Topic Area: Proliferation of Nuclear Energy in Developing Nations

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IAEA

Study Guide

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Topic Area: Proliferation of Nuclear Energy in Developing

Nations

Introduction

The International Atomic Energy Agency, also known as the IAEA, is an international organization that seeks to promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and to inhibit its use for any military purpose, including nuclear weapons. Delegates in this committee must examine previous IAEA frameworks and policies and aim to ensure a nuclear free world.

The IAEA was formed in 1957 in an attempt to prevent the diversion of peaceful nuclear materials and technology for military purposes through early detection. By the mid-1960’s, the IAEA had established a program of on-site inspections, audits, and inventory controls to execute its mission. The IAEA has considered reassessing the safeguards that are currently in place due to weaknesses in the process and the implementation of these safeguards. Some of the recognized issues include timely and efficient detection of military weapons programs, the illicit trafficking of nuclear materials, and non-compliance with the NPT. Many of these problems have presented themselves in recent years with the nuclear programs of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK).

Structure of the IAEA

Currently, the International Atomic Energy Agency consists of 154 member states, all of which are represented in the General Conference (GC), where each of them has a single vote. The GC is the highest decision making entity in the IAEA, which meets annually in December to determine the required budget for the agency. Approve of the annual report that is submitted by the board of governors and to give recommendations to the board about future actions. This Board of Governors comprises of 35 elected members of the IAEA, and is the main executive organ of the agency. Each member is selected for a yearlong tem by the fifteen outgoing board members, or a two year long term by the GC based on a system ensuring the equitable distribution of regions. The m embers are all experts on the subject, and meet five times annually, with 2 meetings held before and after the General Conference meets each year in September.

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From the start, the IAEA has focused its mission to be under the United Nations, and has worked in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. However, the IAEA is still unique in the UN system as there are no other agencies focusing solely on nuclear technology and the issues related to it. Annual reports are submitted by the General Conference to the United Nations General Assembly Plenary, or to the Security Council if the issue is directly linked to international security. The Security Council can then request the agency to take actions regarding issues concerning peace and international security. Security Council resolutions regarding the proliferation of nuclear weapons and safeguards, such as sc resolutions 1373 and 1540, which highlight this cooperation and have become the crux of the agency’s legal framework. Both of these resolutions call for greater cooperation between the United Nations and the International Atomic Energy Agency, in an attempt to tackle the problems of nuclear terrorism and non-state actors being in possession of nuclear material. In order to do this, the IAEA has made a number of programs to support member states taking action to deal with these concerns.

Why do developing nations need nuclear energy?

This committee will be discussing the development of nuclear energy in developing nations. As nation states try to develop to best themselves, the need for a reliable and uninterrupted supply of energy is deemed to be necessary. With a growing a populace and the increasing depletion of finite resources for energy the world needs to come up with better solutions to best solve the growing problem. The need to improve global emergency preparations for nuclear crisis situations has reached its peak in modern times, especially when developing states argue that this very nuclear energy is not only a means to ensure security from bigger nations, but is the only way forward for energy development and progress within their own state. For a committee that pushes for disarmament of nuclear weapons as a whole, this issue needs to be discussed and countries must come together to decide a viable solution for the energy problems developing nations are plagued by.

Non-Proliferation Treaty

The Non-Proliferation was signed by United Nations member states in 1968. This treaty stated that only a state “which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967” shall be treated as a legal nuclear weapon state. It forbids all other states from acquiring nuclear weapons and requests all states all ready in possession of nuclear weapons to use them peacefully through the help of assistance, material and knowledge. It entered into force in 1970, and since then, has often been referred to as a system comprising of three pillars; disarmament, non proliferation and the right to use nuclear

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technology peacefully. While this was not negotiated within the IAEA, the IAEA was assigned to overlook its treaty provisions. It also, for the first time, declared the successful establishment of safeguards as a responsibility of the agency.

