36. Command and Control. In mountainous terrain it is usually difficult to conduct a coordinated battle. Owing to the terrain, engagements tend to be isolated and mutual support cannot always be achieved. Command and control of all available assets can best be exercised if command posts are well forward and able to react quickly. In addition the use of helicopters as airborne command posts give flexibil-ity and good communications if the air and AD threat allow. Boundaries require careful planning. Heights overlooking valleys should be allotted to formations and units over whose area they exert most influence. This is not always easy to decide initially and may require subsequent adjustment.
37. Fire support. The important fire support considerations to note are:
a. Where rates of advance are difficult to predict, fire plans should be on call.
b. The difficulty of resupplying ammunition may restrict fire support.
c. Both tanks and armoured reconnaissance vehicles may be able to provide fire support particularly onto crest lines for which the flat trajectory of their weapons is more suitable than artillery and mortars.
d. If available and when the terrain permits, use should also be made of armed helicopters, naval gunfire support and close air support.
e. If a Forward Air Controller is attached to an assaulting unit, he should be well forward, preferably in an airborne OP.
The Deliberate Attack
38. Frontal attacks in daylight require enormous fire support if they are to succeed against concealed and well constructed defences on dominating ground requiring a long uphill assault, particularly if troops lack the protection provided by APCs.
An attack on the flanks should be considered, but this may require a long ap-proach march and take considerable time unless a heliborne flanking insertion is mounted.
39. Another possibility is a frontal attack at night or in restricted visibility. However this will be dangerous in low cloud if a sudden clearance exposes the assaulting infan-try to enemy fire. Smoke should be available on call even though winds are un-predictable. Advancing at night or in bad visibility must generally be at a slow pace in order to maintain control and to prevent troops becoming spread out in difficult country. Routes should be marked and objectives should be limited. The final stages of an advance should, whenever possible, be along ridges with the aim of assaulting from higher ground. Possibly the best timing is a night approach with a dawn assault.
Terrain Factors
40. The movements of the troops in mountainous terrain can be substantially acceler-ated by the use of support helicopters. In this way:
a. Important sections of terrain can be taken before the enemy.
b. The enemy can be attacked from unexpected directions.
c. Segregated units can be rejoined.
d. Material needed in a particular phase of battle can be brought quickly to combat positions and troops can be relieved of anything they temporarily do not require.
e. Casualties can be rescued and transported quickly to a medical aid post 41. The terrain in the mountains makes the coordination and momentum of any
at-tack more difficult. It is not always possible to control all units and sections by time and space such that they can operate together. It is even more important there-fore to bring combat forces into action at the right place and at the right time.
42. Mountainous terrain with its ridges and crests leading to the objective of the at-tack will dictate that combat troops be organised in depth. This also applies to units of any armoured forces which have to move in narrow valleys and on roads and tracks. Easily walkable slopes, wide mountain ridges, alpine meadows and valley floors on the other hand allow for a wider form of spacing between groups and sub units.
43. Troops should be allocated by virtue of the accessibility of the terrain to their objective. Where this accessibility changes then reorganisations will be neces-sary. Independent action by a sub unit will probably need some form of reinforce-ment from within a battlegroup to allow sufficient support from other Arms to be arranged.
Coordinating Factors
44. Assembly Area. The battlegroup should prepare itself for an attack in a suitable assembly area. In the mountains this can be nearer the enemy than elsewhere, although it should be positioned in such a way that the enemy cannot use indirect fire weapons to harass any concentration of forces. The assembly area would usually lie below the tree line and should allow for good communications and a clear approach to the Line of Departure. Where possible reinforcements should marry up with other forces in the assembly area. The commander would allocate to sub units:
a. A Line of Departure or Points of Departure.
Figure 3-4b. Attack by Reinforced Company on Two Objectives Figure 3-4a. Initial Deployment and Attack on First Object.
Fig 3-4a: INITIAL DEPLOYMENT AND ATTACK ON FIRST OBJECTIVE
Fig 3-4b: ATTACK BY A REINFORCED COMPANY IN PLACES USING 2 OBJECTIVES
b. The objective of the attack c. The route to the objective.
d. Tasks after taking the objective.
45. Timings for Attack. The start of the attack in the mountains can rarely be set at a particular time. Troops which have to approach the enemy from a distance or have to negotiate great altitude differences should approach first. The start of an attack by armoured fighting troops in the valley often depends on the infantry first gaining a particular section of terrain and freeing slopes and peaks from enemy observation for fire.
46. Objectives. The commander usually selects the focus of the attack where sev-eral dominating sections of terrain are to be taken. Often possession of such terrain is the pre-requisite for taking the objective. It may be necessary to move the focus several times in the course of a large scale attack See Fig 4a and 3-4b.
47. Limited Visibility. Limited visibility allows troops to approach an enemy unno-ticed even over relatively smooth covered terrain. In limited visibility the objec-tives of the attack are usually close together. Often the aim of a night attack or an attack in fog or snowstorm is to surprise and destroy the enemy, where in good visibility this would hardly be possible. Attacking in limited visibility in the moun-tains is difficult because:
a. Movements in difficult or climbing terrain are limited.
b. Movements at night, in fog and snow can only proceed slowly.
c. Orientation is difficult.
d. Limited use can be made of transport.
e. Loose stones, scree and dry branches make silent movement in many sec-tions of terrain impossible.
Preparations for a Deliberate Attack
48. In mountain terrain the battlegroup would require more time for the preparation of an attack than in other environments. The commander would first assess the options the terrain offers the enemy for defence, counterattacks and containment.
49. The enemy's aim is normally to take valleys and communication paths including adjacent slopes and peaks. Defence at obstacles and bottlenecks is usually vital for the whole of his position. He also positions his long range flat trajectory weap-ons on slopes and protruding peaks even in difficult mountain terrain, so that he can use flanking fire against attacking forces in the valley and on the counter slope. Where targets are available to his artillery he uses fire often with direct
Figure 3-5. A Company Attack using one Slope of a Valley Feature