PART 1
MOUNTAIN OPERATIONS
ARMY FIELD MANUAL
VOLUME 2 - OPERATIONS IN SPECIFIC
ENVIRONMENTS
1996
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PART 1
MOUNTAIN OPERATIONS
PART A COMBINED ARMS OPERATIONS
PART B SKILLS, DRILLS AND MINOR TACTICS PART C MOUNTAIN SAFETY, SUPERVISION
AND BASIC TECHNIQUES
"Of all wars, none is more difficult, none requires more resort to strategems, and is at the same time more dangerous, than a war in mountains where there are high passes and deep val-leys, with difficult paths, ravines, terrifying precipices, and a thousand other obstacles, which furnish an infinity of strata-gems and resources. It is in these sorts of situations that a great captain can put to use all that is greatest and worthiest of his address and knowledge in the science of war. It is in these sorts of countries that nicely judged strokes are delivered, but for that one needs to be alert to seize the opportunity."
From Jean Charles de Folard. Traité de l'ordre profond, in Bibliothéque Historique et Militaire,
PREFACE Background
1. Mountainous terrain is relevant to all the publications which cover operations in
special environments. It is thus appropriate to have the first Part of this Volume of the Manual covering operations in such terrain.
2. Mountainous terrain is defined as country higher than 600 metres, characterised
by steep slopes and deep valleys; it includes the villages and plains between mountain ridges, plateaux, passes and the mountain sides themselves. Such country can be found all over Europe from Scotland to Scandinavia and from Spain to Turkey, indeed all over the world, in Africa, Asia, Australia and the Ameri-cas.
3. None of the more specialist climbing techniques adopted by the Royal Marines,
Special Air Service troops or Airborne Pathfinders when deployed in mountain areas are covered in this publication.
Aim
4. The purpose of this publication is to describe the effect that mountainous terrain
will have on the conduct of operations and to introduce commanders and staff officers to the different tactics and procedures involved in these operations.
5. The essential doctrine and principles for military operations do not change
be-cause of the altered terrain conditions and thus this publication complements AFM Vol I Part 1 Formation Tactics. It also records those tactical factors that need greater emphasis where mountain conditions affect operations.
Scope
6. Mountain Operations is split into four Parts.
a. Part A deals with Combined Arms Operations, the purpose of which is to
provide a guide for use by commanders, staff officers and regimental plan-ners in units and at formation level when operating in mountain conditions. It describes the effects that this environment will have on combat operations, the functions in combat, the employment of particular weapon systems and the tactics used by the combat arms.
b. Part B deals with aspects that concern the individual, how he survives, lives
and operates in these regions and is designed for the young officer and NCO as a basis further instruction. It provides some tactical features about movement of troops, the use of animals and some basic tactical features about operating in such conditions at Section and Platoon level. Part B concludes with some details about the extra individual and collective training needed for mountain operations.
c. Part C deals with mountain safety, supervision and basic climbing techniques. The purpose is to describe the minimum safety required, the supervision of military mountaineering and elementary techniques which will enable sol-diers to appreciate the limit of what can be attempted by those who do not have rock climbing experience. This publication will ensure that these skills are not forgotten by an Army that does not, by tradition, have designated mountain troops with specialist training.
d. Part D is a historical supplement which gives an insight into how soldiers
have operated in the mountains during previous campaigns.
7. Nuclear and biological weapons have not been used in these environmental
con-ditions; and although chemical weapons have been used in Northern Iraq during the 1980s, the general prospect for their use in the future is considered to be remote. Nevertheless, this assessment may change, given the growing prolifera-tion of nuclear weapons systems and the scope for rapidly producing biological and chemical agents. Many nations already have the ability to produce chemical and biological agents and it would be wrong to discount the possible use of these weapons, or to overlook the accumulated knowledge gained about their effects on combat operations in these conditions. These points are emphasised at greater length in Chapter 5 of Part A.
8. The implications surrounding the use of technology which became more
appar-ent in the Gulf War of 1991 have not been properly evaluated for use in mountain conditions at formation and unit level. While there are obvious advantages to be gained from the coordinated use of such devices as Remote Ground Sensors (RGS), Thermal Imagery (TI) and Night Vision Goggles (NVG), the tactical impli-cations for these devices have not been tested in battle conditions; neither have the logistic burdens of additional equipment resupply and maintenance. More significantly, the use of attack helicopters and the greater use of support helicop-ters in mountain terrain has not been properly assessed. These could have a significant effect on the tactics employed by a commander and may well speed up the overall tempo of operations. When more information has been gained, amend-ments and additions to this publication can be made. Until then, any initial deduc-tion that can be made is that these weapons platforms and equipment will need to be tested properly in a mountain environment during any period of acclimatization and training for troops, which could lengthen the overall time it takes to reach combat readiness for such operations.
MOUNTAIN OPERATIONS
ARMY FIELD MANUAL VOLUME 2
PART 1
MOUNTAIN OPERATIONS
PART A COMBINED ARMS OPERATIONS
CONTENTS CHAPTER 1 - THE ENVIRONMENT
Section 1 - Defining Mountainous Regions 1-1 Section 2 - Climatic Conditions 1-2 Section 3 - Terrain 1-2
Annex A. Mountainous Areas of the World 1-A-1
CHAPTER 2 - OPERATIONAL FACTORS IN MOUNTAIN OPERATIONS
Section 1 - The Potential Threat 2-1 Section 2 - Joint and Combined Operations 2-2 Section 3 - Command, Control and Communications 2-3 Section 4 - The Conduct of Operations 2-4 Section 5 - The Functions in Combat 2-7
CHAPTER 3 - TACTICAL FACTORS IN MOUNTAIN OPERATIONS
Section 1 - Common Features 3-1 Section 2 - Tactical Movement 3-4 Section 3 - Security on the Move 3-7 Section 4 - Reconnaissance 3-9 Section 5 - Offensive Operations 3-13 Section 6 - Defensive Operations 3-20
Section 7 - Delay Operations 3-34
Section 8 - Transitional Operations 3-41
Section 9 - Operations in High Altitude Glacial Regions 3-46
Annex A - Picketing in Mountain Areas 3-A-1
CHAPTER 4 - COMBINED ARMS ACTIVITY
Section 1 - General Considerations 4-1
Section 2 - Armour (Including Armoured Reconnaissance) 4-1
Section 3 - Artillery (Including Air Defence Artillery) 4-3
Section 4 - Engineers 4-7
Section 5 - Signals 4-11
Section 6 - Infantry 4-12
Section 7 - Aviation 4-14
Annex A. Helicopter Data. Range and Payloads 4-A-1
CHAPTER 5 - NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Section 1 - Introduction 5-1
Section 2 - The Effects of Nuclear Weapons in a Mountain Environment 5-1
Section 3 - Tactical Considerations in a Nuclear Environment 5-2
Section 4 - The Effects of Biological Agents in a Mountain Environment 5-3
Section 5 - The Effects of Chemical Agents in a Mountain Environment 5-3
Section 6 - Tactical Considerations in a Chemical Environment 5-4
CHAPTER 6 - COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT (CSS)
Section 1 - Basic CSS Considerations 6-1
Annex A. Suggested Battalion Echelon System for Mountain Operations 6-A-1
Annex B. Key Combat Service Support Factors in Mountain Operations 6-B-1
CHAPTER 1 THE ENVIRONMENT
SECTION 1. DEFINING MOUNTAINOUS REGIONS General
1. Success for mountain operations is usually achieved by the forces that gain con-trol of vital ground, such ridge features, valley outlets, mountain passes, defiles and routes. Some of these features will have a natural canalizing effect on move-ment and can often be controlled by forces placed on dominating heights around them. The battle for these positions will, therefore, generally be the governing factor in mountain operations. Accordingly, they will be likely objectives in an attack and will be the key terrain on which the defence will be based. Owing to the restricted mobility of ground vehicles, the use of helicopters for tactical mobility, reconnaissance, resupply and casualty evacuation can be of decisive importance, although even these resources have some limitations.
