Rule 2 Case Digest

Outline: RULE 2 - Cause of Action CIVIL PROCEDURE

CIVIL PROCEDURE

Lesson for August 2, 2014, Saturday

Judge Mike Asuncion

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Felipe Sr. v. Hon. Leuterio, G.R. No. L-4606, May 30, 1952

Cause of Action - the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another - Sec. 2, Rule 2

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Du v. Jayoma, G.R. No. 175042, April 23, 2012

Elements:

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Ma-ao Sugar Central Co. v. Barrios, G.R. No. L-1539, December 3, 1947

Right of Action vs. Cause of Action

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Marquez v. Varela, G.R. No. L-4845, December 24, 1952

Failure to state a cause of action

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Remitere v. Montinola Vda. De Yulo,. G.R. No. L-19751, February 28, 1966

Test of the sufficiency of a cause of action

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Misamis Occidental II Cooperative, Inc. v. David, G.R. No. 129928, August 25, 2005

Splitting a single cause of action

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Quadra v. CA, G.R. No. 147593, July 31, 2006

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Bachrach Motor v. Icarangal, G.R. No. L-45350, May 29, 1939

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City of Bacolod v. San Miguel Brewery, G.R. No. L-25134, October 30, 1969

Joinder and mis-joinder of causes of action

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Ada v. Baylon, G.R. No. 182435, August 13, 2012

G.R. No. L-4606, 30 May 1952

Facts:

A benefit inter-collegiate oratorical contest was held in Naga City. The contestants were eight, among them Nestor Nosce, Emma Imperial, and Luis General, Jr.

There were five judges of the competition, the petitioner Ramon B. Felipe, Sr. being the Chairman.

After the orators had delivered their respective pieces, and after the judges had expressed their votes, the Chairman publicly announced their decision awarding first price to Nestor Nosce, second price to Emma Imperial, third price to Menandro Benavides and fourth place to Luis General, Jr.

Imperial addressed a letter to the Board of Judges protesting the verdict and alleging that one of the Judges had committed a mathematical mistake, resulting in her second place only instead of the first.

Upon refusal of the Board to amend their award, she filed a complaint in the court of first instance.

At the contest the five judges were each furnished a blank form wherein he gave the participants grades according to his estimate of their abilities, giving number 1 to the best, number 2 to the second best etc., down to number 8. Then the grades were added, and the contestant receiving the lowest number got first prize, the next second prize, etc.

The sums for the first four winners were: Nosce 10; Imperial 10; Benevides 17, General 17.

It appearing that Nosce and Imperial had tied for the first place, the Chairman, apparently with the consent of the board, broke the tie awarding first honors to Nosce and second honors to Imperial.

It was discovered later that the form filed by Delfin Rodriguez, one of the Judges, gave Imperial a total score of 94 (4th place) and General a total score of 95 (3rd place).

Imperial asserts that her total should be 95 instead of 94 and therefore should rank 3rd place in Rodriguez' vote. And if she got 3 from Rodriguez, her total vote should have been 9 instead of ten, with the result that she copped first place in the speaking joust.

Rodriguez testified that he made a mistake in adding up Imperial's ratings; that she should have been given a total of 95, or placed no. 3, the same as General; that he was not disposed to break the tie between her and General and insisted that he wanted to give rank 3 to Imperial and rank 3 also to General.

The situation then is this: Days after a contest has been conducted and the winners announced, one of the judges confesses he made a mistake, that the ratings he gave the second place winner should have been such as would entitle her to first place. The other judges refuse to alter their verdict.

Issue:

May the matter be brought to the court to obtain a new award, reversing the decision of the board of judges? No.

Held:

For more than thirty years oratorical tilts have been held periodically by schools and colleges in these islands. Inter-collegiate oratorical competitions are of more recent origin. Members of this court have taken part in them either as contestants in their school days, or as members of the board of judges afterwards. They know some (few) verdicts did not reflect the audience's preference and that errors have sometimes been ascribed to the award of the judges. Yet no party ever presumed to invoke judicial intervention; for it is unwritten law in such contests that the board's decision is final and unappealable.

Incidentally, these school activities have been imported from the United States. We found in American jurisprudence no litigation questioning the determination of the board of judges.

SC observes that in assuming jurisdiction over the matter, the respondent judge reasoned out that where there is a wrong there is a remedy and that courts of first instance are courts of general jurisdiction.

The flaw in his reasoning lies in the assumption that Imperial suffered some wrong at the hands of the board of judges. If at all, there was error on the part of one judge, at most. Error and wrong do not mean the same thing. "Wrong" as used in the aforesaid legal principle is the deprivation or violation of a right. As stated before, a contestant has no right to the prize unless and until he or she is declared winner by the board of referees or judges.

Granting that Imperial suffered some loss or injury, yet in law there are instances of "damnum absque injuria". This is one of them. If fraud or malice had been proven, it would be a different proposition. But then her action should be directed against the individual judge or judges who fraudulently or maliciously injured her. Not against the other judges.

The judiciary has no power to reverse the award of the board of judges of an oratorical contest. For that matter it would not interfere in literary contests, beauty contests and similar competitions.

Cause of Action - the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another - Sec. 2, Rule 2

DU vs. JAYOMA

G.R. No. 175042, 23 April 2012

Facts:

The Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Mabini, Bohol, enacted Municipal Ordinance No. 1, series of 1988, requiring the conduct of a public bidding for the operation of a cockpit in the said municipality every four years.

For the period January 1, 1989 to December 31, 1992, the winning bidder was Engr. Edgardo Carabuena. Due to his failure to comply with the legal requirements for operating a cockpit, the Sangguniang Bayan adopted Resolution authorizing petitioner Danilo Du to continue his cockpit operation until the winning bidder complies with the legal requirements.

Case Digest: RULE 2 – Cause of Action CIVIL PROCEDURE

Upon discovering that petitioner has been operating his cockpit in violation of Municipal Ordinance, the Sangguniang Bayan passed Municipal Resolution suspending petitioner’s cockpit operation.

Pursuant to Municipal Resolution, respondent Venancio R. Jayoma, then Mayor of Mabini, in a letter, ordered petitioner to desist from holding any cockfighting activity.

Petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bohol, a Petition for Prohibition (Special Civil Action) against respondent mayor and nine members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mabini. Petitioner prayed that a preliminary injunction and/or a temporary restraining order be issued to prevent respondents from suspending his cockpit operation. Petitioner claimed that he has a business permit to operate until December 31, 1997; and that the Municipal Resolution was unlawfully issued as it deprived him of due process.

