. Yet, some would argue that when moral obligations exceed or conflict with one's legal obligations, one is morally bound to act in a militant and possibly even illegal manner. Consider these ex-amples from medicine:

1. For some patients, marijuana is the most effective pain-control substance with the fewest adverse side effects. In light of current legal pro-hibitions against the use and sale of marijuana, should physicians recommend marijuana to their patients or possibly even help them procure it?

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2. Some dying patients and their physicians agree that death would be in the patient's best in-terest as a release from uncontrollable pain, dis-comfort, and decline. Though not illegal, physician-assisted suicide presently is not legal in the U.S. Should physicians assist a patient in committing suicide when their condition is in-curable and they are in uncontrollable pain? 3. Consider abortions. Even though abortions are presently legal, perhaps physicians should refuse collectively to perform abortions. On the other hand, perhaps if abortion were illegal, physicians should agree collectively to perform illegal abortions.

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The point here, of course, is that questions con-cerning what professionals, such as physicians or engineers, ought to do morally as profession-als is ultimately a moral matter, not a legal one. Thus, although there are people who would ar-gue that morality does indeed make obedience to the law, whatever that might happen to be, the professional's preeminent moral obligation, most critics will argue that when morality and the law do conflict, one is morally bound to fol-low the dictates of morality.

Consequently, if there are occasions when mor-ality does demand professional conduct that conflicts with or surpasses the demands of the law, then professional codes of ethics that re-quire compliance with standards that fall within the parameters of our present legal statutes may be criticized as lacking a moral commitment.

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Page 12 Lack of Legal Authority

A related criticism of professional codes of eth-ics is that they lack legal authority. Organiza-tions, such as the AAES or NSPE, are not feder-al or state law enforcement agencies. Often, the extent of the punitive measures that can be taken are limited to reprimands, publication of the transgressors name in a professional circulation, or suspension or termination of membership in the organization. The rules of the NSPE's Code, for example, are generally enforceable only among NSPE members, through affiliated state societies whose primary function is the adminis-tration of disciplinary action. It should be noted, however, that in some instances portions of the NSPE's Code have been incorporated into state laws and, in those instances, those portions are legally enforceable. This is discussed further in Chapter 5.

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Lack of Objectivity

Another criticism of professional codes of ethics is that they may be biased toward members of the profession. For example, the judgments of an ethics board or committee made up exclus-ively or predominantly by members of the pro-fession may not reflect the moral sentiments and expectations of persons generally. If they do not, then these judgments are likely to carry very little weight outside the profession. There may be serious concerns about the impartiality and objectivity of a committee or board drawn pre-dominantly from members of the profession. By analogy, we would have similar doubts about the impartiality and objectivity of a jury in a murder case made up exclusively of members of the defendant's family.

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The question of moral authority points toward a fundamental concern about the justification basis for professional codes of ethics in general. Are any of these codes grounded in universally, or even generally, accepted moral standards? However, even though there are discrepancies among codes of ethics, this does not mean that none of them are grounded in such standards. The question we need to ask is whether it just so happens that some code available to engineers, such as the NSPE's, is one that is sufficiently grounded. If it is, then we would have a compel-ling reason to accept that code. If it is not, we would be compelled to look elsewhere for moral guidance.

Alternative Approaches to Morality. Models of Moral Responsibility

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In addition to the professional model of moral responsibility expressed in various professional codes of ethics, there are at least five other mod-els of moral responsibility worth considering: the subjective, or egoistic, model; the legal

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Page 13 model; the societal model; the religious model; the so-called Natural Law model; and, finally, a philosophical model.

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Many professionals and nonprofessionals think it is enough to act in a manner that they person-ally believe to be ethical for their conduct to be, in fact, morally correct. According to this ap-proach, the moral responsibilities of engineers are those recognized individually by each mem-ber of the profession. Awareness, sensitivity, and appeals to conscience, however, will not eliminate or resolve conflicts among persons equally concerned with acting ethically. The de-bate over physician-assisted suicide among health professionals is a striking example of dis-agreement among members of the same profes-sionif not equally, at least enthusiastically-committed to doing what they believe is the right thing. Because of the extreme and often conflicting diversity of opinion in matters of morality, allowing each individual member of a profession to define for themselves their own code of ethics would almost certainly lead to as many different codes of ethics as there are

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members of the profession. It is precisely be-cause of disagreement at the level of personal opinion or personal intuition that the subjective approach to questions of morality is generally unacceptable.

