Ms# P-059 Project # 47 Tank Losses

KS

#

P-059

Burkhart M L RLHILLER11f

Genieralmajor

Qhef of Staff of Third P& izer Army

PROJECT

#

47

GNRMAN~

TAINK

LOSSiES

Koenigetein/Ts

3.0 Nov 31950

Translator: M. FRIK

IEditort

G; VAN1'DRSTADT

Reviewers

Cat

]3,X, HUFFORD

HISTORICAL

DI VISION

MS

P

-059

MS #

P-459

File No 72 C 12 Dec 1950

MOAI"Ui

FORt Chief,

Operational

History (Germ) Branch

Lt

Col

NAWLOCK1Y

SUBJECT:

MS f P.059, Project

#

47,

TA1NK

LOSSES

The following Questions are not answered fully: lb Tank strength within Feldheer, listed by theater,.

2b Tank losses and replacement for Polish, Norwegian,

French, etc, campaigns,

2c Breakdown of losses by causative agents~ The topic leader states that he cannot answer these questions more fully,

No information at all is given on the bases used in

predicting tank losses (question 2d) and the answer to

question

2e (guidance furnished tank producers...) is so vague that it can hardly be called an answer at all.

In his introduction, the topic leader refers to a con-tribut ion by Emil LD , the former chief of the Army Armament Office, This contribution contains very much the same informat;

ion embodied in the study but also gives the names

and.

present

addresses of persons who should be able to give more detailed information on product ion and so forth, He further states that an illustration of the TIGER Panzer and of the model developed by PORSCHE*, the

ELEPHANT Panzer

on a demonstration trip (No 20)

was printed in the September issue of the PINGUIN**,

Professor PORSCHE, the designer of the Volkswagen

** Good illustrations and descriptions of all German panzer types are to be found in the HANDBOOK

ON

GERMA1O MILITARY

FORCE S,

H, HEI TiA n1

MS

#

?-059

The Author

Herman -Burkhart

U

ERHILL BA1Ifl,

Gene ralajr,

Born.,- 26 Dec 1904, Dieuze, Lorraine,

;iU: +L +' -HILLeZeBRAN received training

in the Ohrdruf Officer Candidate School

in 1925 after having served since April

1923 in the 16th Cavalzry Regiment, and.

later

underwent

further training at the Hannover Cavalry School in 1925/26

and

at the Berlin War College in 1934/368

Just before World far II broke out, on

15 September 1939, he was transferred

from the Organization Division of Army

General Staff to the 93 Inf Div as

Oper-ations Officer, On . October 1940 he was

assigned. as adjutant to the Chief of Army General Staff end in April 1942

as

appoint-ed Chief of Organization Division of Army

General Staff. In 1944, after two brief

spells in the OKH Officer Reserve and an assignment as Commander of 24th Panzer

Regiment, NI +LER-HIa B I'D was assigned

as Chief of Staff to XJOXVI Panzer Corps in

Ukraine and Poland, remaining in that position until transferred as Chief of Staff to the Third Panzer Army, During the Wear he served.

in France, Italy and on the east front and

was finally captured near Schwerin, Mecklenburg

MS

F

P-059

CONTENTS

Pg

COHN3iNS

ON

G'B.AN

TAX K

LO S

SEiS

y r v a v $ a . t

I

6 RU A o

R

Y

A

K

S MD,,

.V""

₄ 6O' aai 2

Gere.n

Nomenclature and Abbreviations used

in

the Text

3

1,

TYPEiS

AND

AIu

A1:

T

OF ARM'OREDf

V. I

CLi3

s

*

"

*

4

a.,

Types

of' Tank Carriages . , .. . .

4

b*

Tak

f * f .4 " " $ $ a

90 -

. * a . ." " 4

c.,

Assault Guns and

Je.

.panzers (Tank Destroyers).

6

d.,

Antitank Cannon on Self'--Propelled

Mount

, .. *

7

e, Nomenclature of'

Weapons

and Their Abbreviations

,

8

f,

Performaceof

Kw

Kand

Pak~

~

,

9

2;p

TANK

STREiNGTH

aW a

a

"

m

. vs a b r

10

a,

Tank

s , ,. a . a.~ . v .. .r eafvavo . , 10

b,

Assault Guns

and

Jagdpanzers (Tank Destroyers),

10

C,

Pak

on Self- ropelled.