Respondents interposed that under the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991, the power to authorize and license the establishment, operation and maintenance of a cockpit is lodged in the Sangguniang Bayan; that respondent mayor, in ordering the suspension of petitioner’s cockpit operation, was merely exercising his executive power to regulate the establishment of cockpits in the municipality, pursuant to the ordinances and resolutions enacted by the Sangguniang Bayan; and that Municipal Resolution does not need to be approved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan because it is not an ordinance but an expression of sentiments of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mabini.

A Temporary Restraining Order was issued by the RTC enjoining respondents from suspending the cockpit operation of petitioner until further orders from the court.

The Petition for Prohibition was later amended to include damages, which the RTC admitted in an Order.

The CA reversed the Decision of the RTC. According to the CA, petitioner did not acquire a vested right to operate a cockpit in the municipality as he was only granted a temporary privilege by the Sangguniang Bayan. CA denied petitioner’s reconsideration.

Issue:

Whether the CA erred in finding that petitioner is not entitled to damages. No. There was no cause of action.

Held:

The petition lacks merit. A cause of action is defined as "the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another."

Corollarily, the essential elements of a cause of action are: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff; (2) an obligation on the part of the defendant to respect such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of the defendant in violation of the plaintiff’s right with a resulting injury or damage to the plaintiff for which the latter may file an action for the recovery of damages or other appropriate relief. Petitioner has no legal right to operate a cockpit.

In this case, we find that petitioner has no cause of action against the respondents as he has no legal right to operate a cockpit in the municipality. Under Resolution, the Sangguniang Bayan allowed him to continue to operate his cockpit only because the winning bidder for the period January 1, 1989 to December 31, 1992

failed to comply with the legal requirements for operating a cockpit. Clearly, under the said resolution, petitioner’s authority to operate the cockpit would end on December 31, 1992 or upon compliance by the winning bidder with the legal requirements for operating a cockpit, whichever comes first. As we see it, the only reason he was able to continue operating until July 1997 was because the Sangguniang Bayan of Mabini failed to monitor the status of the cockpit in their municipality.

And even if he was able to get a business permit from respondent mayor for the period January 1, 1997 to December 31, 1997, this did not give him a license to operate a cockpit. Under Section 447(a)(3)(v) of the LGC, it is the Sangguniang Bayan which is empowered to "authorize and license the establishment, operation and maintenance of cockpits, and regulate cockfighting and commercial breeding of gamecocks." Considering that no public bidding was conducted for the operation of a cockpit from January 1, 1993 to December 31, 1997, petitioner cannot claim that he was duly authorized by the Sangguniang Bayan to operate his cockpit in the municipality for the period January 1, 1997 to December 31, 1997. Respondent members of the Sangguniang Bayan, therefore, had every reason to suspend the operation of petitioner’s cockpit by enacting Municipal Resolution. As the chief executive of the municipal government, respondent mayor was duty-bound to enforce the suspension of the operation of petitioner’s cockpit pursuant to the said Resolution. License to operate a cockpit is a mere privilege.

In addition, it is well enshrined in our jurisprudence that "a license authorizing the operation and exploitation of a cockpit is not property of which the holder may not be deprived without due process of law, but a mere privilege that may be revoked when public interests so require." Having said that, petitioner’s allegation that he was deprived of due process has no leg to stand on.

Cause of Action - the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another - Sec. 2, Rule 2

Elements:

MA-AO SUGAR CENTRAL CO. vs. BARRIOS

G.R. No. L-1539, 03 December 1947

Facts:

This is a petition for certiorari to set aside the order of the respondent judge denying the motion to dismiss the complaint of the other respondents which seek to recover amounts of money due then from the petitioner before the outbreak of the war, on the ground that the respondent judge acted without or in excess of the court's jurisdiction in rendering said order; and for prohibition to forbid the respondent judge from taking cognizance of the case on the ground that the respondent judge had no jurisdiction to try and decide it.

The ground for the motion to dismiss filed by the petitioner is that the complaint of the respondents does not state

facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, because the plaintiffs have no right to demand the payment of the defendants' alleged debts until after the termination or legal cessation of the moratorium provided No. 32, the pertinent part of which reads as follows:

III. DEBT MORATORIUM

1. Enforcement of payment of all debts and other monetary obligations payable within the Philippines, except debts and other monetary obligations, entered into in any area after declaration by Presidential Proclamation, that such area has been freed from enemy occupation and control, is temporarily suspended pending action by the Commonwealth Government.

Issue:

Whether or not the complaint of the plaintiffs-respondents states no cause of action and the petition for certiorari and prohibition filed in the present case do not entitle the petitioner to said reliefs. Yes!

Held:

It is plain and Supreme Court (SC) is of the opinion that the complaint filed by the plaintiff respondent in the court below does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. A cause of action is an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of the other; and its essential elements are legal right of the plaintiff, correlative obligation of the defendant, and act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right. In the present case the complaint alleges the legal right of the plaintiffs to be paid the amount due them from the defendant, as well as the correlative obligation of the defendant to pay said debts to the plaintiffs when it becomes due and payable; but not the omission on the part of the defendant to pay in violation of the legal rights of the plaintiffs to be paid, because according to the above quoted provision of Executive Order No. 32, said debts are not yet payable or their payment can not be enforced until the legal cessation of the moratorium, which is still in force. As the defendant herein petitioner is not yet in default, plaintiffs have no cause of action against him.

While the debt moratorium is in force the defendant-petitioner has no obligation yet to pay the plaintiffs, and the latter can not file a suit against him in the courts of justice requiring him to recognize his debts to the plaintiffs and to pay them (after the moratorium) not only the amount of the indebtedness, but the legal interest thereon from the filling of the complaint, the attorney's fees of ten per centum of the amounts due, and the costs of the suits. There is no such action to compel a defendant to acknowledge or recognize his debt which is not yet payable, distinct and different from the action for recovery or payment of a debt already due and payable, against the debtor who refuses to pay it. To allow the plaintiffs' action and grant the relief demanded in the complaint, would be to compel the defendant to pay legal interest of the amount claimed from filing of the said complaint, as well as the attorney's fees of 10 per cent of the sum due thereon as stipulated, and the costs of the suit, as if the defendants' obligations to the

plaintiffs were already payable and he had failed or refused to pay them. Why should the defendant be required to bear the expenses incidental to a suit before he has violated the plaintiffs' right? How could plaintiffs assume that the defendant will not pay his debts when they become payable, and for that reason they have filed this action against defendant? Why should not the contrary be presumed, that is, that the debtor will pay his obligation at the proper time, in order to prevent a suit, preserve its credit, and avoid the expenses incident to a suit, and the payment of legal interest on the amount due and attorney's fees?

