Are Economists Selfish and Rational? And if so, Why?

Universität Bielefeld

Fakultät für Soziologie

Didaktik der Sozialwissenschaften

Working Paper Nr. 4

State of the Art:

Are Economists

Selfish and Rational?

And if so, Why?

Simon Niklas Hellmich

Simon Niklas Hellmich

State of the Art:

Are Economists Selfish and Rational? And if so,

Why?

Some fear that it might undermine social cohesion and the level of cooperativeness in our societies, if school or tertiary education increasingly confronts young people with the homo oeconomicus actor-concept as a basic analytical tool in economics and mod-ern social science in general. This paper discusses survey and experimental evidence that has been collected to examine whether people trained in economics are different with respect to their preferences and behaviour and whether this could be a result of their education. This evidence, as I will argue, is unfortunately inconclusive. Future research could benefit from replacing dichotomic constructions used to describe and interpret empirical findings with more recent actor concepts as suggested in psychol-ogy, economics, and sociology.

Contents

1. Introduction: 'Economic Imperialism' and Social Sciences Education ... 2

2. Why are Economists 'Conservative'?... 5

3. Are Economists Selfish?... 10

4. Conclusion: What we know and don’t know... 20

References ... 25

1. Introduction: 'Economic Imperialism' and Social Sciences Education

Should we “stop teaching economics” because it educates “bad citizens” (Frank et al., 1996) and rests on normative assumptions that are destructive to human society and habitat (Miller, 1993)? And should we resist the increasing use of the homo oeconomicus concept and the related model-building in other social sciences because it will undermine the “public spirit” (Kelman, 1987)? A number of authors from inside and outside of the economics profession warn us that teaching economics potentially creates the type of selfish individual assumed in the theories (Ostrom, 1998), and the necessity, use, and meaning of ethics training in business schools is intensely dis-cussed (Gautschi and Jones, 1998; Carlson and Frances, 1998; Etzioni, 2002).

While the fears are manifest, it is far from proven that economists are indeed somehow 'different' and that something could be done about this by changing teaching practices. This article presents a summary of what we know about the effects studying economics has on the formation of attitudes towards specific institutions and on the preferences that are the background of social behaviour.

Generally, fewer economists than in the past would state that the homo oeconomicus (even its reduced form, assuming bounded rationality) explains all human decisions. Economic modelling has become more flexible over the last two or three decades, in particular by incorporation of more faceted understandings of human preferences and decision making (Colander/Holt/Rossner, 2004). However, even if the profession is replacing the paradigm of non-reflected profit maximisation and atomistic competition by enlightened self-interest and purposeful behaviour, this is subject to more advanced courses and usually not dealt with in undergraduate teaching (Colander, 2007). More-over, the new 'enlightened economic actor' is still not defined precisely enough to chal-lenge the dominance of the homo oeconomicus as a fundamental concept at least in those fields of social science which have only recently become concerned with it. As the demand for generalisable assumptions about human behaviour is rising in other social sciences, the more these are permeated by systematic theory- and model-building, elements of neoclassical thinking are drawn into these disciplines, while they are under challenge in their field of origin. 'Economic imperialism' is a term used to de-scribe the spread and rise to dominance of the neoclassical practices of explanatory

logical concept of the homo oeconomicus) in the social sciences. It meanwhile ranges far beyond its field of origin in micro-economics into the disciplines of political science and macro-sociology and is growing in importance even in cultural sciences and micro-sociology (Lazear, 2000). The boom of public choice-theory in political science is only one vivid example.

The original version of the homo oeconomicus assumption describes human decision making 'as a rule' or ‘in 95 per cent’ of cases to be free of genuine altruism, not bound to any fairness-norms and focused on short-term or lifetime income maximisation. De-cisions are made with full or bounded rationality, as in a one-shot game. Cooperation is possible under conditions of complete contracting only, though some allow the evolu-tion of instituevolu-tions and trust-relaevolu-tions in repeated games. In general, however, free rid-ing and other forms of opportunism are endemic.

There is, on the other hand, little reason to question that institutions of cooperation and altruism play a beneficial if not critical role for sustainable economic development or even the vitality of market exchange itself. Hence, when evaluating teaching practices and curricula in economics and the other social sciences, we should take into account the risks Amitai Etzioni (and others before and after him) warned us about – that eco-nomic action in the form propagated by mainstream ecoeco-nomic theory has the potential to undermine the cultural and institutional preconditions economic exchange and viable market competition depend upon. “[C]ompetition”, he wrote, “is not self-sustaining; its very existence, as well as the scope of transactions organized by it, is dependent to a significant extent upon contextual factors … within which it takes place” (Etzioni, 1988, 199). This position resorts to the concept of performativity which has received signifi-cant attention in recent scholarship (Callon, 1998; MacKenzie et al., 2007). Its basic idea is that economic theory is not to describe economic reality, but rather to inform economic actors about how they should act to maximise their benefit and behave mor-ally correct. Hence, the more the templates provided by economic theory are made use of, the more subsequent economic processes will conform to economic theory. Such processes have already been analysed on commodities markets (Garcia-Parpet, 2007) and financial markets (MacKenzie and Millo, 2003). But the fact that moral sentiments, fairness and reciprocity considerations might play an important role to the specific form, outcome and sustainability of market exchange and the effective conduct of coopera-tive economic behaviour (Gintis et al., 2005) is not always adequately recognized in the normative statements that can be drawn from basic neoclassical economics. They also conflict with recently raised concerns about potential negative effects socioeconomic inequality might have on overall social welfare and the stability and functionality of the very process of resource allocation itself – besides its potential negative implications for the social acceptance of market exchange and private property. In the end, how-ever, resorting to what Albert Hirschman (1986, 109) has called the self-destruction thesis, capitalism itself would make the coordination of economic processes impossi-ble, as it failed to reproduce the moral values and social institutions on which it is founded.

So, does current teaching in economics create a type of human actor who will poten-tially undermine our economic system? Since the early 1970s a number of researchers have devoted attention to the question whether and how training in economics affects

preferences and behaviour. This paper discusses survey and experimental evidence that has been collected with regard to these questions. The organisation of the paper recognises that the discussion actually follows two major threads. One examines

whether people trained in economics are different with respect to their preferences for

institutions (such as the market versus other modes of distribution), the second

exam-ines their behaviour and motives and whether such differences are indeed a result of

their education.

