PARTICIPANTS (* DENOTES PART TIME)
Spectrum Pharmatech Consultants Pvt.
Ltd. (SPCPL) M/s Navin Fluorine International Ltd
Mr. Mahendra Sarvankar* Mr. Suhas Kadam Mr. Chaitanya ChabukswarMr. Mr. T Bhaskar Mr. Subba Reddy Mr. Sanjeev Sheth Mr. Shamkant Suryavanshi Mr. Appasaheb Gajabar* SUMMARY
M/s Navin Fluorine International Ltd, proposes to construct a New Manufacturing Plant No – 2 at Dewas, Near Indore. Madhya Pradesh.
Since the process is not defined, hazard and operability study (HAZOP)is carried out for facility considering multipurpose plant. Product specific HAZOP study will be carried out by M/s NFIL as & when required.
The hazard and operability study (HAZOP) is basically carried out toidentify hazards and operating problems in a process plant.
Safety awareness within the industry results in highly efficient and profitable & support the need for plant safety and effective safety management. The hazard and operability study will help operators to have.
Up-to-date knowledge about all safety relevant aspects of their operations. Prevent accidents or to limit their impacts/escalations.
control hazards reliably and to minimize risks by identifying installations with risk potential regarding health and safety as well as the environment.
Design, start up, operate and maintain workplaces in such a manner that the workforce can conduct work without putting their own safety and health or that of others at risk.
OBJECTIVES:
The prime objective of this HAZOP study was to systematically examine the proposed design and to identify the potential hazards and operating problems.
HAZOP study was carried out in presence of multi disciplinary team members which leads to examined in details all possible deviations from normal operating conditions and their reasons and consequences are assessed.
The detailed insight into the plant issupported by dividing the plant into manageable sections, so called'nodes'. Specific 'parameters' and 'guidewords' were used to focus the team towards likely design issues in each section of the plant. Once identified, ‘Consequence/Risks’ from the standard operating or design conditions, then same were discussed and assessed by the team with respect to their effect on safety. Subsequently the implemented safeguards/control measures were identified and where considered necessary recommendations for action or further consideration are recorded in the HAZOP report. The necessity of additional safeguards/recommendations can either be evaluated by the team on a qualitative basis or by means of a risk matrix.
PROCEDURE
Following procedure was followed during HAZOP study. By defining appropriate nodes, each system or equipment is divided into sub-systems by consensus of the review team. Specific 'parameters' and 'guidewords' defined related to operation, and was review as per P&ID. The HAZOP process was carried out as follows:
1. Select the appropriate node 2. Apply the first or next parameter
3. Apply the first or next guideword, which in combination with the parameter gives the deviation
4. Determine severity
5. Identify all potential causes of the deviation 6. Appraise the consequence/risks of the deviation
7. Appraise the safeguards preventing or mitigating of the deviation and its consequences. 8. Agree a recommendation for action or further consideration of the problem where required.
9. Once all causes and consequences for a given deviation have been identified and the requirement for action discussed, the procedure returns to step 3. This process iterates until all guidewords have been combined with a selected parameter.
10. Once all guidewords have been considered the next the next parameter will be selected (step 2) and the process will be repeated until all parameters have been applied
11. Then the discussion moves to the next node and the process will be repeated until all nodes are applied.
The method consists of a systematic study of all process and utility lines and equipment included in the project. The study will primarily be performed based on the piping and instrumentation diagrams (P&IDs) developed for the project. The study will be confined within the new facilities only. Each line will be studied as a whole from battery limit to battery limitor to the equipment connected to the end of the line, whicheverapplicable.
For each key word, the HAZOP team will list the possible causes andthe consequences regarding the operating procedures and the safetyaspects from both personnel and material point of view. If theconsequences are considered as being out of the normal operating range, the HAZOP team will investigate the installed safeguards:
BASIS FOR HAZOP STUDY:
Following drawings were refer for preparation of HAZOP report Equipment layout
Men material movement layout Hazardous area classification layout HVAC classification layout
Safety shower & fire exit layut Fire hydrant layout
Gas detection system layout P&ID
KEY ASPECTS INCLUDES:
A detailed systematic study of the design and outlineoperating and maintenance philosophy to identify theconsequences from design intent.
The detection devices, to ensure that the operator will be aware that something abnormal is happening.
The safety devices installed.
Consideration of transient operating conditions duringstart-up, shut-down, plant upsets and emergencies.