After stating SC’s opinion that the complaint of the plaintiffs respondents states no cause of action, SC has to hold that the facts stated in the petition for certiorari and prohibition filed in the present case do not entitle the petitioner to said reliefs. It requires no argument to show that the respondent judge had jurisdiction and did not exceed it or act with grave abuse of discretion in denying the petitioner's motion to dismiss, and therefore we have to dismiss the present petition. This Court, in special civil actions of certiorari and prohibition, can only determine the question whether or not the court acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of its discretion in doing the act complained of. SC can not correct errors committed by the lower courts in their judgments, decrees or orders rendered in the exercise of their jurisdiction.

Right of Action vs. Cause of Action

MARQUEZ vs. VARELA

G.R. No. L-4845, December 24, 1952

Facts:

This is an appeal against an order of the Court of First Instance of manila dismissing the complaint as to plaintiff L.G. Marquez.

The pertinent allegations of the complaint are as follows : that plaintiff Gutierrez Lora was authorized by defendants to negotiate the sale of their share or interest in a parcel of land on Plaza Goiti, Manila, and having meet his co-plaintiff L. G. Marquez, a real estate broker, both of them agreed to work together for the sale of defendant's property; that they found a ready, willing, and able buyer, which accepted defendants' price and terms, but that thereafter defendants, without any justifiable reason, refused to carry out the sale and execute the necessary deed therefor; and that as a consequence plaintiffs failed to receive the commission which they were entitled to receive.

The defendants presented a motion to dismiss the complaint as to L. G . Marquez on the ground that he has no cause of action against defendants , and this motion having been granted, plaintiff L. G. Marquez has prosecuted this appeal.

The complaint was dismissed on the alleged ground that it states no cause of action against the defendants.

Case Digest: RULE 2 – Cause of Action CIVIL PROCEDURE

Whether or not the objection to the complaint justified./ Whether or not the complaint of Marquez is properly dismissed. No

Whether or not there is a cause of action in favor of Marquez against the defendants. Yes.

Held:

The term "cause of action" has been held to be synonymous with "right of action" , but in the law of pleading (Code Pleading) one is distinguished from the other in that a right of action is a remedial right belonging to some person, while a cause of action is a formal statement of the operative facts that give rise to such remedial right. The one is a matter of right and depends on the substantive law, while the other is a matter of statement and is governed by the law of procedure. (Phillips, Code

Pleading, section 189, page 170.)

It is not denied that Lora, if he rendered the service alleged in the complaint, would have a right to be paid compensation for the service he rendered jointly with Marquez. He acted as a broker, and a broker is entitled to a commission for his services. (Article 277, Code of Commerce: Henry vs. Velasco, 34 Phil. 587; Perez de Tagle vs. Luzon Surety Co, 38 Off. Gaz. 1213).

There is no prohibition in law against the employment of a companion to look for a buyer; neither is it against public policy. Neither was there even any implied understanding between Lora and the defendants that no part of the compensation to which Lora would be entitled to receive could be paid to any companion or helper of Lora. Marquez's right to compensation can not, therefore, be disputed under the operative facts set forth in the complaint.

There is a primary right in favor of Marquez (to be paid for his services even through Lora only) and a corresponding duty devolving upon the defendants (to pay for said services). Since (as alleged) defendants refuse to comply with their duty, Marquez now is entitled to enforce his legal right by an action in court. The complaint in the case at bar, therefore, contains both the primary right and duty and the delict or wrong combined which constitute the cause of action in the legal sense as used in Code Pleading (Pomeroy, Code Remedies, section 347), and the cause of action is full and complete.

Objection to the complaint, however, is not that Marquez has no right to share in the compensation to be paid Lora, whom defendants had directly engaged, but that Marquez can not join in this action and enforce therein his rights directly against the defendants, evidently because defendants never dealt with Marquez, directly or indirectly, or, in other words, that both Marquez and his services were not known to dismiss show that such in fact was the objection:

This paragraph clearly shows that the authority to sell was only given to plaintiff Z. Gutierrez Lora and not to the other plaintiff L. G. Marquez. Attention is respectfully called to the word "plaintiff" used in said paragraph III and expressed in singular form to the exclusion of the other plaintiff L. G. Marquez. If the plaintiff L. G. Marquez had worked at all for the sale of the property at the instance of an invitation of his co- plaintiff

Z. Gutierrez Lora, we maintain that his action if there is any is against his co-plaintiff and not against the defendants herein.

As far as the defendant are concerned in this case, plaintiff L. G. Marquez is not only a stranger in this case but also unknown to the defendants; and if he had worked at all for the sale of the defendants' share and participation in the parcels of lands referred to in the complaint, the same was made not only at his own look-out, risk and responsibility but also with no authority whatsoever. (Record on Appeal, pages 16, 17)

The principle underlying defendants' objection is one of substantive law, recognized under common law, where no one could sue for a breach of a contract who was not a party thereto, and the action allowed to be brought only in the name of the one holding the legal title. The requirement was based upon the doctrine of privity of contract.

Sec. 234. Plaintiffs in Action ex Contractu. — When an action of contract concerns only the original parties to the instrument, it is not difficult to determine who should be the plaintiff. Obviously the one seeking to enforce it is the real party in interest. At common law no one could sue for the breach of contract who was not a party thereto. Hence an action on contract, whether express or implied, was required to be brought in the name of the one who held the legal interest. This requirement was based upon the doctrine of privity of contract. . . . (Phillips, Code Pleading, page 226.)

Sec. 235. Privity of Contract. — When necessary. — It was a rule of the common law that before one may complain of another for breach of contract, there must be some direct contractual relation, or privity, between them; and this, with only a few exceptions, is a requirement of the law today. . . . (Phillips, code Pleading, page 227.) But we did not import into this jurisdiction the common law procedure. Our original code of civil Procedure (Act 190) was taken mainly from the code of Civil Procedure of California, and this in turn was based upon the Code of Civil procedure of New York adopted in that stated in 1948. Our system of pleading is Code Pleading that system used in the states of the Union that had adopted codes of procedure. The code system of pleading adopted in substance the rules of equity practice as to parties, under which "all persons having an interest in the subject of the action, and in obtaining the relief demanded, may be joined as plaintiffs". (Phillips, Code Pleading, section 251, page 247.) In New York and California interest in the subject matter, or in any relief growing out of the same transaction or series of transactions is sufficient to allow joinder

Under the former Code of civil procedure "every action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest," and "all persons having an interest in the subject of the action and in obtaining the relief demanded shall be joined as plaintiffs, " and " if any person having an interest and in obtaining the relief demanded refuses to join as plaintiff, he may be made a defendant and the fact

of his interest and refusal to join to be stated in the complaint." ( Section 114, Act 190)

The principle underlying the rule is that all persons having a material interest under the substantive law should be made parties, as distinguished from that of the common law which allowed only a two-sided controversy, each party to be opposed to the other. Phillips, Code Pleading, 2d ed. section 228, page 216.)

