Case 7
Jollibee Foods Corporation
LEONARDOR. GARCIA, JR.,
CHRISTOPHERLOVELOCK,ANDJOCHENWIRTZ
The Philippines’ leading food service company has grown both organically and through acquisitions. Ranked among Asia’s top companies, it now dominates the fast-food market in its home country, where it offers four separate fast-food concepts under separate brand identities, led by the original Jollibee stores. However, despite international aspirations, it has made only modest progress overseas, where recent growth has come primar-ily from purchase of the Yonghe King chain in China.
Around the world, when someone says “fast-food restau-rant” the chances are high that the first name that comes to mind will be McDonald’s, the world’s largest quick-ser-vice restaurant chain. In 2005, McDonald’s held a 20 per-cent share of the U.S. fast-food market, triple that of its nearest competitor Burger King. This was not the case, however, in the Philippines where, for more than two decades, fast-food had been synonymous with the name Jollibee. In the global business arena, Jollibee Foods Corporation (JFC) was not exactly a household name. But in its niche, the Philippines, where it controlled four brands—Jollibee, Delifrance, Greenwich Pizza, and Chowking—it dominated the market.
During the 1990s, JFC extended its sights overseas, opening a small number of restaurants in several Asian and Middle Eastern locations. The company’s chairman and CEO, Tony Tan Caktiong, observed:
Internationalization remains a key component of our business strategy, even as we continue to reinforce our domestic network of stores. Our goals of contin-ued growth, profitability and market leadership, as well as our contribution to the development of our country, may lie not just in continuing to expand aggressively at home but also in becoming a truly multinational Filipino corporation.
By June 2005, the total number of stores worldwide in the JFC Group had grown to 1,200, of which 1,079 were located in the Philippines and the balance in several other countries, led by the recently acquired Yonghe King chain in China. Jollibee had recently beaten 31 other entrepreneurs from around the world to win the 2004 World Entrepreneur of the Year award, sponsored by Ernst and Young, one of the world’s top accounting firms.
J
OLLIBEE
: T
HE
E
ARLY
Y
EARS
Humble Beginnings
In 1975, Tony Tan Caktiong, a Filipino of Chinese ancestry, and his brothers opened two ice- cream parlors in Manila’s commercial districts of Cubao and Quiapo. These ice-cream parlors were an instant hit among food-loving Filipinos, who came to associate the stores with special occasions such as birthdays and holidays. In no time the Tan brothers had decided to expand their menu and began offering other quick-meals such as hot sandwiches, spaghetti and burgers. After its second year of operations, the Tan brothers noted that the store was actually earning more from the side orders, specifically their burgers, than from the ice-cream.
Following the taste and feel of the market, the Tan brothers decided to develop their own unique brand by coming up with a menu that would appeal to the Filipino palate. Jollibee was conceived as a fast-food outlet of high-quality but reasonably-priced food products tailored espe-cially for Filipinos, who were served by a jolly, “busy-as-a-bee” restaurant crew. Hence the birth of the bright red and yellow “Jolly Bee” mascot, which had since become a favorite among Filipino children. In response to the growing popularity of their sweet homemade burgers—made from their mother’s secret recipe—and the other hot meals, Tony Tan and his brothers formed Jollibee Foods Corporation (JFC) in 1978 to exploit the possibilities of a hamburger con-cept more fully. By that time the firm had seven outlets.
When McDonald’s entered the Philippine market in 1981 and began opening stores in Manila, some industry observers questioned whether the little 11-store local chain could survive. However, Jollibee’s management team decided to see this as an opportunity that would allow them to benchmark the American giant’s opera-tions and then bring their own chain up to world-class standards. In particular, they focused on learning about the sophisticated operating systems that enabled McDonald’s to control its quality, costs, and service at the store level—an area of weakness in the local firm that had constrained its further expansion. As Tony Tan gained a better understanding of McDonald’s business model, he recognized not only strengths but also specific
© 2007 Leonardo R, Garcia, Jr., Christopher H. Lovelock, and Jochen Wirtz. The authors gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Kristine Abante.