IMounts,

,

10

M4S

#

p-059

Franz EALDEIHR _{Koenigstein/l 7 Nov 1950}

Genobst a )

COMMET~itS

0N GBRA TANK

LOSSES

(Project

~

4'?; MS

#

pO59)

After a thorough study of the subject, the topic leader, former

Genmaj Butrkhart Mueller-Hillebrextd, has succeeded. in answering most of

the uestions in detail,

For question ib, allocation of tanks to theaters of operation,

incomplete data only, covering the years 1940, 1943, 1944 and 1945, could

be obtained, and these do not provide as comprehensive a picture as to the

statistics on strength, production and losses,

As

for the breaking down

of tank losses according to campaign (question 2 b), according to

types of loss (whether permanent or temporary) and according to cause

(question 2 c), it was impossible to procure data useful in the

preparat-ion

of

statistics,

The

topic leader was able) however, to anwer in greater detail the

remaining question pertaining to strength, production and losses, The

replies are given in the form of tables ani. graphic charts (See

appen-dices), They are of great value because of their completeness and the

clearness with which they have been presented and in this respect they are perh-aps unique,

In regard to the text, I am in full accord

with

the author.

(signed) Franz HALDER

MS

j

p-059

PREFATORY

REMARKS

Principal

sources of

information available to

the author were the monthly bulletins

published

by

the German

Army Ordnance

Office under the title,

Suirve

of

Army

armament,

These served as the

offici

al statistical basis for the German Wehrmacht,

In

addition, the original documents of the Inspector

General of the Tank Forces were made available to the

author, and these contained the data for his reports

to the

FuIehrer,

'These

sources

may

be regarded as

reliable.

In addition, Gen d Art a D Leeb, the former

Chief

of the

Army

Ordnance Office, also made a study

MS

#PO59

In conformity with the original manuscript, German nomenclature

and abbreviations have been retained throughout the translation,

In order to facilitate the reading of

this

study

and attached

statistics, the German nomenclature and abbreviations used in the

text have been consolidated on this page,

Flakc

K

Kwk

MG

Pak

Pak/ Sf1

P

z

Bef W

Pz Kpfw

Stu Gesch

Plug

zeuga bwehrkano

ne

Kanone

Kampfwagenkanone

Maschinengewehr

Panzerabwehrkenone

Panzerabwehrkenone auf

Selb

stfahrlafet

te

Penzerbef ehl swagen

Panz

erkampfwagen

Sturmgeschuetz

Stu H

Stu K

Stu Ps

Sturmhaubit ze

St urmka none

Sturmpanzer

Jagdpanzer

H

Jiashorn"

Panzer

antiaircraft gun

cannon

tank gun

machine gun

antitank

gun

antitank gun on

self-propelled

mount

armored command car

tank

assault gun

(self-propell-ed)

assault howitzer

(self-propelled)

assault cannon (self-*

propelled)

assault tank

tank destroyer

MS

#

p-0O59

1,

TYPES AND AR

M

NET

OF

ABMORL)

VEHICLE~S

a,

Types

of Tank

Carriages:

Abbreviation: Panzerkanipfwagen .Ltank/

Pz

Kpfw

Panzer

Beofehl swagen

Larmnored

command

carj:

Pz Bef

W~

Carriages:

I to VI, 35 (t),, 38

(t).

The two latter types were

taken from the Ozechoslovakian Army and were produced

in Ozechoslovakian factories,

b~

Tanks:

Principal Weapon**

Date Indtroduced to

Troop

Units

Pz Kpfw I

Ps

Kpfw II

Pz Kpfw

II (F)

Pz

Kpfw

35

(t)

Ps

Kpfw 38 (t)

Ps

Kpfw III

MG

Kw K 38, 20 mm

Flame thrower

Kw K 37 mm

Kw K

3?

mm

Kw K 3? mm

Kw K 50 mm L 42

Kw K 50 mm L 60

Kw K 75 mm L 24

*

Designation of ti'e

includes

designation of

carriage.

*

Cf

.Sec. e

tror

abbreviations of

weapor

nomenclature.