2. Knowledge of the more specialized tactics and skills required for operations un-der the conditions imposed by mountainous terrain is essential to the successful conduct of operations.
Definition
3. For the purposes of this Manual, mountainous terrain is formally defined as; coun-try at an altitude higher than 600 metres which is characterized by steep slopes and deep valleys and includes villages and plateaux between mountain ridges together with passes running through them and the mountain sides themselves. Such terrain is found in every continent.
4. Mountainous terrain can be divided into the following categories:
a. Temperate Wet. Comparatively low level hilly country which is liable to be covered with snow in winter, such as the Lake District, Harz Mountains and parts of Scotland.
b. Cold. Mountains high enough or far enough North to have their summits
permanently covered in snow. The Alps, Norwegian mountain ranges, part of Eastern Turkey and the Balkans are examples of this category.
c. Hot Barren. Rocky, arid ridges and peaks often rising to considerable heights but located in a hot climate and therefore free of snow. The Radfan, Muscat, Morocco and parts of Greece are typical examples of this category.
d. Jungle. Mountainous country covered with tropical jungle such as Malaysia, Borneo and northern parts of South America.
5. Troops can normally operate in such types of mountainous terrain without special training in mountaineering techniques, although in cold mountains, or temperate wet mountains in winter, a proportion of special mountaineer troops and some ski trained troops are desirable to improve mobility.
6. There are also areas such as most of Central Asia and parts of Kenya which, although at considerable altitude, are flat or sufficiently undulating to permit the full use of mechanized forces. As these areas are not characterized by steep slopes and deep valleys, they are outside the scope of the definition of mountain-ous terrain and are not considered further in this manual. However, if planning or conducting operations in such areas, the effects of altitude on men, machines and materiel covered in this manual could be relevant.
7. The mountainous areas of the world are shown diagrammatically at Annex A to this Chapter.
SECTION 2. CLIMATIC CONDITIONS
8. Mountain weather is frequently unpredictable and unstable, with gentle breezes becoming hurricane force winds in minutes. Changeability is such that in one place in quick succession there may be hot sun and cool shade, chill wind or calm, thick fog or clear visibility, storms of rain or snow, followed perhaps by hot sun again in a single day.
9. Weather can determine the success of failure of a mission. Fog or low cloud can provide valuable concealment for movement, but it can also interfere with air sup-port. Alternative plans have to be prepared and every effort must be made to forecast the weather accurately. Advice should be sought from army sources and any meteorological services available whenever possible. Routine area forecasts could be helpful but may be optimistic if produced primarily for lowlands. For example, clearance of bad weather may be delayed for several hours or fog may persist in the mountains long after sunshine has returned to the valley.
10. Unpredictable weather conditions in mountainous regions indicate that it would be prudent for staff officers and commanders to take advice on the prevailing and predicted weather conditions before and during any period of operations.
SECTION 3. TERRAIN General
11. Characteristics. The major characteristics of all mountainous terrain include:
a. The geographical size of mountain areas is often immense and underesti-mated. In larger mountain ranges, possession of the heights may not nec-essarily influence movement in the valleys.
b. Sharp differences in elevation may provide excellent observation or, con-versely may totally mask large areas of ground.
c. The structure of the terrain will normally follow a distinctive grain with the track network tending to follow the drainage pattern.
d. Valleys frequently twist and turn extensively, becoming narrower and more closely overlooked as they penetrate more deeply into the mountains. e. Deep swift-running rivers and streams can create instant obstacles,
particu-larly after rain or during a thaw. Flash floods may appear many miles down stream from where rain has fallen.
f. Road and rail networks are limited and tend to follow the valleys. The tactical importance of any flanking mountains will depend on the extent to which these dominate the valley.
g. There are wide variations in the type of ground and, at the higher altitudes, the population is sparse and there is a lack of natural resources, particularly water, even in snow and ice conditions. Built-up areas and communication systems are usually concentrated in the valleys.
12. Cover and Vegetation. The following features usually apply in mountainous
re-gions:
a. Lower Slopes. Every type of vegetation may be encountered on lower slopes, with impenetrable tropical jungle and large areas of forest covering the ground in some parts of the world.
b. Upper Slopes. Higher elevations will frequently consist of exposed rock. The highest mountains will have snow all the year round and there may also be glaciers.
c. Tree Line. The line above which the climate or ground prevents the growth of trees is known as the tree line. Dense scrub may grow well above the tree line. Trees in valleys are taller than those on hill tops; this tends to mask undulations in the ground.
d. Terracing. Where mountains are cultivated, there may be some form of arti-ficial terracing on hillsides. Terracing can also occur naturally and this re-flects different erosions in rock strata.
13. Ground. The following ground limitations may apply to operations in
mountain-ous regions:
a. The absence of adequate roads, railways and airfields may restrict the size of the force that can be supported.
b. The lack of LZs for all types of aircraft and the restrictions of altitude and weather may restrict the use of air support to some extent and limit payload and endurance.
c. The grain of the country frequently makes movement by vehicle or on foot from one valley to the next slow and difficult. This will have a major impact on manoeuvre and mobility as land operations will be forced to utilize the general grain of the mountain region.
d. Roads and tracks are generally narrow steep and winding, with sharp bends and weak bridges which could make them impassable to large military vehi-cles.
e. Terrain frequently restricts mutual support.
f. Lateral communications are fewer than normal. Those available will be im-portant for command and control of land operations.
g. Digging protective positions is often very difficult or impossible without engi-neer assistance.
h. Maps are often indifferent, of small scale or non-existent. Air reconnais-sance including air photography may be the only means of obtaining accu-rate details of the terrain.
i. Radio communications, particularly VHF, can be obscured by terrain.