This case is based on published sources, student research, and personal experience. It was prepared solely for use as a learning tool and is not intended to serve as an endorsement, source of primary data, or illustration of effective or ineffective management. Financial data are in Philippine pesos (exchange rates in mid-2004 were PHP 1 = US$0.018, or US$1 = PHP 56).
areas of weakness in the latter’s strategy, reflecting its standardized product line and a U.S.-dominated deci-sion processes.
Capturing Filipinos’ Taste buds
In the Philippines, people love to eat and are used to doing so up to five times daily, enjoying snacks in between meals and a comfortable place to chat with friends and loved ones. As a result the nation had become an attractive mar-ket for global players such as McDonald’s, KFC, Wendy’s, Burger King, and Pizza Hut. Yet despite growing competi-tion, Jollibee had managed to maintain its dominant posi-tion as the leading fast-food chain in the Philippines with a menu tailored specifically to the Filipinos’ preferences.
Jollibee’s keen insight and understanding of the Filipino psyche had brought to everyone’s lips the promise of langhap-sara (freely translated, this means “smells good so it must taste good”). In addition to meals with fries, Jollibee offered rice or spaghetti with its entrees. Its moist burger patties and spicy sauces were so distinctly Filipino that Jollibee’s burgers were often likened to what a Filipino mother would cook at home. This strong understanding of Filipinos’ taste and prefer-ences set Jollibee apart from its competitors.
Although long-time favorites like Chickenjoy, Spaghetti Special, Jolly Hotdog, French fries and Yumburgers still continued to hold their appeal, over time Jollibee had broad-ened its product range to create more excitement and vari-ety. The enlarged menu included more rice-based products like Honey Beef Rice and Shanghai Rolls; a variety of burger choices from mushroom to garlic and cheese, a variety of chicken dishes, more flavorful desserts like the Ice Craze in
Buko pandan (coconut and jelly) and mais con yelo (sweet
corn) served with milk and crushed ice; traditional Filipino breakfast rice meals, and options such as the Tuna Pie and Pies-to-Go. Never before had Filipinos—children, families,
and adults from all walks of life—been offered so much in a single location.
Addition of New Brands
By 1989, Jollibee had become the first Philippine fast-food chain to break the one billion peso sales mark. In 1993, Jollibee Food Corporation (JFC) went public on the Philippine Stock Exchange to broaden its capital base, lay-ing the groundwork for expansion both within and beyond Philippine shores. Over the years, the size, geo-graphic expanse and breadth of the company’s operations had continued to grow. In addition to the original chain of Jollibee burger restaurants, several new brands had been added through acquisition.
Even as the Jollibee brand achieved market domi-nance, the firm was also pursuing a strategy of diversifica-tion as a hedge against both competidiversifica-tion and downturns in specific market niches. Reaching out to other segments, Jollibee Foods Corporation had acquired a portfolio of other fast food concepts, to which it applied its carefully honed operational and marketing skills. In 1994 it pur-chased Greenwich Pizza, the Philippines’ leading pizza and pasta chain. The following year, seeking to cater to the changing taste preferences of the Filipinos, JFC acquired the right to operate the Philippine’s franchise of Délifrance, an international chain of French bakery-cafés headquar-tered in France. In 2000, JFC bought Chowking Foods Corporation, which operated the Philippines’ top chain serving Chinese fast-food.