Type*

use in

if to

already

II 'I if

1940

, Ii Bt i, II if i is if

Jan 1941

Jan 1942

July 1942

Iv#P-05,9

Principal Weapon

Date Introduced to Troop Units

Pz

Kpfw III

(i')

Pz

Kp'lr IV

Pz

Kpf'w V Panther

Pz

Kpfw

VI

Tiger I

Pz Kpf'w VI Tiger

Flak

tank on

carriage

38 (t) and

IV

Pz

:8etf

W

(carriage

I-VT )

Recovery tank (carri-'

a'ge

38 (t),

III, IV,

V)

Flamethro~rer

Kw K

75 mm

L.24

KW K 40, 75 mm

L

43

and. 48

Pak

42,

75

mm

L

70

Kw K

42,

75 mm L 70

Kw K 36, 88

mmL

56

Kw K 43, 88 mm L 71

Flak

20

mm,

20

mm-four-barreled

Flak 37 mm,

30 mm

double-barreled

same as Pz

Kpfw

1-VI

Feb 43

already in use in 1940

April 42

Aug 44

Feb 43

June 42

Niov

43

1Nov

43

Jun 43

*

Also called Komnigtiger

LtRoyal

Tigerf,

MS f p--059

C,

Asault

Guns~ and. JagdpanzersLTank

Destroyers-7

Abbreviations:

Type*

Sturngeschuetz

L;assault

gun7: Stu~ Gesch

Kamrofwagenkexione

tank cannonj:

Kw

K

Sturmhaubitze

Lasseult howitzer

7:Stu

H

Sturmnkanone

.Lassault

cannonf

Stu K

Sturmpanzer Lassault tanskj Stu Pz

Principal

Weapon

Date Introduced to

Troop U~nits

Stu Gesch III

Stu

Gesch IV

Stu H 42 (carriage

III)

Stu Pz (carriage IV)

Jagdpanzer

38***

Jagd~pan~zer IV

Jagdpant her

(carriage V)

£lefhnt (carriage

VI)**

Jagdtiger (carriage

VI)

Kw K 75 mm L 24

Stu K 40, 75 nun L 48

Stui K

40,

75 mm L 48

Stu H 42, 105 mm L 28

Stu H 43, 150 mm L 12

?ack 39, 75 mm L

48

Pack 39, 75 mm L 48

Pack 43/3, 88 mm L 71

Pak 43/2, 88 mm L 71

Pak

80,

128 mm L 55

already

in

use in 1940

Apr 42

Dec 43

Mar 43

Apr

43

Apr

44

Jan 44

Oct 43

Apr 43

Feb 44

Dlesignation of type includes designation of carriages,

Cf.

Sec.

e for abbreviations of wee; on nomenclature,

Also

'called

"Panzerjaeger

38" or "Hetzer".

Also celled "Ferdinand" or

"18.8

$tu Gesch, it,

* ** **4s

MS #

PO'59

d~.

Ant ita k Cannon on Self -Pro elled Mount

Abbreviation:

Panzerabwehrkerione auf Selbstfahrlafette:

Pak/ Sfi

Weapon

Date Introdiuced to Troop

Unit

s

7:05

Pak 40/Sfl II

71b

Pak 4U / Sfl 38

(t)

7,

5

Peik

40/

Sfl

Lorraine**

7,62

Pek/

Sfl II

7,62

Pakf

Sf1

38 (t)

Nashorn/

Sf±

III or IV

Pak

40,

75

rm

Pek

40,

75

mm

Pak 40,. 75

mm

76, 2

mm

Pak

36

or

76,2

mm K (r)***

76,2

mm

Pak 36

or

76,2

mmKIL(r)

88 mm

Pak

43/41,

L

71

from Feb

from Feb

from Apr

from

Apr

from Apr 42

from Feb 42

Designation of type includes designiation of

carriage,

French carriage,

Captured Russian gun.n,

After rebuilding they were called

117.62

Pak

36" : prior rebuilding thaeir designa~tion

was

117;62

K

(r)"r',

Caliber length unknown.

Type*

M4S

#

P-.059

e,

Nomenclature of Weapons anid their

Abbreviations

Abbreviation

Nomenclature (Germani)

Translation (American)

MG'

Kw K

20 mm

3?

mm, etc~

L 42, L60

etc,

Pak

Flak

Stu K

Stu H

Mschinengewehr

Kanipfwagenkanone

Kaliberdurchmesser

in mm

Kal iberlaenge des Rohre

s

Pa c era bwehrkaxsone

Fl ie gerabw eh rkan on e

Stixrikanone

Sturmhaubitze

Machine gun

Tank cannon

Caliber diameter in mm

Length

of

the barrel

Antitank cannon

Antiaircraft gun

Assault cannon

Assault howitzer

A number behind "Kw

K"°

or

"Pak"

designates the type, such as

Kw K 42 or Pak 39, The number, however, does not indicate the year

MS

#

p-059

f. Performance of Kw K and Pak

Cali- Cali

Muzzle

Armor-piercing capacity in mm with armor-piercing

ber

ber

velo-.