Glaciers
14. Definition. A glacier is a constantly moving river or mass of ice formed by the
accumulation of ice on high ground. Glaciers are therefore only generally found in mountainous areas where the amount of snow has been enough to create and feed them. There are various types of glacier, the most important of which are: a. Mountain Glaciers. Ice streams that flow from mountain valleys are
com-monly called valley glaciers. The Himalayas, the European Alps and other mountain ranges contain this type of glacier.
b. Ice Sheet or Inland Glacier. These are the largest form of glacier which generally cover vast areas, such as the central plateau of Greenland. c. Scandinavian Glaciers. A rare phenomenon and are classified as between
a mountain glacier and an ice sheet.
15. Glacial Terms. These are certain geographical terms that are applied to glaciers
which are in common usage. These are:
a. Moraines. Glaciers transport, during their movement, enormous quantities of material ranging from fine particles to huge boulders. This finds its way into the mass of the glacier and is called a 'moraine'. Moraines covering the surface of the glacier are termed 'superficial' while those which are engulfed in the moving ice are termed 'englacial'. Another phenomenon is the
exist-ence of terminal moraines. These are highly uneven, broken and rugged, consisting of innumerable intervening features, varying in height from 5 to 25 metres with steep slopes. Terminal moraines are infested with both ap-parent and hidden crevasses running both laterally and longitudinally and deceptive frozen lakes and streams.
b. Crevasses. Large cracks (wide openings) which appear on the surface of the glaciers, with varying lengths, depth and width are called 'crevasses'. At times they are bridged with soft snow and therefore dangerously invisible. In certain areas crevasses have been known to occur in continuous rows. Movement across crevasses demands special techniques in the use of spe-cialised equipment, such as telescopic ladders, ropes, jumars and carabiners. c. Glacial-Fluvial Streams. Streams formed as a result of melting snow and ice which may run on the surface or under the glacier itself are called glacia-fluvial streams. They are more common during the summer. Movement across such streams is difficult and routes along or across such streams have to be reconnoitred and marked.
Avalanches
16. Avalanches are a serious danger in mountains and precautions have to be taken against them. They occur when a mass of snow slides off a mountainside just as it does off the roof of a house during a heavy snowfall or thaw. A mass of snow may be released by the extra weight of a falling cornice or of a skier or person on foot, or sometimes as a result of gunfire, explosions or other loud noises, such as jet aircraft.
17. Avalanches often occur for no apparent reason, through the breaking of the ten-sion within the snow structure, perhaps due to a rise in temperature, or to a com-plicated set of circumstances.
18. The most common altitude for avalanches is between 1,800 and 2,800 metres (6,000 and 9,000 feet). Above 3,000 metres avalanches are comparatively rare because slopes are generally steeper and accumulate little snow; winds are also stronger and snow is quickly dispersed. The most dangerous place for avalanches to form is on a very steep slope (over 35 degrees or 70 per cent). The snow can build up heavily on such inclines and can become a moving avalanche with dev-astating suddenness on an alarming scale often without warning.
19. Avalanches can be artificially induced by fire from artillery, mortar, anti-tank weap-ons or other explosive charges, either to bring down dangerous mass of new snow to make an area safe for friendly troops or to cause enemy casualties. In the former case it is essential that friendly troops and equipment should be well clear as avalanches can build up enormous speed and power and may run out a great deal farther than expected even on flat ground.
20. Although avalanche-craft cannot be summarised in a few lines some hints on dealing with avalanches are at Annex D to Chapter 1 in Part B of this Manual.
1 - A - 1
7200(4500) Andes Aconcagua (Argentina) 6960(22 834)
4800(3000) Rocky Mountains Mt Elbert (USA) 4400(14 433)
3800(2400) Himalaya-Karakoram-Hindu Kush Mt Everest (China/Nepal) 8863(29 078)
3600(2250) Great Dividing Range Kosciusko (Australia) 2230(7 316)
3500(2200) Trans-Antarctic Mts Mt Vinson 5140(16 863)
3000(1900) Brazilian Atlantic Coast Range Pico de Bandeira (Brazil) 2890(9 482)
2900(1800) West Sumatran-Javan Range Kerintji (Indonesia) 3805(12 484)
2650(1650) Aleutian Range Shishaldin (USA) 2861(9 387)
2250(1400) Tien Shan Pik Pobeda (USSR/China) 7439(24 406)
2000(1250) Central New Guinea Range Ngga Pulu or Jayakusumu (Indonesia) 5030(16 503)
2000(1250) Altai Mountains Gora Belukha (USSR) 4505(14 783)
2010(1250) Ural Mountains Gora Narodnaya 1894(6 214)
1930(1200) Kamchatka Mountains Klyuchevskaya Sopka (USSR) 4850(15 910)
1930(1200) Atlas Mountains Jebel Toubkal (Morocco) 4165(13 665)
1610(1000) Verkhoyansk Mountains Gora Mas Khaya (USSR) 2959(9708)
1610(1000) Western Ghats Anai Madi (India) 2694(8 841)
1530(950) Sierra Madre Oriental Citlaltepetl (Mexico) 5610(18 405)
1530(950) Zagros Mountains Zard Kuh (Iran) 4547(14 921)
1530(950) Scandinavian Range Galdhopiggen (Norway) 2469(8 098)
1450(900) Ethiopian Highlands Ras Dashen (Ethiopia) 4620(15 158)
1450(900) Sierra Madre Occidental Nevado de Colima (Mexico) 4265(13 933)
1370(850) Malagasy Range Tsaratanana (Madagascar) 2885(9 465)
1290(800) Drakensberg Thabana Ntlenyana (Lesotho) 3482(11 425)
1290(800) Chersky Range Gora Pobeda (USSR) 3147(10 325)
1200(750) Caucasus Elbrus, West Peak (USSR) 5642(18 510)
1130(700) Alaska Range Mt McKinley, West Peak (USA) 6194(20 320)
1130(700) Assam-Burma Range Hkakabo Razi (Burma) 5881(19 296)
1130(700) Cascade Range Mt Rainier (USA) 4392(14 410)
1130(700) Central Borneo Range Kinabalu (Malaysia) 4101(13 455)
1130(700) Apennines Corno Grande (Italy) 2931(9 617)
1130(700) Appalachians Mt Mitchell (USA) 2037(6 684)
1050(650) Alps Mt Blanc (France) 4807(15 771) Length Km/Miles Name Culminating Peak Height m/ft
ANNEX A TO CHAPTER 1
CHAPTER 2
OPERATIONAL FACTORS IN MOUNTAIN CONDITIONS SECTION 1. THE POTENTIAL THREAT
Background
1. History and experience shows that mountain regions in the past have been crossed and recrossed by armies looking for a decisive military result elsewhere to end the campaign. In more recent times mountainous regions have generally formed a geographical barrier between two or more states, and it is this that tends to indicate that mountain regions may well be the first areas where combat starts in any new campaign. Mountain regions have also generally been the last areas where resistance continues against any invader although these forms of opera-tions have often degenerated into insurgency and banditry, particularly when it was impossible to defeat the invader in open battle.