Although Chowking had reported excellent sales and performance since its purchase, it took time before Greenwich Pizza was able to establish a strong position in the market. By the end of 2003, JFC was the Philippines market leader in three segments. In the hamburger and chicken segment, Jollibee had 467 outlets to only 240 for its nearest rival, McDonald’s. In Chinese fast-food, there
EXHIBIT 1 Trends in Number of Stores by Brand, 1998–2005
DECEMBER31 JUNE2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 1998 Philippines Jollibee 508 499 467 436 408 374 350 302 Greenwich 228 232 213 191 194 193 191 169 Chowking 310 303 245 216 194 164 159 142 Delifrance 33 31 30 28 24 13 6 4 Subtotal 1,079 1,065 955 871 832 744 712 617 International Jollibee 22 22 21 21 23 22 21 n.a. Chowking 11 10 9 8 7 6 6 n.a.
Tomi’s Teriyaki — — 3 2 1 — — n.a.
Yonghe King 88 88 — — — — — n.a.
Subtotal 121 120 33 31 31 29 27 n.a.
TOTAL 1,200 1,185 988 902 863 772 739 n.a.
were 245 Chowking restaurants, compared to 136 for its nearest competitor, Luk Yuen. And finally, JFC’s pizza and pasta outlet, Greenwich, had 213 stores as compared to 113 for its nearest rival, Pizza Hut.1 Exhibit 1 shows
trends in the number of stores by brand between the end of 1998 and September 2004.
By that time, Jollibee had become had become an international brand that, as management declared, made Filipinos proud. Forbes, Far Eastern Economic Review, and
Asian Business had all ranked JFC among Asia’s top
compa-nies. It was recognized as the number one food company in Asia by Euromoney and as the best-managed company in the Philippines by Asiamoney, and was consistently ranked among Asia’s best employers in the Far Eastern Economic
Review’s annual survey. In 2004, Jollibee Foods Corporation
topped the “Asia’s Most Admired Company” (AMAC) sur-vey, conducted by Hong Kong-based Asian Business
Magazine. Exhibit 2 shows annual financial and operational
data for JFC from 1998 to 2004. Exhibit 3 reproduces the company’s values, vision, and mission.
Twenty-nine years after Jollibee was founded, JFC controlled about 55% of the quick-service restaurant mar-ket in the Philippines based on “visit shares” and held 70% of the burger-based meals market. One million cus-tomers ate at JFC stores daily, averaging a per capita
spending of about 40 pesos (US$0.71). Each day, JFC bought or produced 40,000 packs of chicken (with eight pieces in each pack), 320,000 pieces of burger, and 44,250 eggs. With more than one thousand stores across the Philippines, JFC’s four brands enjoyed substantial economies of scale, gaining leverage in terms of retail site selection and operations, procurement, manufacturing, distribution and marketing at levels unavailable to most industry players. Despite a recent economic slowdown in the Philippines and unfavorable business conditions, JFC had continued to deliver same-store sales growth. Exhibit
4 shows a modern Jollibee store.
M
ARKETING
, O
PERATIONS
,
AND
H
UMAN
R
ESOURCES
Jollibee’s ‘FSC’ Commitment
The acronym FSC, described by the company on its web-site as “a byword in all of Jollibee,” represented its com-mitment to meeting high standards in three key areas:
Every Food (F) item served to the public must meet the company’s excellent standards or it will not be served at all; the Service (S) must be fast and courte-EXHIBIT 2 Jollibee Foods Corporation: Selected Annual Financial and
Operational Data, 1998–2004*
2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 1998 Consolidated Systemwide Sales 35.5 28.9 26.8 24.1 20.3 18.1 16.7 Gross Revenues 26.2 21.6 20.3 18.8 15.7 14.1 12.9 Income from Operations 2.0 1.4 1.5 0.8 1.1 0.9 1.2 Net Income 1.6 1.3 1.0 0.5 0.9 0.6 0.8 Number of Personnel (000) 26.5 21.6 22.0 21.8 20.6 14.2 13.9
*All financial data in billions of pesos.
Source: Annual Reports, Jollibee Foods Corporation, 1998–2004.