In pursuit of this agenda I will begin (in section two) with a review of a discussion initi-ated by Nobel laureate George Stigler. He argued that training in economics would make students more ‘conservative’ in terms of enforcing their positive assessment of private ownership, market competition, support for efficiency and progress, and a pref-erence for decentralised market allocation (1959, 522). I will, of course, not argue that endorsement of the price-system, for instance, is a reliable indicator for a tendency towards opportunism and corruption of all moral standards. One might have various reasons to endorse institutions associated with ‘conservatism’, but usually they are presented as complementing the homo oeconomicus. This association between mar-kets and self-interested behaviour is understood even by non-economists. There is sufficient evidence that demonstrates that, if a given situation is framed as a market, most people tend to behave more selfishly (Liberman et al. 2004). In market-like con-texts, there is broad acceptance of self-interest, and it may even constitute the social norm to follow (Bicchieri, 2006). Thus, I argue that a preference for markets might be indicative for a preference for selfish behaviour, not necessarily but with some probabil-ity. At it is indicative of a conviction that the homo oeconomicus-actor model is a realis-tic conceptualisation of human behaviour. A positive assessment of private rather than public ownership might be indicative of a persuasion that the principle of liability (asso-ciated with private enterprise), market-competition as a check on private power, and the freedom to maximise individual utility are indeed a necessary, or at least most ef-fective, instrument to minimise moral hazard problems and to motivate humans to en-gage in coordinated activity. It is furthermore indicative of the individual's willingness to occasionally depart from common socially construed fairness-norms. The distribution of scarce or vital goods by the price system, i.e. in accordance with the willingness and ability to pay as an exclusive criterion, does not always go well with common under-standings of fairness. But economists, at least in principle, deem inter-individual utility comparisons unfeasible and inadequate as a measure to control the distribution of goods. Distributional fairness can only be achieved in the pareto-optimum between the self-interest of the supplier and the buyer’s 'willingness to pay', while a socially con-structed norm of distributional fairness is necessarily arbitrary. Such thinking does not deliver much justification for redistributive politics (which is in the American context often associated with the idea of 'progressivism').

The pieces of research I review and discuss in the third section are narrowed down to the question whether economists are different in character, and why. In part, they mir-ror a growing dissatisfaction among economists with their professions' prevalent mode of communication. Some scholars criticise its limited ability to represent other than nar-rowly material considerations as well as the absence of “moral” norms which form the

mists seem to have transformed their stance towards their profession’s traditional mode of reasoning – from praising its prosaic and unemotional objectivity to lamenting its lack of moral categories. In the 1990s, this amounted to what was called a ‘moral trial’ (Lanteri, 2008), as researchers have conducted series of laboratory games, opin-ion surveys, and real world field studies to understand whether and why economists are distinguished from other social groups by a lesser willingness to cooperate, weaker altruistic inclinations, or even outright opportunism. And they searched for the sources of that difference. Many economists argue that ‘‘economists are born, not made’’ (Carter and Irons 1991). According to that so-called ‘‘self-selection hypothesis’’, eco-nomics students choose their major because of some character traits and values they already have prior to their studies, while the educational track has no strong effect (Frey and Meier, 2004).

The last section draws a conclusion and points at some bleak points, hopefully useful as suggestions for further efforts in this line of inquiry.

2. Why are Economists 'Conservative'?

In the 1970s, Stigler’s hypotheses initiated a discussion about the effects that training in economics might have in early adolescence, in school and tertiary education. This early research yielded a number of empirical studies, conducted largely with under-graduate students as subjects, which generally supported Stigler’s position. But while he probably had expected that no less than many years of study would be necessary to generate an effect, the results of these empirical analyses suggest that formal training in economics for a period as short as a single semester or even less might bring young college students' attitudes more in line with the profession’s ‘conservative’ mainstream (Luker, 1972; Luker and Proctor, 1981; Mann and Fusfeld, 1970; Riddle, 1978; Scott and Rothman, 1975; Sosin and McDonnell, 1979; Weidenaar and Dodson, 1972). However, the employment of mostly small local samples in these studies and meas-urement characteristics of the applied attitude measmeas-urement instruments raised ques-tions about the validity of these findings (Walstad and Soper, 1981).

By 1980 more elaborated measurement instruments had been developed (Soper and Walstad, 1983). Jackstadt, Brennan and Thomson (1985) affirmed that introductory

economics survey courses made students more 'conservative' in the way characterised

by Stigler. However, no such effects were detected in more specific introductory

macro-and microeconomics courses. This is consistent with Lucker’s (1972) and Thomson’s (1973) earlier findings that different types of introductory courses have different effects. These studies did not reliably clarify the causes of attitude change. But as changes did not appear in all tested classes and not to the same extent, they seem to result from more complex processes. Jackstadt, Brennan and Thomson (1985, 49) singled out the attitude of instructors as a weaker and some attitudinal bias of the textbooks in use as a stronger possible source of attitude change.

In the 1980s, then recent cognitive-developmental research was taken up that under-scored the importance of adolescence as a period in which fragmentary economic knowledge and attitudes gain consistency and integration (Webley, 2005). McWilliams

and Pinney (1978) and Jackstadt (1981) examined the effects of economics training at the high school level and presented evidence that high school students became more favourable towards the American economic system as a result of this training. Even a single one-semester introductory course in economics seemed to yield significant ef-fects (Jackstadt, 1981; see also Jackstadt et al., 1985). Ingels and O’Brien (1988, 283) used the nationally normed Economic Values Inventory to test 1,457 public school stu-dents in Colorado and Iowa, who were exposed to one term of economic instruction, using the text “Our Economy, How it Works” (Clawson, 1984). The subjects were re-quired to answer 44 measurement-item questions which were combined with eight scales indicating attitudes. Their findings made Ingels and O’Brien conclude that even one single term of economics instruction made ninth grade students more supportive of the American economic system. Common-sense fairness norms seem to have lost relevancy for them, as they became less critical of alienation, workers’ treatment, and the status quo of income distribution. It remained open, however, whether these effects were of long-term durability. The authors, however, came to believe that students were rational and “open enough to be affectively influenced by economics learning” (Ingels and O’Brien 1988, 285). The results Ingels and O’Brien present seem to be unambigu-ous, but it is difficult to infer any general conclusions or policy implications from them. The authors used a specific text and measured its short-term influences. This setting is very different from the multifaceted experiences a student is exposed to in years-long secondary or tertiary education. Therefore, this experiment tells us very little about what a real-life instruction practice in school actually does in terms of forming attitudes. In this respect, the study-design applied by Nijhawan and Ellis is more promising. They used the same measurement instrument as Ingels and O’Brien, but come to very dif-ferent results. Nijhawan and Ellis measured economic attitudes and values of 350 high school seniors who were members of a youth organisation that supports students in preparation for a business career. These students are usually enrolled in business courses that encompass a range of micro- and macroeconomic concepts as identified in the National Economic Standards and include a number of competencies that re-quire an understanding of the market economy and the role of business in it. This group was compared to a random sample of 363 high school seniors evenly drawn from all of the North Carolina education districts and a national US-sample of 850 ran-domly selected high school seniors. The results were surprising, as Nijhawan and Ellis found no indication that training in economics had a significant influence on the stu-dents in terms of fostering 'conservatism'. Indeed, though their responstu-dents are benefi-ciaries of experiences that are designed to promote a better understanding of and ap-preciation for the private enterprise system, Nijhawan and Ellis detected little more affirmative attitudes towards these institutions than among the control groups and less than one would expect based on their training (Nijhawan and Ellis, 2003).