2. The vast scales and remoteness involved in the world's mountain regions pre-cludes a precise definition of any generic enemy. However, some outline defini-tion is necessary as an essential background against which our own operadefini-tional planning and tactical procedures can be set and from which training programmes can subsequently be derived.
3. Over the last 50 years the main threat for British troops was from the Soviet Union and its ability to strike into the mountainous areas of North Norway or Eastern Turkey. Since 1989 this threat has virtually disappeared, but it is entirely feasible to note that this large and potentially serious threat has been replaced by a more aggressive form of nationalism or self determination based on other cultural val-ues and that fresh tensions could appear almost anywhere in the world including mountainous regions. Requests for assistance to the UN or NATO by beleaguered nation states in vulnerable areas could result in some form of military deployment. New technology and scientific improvement has also improved the living condi-tions to such an extent that it is now possible to take refuge and operate in and from mountain regions on a near permanent basis. This form of activity has al-ready occurred in Northern Iraq and Eastern Turkey.
Planning Assumptions
4. Overt armed aggression by the regular forces of one or more nations against another in one of the many mountainous regions of the world is the most likely potential threat that could develop. This aggression could take many forms, but at worst, it could be an all out war in which these geographically hostile regions are used as the battleground for obtaining a decisive result. It is this assumption that forms the backdrop to the subsequent Chapters of this Manual.
Enemy Characteristics
5. The various locations of the world's mountainous regions do not preclude a po-tential enemy in the region from having large and generally well equipped armed forces, but more significantly, having access to modern weapons systems and military resources. It would thus be wise to assume that any future enemy is likely to be adequately trained and equipped and could sustain land and air operations in these regions for long periods, although this is more likely to be light mobile forces rather than armour heavy troops.
6. Beyond this general categorisation, it is well known that resistance fighters, gue-rillas, and insurgents have used mountain terrain to build their organisation and harass the state or occupation forces. These actions could take place within a given theatre of operations for general war. The Balkans are good examples of this type of activity during the Second World War. This Manual covers those mili-tary operations conducted in mountains in the course of a general war. Other types of military operation which are intended to counter guerilla or insurgent activities are covered in AFM Counter Insurgency Operations.
Enemy Aims
7. It should be assumed that an enemy has gained the ability and experience to fight in mountainous regions. Similarly, it has to be assumed that the enemy has the ability to conduct operations on a larger and more coordinated scale at up to formation level, and that he would aim to dominate and control areas and to de-feat an adversary as quickly as possible while relying on a firm base in mountain areas to sustain operations.
8. An enemy could also take advantage of the same operational principles that we adopt and would, no doubt, utilise the same sort of military resources to a similar level of sophistication. However, the constraints and limitations that affect fighting in mountain regions will apply equally to the enemy and this, if used to advantage, could contribute to his defeat if the operational initiative can be obtained.
SECTION 2. JOINT AND COMBINED OPERATIONS Background
9. Following a government policy statement to deploy a force for operations in moun-tainous areas, decisions would be taken within the MOD on the type and size of force to be sent and on its subsequent deployment. These are beyond the scope of this Manual.
10. It is unlikely that British forces will operate alone in any future operations in such an environment; the prospect of operating in conjunction with a multinational Alli-ance, or Coalition is much more likely. AJP1(A) and ADP Vol 1 Operations all provide further details on joint and allied cooperation.
Coalitions/Alliances
11. Whether any military grouping would come under UN, NATO, Commonwealth or Coalition auspices remains to be seen, but whatever the circumstances, there would need to be integrated command and control arrangements.
12. It is also likely that the British Authorities would nominate a self contained forma-tion for commitment to such operaforma-tions, although it is perfectly feasible to nomi-nate only a formation headquarters, or even individual trained staff officers, ob-servers and specialist to assist other nations or governments.
13. Whatever the British contribution, an awareness of the main characteristics of working within a group of other military partners is important. These are set out in Chapter 6 of ADP Operations and will require careful study.
Joint/Combined Operations
14. Any British force committed to operations in a mountainous region will invariably be joint at the appropriate level of command and will be working to a single joint force commander.
15. In the absence of Alliance (eg: NATO) procedures being used in the operational area then UK Joint Operating Procedures should be utilised until other operating arrangements are agreed.
SECTION 3. COMMAND, CONTROL AND COMMUNICATIONS Command
16. An army trained and equipped for operations in temperate climates requires both specialist training and additional equipment for deployment to a mountainous re-gion. This essential prior preparation may engender apprehension and uncer-tainty amongst soldiers who have never experienced these conditions and envi-ronment and could place additional pressures on commanders at all levels. 17. The use of mission command and main effort1 will be just as important as tools of
command in mountainous conditions as elsewhere. The commander who re-stricts flexibility by issuing over-detailed orders is likely to restrain his subordi-nates from using their initiative and may miss the opportunities that changes in the general situation and the weather might present. By designating a main effort a commander will be indicating where his priorities lie, thus allowing subordinates to act in accordance with the mission and in the absence of new orders.2
1. See AFM Formation Tactics, for details of 'main effort'.
2. Note that main effort is not merely the tool of operational commanders. In mountain operations, particularly where resources are limited and lines of communication restricted, the use of main effort in Combat Service Support planning will also be crucial.
18. The military emphasis in mountains is likely to be on smaller unit operations and therefore much responsibility should be devolved upon junior commanders. Op-erations may be conducted over extended distances and under difficult communi-cation conditions. There will be a danger that units may be cut off in these situa-tions. A rigid style of command will not thrive in such an environment and subor-dinates should be encouraged to act in the absence of orders.
Command and Control (C2)
19. Organisation. The organisation of C2 in mountain operations will depend upon
the type of operation envisaged and the extent to which local conditions affect normal procedures. Limited mobility will be one of the main problems and it may be necessary to reduce the size of headquarters in order that they can maintain the appropriate mobility.
20. Relationships. The command and control relationships between units and
for-mations do not change in cold weather operations. The states of command and Fire Support Control terms are described in Chapter 2 of Formation Tactics. Con-trol of operations, conCon-trol of fire, airspace conCon-trol and conCon-trol of the EM spectrum all conform with normal operational conditions.
Communications
21. Priorities. Good communications will be vital if the effects of dispersion and lack
of mobility are to be minimised. To compound the problem, mountain regions are subject to severe magnetic storms and ionospheric disturbances which will make HF communications less easy to maintain than in more temperate regions. 22. Effect of the Cold. Unusual atmospheric conditions can be noted in mountain
regions; these can produce sporadic static, which is most severe in the High Fre-quency (HF) waveband between 3 and 30 MHz. Magnetic storms, particularly when combined with ionospheric disturbance, may result in communications black-outs lasting several hours. More normally it should be possible to operate by voice on HF, at least during daylight hours. Skywave should be considered for longer ranges. VHF is reliable under most conditions, although some areas pose significant screening and reflection problems which will affect ground nets and ground to air VHF/UHF communications. The handling and maintenance of com-munications equipment poses special difficulties in mountainous conditions, in particular, battery life is seriously reduced when low temperatures are experi-enced.