shell 39 at an impact angel of 600 and a range of

mm length city

M/sec

100m

50Cm

100Cm

1500m

2000m

250Cm 300Cm

75 48 704 !99 91 82 67 63 75 70 925 138 129 111 99

88

88 56 773 120 110 110 91 84

88

71

1000

.222

185

165

148

132

18

592

228

215 202 190 178 166 155

14S # P#059

2,

TAILK STR1E1GTH

=Apiendix

1 shows tank strength on the following dates:

1 Septeber

1939

1 April 1940

1 September 1940

1

January 1941

After

January,

1941, strength is shown as of the first of every month

up

to

1

February 1945,

Strength in this case indicates the total strength in tanks of all

units

of the

Army

(Field

and Replacement

Army) and the

Waffen-SS

at

repair installations, schools, ordnance depots and the like4

Appendix 1

lists tanks

according to

type, which

the author

has

classified

in

the following

three

groups:

a,

Tanks

b,

Assault guns and Jagdpanzses

tank destroyers-/

c,

Pak on self-propelled mounts,

A tank is characterized by

a

revolving turret; it is the principal

weapon

of the Armored

Command,

In assault guns and

Jagdpaenzer

the gun is not mounted in a turret,

which makes the vehicle lower and less ponderous and saves material and

work hours,

Assault guns and Jagdpenzers

are

principally

'employed

as

1vS #

PO59

infantry stxpprort or antitank weapons in conjunction with other arms

of the service,

The Pak on a self-.propelled mount (Pak/Sfl) is simply

an

antitank

gun mounted on a tank carriage and is

lightly

armored in front and.

on the sides. It is open on top. The Pak/Sfl is an emergency weapon

to compensate temporarily for the lack of production of assault guns

and Jagdpanzers.

Obsolete tank models, which _{can no longer be employed at the front,}

are specifically designated as such in Appendix 1.

They were normally used in the Replacement Army; by occupation

troops and in the protection of troops against partisans, The carriages

of some of these tanks which had not been removed comletely from Army

inventories were rebuilt sa PekfSf1 or Jagdpanzers.

It has not been possible, in Appendix 1, to break down the vehicles

according

to theater or according to Field. and Replacement Army,

It was possible to give a limited breekdown according to theater but

only for certain key-dates,

a.

In the Western Camaign of &ay 1940 the'following tanks participated as part of the Field. Army (The figure in brackets denotes

the strength, but only after 1 April

1940,

The

Western; Campaign

(second column) began on 10

May

1940)

Pz,

Kpfw.

1 523 (1062)

II 955 (1079)

" " III

349

(329)*

* The figure for ?z,Xpfw III participating in the

Western

Campaign, which

exceeds the strength as of 1 April, is explained by the fact that vehicles

of this type rolling off production lines in April were delivered to the

KS

#

p-059

Pz

Kpfw

IV

278

(280)

a

"a

35 t

106

(143).

11 "

38 t

228

(238)

Pz

Bef W

Larmoaconmand

car

135(2)

Total

2574

(.3379

)

b,

The following tanks were

employed

on the

Eastern

Front

on

4

M

1943

by the field forces, inclusive of the Wfaffen-SS. (The

figuires in brackets denote strength of the respective types as of

1

Mae~

1943)

:

Pz IKpfw

III

507

(1465)

f

IV

541

(1077)

Ha

r

VI

72

(165)

In repair installations

Total:o

162

(230

NIote:

The difference between the figures in the second column and

those in brackets is accounted for by

distribution

over the remaining

theaters, the Replacement Army, tank repair installations. in the Zone

of Interior and the ordnance depots,

c,

The Ps

fw II

VI and assault guns employed on the

Eastern Front on

10

June 1943 by the field

forces,

inclusive of the

Waffen-SS

amounted

to the following:

MS

#

p059

(The figure in brackets denotes total Army strength

as

of 1 June 1943),;

Ready for employment 2569

In repair installations 463

Total 3032 (5416)

Notes The difference between the figure and that in -brackets was

distributed as set forth under b, above,

d, A breakdown covering much the same period and several

theaters is possible for the beginning of 1944. (Figures denoting

total Army strength are added in brackets)

Pz Kpfw III (ready for action)