EXHIBIT 3 Jollibee Food Corporation: Values—Mission—Vision
Values
• Always put customer first • Excellence through teamwork • Spirit of family and fun • Frugality, Honesty and Integrity • Humility to listen and learn Mission
We bring great taste and happiness to everyone Vision
Become the most dominant and best tasting QSR . . . . The most endearing brand that has ever been.
We will be within reach of every Filipino . . . We will lead in product taste at all times
We will provide FSC excellence in every encounter . . . Happiness in every moment
ous; and Cleanliness (C) from sidewalk to kitchen, from uniforms to utensils, must be maintained at all times.
The company recognized that maintaining high stan-dards required that employees be committed to FSC. Jollibee Foods Corporation paid the highest compensation and benefits package in the Philippine fast foods industry. All employees underwent comprehensive training pro-grams based on the underlying standards. In addition, managers received ongoing training in the latest opera-tions systems and in people-management skills. Opportunities existed for qualified crew members to pur-sue a career path into management positions.
Marketing Strategy
JFC’s marketing philosophy was based on being closer to Filipino families than its competitors. There was wide awareness that Jollibee was a local Filipino service busi-ness establishment that had captured the unique Filipino taste, so it appealed to patriotic or “pam-Pinoy” instincts. The chain also appealed to a broad cross-section of the population that felt comfortable and very much at home
in an environment where the crew talked to them in the local language, unlike other outlets where the crew spoke in English and where the atmosphere might be perceived by some as projecting an elitist appeal.
The Jollibee chain had tailored its marketing strate-gies to suit the Filipino culture and lifestyle. “What happens in the normal Filipino family is that weekends are reserved especially for children,” noted a Filipino business analyst, “and parents try to ask their children where they want to eat.” Jollibee appealed to children with in-store play activities and a cast of captivating characters. Its hamburger-headed Champ, complete with boxing gloves, went head-to-head against McDonald’s Hamburglar. Industry observers reported that Jollibee’s giant smiling red and yellow bee and a blond spaghetti-haired girl named Hetti (a mascot for Jollibee restau-rants) were better known and loved in the Philippines than Ronald McDonald. Jollibee endeavored to maintain its dominance in the children’s segment by promoting its Jolly Kiddie Meals and offering a choice of Regular Yum, Spaghetti Special or Chickenjoy. Having an adver-tising strategy that was deeply rooted in the traditional values of family, with a tinge of national pride, allowed Jollibee to position itself as the destination for family outings.
The DLSU Survey
A survey conducted by advertising management students from De La Salle University in Manila in mid-2004 con-trasted Jollibee’s value proposition against that of McDonald’s operations in the Philippines (Exhibit 5) and revealed the main rational and emotional factors that drove Filipino consumers’ choices in fast food restaurants.
Rational Attributes
Of the top ten rational attributes underlying selection of a fast food restaurant, the most significant, cited by 90 per-cent of respondents, was for it to be “affordable and/or cheap.” Next came “faster service” (cited by 78 percent), followed by “accessibility,” (70 percent). Other attributes mentioned were “tasty,” “variety of food,” “accommodat-ing personnel,” “delivery services,” “promotional items are useful,” “frequent and effective ads,” and “offers seasonal products” (Exhibit 6). Among Jollibee’s pa-trons, affordable/cheaper prices was ranked top, with 94 percent mentioning this attribute, followed by accessibility/many outlets (72 percent) and tastier (66 percent). However, only 44 percent of respondents cited “faster” as a desired attribute.
Emotional Attributes
For fast-foods in general, the three most dominant attributes were friendly atmosphere (76 percent), family-oriented pampamilya (74 percent), and hang out or
tambayan (66 percent). (Exhibit 7). The other emotional
attributes considered by respondents were mass appeal, EXHIBIT 4 Typical Jollibee Outlet in the Philippines
better environment for kids, patriotic or pam-Pinoy or
lasang Pinoy, “brings you closer to home,” “likeable
Filipiso selections” or “putaheng Pinoy”/”sangkap Pinoy,” “use of Filipino language” particularly by the ser-vice crew, and the use of “wholesome” or “cute” endorsers. Broadly similar ratings of these attributes were achieved for Jollibees, although “family-oriented” was ranked first and “friendly,” second.