There is an additional, deeper, concern about the kind of reasoning that instructs us to be ethical for the sake of prudence and our own self-in-terest. That objection is simply that there would be no reason to behave ethically if we could bet-ter serve our own inbet-terests by acting unethically. The Legal Approach to Ethics

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It is sometimes argued that our present laws and statutes establish the appropriate parameters of what is morally permissible or obligatory. It would follow, then, that our duty to obey the law is our paramount moral obligation. Con-sequently, if our professional conduct conforms to the dictates of the law, then it is morally de-fensible. In fact, some professional organiza-tions do appear to hold this position. Like the AAES's Model Guide discussed above, the code of ethics advanced by the American Academy of Ophthalmology, for example, also affirms the overriding importance of conformity to the law. It states that the Code is only permitted to rep-resent standards that fall within the law (15). The Academy, therefore, will not require its members to act in any way that would violate the law.

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The legal approach to moral behavior would ap-pear to make sense for two immediate reasons. First, it certainly seems prudent from the view-point of staying out of trouble to obey the law. Second, it can be argued that the laws that gov-ern a community reflect the considered moral judgments and sentiments of that community. This does not mean that the law is identical to morality. What it means is that there is a private morality that falls outside the scope of the law and a public

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morality that is the concern of the law. The laws in a community represent the public morality in a codified form.

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There are objections to this kind of reasoning, however. Again from the vantagepoint of self-interest, knowledge of the law alone is no guar-antee against litigation and criminal liability. The right to refuse lifesaving medical treatment, for example, has become legally enforceable in the case of autonomous and informed refusals of treatment, though it has not always been. Today competent patients can legally refuse any treat-ments or surgeries, including those that are lifesaving. Consequently, a competent and adult patient who is a practicing Jehovah's Witness can legally refuse a lifesaving blood transfusion. In the past, physicians would generally transfuse such a patient in spite of their refusal. Today, medical paternalism of this sort would be pun-ishable as battery. Physicians acting purely from beneficent motives to save life during the trans-itional stage from the legality of such forced transfusions to their illegality may find them-selves the object of personally damaging legal

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action. It is because of changes in the boundary between conduct that falls within the scope of the law and that which falls outside of it, that it may be prudent to look beyond the law to gain some idea of what is will ultimately be con-sidered morally appropriate and morally inap-propriate conduct.

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There are even deeper concerns about limiting our moral obligations to the dictates of the law. We discussed some of these in relation to the criticisms of some professional codes of ethics. The foremost criticism we discussed is that the law, i.e., current laws, may be morally in error. In other words, laws are sometimes morally in-defensible and require us to do things that are morally wrong. The Fugitive Slave Law of 1850, for example, required that citizens help re-turn runaway slaves to their owners. Most would argue that this law is morally indefensible since slavery itself is morally unacceptable. The legality of abortion is a current example of a legal statute that some would consider immoral.

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Another obvious concern about legal models of moral responsibility is that they are not univer-sal. That is, what is legal, and thus moral, in one society may not be acceptable in another society where the laws differ. Ethical Relativism is a term used to describe the idea that the social norms that prevail in a given society are the morally appropriate norms for that society. In other words, because they are the norms, they are morally appropriate. The major objection to this kind of relativism, of course, is that norms are just that, norms. They are averages that vary from society to society; that vary within a soci-ety as it evolves; and that represent only the moral sentiments of majorities, to the frequent exclusion of minorities. Critics, then, find the legal model of moral responsibility unacceptable because of its lack of moral authority and the absence of grounding in universally accepted moral principles.

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The Societal Model of Moral Responsibility According to the societal model of moral re-sponsibility, the prevailing social norms and at-titudes of a given society determine the right-making characteristics

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of actions. This is sometimes referred to as con-ventional morality since it defines our moral ob-ligations in terms of the conventions or custom-ary rules and practices of a given society.