SECTION 4. THE CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS Concepts
23. This Manual deals primarily with how to operate in mountain conditions wherever they may occur. The land areas are normally vast and generally inhabited by very few people. As with other military operations there is clear advantage in capturing
or holding areas of vital ground , such as passes over mountains, high ground or bridges where movement is canalised.
24. There is, however, every reason to prevent the enemy from making use of the terrain features and weather conditions to sustain his operations; this can be achieved by seeking to dominate and control critical terrain and the airspace above it in such a way that the enemy cannot operate there without disruption to his plans.
25. When this is achieved the ground can be utilised to canalise or restrict enemy movement which then can lead to more aggressive activity to destroy the enemy's will and capability to fight.
26. For a commander the first operational task could be to regain the tactical initiative from the enemy by establishing control and domination over the designated area of operations prior to making any further plans to defeat the enemy. Once this has been established operations on a larger and more coordinated scale can then begin.
27. Experience from history and previous campaigns in mountainous terrain indicates that, at an operational level, the use of bold thrusts that move directly to areas of vital interest while making use of deception to mask the obvious moves of re-serves could provide the basis for military success. The terrain, weather condi-tions and seasonal changes could have an overwhelming effect on the chances of success or failure and certainly alter the pace and tempo of operations. A com-mander who ignores the opportunities afforded by the terrain and changes in weather conditions will not succeed.
28. Similarly a commander will need to arrange his forces in such a manner to make best use of the resources available. The grouping and regrouping of forces to take account of the task in hand will offer the greater potential for success. The acquisition of the attack helicopter and the combat groupings that can be gener-ated from this weapons platform have to be exploited to the fullest extent.
29. There will undoubtedly be constraints and limitations that affect a commander's ability to conduct operations in mountainous regions but these do not alter the approach to operations described in Chapter 2 of ADP Vol 1 Operations and in more detail in AFM Formation Tactics.
Attacking an Enemy's Cohesion
30. In the mountains attacking and fragmenting an enemy's cohesion and rendering his resistance ineffective is deemed to be potentially more rewarding than other tactics, at least initially.
31. Breaking cohesion can be achieved in many ways and a commander will need to be flexible in utilising any number of factors to tighten the noose until it becomes a stranglehold. The main techniques that can be applied are:
a. Firepower. The selective application of firepower to attack vital bases, com-munication sites, command posts and logistic installations are probably those targets which have the greatest worth in mountainous terrain.
b. Tempo. The rate of activity in relation to the enemy is the key factor. The mountainous terrain will inevitably slow the pace of battle for all sides in comparison with operations elsewhere, but if a commander can make deci-sions quickly and control the pace of operations at a faster rate than the enemy he will quickly gain the operational initiative.
c. Simultaneous Operations. In conjunction with tempo this technique seeks to overload the enemy commander so much that he is forced to divert time and resources away from his main operational aims.
d. Surprise. There are many possibilities for achieving surprise both in timing and location and these should be applied at every suitable opportunity across all levels of command.
Command and Control at Operational Level
32. The principles of command and control of operations are described fully in ADP Vol 2 Command and are not repeated here. However, a salient feature of cam-paigning in the mountains is that of overall planning at the highest appropriate level followed by decentralised execution; scarce military resources can then be utilised in the most effective manner. More details are given in paras 39 to 42.
Communications and Liaison
33. Radio communication is usually the only means of direct contact between a com-mander and his different formations and units. It may well be advantageous to establish a forward or advance headquarters at a suitable location which moves as operations develop. Redundancy and replication of communications should be considered where appropriate to improve direct contact with other users. 34. Liaison officers at all levels of command are essential. They should be suitably
chosen and briefed, and capable of moving rapidly around the operational area (probably by helicopter). Given suitable radio links, liaison officers can back up and endorse the commanders's control of operations, as well as confirming any changes in tactical planning, or reporting developments as they occur. This should allow a commander to be at the place of best information during periods of activ-ity.
Combat Identification
35. Positive identification of enemy targets is always difficult but in the mountain and with limited visibility it is even more complicated. The danger of contact between friendly forces is a permanent hazard of operations and a clear definition of bounda-ries, objectives and other ground locations is necessary to reduce the change of this danger.
36. Misunderstandings and accidents cause casualties, prejudice security and lower confidence. SOPs have to contain precise instructions for identification, both on the ground and in the air. Policy for the accurate location and marking of mines and traps should also be clearly defined.
SECTION 5. THE FUNCTIONS IN COMBAT General
37. The principles of war are the basis for the successful employment of military force in combat. The guidance of these broad principles is translated into operational concepts which are known as 'functions in combat'. The practical expression of the 'functions in combat' is combat power and physical capabilities. When guided by doctrine and with the human dimension added, the result is 'fighting power' which defines the ability to fight.
38. These 'functions in combat', their validation and their use on the battlefield are covered fully in AFM Formation tactics. Additional factors which apply to a moun-tainous environment are mentioned in subsequent paragraphs.
Command
39. The sheer scale and nature of a mountain environment make the achievement of good and effective command and control (C2) more difficult than elsewhere un-less the aims of any military activity are very simple, clear and direct.
40. Realistic timetables and timings based on sound practical knowledge of moun-tains are the key to successful tactical operations. If in doubt plan for two or three times the time it takes to achieve the task elsewhere, particularly for movement by night.
41. Once operations begin, the problems of command and control in practical terms, devolve down to junior commanders very quickly. Simplicity is thus the key to planning at formation level. A commander should make his operational aim and the method of achieving it very clear - not least because it enhances control. It is important to note that good workable and well rehearsed SOPs (which include drills for lost soldiers as well as communications and medevac procedures) are essential to allow for effective devolution of command and control.
42. However, a large element of initiative and latitude has to be built-in to any plan to allow subordinate commanders the ability to overcome the difficulties, delays and frustrations inherent in any operations in mountainous terrain. The hazards and danger of changing fundamental aspects of an operation in mountain regions cannot be overstated.
Manoeuvre
43. Manoeuvre enables friendly forces to engage and destroy the enemy. This is vital, particularly in the mountains but take a great deal longer to achieve. The use of
engineers to improve mobility, and equally, to prevent the use of critical terrain by the enemy is a battle winning factor for a tactical commander.
44. Sensible planning by formation staffs taking full account of the capabilities of the soldier, his weapons systems and his level of training, will prevent over ambitious assumptions about movement (and hence manoeuvre) in mountain operations. This, combined with an appropriate allocation of weapon systems, will also keep the necessary balance and cohesion in the grouping of forces during moves and also allows for unexpected contacts or delays.