Organizational Structure
By concentrating on a country market with distinct prefer-ences, Jollibee had been able to tailor its menu and mar-keting strategies to better reach and satisfy the customers. While global players like McDonald’s and KFC chose to
spread their resources among their fast-food chains worldwide, for many years Jollibee focused its efforts only in the Philippines. During the 1980s, when political insta-bility hit the Philippines, McDonald’s had to curtail its expansion process. Jollibee, on the other hand, continued with its strategic plans of expansion. By the time the coun-try was back on track, Jollibee had already gained the upper hand in terms of store locations, thus leaving the global giant trailing behind.
The unique geographical structure of the Philippines with its many islands made it a challenging market for fast-food companies. Among all the fast-food chains com-peting in the Philippines, Jollibee was the only one that operated nationwide. In some locations, it faced no com-petition from other fast-food chains.
EXHIBIT 5 Value Proposition of Jollibee Versus McDonald’s in the Philippines
VALUEPROPOSITION
JOLLIBEE MCDONALD’S
TARGETMARKET FAMILIES& CHILDREN FAMILIES& CHILDREN
Business Operations To provide high quality food, fast and friendly To provide outstanding quality, service, service in a clean and comfortable environment. cleanliness and value.
Menu Tailored to the Filipino palate. E.g., peach-mango Standardized Fare E.g., meals with fries.* pie, meals with spaghetti or rice.
Promotions • Langhap Sarap Value Meals • Extra Value Meal
• Jolly Kiddie Meal (with premium items and toys) • Happy Meal (with premium items and toys) • Eats for Free purchase rewards program
• Bestsellers Campaign (20 percent discounts on various combinations of the popular Langhap Sarap Value Meals)
No. of Stores in the
Philippines (mid-2004) 472 241
Mode of International
Expansion Franchising Franchising
*McDonald’s subsequently bowed to the pressure of conforming to Filipino taste preferences by introducing menu items such as McSpaghetti and McDo, a heavily seasoned burger.
Source: DLSU student research project, 2004.
EXHIBIT 6 Rational Attributes Filipinos Look for in Fast-Food Restaurants/Jollibee
FAST-FOODMARKETOVERALL JOLLIBEE
RANK ATTRIBUTE PERCENT ATTRIBUTE PERCENT
1 Affordable/Cheaper 90 Affordable/Cheaper 94 2 Faster Service 78 Accessibility/Many outlets 72 3 Accessibility/“Maraming” 70 Tastier 66
(many) outlets
4 Tastier 68 Frequent and Effective Ads 56 5 Variety of food chains 60 Variety of food chains 50 6 Accommodating personnel 34 Faster service 44 7 Delivery Services 42 Promotional items are useful 40 8 Promotional items are useful 38 Accommodating personnel 38 9 Frequent and effective ads 34 Delivery Services 38 10 Offers seasonal products 28 Offers seasonal products 36
Total N = 50 100 100
JFC’s strategy included a focus on achieving opera-tional efficiency in its commissary and hiring the right candidates to manage its operations and strategy plan-ning. To meet the challenges of a more intensely compet-itive market and to manage business more effectively, the company had undertaken a major initiative in 2000 to re-align the structure of Jollibee Philippines, decentraliz-ing the organization into four autonomous Regional Business Units (RBUs) that corresponded to the coun-try’s major geographic markets: Mega Manila, Luzon, South Luzon, and Visayas-Mindanao. This structure ensured a more manageable business size and span of control. Key support functions like human resources and administration, finance and network development were transferred to the RBUs for greater efficiency in the delivery of products and services, quicker coordination, and more timely decision-making.