The above principles have not been changed by the reforms in the rules in 1940 and 1941. The action is still to be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest. Under section 6 of Rule 3, "All persons in whom . . . any right to relief in respect to or arising out of the same transaction . . . is alleged to exist, whether jointly, severally, or in the alternative, may, . . . join as plaintiffs . . . where any question of law or fact common to all such plaintiffs . . . may arise in the action;

Plaintiff Marquez, in the case at bar, clearly falls under the above rule. He is entitled to be paid his commission out of the very contract of agency between Lora and the defendants; Lora and he acted jointly in rendering services to defendants under Lora's contract, and the same questions of law and fact govern their claims. The rules do not require the existence of privity of contract between Marquez and the defendants as required under the common law; all that they demand is that Marquez has a material interest in the subject of the action, the right to share in the broker's commission to be paid Lora under the latter's contract, which right Lora does not deny. This is sufficient to justify the joinder of Marquez as a party plaintiff, even in the absence of privity of contract between him and the defendants.

Failure to state a cause of action

REMITERE vs MONTINOLA VDA. DE YULO

G.R. No. L-19751, February 28, 1966

Facts:

Remitere filed a complaint against the defendants-appellees, Montinola and the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental. A parcel of land was registered in the name of Remedios Montinola Vda. de Yulo, the defendant herein.

Prior to the transfer, the public sale mentioned in this complaint, however, was and still is absolutely a void sale, and certainly did not pass titles and ownership of said lots, starting from its primitive owner, now being represented by the plaintiffs herein, as surviving heirs thereto, until it reaches the possession by the defendant. That by reason of its invalidity, all and every benefits that the transferees, including the defendant herein, had acquired from the parcels of land in question, should be indemnified to the plaintiffs.

The complaint prayed that the defendants be ordered to reconvey the two lots in question to the plaintiffs; that the defendant Register of Deeds be ordered to cancel the certificates of title in the name of the defendant Remedios Montinola Viuda de

Yulo and to issue new ones in the names of the plaintiffs; and that the defendants pay the costs.

The defendants-appellees filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the grounds (1) that the complaint does not state a cause of action, and (2) that even assuming that a cause of action exists, the same has already prescribed.

The lower court dismissed the complaint precisely on the grounds relied upon by the defendants-appellees. Hence this appeal. In this appeal, the plaintiffs-appellants contend that the trial court erred: (1) in declaring that the complaint contains no narration of facts; (2) in holding that complaint states no cause of action; and (3) in holding that the plaintiffs' cause of action, if any, has already prescribed.

Issue:

Whether or not the complaint states no cause of action.

Held:

Yes. The lower court had correctly ruled that the complaint in the present case does not narrate facts that constitute a cause of action.

The lack of a cause of action as a ground for dismissal must appear on the face of the complaint, and to determine whether the complaint states a cause of action only the facts alleged therein, and no other, should be considered. A reading of the complaint in this case will readily impress one that no ultimate facts which may constitute the basis of plaintiffs-appellants rights which had been violated are alleged. Neither are there allegations of ultimate facts showing acts or omissions on the part of the defendants-appellees which constitute a violation of the rights of plaintiffs-appellants. Apparently, the plaintiffs-appellants rely on the allegations of paragraphs 3 and 5 of the complaint for their cause of action. Paragraph 3 states:

3. Upon the demise of Gregorio Remitere on January 1, 1914 the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, in Civil Case No. 1661, Re-Application for Letters of Administration, appointed his wife as administratrix of his estate, among which the two lots in question.

During this period, the provincial sheriff of Negros Occidental, conducted a public auction sale over the said parcels of land, and on the same day, September 23, 1918, he issued thereof a deed of sale in favor of Mariano Yulo of Binalbagan, Negros Occidental, for the total consideration of P20,000.00. . .

The allegations embodied in the above quoted paragraph are mere averments or recitals of facts that do not establish any right or claim on the part of the plaintiffs. The allegations do not state any connection that the plaintiffs have with the deceased Gregorio Remitere, nor do they state what connection or claim the plaintiffs have on the properties left by the deceased Gregorio Remitere. The allegation about the sale at public auction does not state in what way the rights or interests of the plaintiffs had been affected, nay prejudiced, by that sale. Again, paragraph 5 of the complaint states:

Case Digest: RULE 2 – Cause of Action CIVIL PROCEDURE

5. The public sale mentioned in paragraph 3 of this complaint, however, was and still is absolutely a void sale, and certainly did not pass titles and ownership of said lots, starting from its primitive owner, now being represented by the plaintiffs herein, as surviving heirs thereto, until it reaches the possession by the defendants.

That by reason of its invalidity, all and every benefits that the transferees, including the defendant herein, had acquired from the parcels of land in question, should be indemnified to the plaintiffs.

It is not stated anywhere in the complaint why the sale at public auction was absolutely void, nor were there stated any particular facts or circumstances upon which the alleged nullity of the sale or transaction is predicated. The averment that "the public sale . . . was and still is absolutely a void sale, and certainly did not pass titles and ownerships of said lots, starting from its primitive owner, now being represented by the plaintiffs herein, as surviving heirs thereto, until it reaches the possession by the defendants. . ." is a conclusion of law or an inference from facts not stated in the pleading. A pleading should state the ultimate facts essential to the

rights of action or defense asserted, as distinguished from mere conclusion of fact, or conclusion of law. An allegation that a contract is valid, or void, as in the instant case, is a mere conclusion of law.

General allegations that a contract is valid or legal, or is just, fair and reasonable, are mere conclusion of law.

Likewise, allegations that a contract is void, voidable, invalid, illegal, ultra vires, or against public policy, without stating facts showing its invalidity, are mere conclusions of law; as are allegations that a contract is in conformity with, or in violation of a constitutional or statutory provision. . . (71 C.J.S. pp. 44-45.) (Emphasis supplied.) Not being statements of ultimate facts which constitute the basis of a right of the plaintiffs-appellants, nor are they statements of ultimate facts which constitute the wrongful acts or omissions of the defendants-appellees that violated the right of the plaintiffs-appellants the allegations of the complaint in the present case have not fulfilled the requirements of Section 3, Rule 6 of the Revised Rules of Court (Sec. 1, Rule 6 of the former Rules of Court) that the complaint should contain a "concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's cause or causes of action."