The early research was primarily interested in the pedagogical aspects of teaching economics and in evaluating teaching outcomes. It involved largely American scholars, did not reach a wider public in the scientific community, and the empirical evidence it produced is often fragmentary and of a highly local nature. Since the mid-1980s, how-ever, a larger part of the academic community became involved in the discussion. It

also became more focused, as it concentrated on the acceptance of the price system versus fairness norms.

Stigler had placed specific emphasis on the argued that trust in the price-system as a factor causingis the cardinal point in most economists’ conservatism, as the econo-mistconservative economic worldview, as they would be “drilled” to view the price-system as a potential instrument for solving all the problems an economic price-system might have (Stigler, 1959, 528). Indeed, by questioning American economists about their be-lief in the superiority of the market system versus other modes of resource-allocation, Kearl et al. (1979) found strong support for the price-system, a result which later stud-ies more or less replicated for Austria, France, Germany and Switzerland (see: Frey, Pommerehne, Gygi, 1993). Frey found that economists working in the government had less trust in the market system than those pursuing a career in academia. He inter-preted this as evidence for a significant difference in the assessment of the market-system distinguishing academic economics from the general public (Frey, 1986). The relevancy of these findings comes from the aforementioned conflict between many economists' rejection of interpersonal utility-comparisons and the emphasis placed on the 'willingness to pay' as an instrument to direct distribution. The implications these preferences have for economists' policy advices are the reason why these are often at odds with common-sense fairness norms. While traditional economists do not need to be opportunistic, few of them would consider 'fairness'-norms as something not exoge-nous to the basic tenets of their teachings and potentially threatening the general wel-fare.

Kahnemann, Knetsch and Thaler (1986) developed an experiment to test the apprecia-tion of the price-system versus social norms of fairness among the general public. They constructed a situation wherein, due to weather conditions, a specific good (snow shovels) is in excess demand and questioned randomly selected samples of inhabi-tants in the Toronto and Vancouver-areas about their opinion regarding the relative fairness of the use of different systems of distribution. The large majority of respon-dents considered the auctioning of the good in such a situation as unfair or even very unfair and preferred the first-come, first-serve practice. Frey and Pommerehne (1993) questioned 645 inhabitants of Zurich and West Berlin about their preferences in the described and another, similar situation. Frey, Pommerehne and Gygi (1993) added an opinion survey conducted at the universities of Zurich and of the Saarland among 356 economics freshmen at the first day of their studies and among 155 second-year economists to compare their responses to the opinion held by the general public. They found that while around two thirds of the students rejected allocation by the market-system in these situations, five sixths of the general public did. Hence, a significantly larger group of the students preferred the 'willingness to pay'-criterion. In both groups, majorities preferred the traditional system of first-come, first-serve, followed by the dis-tribution via a public body. A further important result of this study is that the duration of the exposure to economic instruction did not appear as an important factor. But inter-estingly, while among the beginners politically more left-wing oriented students had a less favourable perception of the market than right-wing oriented students, such corre-lations disappeared in the more advanced group. While, according to Frey and Meier (2004), the 'indoctrination-hypotheses' has “convinced most of the academic

commu-nity”, there are only slight differences between beginning and more advanced econom-ics students, an observation that raises questions about the relevancy of the 'indoctri-nation'-effect.

The arguments of Frey et al. (1993) have been criticised by Haucap and Just (2004, 2010) for a failure to control for any other socio-economic variables, such as current or expected future income, age, gender, or educational level. It is clear that these factors can have an independent effect on the formation of attitudes (Parker, 2012). Higher income individuals, for instance, tend to prefer auctioning systems, as they have better chances in a market. Haucap and Just present a study wherein the Frey, Pommerehne and Gygi – experiment was replicated with their own students at the University of the German Federal Armed Forces in Hamburg. Of the 505 students included in the sam-ple, 166 were enrolled in first-year, 145 in advanced economics classes, and 194 in other social sciences and engineering. All of them had previously not received much training in economics. Because of its relatively homogenous student-population, no preparations had to be made to control for expected future income levels, education, gender, nationality or age. Only male students were included in the survey, who will (in case they succeed) stay in the army for at least 12 years. The ‘general public’ was rep-resented by the students enrolled in engineering and other social sciences.

In some aspects the results of Haucap and Just differ significantly from those of Frey, Pommerehne and Gygi. Haucap and Just found evidence to again verify that there is a self-selection effect, as their economics students hold views different from those of the other groups already when beginning their studies. But there is also a strong indoctri-nation effect. Forty percent of the first-year economists considered the auctioning of the scarce good to be a fair practice, but among the entire group of advanced economists 60 percent do so. Haucap and Just also divide the advanced students in a group spe-cialized in economics and those in business economics. This reveals interesting differ-ences, as only 46 percent of the business students, those preparing for a business career, seem to prefer the price system (Haucap and Just, 2004).

It is obvious that the subjects questioned by Haucap and Just are less representative for all economics students than those surveyed in Zurich and Saarbrücken. Thus, even though Haucap and Just seem to reveal a strong indoctrination effect, whether these results can reasonably be transferred to the general (German) student population is unclear. To have a homogenous group as in Hamburg avoids the difficulties associated with controlling for age-, gender-, and many other effects one is potentially not even aware of. But, as we will see further below, some scholars found evidence that males and females respond differently to 'indoctrination', and above mentioned evidence sug-gests that it is unlikely that humans form preferences and attitudes towards economic issues in passive reception of what their teachers tell them, but rather in complex social processes of interaction with their teachers and peer students. We cannot exclude the possibility that social homogeneity enforces biases that are absent in different or more heterogeneous groups. A positive reception and trust in market-institutions might be a characteristic of middle-class males who usually fill the higher ranks of a European army, but it says little about what happens in the student population as a whole.

Does training in economics make people conservative? The available evidence tells us that economists probably have a stronger preference for market-institutions and the price mechanism than the general public or other social scientists. It is, however, less clear where these attitudes come from. The older research seems to unanimously con-firm the hypothesis that basic economic education makes both high school and college students more conservative. But more recent findings confront us with a more ambigu-ous picture. According to Frey, Pommerehne and Gygi (1993), the duration of aca-demic training does not make a difference and economists have a natural affinity to the price-system. Thus, they assume that self-selection is the reason for the observed preferences. Nijhawan and Ellis (2003), however, did not observe high school students preparing for a business career to be significantly more 'conservative' than their peer students who do not have this specific interest in business. But Nijhawan and Ellis did not control for any socioeconomic variables or the duration and intensity of specific coursework and focused on those on the business-track and did not compare them to prospective economics students. Haucap and Just (2004) detected a significant indoc-trination effect among main-stage economics students, but a much weaker one among their peers on the business-track. But as discussed above, at least from the perspec-tive of the author of this article, the homogeneity of the groups in the Haucap-Just sample raises doubts about the external validity of their results.