Pz

Kpfw IV ( ready for action) Pz Kpfw V (ready for act ion)

Pz

Kpfw

VI (ready for

action)

Pz Bef W (ready for

action) Assault guns Italy 1 Feb 106 171 8 6

141

West 29 Feb 99 58? 290 63 194 Last 23 Feb 44 ZI

Repair

Total

29

Feb 44

450 405 128 78 655

:1

171

Strength

I1

Mar44

(

888)

1163 I(1824)

418

(1339)

149'

(504)

6 (466)

506

(~no

Total (ready for action) 432 1233 1519

In repair installJationsf 49 1534 1232

- ---

-I-~-

--- -

'

r - - -"- 1 - - --~- - I - -r

c---

--

---

MS

#

p-059

The difference in number of vehicles, i.e. the difference between 8031 and 5999 (2032 vehicles) applies to vehicles in use by occupation

troops in N5orway and in the Balkans, including Crete and Rhodes, newly

activated units in the Zone of Interior, ordnance depots and. the Replace-ment Army.

e, The following survey shows the reinforcements, according

to month and type of tank, assigned to the tank forces in the

'West

dur-ing the six months preceddur-ing the Allied invasion. The percentage of allover tank strength represented by each month's reinforcement, is

indicated by figures in brackets.

Date Pz III

j

Pz

IV

Pz

V Pz VI Stu Gesch Total

(%)

1%)

(

Jgdpz

(%)

(%)

31 Dec 43 145

(16)

316 (19) 157 (14)j 38 (10) 223 (10) 879 (14) 31 Jan 44 98 (11) 410 (24) 180 (15)' 64 (15) 171 (7)

1

923 (14) 29 Feb 44 99 (11) 587 (32) 290 (22) 63 (12) 194 (6) 1210 (16) 31

Mar

44 99 (12) 52? (25) 323 (20) 45 (9) 211 (7) 11205

(15)

30 Apr

44

114 (14)

674

(32)

514 (31)'101

(18)

219 (7)

1622

(19)

10 Jun 44 39 (5) 748 (32) 663 (35) 102 (16) 310 (8) 1862 (20)

MiS

; P059-1.

IT.

Pz

Kpf'w

and

Stu Gesch with the field forces on the

eastern Front as of' 5 Januar 1945:

Stu Ge sch

?z units; brigades

Pz

Jaeger

companies

0)) ro y4E (q } {

Total

F..stern

Front

Strength

(according to

Appendix

1)

Pz

Kpfw

IV

Pz

Bef

W,

Flakpz

Stu Gesch

Jagdp z

596

670

26

641

1933

902

949

902

949

596

670

26

2492

3784

(2259)

(1982)

(428)

(576)

( 6167)

(11412)

*Already

included in the figures directly above.

0)

_{Stu Gesch Brigades ~[Sturmgeschxetz Brigaden}

_-Assault

_{gun brigades}

_/

are

GHC,

troops for the reinf'orcement of' infaentry divisions,

0))

Pz

_{Jaeger companies are component parts of' infantry divisions,,}

N~oce:

The great Russian offensive, which extended over the entire

Eastern Front began on 15 January 1945,

-15

us

#

P-059

g,

Tank strength

at

the

Wetern

Front on 5 February 1945:

Strength

Readyr for

ion

act-

Strength

(accord-ing

to Appendix 1)

Pz

Kpfw

III

and IV

110

68

(2810)

if

n

V

219

.96

(1964)

if "r

VI

61

26

(

404)

Pz~efW

299)

Flak

tanks

(228)

Total number

vehicles

390

190

(5705)

Stu

Gesch

anid

Jagclpz

IV

892

533

(6054)

Assault tank

32

15

( 188)

Jagdpz V

66

43

( 208)

Jagdpz VI

28

I21

(

51))

Total number of Jagdpz and

1018

.612

(6501)

Stu Ge sch

1Nashorn

(?ako/SfJ.

with 88

mm

12

8

(

141)

cannon)

Total number of Pz Kpfw,

MS

#

P-059

3. TANK LOSSES AND I fLACBMirT

a, In principle the repairing of tanks was carried out as close

to the

front

as possible,

The

repair

services

accompanied

the

troops

to

the

combat area, as far as enem~y fire permitted..

TLhe

motor officers of the tank battalions accompanied the repair services to the combat area and directed their employment there. In this manner these officers were able personally to survey losses and damages.