This Court has defined the term "cause of action" as follows:

A cause of action has been defined by the Supreme Court as an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of the other; and its essential elements are legal right of the plaintiff, correlative obligations of the defendant, and act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right. (Ma-ao Sugar Central Co., Inc. vs. Barrios, et al., L-1539, Dec. 30, 1947)

The term "ultimate facts" has been defined or explained as follows:

Ultimate facts defined.—The term "ultimate

facts" as used in Sec. 3, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, means the essential facts constituting the plaintiff's cause of action. A fact is essential if it cannot be stricken out without leaving the statement of the cause of action insufficient. . . (Moran, Rules of Court, Vol. I, 1963 ed., p. 213)

Ultimate facts are important and substantial facts which either directly form the basis of the primary right and duty, or which directly make up the wrongful acts or omissions of the defendant. The term does not refer to the details of probative matter or particulars of evidence by which these material elements are to be established. It refers to principal determinate, constitutive facts, upon the existence of which, the entire cause of action rests. (Montemayor vs. Raborar, et al., 53 O.G. No. 19, p. 6596, citing Pomeroy, Code Remedies, 5th Ed., sec. 420).

Test of the sufficiency of a cause of action

MISAMIS OCCIDENTAL II COOPERATIVE, INC. vs DAVID

G.R. No. 129928, August 25, 2005

Facts:

Private respondent David, a supplier of electrical hardware, filed a case for specific performance and damages against MOELCI II, a rural electric cooperative in Misamis Occidental. The said case, which was essentially a collection suit, pending before Judge Felixberto Olalia (hereinafter, Judge Olalia) of the RTC Manila, was predicated on a document and that according to David is the contract pursuant to which he sold to MOELCI II one (1) unit of 10 MVA Transformer.

MOELCI II filed its Answer to Amended Complaint which pleaded, among others, affirmative defenses which also constitute grounds for dismissal of the complaint. These grounds were lack of cause of action, there being allegedly no enforceable contract between David and MOELCI II under the Statute of Frauds pursuant to Section 1 (g) and (i), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, and improper venue.

MOELCI II filed with the trial court a Motion (For

Preliminary Hearing of Affirmative Defenses and Deferment of Pre-Trial Conference)(hereinafter referred to as Motion) arguing that the document attached as Annex "A" to the Amended Complaint was only a quotation letter and not a contract as alleged by David. Thus, it contends that David’s Amended Complaint is dismissible for failure to state a cause of action.

David contended in the main that because a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action is required to be based only on the allegations of the complaint, the "quotation

letter," being merely an attachment to the complaint and not part of its allegations, cannot be inquired into.

MOELCI II filed a rejoinder to the opposition in which it asserted that a complaint cannot be separated from its annexes; hence, the trial court in resolving a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action must consider the complaint’s annexes.

Judge Olalia issued an order denying MOELCI II’s motion for preliminary hearing of affirmative defenses. MOELCI II’s motion for reconsideration of the said order was likewise denied in another order.

MOELCI II elevated this incident to the Court of Appeals by way of a special civil action for certiorari, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of Judge Olalia in the issuance of the two aforesaid orders.

Court of Appeals dismissed MOELCI II’s petition holding that the allegations in David’s complaint constitute a cause of action. With regard to MOELCI II’s contention that David’s Amended

Complaint is dismissible as the document, attached thereto as Annex

"A," upon which David’s claim is based is not a contract of sale but rather a quotation letter, the Court of Appeals ruled that the interpretation of the document requires evidence aliunde which is not allowed in determining whether or not the complaint states a cause of action. The appellate court further declared that when the trial court is confronted with a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of cause of action, it is mandated to confine its examination for the resolution thereof to the allegations of the complaint and is specifically enjoined from receiving evidence for that purpose.

With the denial of its Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner is now before this Court seeking a review of the appellate court’s pronouncements. MOELCI II asserts that the Court of Appeals committed serious error in: (1) ruling that the resolution of its motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of cause of action necessitated hearings by the trial court with the end in view of determining whether or not the document attached as Annex "A" to the Amended Complaint is a contract as alleged in the body of said pleading; and (2) not ordering the trial court to dismiss the Amended

Complaint on the ground of lack of cause of action.Anent the first ground, MOELCI II further claims that with the denial of its Petition, the appellate court in effect exhorted the trial court to defer the resolution of its motion to dismiss until after the hearing of the case on the merits contrary to Rule 16of the Rules of Court and well-settled jurisprudence.

Issue:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari and in holding that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner’s Motion.

Held:

No.

To determine the existence of a cause of action, only the statements in the complaint may be properly considered. It is error for the court to take cognizance of external facts or hold preliminary hearings to determine their existence. If the allegations in a complaint furnish sufficient basis by which the

complaint can be maintained, the same should not be dismissed regardless of the defenses that may be averred by the defendants.

The test of sufficiency of facts alleged in the complaint as constituting a cause of action is whether or not admitting the facts alleged, the court could render a valid verdict in accordance with the prayer of said complaint.

It has been hypothetically admitted that the parties had entered into a contract sale David bound himself to supply MOELCI II (1) unit 10 MVA Power transformer with accessories for a total price of P5,200,000.00 plus 69 KV Line Accessories for a total price of P2,169,500.00; that despite written and verbal demands, MOELCI II has failed to pay the price thereof plus the custom duties and incidental expenses of P272,722.27; and that apart from the previously stated contract of sale, David regularly delivered various electrical hardware to MOELCI II which, despite demands, has an outstanding balance of P281,939.76.

The court believed all the foregoing sufficiently lay out a cause of action. Even extending our scrutiny to Annex "A," which is after all deemed a part of the Amended Complaint, will not result to a change in our conclusion. The interpretation of a document requires introduction of evidence which is precisely disallowed in determining whether or not a complaint states a cause of action. The Court of Appeals therefore correctly dismissed MOELCI II’s petition and upheld the trial court’s ruling.

Splitting a single cause of action

QUADRA vs CA

G.R. No. 147593, July 31, 2006

Facts:

Petitioner Quadra was the Chief Legal Officer of respondent Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) when he organized and actively participated in the activities of Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Employees Association (CUGCO), an organization composed of the rank and file employees of PCSO, and then later, the Association of Sweepstakes Staff Personnel and Supervisors (CUGCO) (ASSPS [CUGCO]).

He was administratively charged before the Civil Service Commission with violation of Civil Service Law and Rules for neglect of duty and misconduct and/or conduct prejudicial to the interest of the service. Civil Service Commission rendered a decision finding petitioner guilty of the charges and recommending the penalty of dismissal. General Manager of PCSO, Ignacio Santos Diaz, sent petitioner a letter of dismissal, in accordance with the decision of the Civil Service Commission.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Civil Service Commission. At the same time, petitioner, together with ASSPS (CUGCO), filed with the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) a complaint for unfair labor practice against respondent PCSO and its officers.