The principal idea behind the self-selection argument is that “selfish persons choose to study economics” (Frey and Meier, 2003, 448). This thesis entails the implicit premise that theories taught in economics classes are attractive to 'selfish' people. This thesis entails the implicit premise that theories taught in economics classes are attractive to 'selfish' people. As most economic theory denies the feasibility of inter-individual utility comparisons, it seems to contradict the legitimacy of common-sense fairness-norms. Hence, neoclassical thinking might indeed represent an attractive and comfortable in-tellectual environment for 'selfish' characters. An approximate test of this theory could be made if we add another assumption: the idea of allocation by the price-system is

even more attractive to those who are 'selfish' and in command of greater financial

re-sources or expect an above average future income. Business students are in such a situation, economists to a lesser degree. According to Haucap and Just, however, eco-nomics students are more in favour of the markets than business students.

A second core axiom of economic theory is that effective market solutions maximise the general welfare and minimise opportunities for rent-seeking behaviour. If econo-mists prefer market solutions – which seems to be the case – this raises questions about their selfishness, because it is intuitively not conclusive to argue that selfish hu-mans feel specifically affiliated to an institutional setup which, from the outset, mini-mises their opportunities to extract rents. A more plausible assumption would probably

be that economists are more afraid of rent seeking by others than non-economists.

Perhaps economists are not that 'bad', but they are afraid of other people’s 'badness'. This might be a result of their education.

The two arguments presented here are probably not powerful enough to dismiss the self-selection assumption. They both presume rational decisions and one should be careful not to over-interpret empirical findings that rest on often quite narrow databases and that are simply not specific enough to support conclusions ranging that far.

How-ever, one undisputable point is that a preference for markets (or 'conservatism' in gen-eral) does not as self-evidently come along with 'selfishness' than it might appear at first sight.

3. Are Economists Selfish?

Alfano, Marwell and Ames (Alfano and Marwell, 1981; Marwell and Ames 1979, 1980, 1981) tested the free rider hypothesis in eleven different public goods experiments, involving between sixteen and 128 subjects. Their studies marked the beginning of a series of increasingly elaborate game- and laboratory experiments and opinion surveys specifically intended to recognise and measure the effects the exposure to homo oeconomicus-based economic theory has on behaviour and value formation among students in economics and related fields. While Alfano, Marwell and Ames repeatedly found the strong version of the free rider-hypothesis – which implies that no invest-ments were made into a public good – falsified, they recognised that a sample of eco-nomics graduate students were significantly less willing to cooperate than high school students who were not particularly involved in economics studies. While in their various experiment settings samples of high school students put roughly between 40 and 60 percent of tokens they were endowed with into the collective investment, graduate stu-dents of economics only invested 24 percent. Thus, the public good investment behav-iour of non-economics students in the sample is almost as different from being collec-tively optimal as from the predictions of economic theory, which would be to maximise individual utility by free riding. The graduate students of economics are somewhere half way between the pattern of the high school students and what is predicted by the the-ory. They were also far less willing or able than the non-economists to explicate in straight simple terms what they considered a 'fair' contribution to the public interests. According to their statements, they were also less concerned with fairness. Marwell and Ames concluded that fairness-considerations seemed to have been somehow “alien” to this group (1981, 309). When assuming causes for this behaviour they sug-gested two hypotheses. The first is that economists were (self-) selected by virtue of a preoccupation with economically ‘rational’ allocation of resources, which would mean to free-ride. The second hypothesis is that economists simply behaved in accordance to the general tenets of the theories they study. However, Marwell and Ames did not make a clear decision as to which of the two hypotheses they prefer.

Carter and Irons (1991) put 10 U.S. Dollars at stake in an ultimatum bargaining game, which was conducted among 92 students from four populations: freshmen and senior undergraduate students with a major in economics and peer students enrolled in other not further specified fields. The game consisted of dividing the sum among two players: a proposer who suggests the division and a responder who is to accept or reject the offer. If the responder accepts, the division takes place as proposed. In case she or he rejects, both players do not earn anything. While economic theory would suggest that the proposer keeps as much as possible and the responder prefers a minimal share over nothing, Carter and Irons found that non-economists on average proposed to keep no more than 5.44 U.S. Dollars and accepted at least 2.70 U.S. Dollars. On the other

cepted a minimum of 1.70 U.S. Dollars. Hence, while economics students did not be-have as self-interested as traditional economic theory predicts, they acted significantly more self-interested than non-economists. Comparable observations were made by Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1986) who found business majors in both the roles of allocator and receiver to be more likely to either make or accept uneven allocations than a control group of psychology students. But as 61 percent of them offered equal splits, they seemed to be more inclined to share 'fair' than the economists in the Carter-Irons experiment. 50-50 splits are the most common proposal in ultimatum bargaining games and the most strongly one-sided proposals are commonly rejected for the sake of 'fairness'. As only 40 percent of economics students in the Carter-Irons experiment offered even splits, in both the roles of the allocator as well as the 'respondent', they seem to act more in line with the premises of the homo oeconomicus-model than 'other' students.

To capture learning effects and to reveal effects of self-selection, Carter and Irons (1991) extended their regression model by dummy variables to measure differences between freshman economists and freshman non-economists as well as between sen-ior economists and freshman economists. The outcome of their regression analysis suggests that differences in the behaviour of economists are a result of self-selection. Carter and Irons also asked the respondents to explain their choice of strategy and found that 31 percent of the economists referred only to features of the game itself rather than to fairness-considerations, compared to only 17 percent of the non-economists.

Among the more important contributions is that of Frank, Gilovich and Regan (1993), who also presented evidence for a “large difference in the extent to which economists and non-economists” behave in accordance to the predictions of the homo oeconomicus concept. The authors provide three different categories of evidence to support their position. The first is the result of a mailed questionnaire surveying chari-table activities among college professors – information for 576 individuals was evalu-ated. It showed that economists, despite a higher average income, spend 10 percent less on financial donations, but did not show greater differences in other dimensions of socially beneficial activities. The second category was collected in three types of ulti-matum bargaining games. Their sample included 414 games or 207 subjects. In the first round, the subjects were allowed to interact extensively prior to the game and to make promises about their behaviour. The second round excluded the prior an-nouncement of individual strategies and the third even limited the time reserved for communication. Taking the sample of games as a whole, economics students showed higher defection rates, namely 60.4 percent compared to 38.8 percent for non-economists. However, the defection rate is smaller in the intermediate category (where subjects have more time to interact than in the limited category) and even significantly more so in the unlimited category (where subjects are permitted to make promises to cooperate). When they are allowed to make a promise to cooperate, the defection rate falls to 28.6 percent (non-majors: 26.9%), although the promises were considered ir-relevant in traditional economic theory. Frank et al. are cautious in making assumptions about the contribution that instruction in economics had on these outcomes. They ob-serve that a progressed state in the course of studies correlates with a lesser tendency

to defect among the non-economists, while this effect is absent among the economists. However, a relation between social interaction and cooperation is obvious and it is striking that changes were much stronger among the economists.