Daiaged tanks which could not be repaired with the means available

to the field forces were collected by recovery vehicles and turned

over to the repair companies of the tank regiments or to other repair

services. In the evening, battalions or regiments were informed as

to the number of tanks ready for action, the number in need of minor repairs, the number in need of major repairs and total losses. These

figures were reported through command channels (adjutant to Ia branch at divisional headquarters and from there to Is. branch at corps head-quarters, etc.), as well as through traffic control channels (regimental

motor officer to divisional motor officer). This short standardized report was transmitted by telephone or radio, and from division to higher echelons usually by teletype.

These

daily reports were supplemented by a monthly report through

traffic control channels in which the daily reports were compiled

and, if necessary, corrected and completed by means of accurate and detailed accounts covering damages and causes. These reports were

MS

+

p-O59

at the Army High Command, who in turn, submitted them to interested

agencies in the Army High Command for further evaluation~

b0 Total losses are compiled in Appendix 2 and are broken down by month and according to tank types beginning with

May

1941,

These losses comprise all losses at the front,. regardless of

whether they occurred in combat through enemy action, were occasioned

by vehicles, falling into enemy hands in damaged or undamaged condit

ion or were the result of "canibalization". of damaged vehicles to

make others fully serviceable,*

Temporary

losses (damages) are not considered in Appendix 2.

During the latter part of, the War, 95 percent of damages were

repaired by the field forces, and at least 95 percent of these within

the tank regiment, while only about 5 percent of the damages were

repaired in repair shops in the Zone of the Interior,. In this

connect-ion see also the following;

Performance

of the Tank Re air

Services

aa

At

the front, ie, the' tank repair shop companies of the

regiments, armies and army groups, exclusive of repair services in companies, etc~:

Reductions in number because of sales to foreign countries, transfers to agencies outside the Wehrmacht and total loss in the Replacement Army have not been considered. These are so small, however, that they would not have affected the statistics to an appreciable extent,

MS

P -059

*1P

Month

Pz

II-VI

Stu Gesch

Pak/ Sfl

Total

Motors

Oct 43

973

652

.200

1825

143

Nov

911

698

195

1804

216

Dec

1294

873

224

2391

2831

Jan

*44

2190

1111

938

4239

228

Total

10259

bb.

Zone of the Interior:

Oct 43

62

22

45

129

1Nov.

90

19

36

145

Dec

57

41

30

128

Jan 44

71

91

39

201

Total

603

C.

It was

impossible

to prepare

a breakdown of losses

according to cause.

d~.

Estimation

of tank losses and replacement

Up

to the beginning of the 1941

Rissian

campaign,

the course of

the War was rather abnormal on

the

German side because

consumption

of materie1 occurred almost

exclusively

during the short

periods

the campaigns (Poland~, Norway, France, Yugoslavia/Greece) lasted.

This

made it. possible, in spite of low -production, to increase the stocks of

war materiel whichi were very

limited

at

the

beginninz

of the

War

during

v S

#

p-059

the long intervals between the campaigns, so that, in the summer

of 1941, sufficient forces were at hand for the difficult task ahead.,

For production data see Appendix 3,

In spite of very low production of Pz Xpfw and Stu Gesch, it had

been possible to increase the number of tank divisions from ten to

twenty during the period oaf twelve months

between

the end of the

French campaign and the beginning of the Russian campaign, Some

of the tank divisions, however, had only two battalions instead of

the customary four, Su.bseqyuently, they were to have been brought up

to full strength,

Aside from 4200 Pz Kpfw, at the beginning of the Russian campaign

there

was

as a result of this situation, practically no reserve avail.,

able. Monthly production amounted to only 260 Pz Kpfw, but it was

increasing, The Army High Command viewed this development with great

concern but had been unable to step up production, N~evertheless, the

Army High Command believed that it could risk being aole to meet

re-quirements for the campaign against Russia. It hoped to be able to

replenish losses from current production, especially since it erroneously

believed that operations on a large scale were impossible in Russia

during

the

winter.

Approximately 3800 Pz Kpfw were expected to roll off production

lines from the beginning of the camipaign, in June, 1940, to the end of

Mays, 1942, i.e. prior to the beginning of furtner large operations in

that year,

At first actual production came up to expectations, Losses during

~jS P

p-059

the summer of 1941,1900 tanks up to the end of October, were high but could have been met by current production without difficulty

if two unexpected events had not complicated the situation:

a.