Consideration of potential exposure of employees tochemicals during routine operations includingmaintenance, de-contamination, etc.
All These requirements will berecorded and classified in the HAZOP Report.
Study Nodes considered are all follows.
1. Reactors 2. Lines
3. Operating Instructions
Following Guide word were considered
1. No 2. Less 3. More 4. Reverse 5. Other than
Parameters considered were as follows
1. Flow 2. Temperature 3. Pressure 4. Level 5. Contamination 6. Relief 7. Electrical 8. Corrosion
SUMMARY OF FINIDINGS & OUTCOME OF THE HAZOP STUDY
Sr. No. Observation Action Recommended
01 Since the process is not defined, only facilities HAZOP was carried out.
M/s NFIL has to carried out, process HAZOP based on the process & has to prepare SOP’s for respective process. 02 SPCPL to ensure that all the
interlocks and safety parameters to be covered in DCS
DCS HAZOP to be carried out with DCS vendor.
SPCPL to provide separate interlock list to DCS vendor as discussed during HAZOP study.
03 Following major safety points
were discussed in
Hydrogenation reaction area.
1. Pressurization & Loss of strength due to high temp.
2. To control heating rate in reactor.
3. Reaction exotherm, due to excess addition of hydrogen.
4. On/off valves on LPS line and hydrogen line were fail to close type, whereas on/off valves on cold utility line were fail to open type.
5. Reverse flow of water
Followings safety precautions were taken.
Separate cooling water line with On/OFF valve to be provided on inlet & outlet of external coil. Will operate based on interlocks from DCS.
Steam control & ON/OFF valve will operate based on interlocks from DCS.
ON/OFF valve is provided on hydrogen line and will be operated based on interlocks from DCS.
from hydrogen vent line.
6. Venting of hydrogen will be at safe location.
Locate water pot at 5 mtr or mezzanine level inside the hydrogenation area, provision of local level indicator and pressure gauge, SPCPL to incorporate it in layout and P&ID and NFIL to incorporate in operational SOP.
To be confirm during PSSR.
04 Following major safety points
were discussed in
Intermediate Glass reactor.
1 Pressurization & Loss of strength due to high temp.
2 To control heating rate in reactor.
3 Malfunctioning of temperature transmitter on reactor.
4 Due to pressurization or gas venting / Vacuum at the end of batch, hazardous gases will be present and will get released in atm.
Followings safety precautions were taken.
Steam control & ON/OFF valve will operate based on interlocks from DCS.
ON/OFF valve is provided on utility line and will be operated based on interlocks from DCS.
SPCPL to incorporate additional temperature transmitter on vapour line.
Vent is connected directly to Scrubber, Scrubber running status will be provided in DCS. NFIL to generate venting SOP.
side will break the tubes in glass condensers, result in cross contamination.
on utility supply line after isolation valve, which will operation on required utility pressure, SPCPL to incorporate in P&ID.
05 Gas leakages inside the plant Hydrogen, oxygen, chlorine and bromine gas detection system is provided
06 M/s NFIL have to prepare following SOPs
1. SOP’s as per process 2. Operation start-up SOP 3. Operational SOP 4. Venting SOP 5. Safety SOP
6. Equipment & Instrument calibration & maintenance SOP. 7. Material loading and
unloading SOP
M/s NFIL has to prepare all these documents, based on process.
08 Motor no current alarm to be provided on DCS
SPCPL to incorporate in DCS 09 Design calculation backup for all
safety installation – like Rupture disk, Safety valve etc
SPCPL to provide the design backup
10 Hydrogen & other gas bank system to be shown in layout
SPCPL to incorporate in layout 11 M/s NFIL have to carry out the
Process HAZOP as per the products
M/s NFIL’s has to prepare process HAZOP and SOP’s as per product.
Only facility HAZOP was carried out for typical high pressure hydrogenation reactor, Intermediate glass reactor, and CF system.
Same philosophy will be carried out for other equipments.
HAZOP study is done based on approved piping and instrumentation diagrams (P&IDs) & approved facility layout. In addition to this HAZOP, study to be done considering specific product manufacturing since facility will be used for multipurpose application.
M/s NFIL has to carry out process HAZOP as per specified product and prepared the operational SOP’s as per requirement.
ANNEXURES:
1. HAZOP report for SSR-216, High Pressure Hydrogenator Reactor 2. HAZOP report for GLR-205, Intermediate Glass Lined Reactor 3. HAZOP report for Centrifuge CF-201