Comparable observations were made by Hu and Liu (2003) whose prisoners' dilemma game was specifically designed to measure the role of calculated self-interest behind cooperative or apparently altruistic behaviour. Prior to the conduction of a first round of their game, the authors introduced a phase of extensive communication between their 225 volunteer subjects in order to provide an opportunity to exchange promises about individual behaviour and to develop trust relations. If both players of a game were al-lowed to make promises, the cooperation rate was the highest and differences between male and female subjects were minimal or disappeared. In a second round, held with-out such preparations, the level of cooperation was lower. Hu and Liu replicated the observation that economics majors showed a stronger inclination to cooperate than students from other fields if the potential gains from the cooperation were higher. This, they conclude, indicates the economists’ stronger ability to understand the incentive structure of the game. Secondly, it indicates the importance of self-interest as a motiva-tion behind their cooperative behaviour and that “altruistic acts actually have large components of reciprocity” (Hu and Liu, 2003, 695-969).

The third type of evidence Frank et al. brought forward was collected in a question-naire, presenting ethical dilemmas to students enrolled in introductory microeconomics courses. The questionnaire was filled out at the beginning and at the end of the course and was intended to measure the degree to which the students became less honest over the course of the semester. As it turned out, training in microeconomics seemed to have a significant effect in terms of moving the students towards more cynical pat-terns of behaviour. The authors speculate that the reason for a stronger tendency to-wards non-cooperation among economics students is not that they are “simply more self-interested” (1993, 159), but rather that “economics training encourages the view that people are motivated primarily by self-interest [which] leads people to expect oth-ers to defect in social dilemmas” (1996, 192). Frank et al., however, did not explain why a control group involved in an astronomy course also showed a movement towards less honesty. While the effect was weaker than in the economics-classes, its sources should be explained to allow for conclusions on the effect of economics instruction in the way the authors suggest.

Rubinstein (2006) takes specific issue with the strong emphasis placed on the mathe-matical articulation of arguments in economics. Empirically, his argument builds on a survey question in which 130 economics students, 172 students in MBA-courses and in three other fields (law, mathematics, philosophy, altogether 386 individuals), all from Tel Aviv University, have to choose in a dilemma-situation between maximising a ficti-tious company's profits and the economic well-being of its workers. Optional choices were presented to the subjects in a table. Reducing the staff by half would maximise profits, but confront those laid off with a high risk of long-term unemployment. Follow-up studies were conducted among several thousand readers of an Israeli business daily as well as among 94 Harvard economics graduate students. Rubinstein's results revealed a sharp difference between economics students and the other groups,

includ-tion of profits – versus a third of the MBA-students and even less among the other groups. In a second round of the experiment, Rubinstein replaced the table with a profit formula the respondents had to use to calculate which personnel-policy would maxi-mise profits. Although the formula generated outcomes identical to the values repre-sented in the table, three quarters of the economists became profit-maximisers. An even more surprising result was that the differences between the groups vanished. Rubinstein draws two conclusions from these observations. Firstly, it appears to him that the MBA-programme is more successful in equipping students with a more com-prehensive understanding of real life decision making and the necessity to balance conflicting interests, rather than to focus on a single maxim. Secondly, he found his intuitive reservations against the representation of problems in mathematical terms supported, as it is characteristic for academic economics, because it conceals the “real-life complexity of the situation” (Rubinstein, 2006, C9).

A number of authors tried to defend the 'moral integrity' of economists and of their teachings. In the ultimatum game conducted by Stanley and Tran (1998), the subjects were randomly and anonymously paired and had no opportunity to make any arrange-ments about their behaviour. The experiment consisted of dividing the sum among a proposer who suggests the division and a responder who is to accept or reject the offer economics majors. It was conducted at a small liberal arts college where instruction in orthodox economics is supplemented by education in religion, philosophy, ethics, and social sciences. More than half (56 percent) of the allocations in their experiment were 50/50 splits, while economists displayed a weaker tendency to allocate to their own advantage than non-economists. They were indeed more cooperative than students from other fields. Stanley and Tran interpret this outcome as entirely according to “fair-ness norms” and questioning the predictive power of neoclassical theory as well as assumptions about the influence economics training might have on human behaviour. While the unambiguity of these results is impressive, the validity of the experiment suf-fers from the small size of the sample (sixteen students). Moreover, to be convinced by the authors' hypothesis that education in other social sciences contributes to this be-haviour, we would like to know more about the curriculum the participants have gone through and the degree to which it can be distinguished from those in other schools. One of the more important contributions in this line of thought was presented by Yezer, Goldfarb and Poppen (1996). Generally, they question that teaching in microeconomics will necessarily have the effect Frank, Gilovich and Regan and many others assume it does, as, in addition to the idea of the homo oeconomicus, economic instruction con-veys the idea of mutual benefit from exchange. “For many students”, they argue, “learning of the possibility for mutual benefit may be a more far-reaching change in their understanding than a reiteration of the already well-known maxim that people are often selfish” (Yezer, Goldfarb, and Poppen, 1996, 178). They raised specific objec-tions against the experimental design and technical details of the evaluation of data conducted by Frank, Gilovich and Regan. More generally, methodological critique was posed against the use of artificially designed games and surveys, as these would not adequately reflect the subjects' behaviour in real world situations. It would rather in-duce them to consider their individual beliefs about their behaviour and other conditions and considerations that have no relevancy to them in real situations. Yezer et al.

col-lected counter-evidence in a ‘lost letter’ experiment in 64 undergraduate classes in economics and other fields and found that economics students were significantly more likely (56 percent) than students in other fields (31 percent) to return an envelope con-taining 10 U.S. Dollars cash which was secretly dropped in the classroom before teach-ing commenced. This happened although the ‘finder’ was in no danger of beteach-ing identi-fied. Yezer et al. also repeated the ‘honesty survey’ conducted by Frank, Gilovich and Regan, but analysed its results in slightly different ways and claimed to have found little reliable evidence for an effect of economics instruction on the likelihood to behave co-operatively.

The arguments presented by Yezer et al. are worth consideration, but as Frank et al. put it (1996), they are not compelling. Against the validity of their lost-letter experiment one might point to the numerous imponderables that might influence its outcome and instead argue for lab experiments that allow the experimenter to calibrate many pa-rameters. One cannot exclude the possibility that the results by Yezer et al. are biased by differences of the gender- or age-structures between the economists- and non-economist subgroups, as it is unknown who picked up the envelopes.