Case Digest: RULE 2 – Cause of Action CIVIL PROCEDURE

CIR issued its decision finding respondent PCSO guilty of unfair labor practice for having committed discrimination against the union and for having dismissed petitioner due to his union activities. It ordered the reinstatement of petitioner to his former position with full backwages and with all the rights and privileges pertaining to said position.

Respondent PCSO complied with the decision of the CIR. But while it reinstated petitioner to his former position and paid his backwages, it also filed with the Supreme Court a petition for review on certiorari entitled "Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office, et al. v. The Association of Sweepstakes Staff Personnel, et al." assailing the decision of the CIR in Case No. 4312-ULP.

During the pendency of the case in the Supreme Court, petitioner filed with the CIR a "Petition for Damages." He prayed for moral and exemplary damages in connection with Case No. 4312-ULP.

Respondent PCSO moved to dismiss the petition for damages on the following grounds: (1) the CIR has no jurisdiction to award moral and exemplary damages; (2) the cause of action is barred by prior judgment, it appearing that two complaints are brought for different parts of a single cause of action; and (3) the petition states no valid cause of action.

Petitioner resigned from PCSO . The petition for damages and the motion to dismiss, however, remained pending with the CIR until it was abolished and the NLRC was created. Labor Arbiter rendered a decision awarding moral and exemplary damages to petitioner . The NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter, prompting respondent PCSO to file a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the NLRC. It held that there was no basis for the grant of moral and exemplary damages to petitioner as his dismissal was not tainted with bad faith. It was the Civil Service Commission that recommended petitioner's dismissal after conducting an investigation. It also held that the petition claiming moral and exemplary damages filed by petitioner after respondent PCSO had complied with the CIR decision of reinstatement and backwages amounted to splitting of cause of action.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals, but the same was denied for lack for merit.

Petitioner now seeks the Court to review the ruling of the Court of Appeals. He argued that:

First: The ruling of the Court of Appeals that the PCSO did not act in bad faith when it dismissed the petitioner is contrary to the already final and executory decision of the CIR finding the PCSO guilty of bad faith and unfair labor practice in dismissing the petitioner. The decision of the CIR was affirmed by the High Court in the case of PCSO. The Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction to amend the final and executory decision of the CIR which was affirmed by the High Court. Once a decision has become final [and] executory, it could no longer be amended or altered.

Second: The ruling of the Court of Appeals that the claims for moral and exemplary damages of the petitioner is allegedly "tantamount to splitting of cause of action under Sec. 4, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure" is contrary to law. When

petitioner filed with the CIR his complaint for illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice, the prevailing law and jurisprudence was that the CIR did not have jurisdiction to grant moral and exemplary damages. Petitioner's claim for moral damages was filed with the CIR in the same case by virtue of the ruling of the High Court in Rheem v. Ferrer, 19 SCRA 130 holding that the CIR has jurisdiction to award moral and exemplary damages arising out of illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner’s contention is correct. (2nd contention)

Held:

Yes. The court ruled that the filing of a petition for damages before the CIR did not constitute splitting of cause of action under the Revised Rules of Court. The Revised Rules of Court prohibits parties from instituting more than one suit for a single cause of action. Splitting a cause of action is the act of dividing a

single cause of action, claim or demand into two or more parts, and bringing suit for one of such parts only, intending to reserve the rest for another separate action. The purpose of the rule is to avoid harassment and vexation to the defendant and avoid multiplicity of suits.

The prevailing rule at the time that the action for unfair labor practice and illegal dismissal was filed and tried before the CIR was that said court had no jurisdiction over claims for damages. Hence, petitioner, at that time, could not raise the issue of damages in the proceedings. However, on January 27, 1967, the Supreme Court rendered its ruling in Rheem of the Philippines, Inc., et al. v.

Ferrer, et al. upholding the jurisdiction of the CIR over claims for

damages incidental to an employee's illegal dismissal. Petitioner properly filed his claim for damages after the declaration by the Court and before the ruling on their case became final. Such filing could not be considered as splitting of cause of action.

Splitting a single cause of action

BACHRACH MOTOR vs ICARANGAL G.R. No. L-45350, May 29, 1939 Facts:

Icarangal with Figueroa executed a promissory note in favor of appellant Bachrach in the amount of P1,614. As a security for its payment, Icarangal executed a real estate mortgage on a parcel of land which was duly registered in the RD in 1931. When the promissors defaulted in the payment of the agreed monthly installments, Bachrach instituted in the CFI an action for collection

of the amount due on the note. Judgement was rendered in favor of

Bachrach, thereafter, a writ of execution was issued and the properties of Icarangal was subsequently levied by the sheriff including the mortgaged property.

Oriental Commercial Co., Inc. (Oriental), the other defendant, interposed a third-party claim, alleging that the mortgaged property had already been acquired by it thru public auction in 1933. By said reason, the sheriff desisted from the sale of the property, and as a consequence, the judgement rendered in favor of Bachrach remained unsatisfied. Bachrach instituted an action to foreclose the

mortgage. The trial court dismissed the complaint, hence, the filing

of the present appeal.

Issue:

Whether or not Bachrach is barred from foreclosing the real estate mortgage after obtaining a personal judgment against Icarangal on the promissory note.

Held:

YES. The rule against splitting a single cause of action is

intended "to prevent repeated litigation between the same parties in regard to the same subject of controversy; to protect defendant from unnecessary vexation; and to avoid the costs and expenses incident to numerous suits." It comes from that old maxim nemo bedet bis vexare pro una et eadem cause (no man shall be twice vexed for one and the same cause). And it developed, certainly not as an original legal right of the defendant, but as an interposition of courts upon principles of public policy to prevent inconvenience and hardship incident to repeated and unnecessary litigations.

For non-payment of a note secured by mortgage, the creditor has a single cause of action against the debtor. This single cause of action consists in the recovery of the credit with execution of the security. In other words, the creditor in his action may make two demands, the payment of the debt and the foreclosure of his mortgage. But both demands arise from the same cause, the non-payment of the debt, and, for that reason, they constitute a single cause of action. Though the debt and the mortgage constitute separate agreements, the latter is subsidiary to the former, and both refer to one and the same obligation. Consequently, there exists only one cause of action for a single breach of that obligation.

Plaintiff, then, by applying the rule above stated, cannot split up his single cause of action by filing a complaint for payment of the debt, and thereafter another complaint for foreclosure of the mortgage. If he does so, the filing of the first complaint will bar the subsequent complaint. By allowing the creditor to file two separate complaints simultaneously or successively, one to recover his credit and another to foreclose his mortgage, we will, in effect, be authorizing him plural redress for a single breach of contract at so much cost to the courts and with so much vexation and oppression to the debtor.