The Head Office/Corporate Services functions (Marketing, Finance, Restaurant Systems, Engineering) were re-aligned as a Support Center to provide corporate-level direction and continuing assistance to the RBUs. Top management believed that the new structure had resulted in better execution of programs and renewed enthusiasm and commitment from JFC’s managers and employees.
The continuing growth in the number of Jollibee, Chowking, and Greenwich restaurants obscured the fact that each year some stores were closed, either because they were underperforming or because they were being replaced by newer and larger stores in better locations. Over time, a higher percentage of stores were being oper-ated by franchisees instead of company-owned.
I
NTERNATIONAL
O
PERATIONS
Building on its success in the Philippines, Jollibee turned its sights overseas. Initially, the company focused on reaching communities with a large Filipino population to capitalize on its brand awareness, targeting markets where there were substantial numbers of “OFWs” (Overseas Filipino Workers). By the early 1990s, Jollibee restaurants were operating in Hong Kong, Saipan and Guam (both islands in the NW Pacific), Vietnam, Brunei, Indonesia, Dubai, and Kuwait.
In 1998, the firm entered one of the most demanding fast-food markets in the world, the United States, which had at that time an estimated two million Filipino immi-grants. But aside from Jollibee’s popularity among Filipinos, the brand also sought to appeal to other ethnic groups in its U.S. outlets. Other immigrants from Asia came with their families to eat at Jollibee’s. One African-American customer stated that the chicken is “excellent, almost like my mother’s Southern fried chicken!” And white Americans enjoyed delicacies not offered by com-petitors, such as Peach Mango Pie.
The company’s international expansion strategy focused on markets where management believed it “could successfully develop the Jollibee brand and put up the supply chain to support the critical mass of stores in these selected markets.” In the U.S., the first state targeted was California, with plans to expand into Nevada, Hawaii, and New York in future years. By adopting a franchise mode in the U.S., JFC was able to draw on local capital and entrepreneurial drive. In 2001, the firm purchased a EXHIBIT 7 Emotional Attributes Filipinos Look for in Fast-Foods/Jollibee
FAST-FOODMARKET JOLLIBEE
RANK ATTRIBUTE N PERCENT RANK ATTRIBUTE N PERCENT
1 Friendly Atmosphere 38 76 1 Family togetherness 39 78 (“Pampamilya”)
2 Family togetherness 37 74 2 Friendly atmosphere 32 64 (“Pampamilya”)
3 Hang-out (“Tambayan”) 33 66 3 Patriotic, “Pam-Pinoy,” 30 60 “Lasang Pinoy”
4 Mass Appeal 27 54 4 Mass Appeal 30 60
5 Better environment for kids 27 54 5 Likeable Filipino selections, 28 56 “Putaheng Pinoy,”
“Sangkap Pinoy”
6 Patriotic (“Pam-Pinoy”/ 22 44 6 Better environment for kids 28 56 ”Lasang Pinoy”)
7 Brings you closer to home 17 34 7 Use of Filipino language 20 40 selections
8 Likeable Filipino selections 16 32 8 Wholesome/”cute” endorsers 13 26 (“Putaheng Pinoy”/
“Sangkap-Pinoy”)
9 Use of Filipino language 13 26 9 Hang-out/”Tambayan” 12 24 10 Wholesome/”cute” endorsers 8 16 10 Brings you closer to home 11 22
N:50 N:50
R
EFERENCES
1“Jollibee beats McDonald’s at its own game,” PJI Journal, www.journal.com.ph, accessed January 17, 2005. Additional sources consulted for this case include: Jollibee
Foods Corporation Website (www.jollibee.com.ph).
Christopher A. Bartlett and Sumantra Ghoshal, “Going Global: Lessons from Late Movers,” Harvard Business
Review 78 (March–April 2001) 132–145.
majority interest in Tokyo Teriyaki House, a Japanese restaurant in California, with the objective of expanding into the Japanese QSR segment and developing it into another major chain; it renamed the restaurant Tomi’s Teriyaki House.