The problem here again is that the prevailing so-cial norms in a given society may themselves be morally indefensible. Human sacrifice, for ex-ample, has been practiced in many cultures and has been the social norm and custom for signi-ficantly long periods of time. Many would ar-gue, however, that it is still nevertheless wrong to sacrifice human beings despite its historical popularity or conventionality. As with the legal model of moral responsibility, the societal mod-el can be criticized as lacking sufficient ground-ing in universal moral principles.

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This model requires very little explanation. It states simply that right and wrong are defined in terms of prevailing religious beliefs. The diffi-culties here are obvious. For one, it is seldom an easy task to determine what religious beliefs prevail in a given society. Beyond this,

however, is the question of whether the prevail-ing religious beliefs are ultimately morally justi-fiable. In other words, Which is the morally right, or correct, religion? To argue that a given religion is the correct one precisely because it is the prevailing one begs the question. We would have to know why this particular religion or these particular beliefs are morally appropriate for reasons other than that are the most popular in a given culture or community.

The Natural Law Model of Moral Responsibility 100/999

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The Natural Law model of moral responsibility is far more pervasive and implicit than many people realize. Consider how often people will object to something because they claim that It just isn't natural. For example, many people will object to the prospect of extending the human life span an additional 50, 100, or 200 years be-cause it would not be natural; it is not the way Nature designed us. Historically, the supposed dictates of Nature and the Natural Law have been instrumental in determining moral conduct. The argument is simply that God designed Nature according to His plan and because this plan is reflected in the laws that govern Nature, it follows that we are morally obligated to obey the Laws of Nature since they are God's laws.

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There are many ways to respond to the Natural Law model of moral responsibility. For ex-ample, if it is true that Nature and Nature's Laws are part of God's design and if we have some moral obligation to honor that plan, then the Natural Law (whatever that might be) would es-tablish the parameters of morality. However, it is not obvious what Nature intends. In other words, does Nature intend that man should not fly because Nature did not give us wings or did Nature intend that we should fly by giving us the intellectual and physical means to discover and imitate flight? Consequently, if we find ourselves confused about Nature's design and just what the dictates of the Natural Law might be, then we would need to

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look elsewhere for moral guidance. If, further-more, we have no reason to assume that Nature or the Natural Law has such God divined moral status or that God's design is even relevant in moral matters, then we would again have to look elsewhere for moral guidance.

Philosophical or Theoretical Models of Moral Responsibility

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There are numerous models of moral responsib-ility that could be regarded as philosophical. There are several versions each of Utilitarian-ism, of Deontological Theories, of Intuitionist Theories, Libertarian Theories, Neo-Naturalism, Cognitivism, Non-Cognitivism, among others. Generally, these are philosophical models not just because they have been proposed and defen-ded by notable philosophers but because the de-fense itself is philosophical. That is, proponents of these models offer as strong a justification, or defense, of their theories as possible. It is not enough, therefore, that there are codes of moral conduct that govern social interaction or that there are other competing codes of conduct. Philosophical inquiry insists on some kind of defense of these codes. It asks What makes this particular code of ethics the right, or appropri-ate, code of ethics?

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It may be the case that there can be no ultimate, rational justification of any particular code of ethics. However, the challenge of providing such a justification stimulates a process of in-quiry that probes our most cherished commit-ments and beliefs. It makes us think about the ultimate reasons why we believe certain acts are morally right and others morally wrong. It is this emphasis on a rational justification that we will be borrowing for the problem-solving approach suggested in this chapter.

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The problem-solving model developed here in-volves five steps. It is a systematic approach to moral deliberation that is designed especially for groups of individuals, such as ethics commit-tees, but can be used by individuals with some minor adjustments. It is the method recommen-ded here because it works. The author of this chapter has seen the success of this model solving real-life ethical difficulties in various professional settings. Figure 1-1 illustrates the steps of this model. It is read from left to right.

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Figure 1-1. Problem-solving in ethics.

1.