We hold, therefore, that, in the absence of express statutory provisions, a mortgage creditor may institute against the mortgage debtor either a personal action for debt or real action to foreclose the mortgage. In other words, he may pursue either of the two remedies, but not both. By such election, his cause of action can by no means be impaired, for each of the two remedies is complete in itself. Thus, an election to bring personal action will leave open to him all the properties of the debtor for attachment and execution, even including the mortgaged property itself. And, if he waives such

personal action and pursues his remedy against the mortgaged property, an unsatisfied judgment thereon would still give him the right to sue for a deficiency judgment, in which case, all the properties of the defendant, other than the mortgaged property, are again open to him for the satisfaction of the deficiency. In either case, his remedy is complete, his cause of action undiminished, and any advantages attendant to the pursuit of one or the other remedy are purely accidental and are all under his right of election. On the other hand, a rule that would authorize the plaintiff to bring a personal action against the debtor and simultaneously or successively another action against the mortgaged property, would result not only in multiplicity of suits so offensive to justice (Soriano vs. Enriquez, 24 Phil., 584) and obnoxious to law and equity (Osorio vs. San Agustin, 25 Phil., 404), but also in subjecting the defendant to the vexation of being sued in the place of his residence of the plaintiff, and then again in the place where the property lies.

In arriving at the foregoing conclusion, we are not unaware of the rule prevailing in certain States of the American Union, to the effect that, in cases like the one at bar, the creditor can pursue his remedies against the note and against the security concurrently or successively. The reason given for the rule seems to be that the causes of action in the two instances are not the same, one being personal and the other, real. But, as we have heretofore stated, the creditor's cause of action is not only single but indivisible, although the agreements of the parties, evidenced by the note and the deed of mortgage, may give rise to different remedies. (Frost vs. Witter, 132 Cal., 421.) The cause of action should not be confused with the remedy created for its enforcement. And considering, as we have shown, that one of the two remedies available to the creditor is as complete as the other, he cannot be allowed to pursue both in violation of those principles of procedure intended to secure simple, speedy and unexpensive administration of justice.

Judgment is affirmed, with costs against the appellant.

Splitting a single cause of action

CITY OF BACOLOD vs SAN MIGUEL BREWERY

G.R. No. L-25134, October 30, 1969

Facts:

In 1949, the City Council of Bacolod passed Ordinance No. 66, series of 1949, imposing upon any person or corporation engaged in the manufacturing of bottling products such as softdrinks within the jurisdiction of the City of Bacolod, a fee of 1/24 of a centavo for every bottle thereof, plus surcharge of 2% every month, but in no case to exceed 24% for one whole year for the delinquent manufacturer.

In 1959, the ordinance was amended by Ordinance No. 150, series of 1959, by increasing the fee to 1/8 of a centavo for every bottle thereof, or an increased from P0.01 to P0.03 per case of softdrinks. San Miguel Brewery, Inc. (San Miguel) refused to pay the additional fee and challenged the validity of the whole ordinance.

Case Digest: RULE 2 – Cause of Action CIVIL PROCEDURE

In 1960, the City Council sued San Miguel before the CFI for the

payment of the unpaid bottling taxes due with legal interests and for the payment of P0.03 per case bottling tax. San Miguel filed its

answer. The trial court rendered judgement in favor of the appellee. Appellant appealed the said decision to SC where it pressed the question of the invalidity of the above mentioned taxing ordinances. The SC affirmed the CFI decision and upheld the constitutionality of the taxing ordinances. After the finality of the SC decision, the appellee (City Council) moved for the reconsideration thereof, praying that the same be amended so as to include the penalties and surcharges provided for in the ordinances. The said motion was denied, for the reason the “the decision is already final

and may not be amended”. During the execution before the CFI, the

appellee again sought the inclusion of the surcharges referred to, the said motion was denied.

Appellee filed before the CFI a second action/complaint to

collect the said surcharges. Appellant move for the dismissal of the

complaint anchored on two grounds: (1) the cause of action is barred by prior judgment, and (2) a party may not institute more than one suit for a single cause of action. This motion was denied by the trial court, and so the appellant filed its answer. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the appellee. Appellants moved for a reconsideration but it was denied, hence, the instant appeal.

Issue:

Whether or not the actions of the appellee splits up a single cause of action.

Held:

YES. It cannot be denied that appellant's failure to pay the

bottling charges or taxes and the surcharges for delinquency in the payment thereof constitutes but one single cause of action which under the above rule can be the subject of only one complaint, under pain of either of them being barred if not included in the same complaint with the other. The error of appellee springs from a misconception or a vague comprehension of the elements of a cause of action.

The classical definition of a cause of action is that it is "a delict or wrong by which the rights of the plaintiff are violated by the defendant." Its elements may be generally stated to be (1) a right existing in favor of the plaintiff; (2) a corresponding obligation on the part of the defendant to respect such right; and (3) an act or omission of the plaintiff which constitutes a violation of the plaintiff's right which defendant had the duty to respect. For purposes, however, of the rule against splitting up of a cause of action, a clearer understanding can be achieved, if together with these elements, the right to relief is considered.

In the last analysis, a cause of action is basically an act or an omission or several acts or omissions. A single act or omission can be violative of various rights at the same time, as when the act constitutes juridically a violation of several separate and distinct legal obligations. In other words, for a single cause of action or violation of a right, the plaintiff may be entitled to several reliefs. It is the filing of separate complaints for these several reliefs that constitutes splitting up of the cause of action. This is what is prohibited by the rule.

In the case at bar, when appellant failed and refused to pay the difference in bottling charges from July 1, 1959, such act of appellant in violation of the right of appellee to be paid said charges in full under the Ordinance, was one single cause of action, but under the Ordinance, appellee became entitled, as a result of such non-payment, to two reliefs, namely: (1) the recovery of the balance of the basic charges; and (2) the payment of the corresponding surcharges, the latter being merely a consequence of the failure to pay the former. Stated differently, the obligation of appellant to pay the surcharges arose from the violation by said appellant of the same right of appellee from which the obligation to pay the basic charges also arose. Upon these facts, it is obvious that appellee has filed separate complaints for each of two reliefs related to the same single cause of action, thereby splitting up the said cause of action.

The trial court held that inasmuch as there was no demand in the complaint in the first case for the payment of the surcharges, unlike in the case of Collector of Internal Revenue vs. Blas Gutierrez,

et al., G.R. No. L-13819. May 25, 1960, wherein there was such a

demand, there is no bar by prior judgment as to said surcharges, the same not having been "raised as an issue or cause of action in Civil Case No. 5693." This holding is erroneous.