A number of studies provide evidence that gender is a significant behavioural determi-nant. Women appear to be more altruistic and perhaps less affected by training in enomics. Frank et al. (1991) and Hu and Liu (2003) find female students to be more co-operative than males, irrespective of variables such as age or their field of study. Ac-cording to Frank and Schulze (2000), they are also less corruptible. However, it is diffi-cult to come to meaningful conclusions regarding males. Male economists turn out to be the most corrupt ones, but male non-economists are the least corrupt. Frank and Schulze suggest the hypothesis that self-selection of male and female students might follow different patterns and/or gender groups might respond differently to educational influences but they provide no further evidence supporting either of these ideas. Selten and Ockenfels (1998) also observed gender-differences in their solidarity game. 120 individuals were divided into three-person groups, wherein each group-member had a 2/3 chance to win DM 10.00. The players were asked how much they would be willing to share with the one or two losers in the group in the case of winning. The experiment was conducted under the condition of absolute anonymity between the members of the subject-sample and between subjects and experimenters. As a result, Selten and Ock-enfels found that male economists were remarkably less willing to share than students from other fields (no distinctions were made as to the duration of studies and speciali-sations in economics versus business economics), and female economists were pre-pared to share nearly the same amount as female non-economists. James, Soroka and Benjafeld (2001) conducted two ultimatum game experiments with groups of 28 and 33 undergraduate students. They observed that female economists were just as willing to share as female students in 'other' fields. But, in contrast to Selten and Ockenfels, they did not find males to be significantly affected by instruction in economics. They rather observed that male psychology undergraduates seem to be affected by their studies, but females are not. Male psychologists were indeed the only group that distinguished itself through its behaviour from other male groups, as the group’s members were sig-nificantly more cooperative than other male groups.

Laboratory experiments and surveys are the most frequently used empirical instru-ments in the discussion reviewed here. However, some scholars are sceptical about survey results because they might be biased towards what subjects may perceive as ‘socially accepted’ or ‘norm-conforming’. Responses might be distorted as the subjects feel as being under observation and a wrong answer may result in disadvantages that are not compensated by a chance of material gain. There seems to be evidence that different groups like economists and non-economists have diverging understandings about which behaviour is ‘socially accepted’ and that this is a result of their training. As the association between markets and the legitimacy of self-interested behaviour is un-derstood even by non-economists, an economist's potential willingness to behave altru-istically or cooperatively in adequate situations does not have to be negatively affected by economic theory, as training in economics might enforce an aptitude to recognise a situation as a market and to behave in accordance to what one might call a 'culture of the market'. Thus, while the 'indoctrinated' might answer survey questions in accor-dance to what they perceive as a norm, it is not certain that they personally conform to those norms and are not ready to violate or overaccomplish them in real life situations. A skillfully designed experimental situation is able to control for many factors we cannot measure in other settings, and there is evidence that people take the experiments very seriously (Dawes, 1980). Because of these characteristics of games, some consider them as a superior way to understand and empirically access human behaviour (Frank and Schulze, 2000). But they admit that appropriately trained subjects (such as economists) might perceive games as a test of economic rationality and behavioural intelligence (Frank, 1988, 226). Hence, rather than moral convictions or social instincts, performance on 'the test' can become the most important criterion according to which their decisions are made. A point advanced by Kirchgässner is that most lab experi-ments create “low cost-situations” that tell us less about the preferences of the subjects than their actual behaviour in everyday situations, where budget constraints are more severe (Kirchgässner, 2004, 9). Moreover, lab situations are specifically designed to incorporate only a limited number of variables that can be easily controlled for. Even if we assume that economists understand such situations by application of the theories they are trained in or decide on the grounds of a natural tendency to be self-regarding, this does not mean that in far more complex real world situations they process informa-tion or assess behaviour-opinforma-tions in ways different from those of 'other people'. Hence, the much more important question is whether there are differences in the behaviour of economists compared to other people in real world situations.

Frey and Meier (2003, 2005) conducted a field study at the University of Zürich that circumvents many problems associated with laboratory settings. Every semester, all students at the University of Zürich have to decide on contributing to two official social funds in addition to the compulsory tuition fee. One fund offers cheap loans for needy students (Loan Fund) while the other supports foreign students (Foreign Fund). A con-tribution of 7 or 5 Swiss Franc respectively is a relatively weak incentive, i.e. solidarity is not costly and self-regarding behaviour yields only minor advantages. But the stu-dents do not spend imagined or given money, but rather their own, so that they have a good reason to take decisions seriously. Moreover, decisions are made in a natural everyday-setting where no observation is expected. Frey and Meier compared the

cisions of the subjects distinguished by faculty, age, sex, nationality, number of semes-ters enrolled, and the stage of their academic schooling (elementary-, main-, and

Ph.D.-stage) over a period of five semesters1_.

The result was that elementary level students in economics sciences do not give sig-nificantly less than the average of all other students, and main stage students special-ised in economics contribute even a little more, while during their Ph.D. studies they contribute a little bit less than the average of the 'others'. Business economists, how-ever, contribute significantly less than the other students. Apparently, those economics students who are more inclined to spend are less likely to do a Ph.D. To eliminate a possible sample selection bias, which might be due to failed exams or other selection processes, Frey and Meier tested the indoctrination effect in a conditional logit model which used the panel structure of their dataset with fixed personal effects. The results show that the contributions of both business students and economists decline over time. The longer they stay at the university, the less money they contribute. As Frey and Meier observe this to be the case for all students, not only for economists, they do not ascribe this behaviour to any effect of economic education. Rather, they conclude that “the lower contribution of business economists, compared to other students, is due to self-selection rather than indoctrination” (Frey and Meier, 2003, 461).

This finding conflicts with the results Franks, Falk and Hinton (1973) drew from a cross-sectional study of 67 business majors at the University of Denver which appears to prove a significant negative relationship between the amount of undergraduate coursework and the importance attributed to social welfare values. However, Frey and Meier have chosen a significantly broader empirical basis and sophisticated analytical methods to support their argument. It included 28,586 subjects and 96,783 observa-tions. One might consider a problem that the students are in a low-cost situation (Kirchgässner, 2004). Another is that the authors cannot directly control for their sub-jects' income situation. Frey and Meier used an anonymous online survey conducted among the same students population as the data set of giving behaviour. It yielded 2,321 usable responses including information about personal factors such as income situation, attitudes towards the social funds, political orientation, and giving behaviour. The sample is not fully representative, but its results are largely consistent with those drawn from the larger data set. If more personnel factors are controlled for, economists do not differ significantly in their giving behaviour from other students, while business economists give significantly less. Moreover, according to Frey and Meier the indoctri-nation hypotheses is again falsified and the self-selection view supported, as the atti-tudes and orientations they measured differ between the student-groups and do not seem to change throughout the studies of their sample subjects (Frey and Meier, 2003, 459-460).