The _{fighting continued unabated during the winter}

months,

b, The superiority in armament of the Russian T 34 tanks, which appeared in ever-increasing numbers, neutralized the lightly

armed

German

tank models on the battleield, with the result that the latter had to be withdrawn and replaced by new models equipped

with better cannon, (Of. Appendix 1),

In

preparation of the big summer offensive. of

1942,

in which the

majority of our tank units was to participate, tanks were withdrawn from battle _{in spite of the fact that doing so involved great risks.} Thiese were completely re-equipped so that approximately 2500 Pz Kpfw

could be conmmitted in this operation alone.

From the beginning of the campaign of 1941 up to the start of the summer offensive on 1 July 1942, approximate losses of 3850 Pz Kpfww

were offset by the production of 4100 tanks. However, an additional

number of over 1000 tanks must be added to the losses, since these tanks were no longer fit for service at the front,

The Stu Gesch and the PakfSf1 have so far not been taken into consideration. _{The Stu Geech was at that time a comparatively new} weapon, still in _{the development stage, and had to undergo extensive} tests at the front. Its production surpassed losses to a considerable

IVS

f

p-059

-2

campaign increased to 780 by 1 July

1942.

These

weapons

did not

increase

the fighting power of the tank divisions, but that of the

infantry divisions.

D~endices 5 and 6 show comparative production

and loss figures,

The Pak/

Sf1

was introduced in the spring of 1942

to fill

the production in the Armored

Command.

This was a, temporary

emergency solution, designed to increase antitank fighting power at

the front. If these vehicles are included in the estimate, a more

favorable picture develops,

as

shown by the following statistics:

remd

for

action

1

Jul 41

lD

ec

4l

lkiar42

1

Jul42

1 Jan43

Pz Kpfw

4278.

4084

2468

3471

4364

Stu Gesch

416

598

625

780

1155

Pakf Sf1

--

306

1124

Total

4694

4682

3093

4557

6643

The heavy destruaction of tank forces

a new phase,9

Here, as

well

as

during the

losses increased immensely.

From

January

to the followings

at Stalingrad introduced

ensuing retrograde.

battles,

to

April 1943 they amounted

2945

Pz

Kpfw,

461 Stu Gesch,

426 Pak/

Sfl1

-22-MS

#

p-059

The strength of the Pz

Kpfw

ready for action thus again

decreas-ed to 2500 during this period, The fact that, as a result of the

Stalingrad defeat, the initiative had passed to the enemy now also

became evident in the field of materiel, Only by conducting the War

on an economical basis would it have been possible in 1943 to regain

this initiative,*

This,

the German command, however, could not decide

to do,

The Stalingrad mistake was soon followed by another. The

un-successful summer offensive of 1943 at Orel-Kursk (Uitadele'"l),

with the retreats following upon it after July 1943, was again very

costly in tank losses, This is shown in Appendix

2

ahd in the

graphic

chats in bend~es 4 and 5,j

Due to the fact that Hitler continuously ordered activation of

new tank units necessary rehabilitation of units was impeded in spite

of a considerable increase in production, The result was that the

available tanks were distributed over an ever-increasing number of

tank

units, and this consequently affected the fighting power of

these units, It was only in the spring of 1944, that the number of

available tanks again increased appreciably, so that, for exanple, in l4arch, 1944, the tank strength as of January 1943, was again

attained, At the beginning of July, 1944,, the number of available tanks reached its wartime peak with 5800 vehicles,

(Cf.

Appendix 4), However, due to the overtaxing of tank forces which. had occurred earlier,

MS

:

p-059

the increase in materiel was counterbalanced by a decrease in

train-ed personnel, so that the fighting power of these forces was no

longer commensurate with the number of tanks available. A steady increase in losses was the result. The high losses in tanks suffered

during the battles after the invasion of France and during the retreats

in Russia could be met to a certain extent by increased production;

as illustrated by A endice - 3 and the graphic chart in Appendix 7.

Developments in the field of assault guns and Jagdpanzers were more favorable, due to the fact that their requirements in materiel

and'

labor were considerably lower than those for tanks, so that it

was

easier to increase

production,

In conclusion, and judging by the course of events after 144, it may be regarded as an established fact that although tanks were subject

to almost continuous commitment, the strength of the German tank

forces could be maintained at a fixed level by monthly production of

10 15 'percent of its over-all strength, A prerequisite for this, however, is that the tank forces have a repair service at their dis-posal to take care of all

small

and average repairs within the units

themselves. A sufficient supply of snare parts and interchangeable

units must be made available to unit repair installations to insure

Quick repair of damages sustained, Unless repair installations are

able to work efficiently, the number of total losses quickly increases,

e, Tank production was guided through the following channels:

organizational plans, filed a request with the General Army Office

for the further development of the tank arm, For the purpose of

establish-ing a pattern, this request took into consideration a long period of time (several years).