45. In the mountains, mobility which forms a major part in achieving manoeuvrability, is a three dimensional factor of great value. A commander who can make positive use of the ground, the air and suitable terrain to move troops and supplies will gain the tactical advantage that mobility provides. These are:
a. Ground Mobility. The speed of movement will depend entirely on the terrain. Movement up and over challenging geographical features in hot or cold con-ditions is difficult and time consuming. Keeping to known tracks, ridges and higher ground is usually the easiest method of movement, but, correspond-ingly, it may be the most obvious route to an enemy.
b. Helicopter Support. The availability and use of helicopters for observation, reconnaissance, attack, protection and transportation significantly enhances a commanders' ability to monitor and develop military operations in moun-tainous areas. Many of these techniques have been practised elsewhere in other types of terrain and are not new, but in this environment the opportu-nity to profoundly affect the conduct of operations is enormous. Neverthe-less their use in mountainous areas will require special training and the use of particular techniques. The Soviet Army, despite its total control over air space in Afghanistan lost over 330 helicopters to mujahideen air defence weapons of various sorts.
Firepower
46. Mountain conditions by themselves do not reduce the effectiveness of the firepower available to modern armies. However, the problem of observation and accurate target acquisition, particularly in poor visibility, can inhibit the use of longer range weapons and can restrict the advantage of heavier supporting weapons. Despite this, artillery and mortar fire of all types can be particularly effective in halting an enemy's advance or his withdrawal, possibly through narrow and confined valleys. In addition artillery has the capacity to disrupt lines of communication and contrib-ute substantially to both deep and close operations.
47. Manportable rocket launchers, grenade launchers, as well as hand grenades have all provided their worth against armoured vehicles and bunkers under almost any conditions and their usefulness in the restricted battle areas available in mountain operations could be enhanced.
48. Thick snow mitigates the effect of high explosive; snow also readily absorbs shell fragments and the burst radius of bombs, shells and mortars is similarly reduced. Higher rates of ammunition expenditure will probably be required to effect full neutralisation and in some circumstances special care will be needed to protect fuses from the cold and damp conditions.
49. Experience shows that medium calibre mortars provide the most practical form of manportable firepower readily available to troops in all mountain conditions. Wire guided missiles are of less value, particularly if there is lack of visibility and physi-cal obstruction. Remote control devices can be affected by line of sight problems but could still be very effective if well located.
50. The firepower available in attack helicopters can materially assist troops operat-ing in the mountains provided suitable visibility is present.
Protection
51. All round protection, whether on the move or halted, is absolutely essential at all times. In defence the subtle use of any natural features available, such as sloping ground or trees, should be integrated into a defensive position in order to canalise the enemy towards fields of fire covering minefields or booby traps.
52. The relative lack of cover during daylight, from both ground, air and sensor obser-vation, can reduce the opportunity for infiltration, deception and ambush. Strict track discipline and control is necessary to keep enemy observation to the mini-mum compatible with good security.
53. Cover from view is not necessarily cover from fire and careful training on the need for the proper depth of protection against small arms, rocket fire and artillery is essential.
Information and Intelligence
54. General. As in every other theatre of war, a major difficulty faced by the
com-mander will be the problems encountered by his G2 staff in providing him with accurate and timely intelligence. In mountain operations these difficulties will be exacerbated and whilst the intelligence cycle (see JSP 120 Manual of Service Intelligence for further details) remains unaltered by external influences, the col-lection of information and intelligence and its subsequent dissemination will be made infinitely more difficult by the restrictions imposed by the inhospitable na-ture of mountainous terrain and by the enemy's ability to employ the extremes of the mountain environment to mask his intentions.
55. Direction. In defining his Critical Information Requirements (CIRs), the
com-mander must consider the effects of any mountainous terrain on his own and the enemy's operations. The Battlefield Area Evaluation (BAE) carried out in the course of his Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) will therefore be of particular importance in its consideration of routes, going and the effect of inadequate
map-ping. Particular requirements for information on the enemy (activities and inten-tions) will be expressed as part of his Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIRs), which will provide G2 with direction and will be used to formulate the Intelligence Requirements (IR) which make up the G2 Collection Plan.
56. Collection. The Collection Plan is the means through which the Reconnaissance,
Intelligence, Surveillance and Target Acquisition (RISTA) assets required to meet the commander's PIRs are tasked by the G2 staff. Depending on the content of the PIRs, appropriate assets may be found within the formation or the tasking may have to be passed to RISTA assets belonging to, or capable of being tasked by, a higher formation.
57. Processing. Apart from the physiological effects of altitude on the G2 staff, the
processing stage of the intelligence cycle will be little affected by a mountain en-vironment.
58. Dissemination. The effects of the mountain environment on communications
(described in paragraphs 21 and 22 of this Chapter), and of the difficulty of physi-cal movement caused by the terrain, will have a corresponding impact on the dissemination of intelligence. Allowance has to be made for the fact that intelli-gence (together with plans and orders) may take longer to reach its intended recipient and decision and planning times may have to be adjusted accordingly. Novel methods for the dissemination of intelligence may have to be devised and adopted and at the planning state of mountain operations a requirement for the capability to transmit imagery and mapping electronically should be considered. 59. The Area of Intelligence Responsibility. The Area of Intelligence
Responsibil-ity (AIR) of a tactical commander is likely to cover a large geographical area and adequate information and intelligence may be difficult to acquire. HUMINT from refugees, local inhabitants and PWs is likely to be sparse and, apart from any organic manned reconnaissance, the commander will have to rely to a consider-able extent on IMINT and SIGINT from higher formations to meet his information and intelligence requirements.
60. Operational Intelligence. Intelligence at the operational level is outside the scope
of this publication (for further details refer to AFM Vol 1 Part 1, Formation Tactics and JSP 120). However, due to the relative scarcity of RISTA assets at the tactical level, and the probable large AIRs, units may have to rely on higher formations for a considerable proportion of their information and intelligence. Due to the lack of in-country logistic facilities and the probable reliance on a few vital supply routes, intelligence at the operational level will often concentrate on identifying the en-emy's CSS assets and his Main Supply Routes as pointers to the strengths, loca-tions and intenloca-tions of the combat troops.
61. Information and Intelligence Requirements. At the outset of operations the
scarcity of intelligence at the tactical level will probably dictate that the operations are aimed at acquiring intelligence, rather than the destruction of any enemy forces. The extent of the tactical commander's AIR, and the limitations imposed on his
organic RISTA assets by the mountain environment, may mean that higher forma-tion assets such as Special Forces (SF) patrols and access to strategic sources will be needed to provide information and intelligence otherwise unavailable at the tactical level. The Commander's tactical information and intelligence requirements will include:
a. Terrain. Detailed terrain information which is not available from existing mapping can be obtained by patrol activity or from imagery sources. Where imagery is not available and the areas are outside the range of the com-mander's organic reconnaissance assets, it may be possible to use SF pa-trols controlled at the operational level to obtain information about the terrain in the Area of Operations (AO).
b. Enemy Strengths, Identification, Locations and Intentions. Information and intelligence about these aspects of the commander's PIR may be obtained from:
(1) HUMINT obtained from contact with the local population, refugees and PW. However, by virtue of the mountain environment, such contact will be, of necessity, sparse. Operations to acquire HUMINT are well suited to SF where they are available in theatre.