While Frey and Meier provided one of the best field studies available at the moment, a closer look at the 'other' groups in their sample yields some problematic observations, such as that elementary stage lawyers and veterinarians are not significantly 'less self-ish' than economists, and that main stage veterinarians are even more selfish than

business economists. In the Ph.D-stage, lawyers, veterinarians, prospective medical doctors, computer scientists, and even theology-students contribute significantly less than business economists. These observations point, first, at methodological problems associated with comparing economists with students from selected 'other fields' without controlling for the fact that these also might have their own specific behavioural pat-terns. If economists are different from some other people, they are not necessarily dif-ferent from everybody else and the selection of comparison-groups or individuals might bias the outcome of the comparison. The empirical strategy chosen by Frey and Meier avoids this methodological flaw but their version of the self-selection argument does not fully exploit this advantage. If law and economics and even veterinary medicine really attract equally selfish freshmen, the self selection-effect cannot occur in econom-ics sciences because of the theories taught in this field. However, this seems to be a key assumption in the moral trial literature. There must be other factors of relevancy here, perhaps some associated with the professional career they prepare for.

Another real world-data study was conducted by Laband and Beil (1999), who exam-ined the incidence of “cheating” with respect to income-based professional association dues among members of the American Economic Association, the American Sociologi-cal Association, and the American PolitiSociologi-cal Science Association. A questionnaire was mailed to 500 non-foreign, non-student members of each of the three organisations and 301 economists, 297 political scientists, and 294 professional sociologists voluntar-ily identified their income by a predefined dues category. Laband and Beil compared their results, the presumably 'real' distribution of income among the associations’ members, to information about dues revenues provided by the organisations them-selves. The comparison discovered that economists were more honest than political scientists and significantly more so than sociologists. To their surprise, this happened “despite the fact that professional sociologists are undoubtedly better schooled than economists (in particular) and political scientists are regarding the putative benefits of cooperative behaviour” (1999, 98). This result, however, in their view, is not an indica-tion of significant differences between professional economists, sociologists, political scientists (or members of other occupations) with respect to honesty or cooperative behaviour. They consider it a result of differentially greater incentives to “cheat” (or higher costs of “honesty”) experienced by the different profession groups. While economists could save up to $20 per year by “cheating” – a 29 percent saving from the annual dues that they would pay when correctly presenting their annual income – a political scientist with an income of the highest category could save $60 per year – thus 48 percent less than the dues associated with the highest income category. A profes-sional sociologist could save as much as $146 per year (an 81 percent saving) by mis-representing his/her annual income to the association. Laband and Beil rejected the validity of the ‘indoctrination’-hypotheses and argued that given “identical dues struc-tures and incomes, we suspect that we would find no differences in the actual pattern of dues payment across the three disciplines we examined”. This conclusion sounds reasonable. If Laband and Beil were right and economics teachers are no less honest than instructors in political science and sociology, this could also be understood as evidence against the indoctrination-hypotheses, because honest teachers are unlikely to educate dishonest students. Unfortunately, however, Laband and Beil provide no

evidence for their assumption except the tentative correlation between the frequency of cheating and the potential maximal opportunity costs of not cheating.

Drawing conclusions from real world behaviour is challenging to the analyst. As it is almost always open to conflicting interpretations, one cannot exclude influences other than those tested for. It remains an open question why in some lab experiments economists behave more ‘selfishly’ than students from other fields while they seem to be even more cooperative than ‘others’ in some real world situations. Gandal et al. (2005) interpreted these apparent inconsistencies by pointing to their finding that a sample of economics students they questioned about their value priorities distinguished themselves with regard to the importance attributed to power, achievement and hedon-ism values, when compared to a group from other social sciences. While the control group showed a stronger concern for the welfare of society as a whole – for humanity and for the natural environment – economists did not place as much emphasis on these issues. But they did not attribute less importance than 'others' to benevolence values. Benevolence values and ‘universalism’ both place emphasis on care for the welfare of others but the focus of their concern is different. Benevolence values em-phasise concern for those the actor is in frequent contact with, such as family, friends, neighbours, and so on. Thus, “economists may make good friends or neighbours, but are relatively less concerned with the welfare of people who are not part of their in-group”. This is accompanied by a special concern about being honest, helpful and loyal. Regarding mixed-motive games, Gandal et al. believe that economists behaved less cooperatively than others because these games represent a highly competitive setting that enables them to express self-enhancement values by competing with oth-ers. Accordingly, they tend to behave more competitively than others in such settings. In real world situations, they do not behave different from others, because field experi-ments that examine altruistic behaviour usually do not involve obvious competitive situations. In such settings, the economists' choice of action may reflect the importance attributed to benevolence values and no differences are found between economists and others (Gandal et al., 2005, 1232-1233). According to Gandal et al., these peculi-arities of the economists’ value priorities are not a result of training in economics, but of self-selection processes. They assume that people who endorse self-enhancement values are particularly attracted to studying economics. An analysis of two question-naires conducted with freshmen, one week after they commenced their studies and after finishing their first year, neither showed signs of an increased importance of self-enhancement nor of decreased importance of universalism values (Gandal et al., 2005, 1236). But it is probably questionable whether these results can be easily generalised. Racko, who tested 85 students of a highly selective business school in Latvia in a two-year longitudinal study for changes in their personal values, observed a significant en-hancement of status-oriented values that cannot be conceived as a consequence of self-selection processes (Racko, 2011). However, at least from the perspective of the reviewer, Racko does not make a convincing case for his argument that the pattern of value formation he observed can be, first of all, traced back to the influences of the mode of rationality underpinning neoclassical economics as taught in the school. He does not seem to address that a “highly selective” school, intended to educate a pro-spective business elite, creates a social environment that is likely to have feedback

effects on the values of the students. In view of this, the choice of control groups (n= 123) from regular Latvian universities does not appear as a convincing strategy. The formation of values in a social group is probably a process too complex to trace back to a single source such as the type of social theory or actor model transmitted to that group.