The annual report for 2002 noted that the overseas stores were providing the company “the experience in the know-how that we need in gearing up to the realities of international competition and in reorienting ourselves to the global environment.”
JFC had identified several markets in Asia for its expan-sion activities. In 2004, the company was looking at the pos-sibility of expanding its three-store network in Vietnam. There were also plans to introduce the Chowking brand to Indonesia, responding to the growing market for Chinese food in that nation. Despite an earlier, unsuccessful experi-ence operating a now-closed Jollibee’s store in Xiamen, east-ern China, JFC saw huge potential in the People’s Republic. In March 2004, the company signed an agreement to pur-chase 85 percent ownership in the Shanghai-based Yonghe King chain, which offered Chinese style fast-food in ten cities. The number of Yonghe King stores grew from 77 at the end of 2003 to 89 by the end of the third quarter of 2004, by which point this brand accounted for 6 percent of JFC’s system-wide sales and was more profitable than the domes-tic operation, which had been hit by rising costs. The strat-egy for Yonghe King was to open 20 new stores a year in each of the next three years, increasing to another 50 in year four and 100 additional stores in year five.
In May 2004, Mr. Ysmael V. Baysa, the company’s chief finance officer, announced that during the first quar-ter of the year JFC had opened 21 new stores but closed 13, of which seven were in foreign locations. It closed all three Chowking stores in Dubai, one Jollibee store in the US, and shuttered its 3-store Tomi’s Teriyaki operation in the US. Said Mr Baysa: “Tomi’s Teriyaki business did not grow according to expectations. Its basic concept is sound, but there is still much work to be done to turn it into a strong brand. We are keeping the brand trademark and the recipes for possible future use. In the meantime, man-agement is placing its priority on brand development of Yonghe King in China.”
Over the course of the following 12 months, most of JFC’s growth came from within the Philippines, led by the Jollibee and Chowking brands, both of which were domi-nated by franchisee-operated units (Exhibit 8). The num-ber of Yonghe King stores in China had remained almost unchanged, but was expected to increase to over 100 stores by early 2006.
Summarizing the company’s strategy, the chairman, Mr. Tan, noted:
There are still major challenges to address to ensure the long-term soundness of the business—we have to improve our cost structure particularly in the support groups, we have to sustain positive growth in same store sales, and we have to win big in foreign opera-tions if we are to become a truly World Class Business.
EXHIBIT 8 Location of JFC Group Stores by Brand, June 2005
JOLLIBEE GREENWICH CHOWKING DÉLIFRANCE* YONGHEKING TOTAL Philippines Co-owned 207 122 99 29 — 457 Franchised 301 106 211 4 — 622 Subtotal 508 228 310 33 — 1,079 Hong Kong 1 — — — — 1 U.S.A. 10 — 8 — — 18 China Co-owned — — — — 82 82 Franchised — — — — 6 6 Others 11 — 3 — — 14 TOTAL 530 228 321 33 88 1,200
S
TUDY
Q
UESTIONS
1. Evaluate Jollibee Food Corporation’s performance in the Philippines. What are the secrets of its success in terms of marketing, operations, and human resource strategies? 2. In what ways does JFC’s strategy of adding new brands
lever-age or dilute the strengths of the original Jollibee concept? 3. What rational and emotional attributes do you look for in a
fast-food restaurant? Do these attributes fit your favorite food establishment in your country?
4. Evaluate JFC’s performance overseas. To what extent can the company transfer its core competency to its interna-tional operations? Should it modify its consumer-driven strategies to suit foreign markets, even if that means Jollibee becomes much less ‘Philippine’ in nature?
5. Should Jollibee continue in its efforts to go international or concentrate on expanding and consolidating its foothold in the Philippines only? Why?