(2) SIGINT, in its various forms, can provide useful information and intelli-gence about the identity, location and equipment of the enemy and may also provide some indication of his intentions. SIGINT is likely to be provided from a higher formation.
(3) IMINT may be restricted both by the terrain and the climatic conditions existing in mountainous terrain. Where available, IMINT can provide information and intelligence about the enemy's location, strength and equipment. IMINT will, except where the formation possesses integral UAV assets, be disseminated from a higher formation.
62. Electronic Warfare (EW). Despite the unpredictable effects of mountainous
ter-rain on the electro-magnetic spectrum, the possession of an EW capability will provide the commander with a wide range of information and intelligence and will also enable him to attack the enemy's Command and Control (C2) systems. Al-though ground based EW equipment can provide a more effective long term ca-pability than airborne assets, the difficulties of deploying it, relatively close to its target in mountainous terrain, may well outweigh any advantage this confers. 63. Surveillance. There is a wide range of equipment which is available to units and
formations to improve their surveillance capability; Global Positioning System (GPS) as a navigation aid, Thermal Imagery (TI) Image Intensification (II) devices for use at night or in poor visibility, Laser Range Finder (LRF) and improved commu-nication systems. While much of this equipment has not, so far, been used opera-tionally in a mountain environment, it has the potential to bring a considerable improvement in surveillance capability to this type of operation. While surveil-lance and target acquisition are strictly part of any gathering of information and
intelligence function, their more detailed aspects are not covered further in this Chapter. Nevertheless, commanders should note the limitation inherent in the graze angle of any line of sight surveillance equipment in such terrain. Con-versely an overflying sensor (Satellite, RPV, or TAR) will have that much more significance.
Combat Service Support (CSS)
64. The principles of good combat service support pertain equally to mountain opera-tions as to any other operational area, but the nature of the environment and its conditions could impose some severe and real constraint on normal operating procedures and methods of support. ADP-3 Logistics provides a general back-ground on the principles of CSS.
65. It should be normal practice to assume that the enemy could have the ability to cut or disrupt the lines of communication. Alternative means of resupply and casualty evacuation should always be considered and contingency plans prepared for such a situation along with sensible plans for protection, surveillance and effective com-munications links.
66. Planning for CSS is described in the interim volume of the AFM on Combat Serv-ice Support and also in Chapter 2 of Formation Tactics. Those aspects that have particular relevance to mountain operations are reiterated below:
a. CSS Framework. Integrated with operational plans should be a CSS plan
which provides effective CSS activity within a framework of reliable commu-nications and simple staff procedures.
b. Preparation Time. Forward thinking by a commander and staff to allow ad-equate time to assemble sufficient stocks and to cater for the unexpected. c. Opportunity. CSS activity is best achieved out of contact with an enemy and
when this occurs every chance should be taken to resupply, evacuate casu-alties, and to repair equipment. In mountain operations constant awareness of the current situation is the only sure means of anticipating opportunities, or equally important, a change in the weather conditions. An effective CSS framework will also enhance the ability to react quickly to events as they occur.
d. Distance. A careful balance of factors is needed to ensure that CSS units are close enough to sustain operations properly but are at a sufficient dis-tance away to avoid enemy attention. In the circumsdis-tances of mountain operations this balance is probably fundamental to the success of any op-eration and will require constant review by a commander and his G1 and G4 staffs. The factors involved on any CSS decision are likely to be, the value of destruction, the rate of demand, distance and duration coupled with weather and terrain. There is very little room for error and it may be appropriate, despite the additional overheads, to have more forward dumps with fewer stocks in each to offset potential shortages.
e. Logistic Control. Close application to the principles of command is essential to ensure that the logistic disadvantages of fighting in the mountains are overcome. A study of ADP Command and the relevant logistic sections of AFM Formation Tactics is directly applicable to all unit and formation com-manders. A basic requisite of logistic control in these conditions is that of centralised planning at the highest appropriate level followed by a rapid de-centralised execution; in that way the normally scarce resources can be uti-lised in the most efficient manner. Once operations start the problem of communication, liaison and logistic control effectively and rapidly devolve down to subordinate staff and commanders.
f. Protection of Lines of Communication. Protection and security for the lines of communication between bases and forward troop positions is vital for the cohesion of all operations in mountainous terrain.
CHAPTER 3
TACTICAL FACTORS IN MOUNTAIN OPERATIONS SECTION 1. COMMON FEATURES
Background
1. Mountains limit mobility and restrict modern armies from making full use of their sophisticated weapons and equipment. This enables a determined and well trained enemy to have a military effect out of all proportion to his numbers and equip-ment. The Italian campaign of 1943-45, Marshal Tito's guerilla operations in Yu-goslavia during the same period and more recently in Afghanistan, (1979-87) all provide illustrations of how success can be achieved against opponents who are superior in numbers and weaponry.
2. The physical limitations imposed by mountain operations which embrace both
cold and hot climates in all weather conditions, will restrict the mobility of a force. The soldier has to be able to continue to move and fight in these various circum-stances which, particularly when aggravated by the contrasting requirements of daylight and darkness, can considerably reduce their overall effectiveness.
Tactical Factors
3. From earlier Chapters, it is apparent that tactics for operations in mountainous country will be affected by the following important factors:
a. Mobility. Mobility is the basic tactical factor upon which the successful appli-cation of all others depend. It implies the ability of the formation, the unit, or the individual to move anywhere, at any time, with the maximum possible speed, and to be fit to fight efficiently. The natural conditions encountered in mountain operations all militate against mobility, and the successful com-mander will be the one who overcomes these conditions by correct appre-ciation and by foresight in planning. The whole object of organization, equip-ment, training, and CSS will be to produce mobility. In the mountains mobil-ity is an attitude of mind as much as a physical requirement.
b. Concentration of Force. Mountainous terrain makes the ideal concentration of forces difficult to achieve. Foresight in planning and careful stage man-agement will be necessary. Much will depend on the seizure of lateral routes. c. Security. Success will depend on the application of this factor since the degree of mobility and concentration it will be possible to attain will be in proportion to the degree of security enjoyed on the lines of communication and in any administrative areas. The mountains offer ideal conditions for the tactic of infiltration and for raids and ambushes. Security becomes still more important if the area of operations is occupied by a hostile population. Con-versely, the use of such tactics against the enemy lines of communication
could pay handsome dividends. Good security lies in the complete domina-tion of No Man's Land by active and aggressive patrolling and by the proper application of suitable forces to security tasks.
d. Surprise. Owing to limited routes for movement, their obvious nature, and the facilities for observation provided by high ground, major surprise will, in general, be more difficult to obtain than in other forms of operation. Mobility, and in particular the ability to move speedily over ground and by routes that the enemy believes to be impracticable, could overcome these difficulties. The intelligent use by troops of ground, covered approaches, of which there are many, as a means of tactical deception, and of operating by night in fog, or under smoke cover, are all means which will assist in gaining the element of tactical surprise.
e. Fire and Movement. In the mountains the object is always to get above and behind the enemy, to outflank him, to mask his fire, and to press on. Once movement is opposed, effective fire has to be opened. As well as gaining suitable positions to dominate any fire fight, some consideration needs to be given to the limited amount of ammunition that can be moved and carried around the mountains - and hence the ability to dominate by fire could be constrained by the ability to move ammunition rapidly. A thorough under-standing of weapons, rigid fire control, and an eye for mountain country, are essential. It is difficult to overstress the importance of accurate fire or the ability of troops to move by the most difficult routes, and therefore the ones least likely to be opposed. In favourable conditions the use of air or aviation forces to produce fire in direct support will undoubtedly be the most mobile, and perhaps decisive, form of fire power in the hands of a commander. f. NBC Hazard Prediction. Hazard prediction for nuclear, biological and
chemi-cal hazards will be complicated by the nature of mountainous terrain and the local variations of weather patterns generally. Current computer prediction (BRACIS) will only take this into account if local meteorological information is applied.