If we assume that economists are really self-regarding, are they then Nozickians or opportunists? Some neoclassical economists argue that actors should be conceptual-ised as strict opportunists, while the economic benefit or the necessity of intelligently designed institutions other than those of arms-length contracting can also be verbalised in terms of neoclassical economics (e.g.: Oliver E. Williamson). At least the importance of property rights is never questioned in the usual thought schools of economic think-ing, while they still by a large majority endorse more or less the idea of the individual rational choice as maximising both the individual as well as the general welfare. An essential, simplifying, but unambiguously defined morality to be drawn from these ideas could be to require the human actor to accept the rights of others as uncorruptible side constraints to be placed upon the individuals’ action. Within these limits, however, the individual is left entirely free to decide and maximise his individual benefit. According to Zsolnai (2003), such a morality, which is a simplified version of libertarian philosophy

as presented by Robert Nozick in his Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974), could be

ap-pealing to economics students. It would make them endorse a rigid market-order while also requiring them to strictly respect property rights and cause them, for instance, to return “lost money” letters in the experiment of Yezer, Goldfarb, and Poppen (1996). Perhaps it also prevents advanced scholars from free-riding or cheating when profes-sional association dues are to be paid. On the other hand, however, a Nozickian economist would be less cooperative and less attentive with respect to the interests of others than non-economists. Zsolnai’s argument sounds reasonable but it does not explain why economists have a distinctively strong tendency to fail in agent-situations. This was shown by Frank and Schulze (2000) in a survey that was conducted among 190 randomly chosen students of the University of Hohenheim in Germany. The study asked about the students' willingness to accept bribes – to the disadvantage of their principal, in this case a student's club. Overall, economists (no distinction was made between economists and business students) seem to be significantly more corrupt than non-economists. Corruptibility in the situation designed by Frank and Schulze is not a gradual divergence from ideal-typical behaviour but is a clear violation of the property rights principal. The same can be said about academic cheating behaviour which is more frequent among graduate business students than among non-business students (McCabe et al., 2006). This is a case of outright opportunistic behaviour and violating moral standards, even if measured against Nozickian philosophy. Undoubtedly, how-ever, we need more empirical research to come to more robust conclusions.

4. Conclusion: What we know and don't know

Are Economists different?

A first hindrance to answering this question is that few of the empirical findings and their interpretation seem indisputable. Gender effects are obviously somehow signifi-cant and we might be convinced that the mathematical language used in economics affects the perception of social situations of humans. But consider, for instance, that when Iida and Sobei replicated some of the prisoners' dilemma experiments and public goods surveys conducted with American students in Japan, neither of the experiments revealed much evidence for any uniqueness of economics majors. Differences ap-peared only when students were asked whether they behave honestly if they pick up money. Significantly fewer economics majors than students in other disciplines said that they would behave honestly in such a situation (Iida and Sobei, 2011). As these results cannot be ascribed to details of the experimental design and cultural influences (the experiments compared Japanese with each other), this once again indicates that economists are different. But with every piece of empirical data collected it seems to become more difficult to explain the nature of that difference.

One major problem is the use of underdefined and improperly distinguished concepts in the description or explanation of empirical observations. Laband and Beil suggest that there is a generally shared understanding of what scholars in this line of research look for, i.e. the dichotomies “selfish versus unselfish [and], cooperative versus unco-operative [behaviour], etc.” (1999, 99n). Most authors construct a second dichotomy between 'nature' and 'nurture', excluding alternatives as well as the possibility that both effects played a role. One might indeed question whether the phenomena observed and measured here do fit such simple dichotomous distinctions. Moreover, terms such as 'selfishness' and 'altruism' or 'cooperativeness' are frequently used, but there seems to be no unanimous agreement about how they should be defined and distinguished. This – vice versa – raises questions about the way empirical results are interpreted. A positive interest to benefit another individual might have 'pure' altruistic motives be-hind it but may also be driven by self-regarding intentions that are less easy to observe. 'Calculated' altruism might be motivated by the aim to earn friendship or social approval or/and other direct benefits. It could also be motivated by an interest in the continuation of a reciprocity-based cooperation which is an advantage for both sides. Reciprocal altruism involves that help is provided to someone else in order to acquire moral credit that may be repaid later, or that one person contributes to the welfare of people in need under the condition that other people contribute as well. There is a lot of survey evi-dence that contributions to public goods not only result from unselfish motives, but also from self-interested motives (Clotfelter, 1985). Defection in the situation as given in many games can also be interpreted as an act of prophylactic punishment for (ex-pected) non-cooperativeness, motivated by a preference for strong reciprocity rather than pure self-interest. Hence, cooperation and honesty do not necessarily equal genu-ine altruism and cheating or defection do not equal selfishness (cf. Lanteri, 2008; see: Hu and Liu, 2003). But few of the tests outlined above were specifically designed to detect potential motives behind the subjects' choice of action rather than to simply

as-sume ad hoc one potential category of behaviour to be linked to a specific character trait and category of motivation.

The likelihood of reciprocal cooperation depends on a number of factors, such as trust in the potential cooperators and the expectation that potential partners are likely to co-operate. Some of the games are designed to control for these factors. Frank, Gilovich and Regan (1993) and Hu and Liu (2003) gave their participants time to get acquainted with each other and to make promises about their behaviour in the experiment, al-though these were not enforceable. In both cases, with the possibilities for communica-tion being improved stepwise, significant reduccommunica-tions of defeccommunica-tion were observable. As more cooperation was possible and promises were exchanged, differences in defection rates between the sexes and between economists and the non-economist-groups

van-ished (or nearly so). It is important to note that cooperation depended entirely on trust

in these games and economists were willing to summon up as much trust as other

groups, but obviously not ad hoc. This is in line with the conclusion Frank et al. drew

from their ethical dilemmas-survey, i.e. that training in basic economics encourages the view that people are motivated by self-interest and that this view causes people to ex-pect others to defect in relevant situations. In the lost letter experiments mentioned above, the subjects are in no need to defend (legitimate) interests or to retaliate the expected defection of a partner in a game. We might conclude from this that econo-mists are more distrustful, but we cannot prove that they are more selfish or opportun-istic.

The results by Frank and Schulze (2000) and Iida and Sobei (2011) in their lost letter experiments could, of course, seriously challenge this interpretation. According to Frank and Schulze, economists seem to pursue their interests more consequently than students from other fields and do not even respond to incentives voluntarily granted by their principal to strengthen their loyalty. They are just as much inclined to harm their principal (the students club), regardless of how they are treated. The problem with the argument presented by Frank and Schulze, however, is that they compare economists with an average-behaviour of the 'others'. The difficulties that arise from this strategy are the same as discussed above with regard to Frey and Meier (2003).

We might conclude that it seems rather certain that the majority of economists are more in favour of the distribution by the price system than most non-economists and that they show a weaker commitment to common-sense fairness norms. A preference for market solutions or conservatism in general might, at least in part, result from a fear of rent seeking behaviour by others and the intention to foreclose it by the help of com-petitive market settings. It might also result from the emphasis neoclassical economics places on the positive overall welfare effects that allocative efficiency might bring about, while common sense distributive fairness norms do not pay much attention to productivity effects. However, we do not have any robust unambiguous evidence for both of these suppositions. Marwell and Ames (1981) concluded that economics stu-dents have ‘different understandings’ of fairness, and Frank et al. (1993) report that 31 percent of the economists in their sample referred only to features of the game itself when explaining their chosen strategies – compared to only 17 percent of the non-economists. Apparently, this group behaved in accordance to the hypothesis that they are “inclined to construe the objective of the game in self-interested terms, and