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The first step in case ethics is to formulate as clearly as possible the exact nature of the ethical problem or dilemma. For example, the problem in our initial case study is that our engineer is faced with losing his job if he does not particip-ate in the development of a product he believes would jeopardize public safety. An ethical di-lemma exists precisely because there are moral reasons why our engineer should refuse to parti-cipate in the project and moral reasons why he should not. The reason we want to be clear about the nature of the problem is so that we can anticipate the kind of solution that is required. In other words, we need to be able to decide

whether our engineer should participate in this project, not whether he/she should sabotage the development of the product, resign, or enter the foreign legion. We want to be able to recom-mend a solution or give council that is relevant to the interests at stake.

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2.

Get the Facts

The second step is to be clear on the facts that we have and to make sure that we gather all the relevant facts to the extent that we can. We want to be able to make an informed decision and to do so, we must possess and understand as best we can the relevant facts pertaining to the case. Adequate knowledge of the facts is no guarantee that a morally appropriate decision will be reached but it is highly improbable that we could even approach a morally defensible de-cision without adequate knowledge of the facts.

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Adequate knowledge of the relevant facts of a case is important for the obvious reason that anything less would make the decision-making process both arbitrary and impertinent. But there is an added reason. Sometimes a problematic looking issue is not really a disagreement over sensitive moral issues or values but

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a disagreement over the descriptive nature of the facts. These are the cold, hard facts, for ex-ample, whether it's raining today in Boston or not. Disagreements involving the facts are much more easily reconciled. We simply need to get the facts straight. For example, consider a situ-ation where a structural engineer is hired by a local newspaper to conduct an on-site inspection of a state bridge construction project. A very critical report is then published in the paper. Is there a moral problem in this case? That de-pends on the facts. According to the NSPE's Code of Ethics for Engineers Engineers shall is-sue no statements, criticisms or arguments on technical matters which are inspired or paid for by interested parties, unless they have prefaced their comments by explicitly identifying the in-terested parties on whose behalf they are speak-ing, and by revealing the existence of any in-terest the engineers may have in the matters (16). Assuming this rule is ethically sound, there

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is no moral problem if the engineer explicitly identified the interested parties and revealed any personal stakes. That the engineer did or did not do so is a factual issue, not a moral one.

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The more intractable problems occur when there are disagreements over the interpretation of some important factual matters or the values that underlie conflicting moral viewpoints. For ex-ample, in medicine, only competent patients are recognized as having the decision-making capa-city to refuse medical treatment. Consider, then, the case of a 75-year-old women who refuses a lifesaving below the knees amputation of a gan-grenous limb that will poison her blood and cause her death if not removed. Yet she refuses, claiming, I fear disfigurement far more than I fear death. Now, while it is true that adults have a legal right to refuse a lifesaving amputation, should we consider this woman a competent and capable decision-maker? If so, then we are leg-ally required to respect her refusal of treatment; if not, then we would have grounds to dismiss her objections and perform the necessary sur-gery. The facts that we have to work with are that the woman is elderly and that her reason for

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refusing surgery is that she fears disfigurement more than she fears death. Assuming that this is all the information we have to go on, how should we interpret these facts? Is the fear she expresses the kind of reason competent persons would offer to refuse a lifesaving treatment? Indeed, some might argue that competent decision-makers would never make a decision concerning life and death on the basis of physic-al disfigurement. Such reasoning might be con-sidered unreasonable and an indication that the patient is not a competent decision-maker. Sim-ilarly, one might argue that refusing a lifesaving blood transfusion because it is a sin against God to drink blood reflects the thinking of a person who does not possess adequate decision-making capabilities.

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On the other hand, others will argue that capable decision-makers could decide such matters on the basis of reasons that others might find ec-centric, idiosyncratic, and perhaps peculiar. In a society that tolerates a wide range of beliefs and behaviors, persons who have idiosyncratic and eccentric beliefs and opinions will be considered no less competent than other normal people. The question of competence is not a scientific ques-tion. It is a question of interpretaques-tion. We are

What Every Engineer Should Know About Ethics

What Every Engineer Should

Know About Ethics

What Every Engineer Should

Know About Ethics

Contents

1

Problem-Solving in Engineering Ethics