The

General Army Office in turn worked out this reauest in detail

and forwarded it

to the Army Ordnance Office, In case it should be impossible for these three offices of the Army High Command to attain a uniform conception,

the

Commander in

Chief of the Army had to

make

the decision. The Army Ordnance Office integrated the resulting plan into its over-all armament plan, which

had to be approved by the Wehrmacht High Command, Tnereafter the Ordnance Office had to insure that everything proceeded according to

plan±, The industrial output necessary to attain the goal either

already existed or had to be created, During the course of the

War the authority of the agencies involved shifted as a result of

the creation of a Miinistry for

Armaments

and

a.

Office of Chief of Army Equipment, With the dissolution of the post of Commander in

Chief of the

Army

and the assumption of its fuanctions by the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Comu and and Hitler himself - particularly

since Hitler showed increased interest in all questions pertaining to armaments authority shifted more and more to the Fuehrer.

For 1940, prior to the French campaign, the monithly production

quota for tanks

and assault

guns was established at 600; this goal

was to be attained in

1943,

At the beginning of 1940) production

was still considerably below 200, At the beginning of the Russian campaign the figure

wias

300. The increase in tank divisions from ten

25-

u26-to twenty, beginning with the autumn of 1A940, led to a revision

of the monthly production quota of 600 tanks.

The

result was a

demand to raise the monthly production quota of tanks and assault

guns to 1250, This reqies ,in January, 1941, fulfillment of which was dependent on the building of new production centers, was opposed by the Minister of Armaments, Todt, The latter regarded the demands

as exaggerated and impossible to satisfy by German industry, He

obtained an order from the Wehrmacht High Command, Keitel, which

prohibited. an increase over the old quota of 600, For the time being, the Army High Command was' satisfied with this decision and

oelieved that it would be able to conduct the campaign against Russia

without the increase, The considerations which motivated this attitude

have been mentioned above,

In January, 1942, the Chief of the Ordnance Oftice again

presented

the Arnlrls requirements, 1250 tanks and assault guns per month, to

the Minister of Armaments. In the meantime, however, there had been high losses in tanks in the past during the winter, further activation

of tank divisions had been ordered by Hitler, activation of tank units

tor the SS had started and the demands for assault guns

had

increased

by leaps and bounds. The inister of Armaments presented the

recuire-ments to Hitler, who failed to make a decision, since he was for the

moment favorably impressed by events at the front and relied upon the effect of the more efficient antitank guns whose employment wa s imminent,

This made him doubt the future of the tank forces,

In response to renewed pressure by the Chief of the Ordnance

MS + P059

Office

von Speer, Minister of Armaments, in July 1942, Hitler

finally was compelled to make a decision, He now exceeded the

origin-el. demand. made by the Army and ordered a monthly production of 1450

tanks and assault guns, The steps which were immediately taken

to increase production and to fill the new quota began to show re-sults in the spring of 1943, as shown in the

graphic

charts in

A joences 5 and 60

In order to meet the reauested increases in production it was

necessary to coordinate production of a great many factories of

various kinds, especially as a large number of plants shared in

the production of the following parts: Tank hulls.

Tracks

and bogie wheels.

Motors,

Gears,

Turrets,

Armament.

Optical

instruments,

Ammunition,

etc,

In addition, frequent changes in tank types, armament, etc,,

which occurre.during the War, had to be considered, It was the mission

of the Ordnance Office and, later, the Ministry of Armaments constantly to coordinate production orders and the capacity of the manufacturing

plants by allocating manpower, etc, The fact

that

tnis was to a

great extent achieved in the face of great difficulties and in spite

-27-1s

P-059

of the air war is shown in A nni

n

h

rpi

hrsi

Arnendi es

5 and 6_,

The air

attacks

were successfully minimized

by

transferring

proOduction centers to areas in less danger and particularly by

de-centralising

prodtuction,

It was not until the end of 1944

that

the air war affected production.

so severely that there was a

cow~

siderable

drop in production,

*) a csaul t guns and Tank

destroyirs readfo

1)

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Tank Destroyers

front

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