Deployment Factors
4. The following factors have to be considered during the estimate process:
a. Ground. This is the dominating factor. Mountain regions are seldom well mapped, and even the best of maps amplified by good air photographs can-not be relied on to give a true impression of the ground. Nor is an eye for mountain country developed without training. To fail to carry out personal reconnaissance or to observe the country with a trained eye can only result in troops being asked to achieve the impossible or for opportunities to be missed. Training in correct and rapid estimation of the tactical value of ground must be so thorough that reaction to it is instinctive.
b. Time and Space. Problems of time and space are greatly complicated by the mountains, and the tendency to be over-optimistic has to be resisted. This factor applies particularly to operations by night. It is always wiser to over-insure.
c. Deployment. Deployment for battle, because of the limited number of routes and their restricted nature, is made more difficult by the mountains. Initial errors cannot be easily corrected, and there is no room to execute last minute changes of plan. Proper stage management, and a crystal clear picture of how a commander intends to fight the battle, are thus as important to subor-dinate commanders as well-rehearsed battle drills are for all troops
d. Traffic. In order to ensure each unit and supporting arms arriving punctually as required, routes (including tracks) should be kept clear of non-essential traffic and any natural blocks such as snow. Major consideration must be given to the order of march and traffic control.
Communications
5. General. The mountains and the effects of the weather make setting up and
maintaining communications more complicated. Personal contact is difficult if vehicles and other means of transport cannot be used or heavy snow, avalanches or mud and rock flows block the available routes. In many cases it is only possible to assemble commanders quickly by using helicopters. Messengers on foot should always be deployed in pairs.
6. Line. It is usually necessary to establish cable links over terrain which is difficult
to pass. Line laying parties will need to be reinforced and transported to the highest point of the route; they can normally operate on foot in valleys. It may be necessary to use pack animals to transport the appropriate equipment. Cable links in the mountains are frequently interrupted by rockfalls, avalanches and the movement of a covering of snow. Where possible fixed communications nets are to be used.
7. Radio. Radio links are indispensable in combat but are subject to unusual
oper-ating conditions. The mountains, the terrain covering and changeable weather reduce the range of radio waves. However by reflecting or bending radio waves it is sometimes possible to establish good links between stations in mountain areas. In visual contact from mountain to mountain or from mountain to valley secure radio links can usually be established, even over large distances. A commander should usually be able to select his combat position from where he can expect favourable radiation conditions for operations. However it is not always possible to predict whether a radio link can be established from a particular location, and so the most important links should be tested in advance of actual deployment if the situation allows.
8. Relay Stations Relay stations for links in the command circuit and in the fire
control circuit (fig 1001) are set up as required. Where necessary and possible, relay teams should be transported by helicopter to their deployed locations. If the
relay stations in position are inadequate, every suitably positioned radio station can be ordered to be utilised as a radio repeater. Radio repeaters should also be used to re-establish broken links.
Planning for Operations
9. The planning for offensive or defensive operations in mountainous terrain at the operational level do not differ from planning for operations elsewhere. Chapter 1 of Part D covering German Army operations in the Caucasus mountains illus-trates this point effectively. There are however, many differences to note in plan-ning operations at the tactical level in mountainous terrain. The Sections of this Chapter that follow are all based around a battlegroup and its sub units. Normally the battlegroup would be an infantry heavy organisation, but this need not always be the case. The introduction into service of the attack helicopter could well affect the future tasks and organisation of any unit operating in mountainous areas.
SECTION 2. TACTICAL MOVEMENT General Considerations
10. In mountainous terrain there are several means by which movement of troops can be achieved. In principle units would move:
a. In vehicles (soft skinned or armoured) if the situation, terrain and weather are suitable.
b. On foot if the terrain does not allow for vehicles or if the situation dictates otherwise.
c. On skis if this helps to cross snow covered terrain more quickly and safely than on foot.
d. In support helicopters if long distances, or large differences in altitude or terrain with many obstacles has to be negotiated quickly.
11. If a unit of battlegroup size is moving in a valley it should ensure its own safety by using patrols both in the valley and on adjacent slopes and peaks to 'picket' the high ground. Often it is appropriate to occupy dominating terrain a long way ahead of any main forces. The patrols, where possible, should be transported and landed near their operational area by helicopter. An illustration of this type of movement is given in Fig 3-1.
12. As well as using patrols a major unit and its sub units should protect themselves to the front by using a vanguard, generally at platoon strength. The vanguard should have an FOO and engineers attached.
Figure 3-1. The Covering of Movement
Movement in Vehicles
13. Vehicles need to be suited to the terrain as well as the task allocated for the troops. In mountain terrain for instance a normal travelling speed of 25 mph by day and 20 mph by night often cannot be maintained if:
a. Long gradients are to be negotiated.
b. The road has many sharp bends
c. On-coming traffic means that overtaking is slow or passing places have to be used.
14. On fair weather roads (tracks, paths in woods, paths on alpine meadows) often only sub units can proceed slowly in light vehicles. Particularly difficult or danger-ous paths should be negotiated at walking pace; occasionally the vehicles will have to be guided individually. Poor movement condition on the road, obstacles, landslides, rockfalls, snow avalanches are to be expected on fair weather road surfaces. In order to avoid congestion it is advantageous to travel at large inter-vals.
15. Fuel consumption in mountain areas can be up to 100% higher than on flatter land if many difficult stretches are to be negotiated or poor weather causes more low gear driving.
Movement on Foot
16. A poor network of paths, the threat from the enemy, the effects of the weather and the dangers of the mountain terrain can result in troops moving on foot or on skis long before reaching the objective. In this case a formation or major unit should move, whenever possible, on several different routes. A commander should aim to keep the most important equipment on transport (eg lorries or pack animals) close to those units moving on foot or bringing them up promptly (eg by helicop-ter). This will depend on:
a. How long sub units will be separated from their vehicles
b. When equipment or supplies can be brought up.
17. Reconnaissance teams for the required march routes should have: a. A qualified mountain leader.
b. Engineer representation.
c. An NBC trace unit.