Section 4 of Rule 2, above-quoted, is unmistakably clear as to the effect of the splitting up of a cause of action. It says, "if separate complaints are brought for different parts (reliefs) of a single cause of action, the filing of the first (complaint) may be pleaded in abatement of the others, and a judgment upon the merits in either is available as a bar in the others." In other words,

whenever a plaintiff has filed more than one complaint for the same violation of a right, the filing of the first complaint on any of the reliefs born of the said violation constitutes a bar to any action on any of the other possible reliefs arising from the same violation, whether the first action is still pending, in which event, the defense to the subsequent complaint would be litis pendentia, or it has already been finally terminated, in which case, the defense would be res adjudicata. Indeed, litis pendentia and res adjudicata, on the

one hand, and splitting up a cause of action on the other, are not separate and distinct defenses, since either of the former is by law only the result or effect of the latter, or, better said, the sanction for or behind it.

It thus results that the judgment of the lower court must be, as it is hereby, reversed and the complaint of appellee is

dismissed. No costs.

Joinder and mis-joinder of causes of action

ADA vs BAYLON

G.R. No. 182435, August 13, 2012

Background of the case:

Spouses Florentino and Maximina Baylon died in 1961 and 1974 respectively. Children: Rita, Victoria, Dolores, Panfila, Ramon and Lilia, herein petitioner. Dolores died intestate and without issue in 1976. Victoria died in 1981 and was survived by daughter, Luz, herein petitioner. Ramon died intestate in 1989, and was survived by herein respondent Florante, his child from his first marriage, and

Flora his second wife, and their legitimate children, the other herein petitioners.

Facts:

Petitioners filed with the RTC a complaint for partition, accounting and damages against Florante, Rita and Panfila, alleging therein that Spouses Baylon, during their lifetime, owned 43 parcels of land all situated in Negros Oriental. After the death of Spouses Baylon, they claimed that Rita took possession of the said parcels of land and appropriated for herself the income from the same. Using the income produced by the said parcels of land, Rita allegedly purchased two parcels of land. The petitioners averred that Rita refused to effect a partition of the said parcels of land.

In their Answer, Florante, Rita and Panfila asserted that they and the petitioners co-owned 22 out of the 43 parcels of land mentioned in the latter’s complaint, whereas Rita actually owned parcels of land, 10 out of the 43 parcels which the petitioners sought to partition, while the remaining parcels of land are separately owned by Petra Cafino Adanza, Florante, Meliton Adalia, Consorcia Adanza, Lilia & Santiago Mendez. Further, they claimed that the 2 parcels of land, claimed to be brought from the income produced from the estate of the late spouses, were acquired by Rita using her own money. They denied that Rita appropriated solely for herself the income of the estate of Spouses Baylon, and expressed no objection to the partition of the estate of Spouses Baylon, but only with respect to the co-owned parcels of land.

During the pendency of the case, Rita, through a Deed of Donation, conveyed the 2 above mentioned parcels of land to Florante. On July 16, 2000, Rita died intestate and without any issue. Thereafter, learning of the said donation inter vivos in favor of Florante, the petitioners filed a Supplemental Pleading, praying that the said donation in favor of the respondent be rescinded in

accordance with Article 1381(4) of the Civil Code. They further alleged that Rita was already sick and very weak when the said Deed of Donation was supposedly executed and, thus, could not have validly given her consent thereto.

Florante and Panfila opposed the rescission of the said donation, asserting that Article 1381(4) of the Civil Code applies only when there is already a prior judicial decree on who between the contending parties actually owned the properties under litigation.

RTC Decision:

The RTC held that the death of Rita during the pendency of the case, having died intestate and without any issue, had rendered the issue of ownership insofar as parcels of land which she claims as her own moot since the parties below are the heirs to her estate. Thus, the RTC regarded Rita as the owner of the said 10 parcels of land and, accordingly, directed that the same be partitioned among her heirs. Nevertheless, the RTC rescinded the donation inter

vivos in favor of Florante, holding that the donation inter vivos was

executed to prejudice the plaintiffs’ right to succeed to the estate of Rita in case of death considering that it refers to the parcels of land in litigation.

Florante sought reconsideration insofar as to the rescission of the donation. The trial court denied the motion.

CA Decision:

On appeal, the CA rendered a decision reversing the RTC decision. The CA remanded the case to RTC for the determination of ownership of the said 2 parcels of land. The CA held that before the petitioners may file a rescission, they must first obtain a favorable judicial ruling that the subject 2 parcels of land belonged to the estate of Spouses Baylon and not to Rita. Until then, an action for rescission is premature.

The petitioners moved for the reconsideration, but it was denied, hence, the instant petition.

Issue:

Whether or not an action for partition and rescission may be joined in a single cause of action.

Held:

NO. There was a misjoinder of causes of action. The action

for partition filed by the petitioners could not be joined with the action for the rescission of the said donation inter vivos in favor of Florante. Lest it be overlooked, an action for partition is a special civil action governed by Rule 69 of the Rules of Court while an action for rescission is an ordinary civil action governed by the ordinary rules of civil procedure. The variance in the procedure in the special civil action of partition and in the ordinary civil action of rescission precludes their joinder in one complaint or their being tried in a single proceeding to avoid confusion in determining what rules shall govern the conduct of the proceedings as well as in the determination of the presence of requisite elements of each particular cause of action.

By a joinder of actions, or more properly, a joinder of causes of action is meant the uniting of two or more demands or rights of action in one action, the statement of more than one cause of action in a declaration. It is the union of two or more civil causes of action, each of which could be made the basis of a separate suit, in the same complaint, declaration or petition. A plaintiff may under certain circumstances join several distinct demands, controversies or rights of action in one declaration, complaint or petition.[29]

The objectives of the rule or provision are to avoid a multiplicity of suits where the same parties and subject matter are to be dealt with by effecting in one action a complete determination of all matters in controversy and litigation between the parties involving one subject matter, and to expedite the disposition of litigation at minimum cost. The provision should be construed so as to avoid such multiplicity, where possible, without prejudice to the rights of the litigants.

Nevertheless, while parties to an action may assert in one pleading, in the alternative or otherwise, as many causes of action as they may have against an opposing party, such joinder of causes of action is subject to the condition, inter alia, that the joinder shall not include special civil actions governed by special rules.

Disposition: WHEREFORE, in consideration of the

foregoing disquisitions, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision dated October 26, 2007 issued by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 01746 is MODIFIED in that the Decision dated October 20, 2005 issued by the Regional Trial Court, Tanjay City,