Non-Compliance and the Loophole in the NPT

Article X of the Non-Proliferation Treaty affirms that all states party to the treaty have the right to withdraw from it after giving a three month notice. This occurred when the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea announced that it was withdrawing from the treaty in 2003. The question that then arose with DPRK’s withdrawal is how to ensure effective safeguards when the NPT allows for withdrawal and does not specify if the nuclear material acquired should be returned. This issue was debated at the 2015 NPT Review Conference. Similarly, the situation in Iran gives rise to the question of what to do when a country is in non-compliance with its safeguards agreements, as the meaning of non-compliance can be interpreted in different ways. As well as this, it is not specified whether refusal to cooperate with the IAEA when there is a suspicion of compliance is considered non-compliance as well.

Case Study 1: Iran

Despite the IAEAs best efforts, if countries do not carry out Additional Protocol and comply with IAEA guidelines, irregularities can occur. In 2003, it was discovered that Iran was not sending reports under the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement 8 and Additional Protocol. Iran had not reported several quantities of fissionable material to the IAEA, including nuclear material and waste. Furthermore, they did not report changes to their existing nuclear programs. The IAEA did follow up work, requesting for Iran to grant access to its facilities and asking Iran to rectify its inventory. Following this, the Board of Governors requested a suspension of nuclear activities in Iran until all of the country’s accounts and facilities could be verified. After continuous unresponsiveness from the Iranian government, sanctions were imposed against them under resolution 1737. The most recent SC resolution, Resolution 2049, called for an extension of the mandate of the Panel of Experts created under SC Resolution 1929 to oversee the implementation of the Council’s demands. In its Safeguards Statement of 2011, the IAEA Board of Governors stated that, “the Agency was unable to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran and, therefore, was unable to conclude that all nuclear material in Iran was in peaceful activities. Today, the situation is still under consideration of the IAEA and the SC.

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Case Study 2: India

The Indian Nuclear Program was begun in mid-1940s as India picked up freedom from hundreds of years of British govern, and after the utilization of nuclear weapons against Japan by U.S. both these legacies have affected Indian pioneers. In 1948 the Atomic Energy Act was set up. Under it the Department of Atomic Energy was made in 1954. Obduracy of Nuclear forces of the world constrained India to go atomic. Legitimization of atomic weapons by universal network likewise contributed towards India going atomic. Rising patterns of mediation by the industrialized countries in the residential undertakings of creating countries, among which India is additionally one, likewise constrained India to coordinate its atomic assets towards atomic weapons. It was vital for India to secure the self-governance of basic leadership in the formative procedure in vital issue which are natural fair privileges of one 6th of the worldwide populace living in India. From the earliest starting point, the Indian atomic program was aggressive, India created offices for mining Uranium, creating fuel, producing overwhelming water, and reprocessing spent fuel and so on the program never dismissed the military employments of nuclear vitality.To start with, India's unique atomic status mirrors that of a Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) perceived atomic weapon state. India has a waiver from the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), allowing exchange without expecting it to have NPT enrollment. India has decided to specifically connect with global non-multiplication agreements, for example, the NSG, while shunning others, for example, the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Proceeded with uncommon treatment undermines to disintegrate the interlinked non-expansion administration by exhibiting the feasibility of accomplishing atomic weapon state status outside the NPT and the likelihood of Indian reintegration without huge concessions.

India's proceeded with endeavors to join the NSG are fundamentally in view of a longing to anchor atomic exchange for its eager three-organize fuel cycle (which enables them to tackle thorium as fuel). Admission to the NSG will require a sensitive exercise in careful control between India's national intrigue and business estimation of on one hand, and the worries of India's neighbors about expansion and the second-phase of the fuel cycle. The second phase of Fast Breeder Reactors could be used to create plutonium, and merchandise gave under a NSG enrollment waiver could empower India to seek after atomic expansion.

Second, India's vital weapons complex can possibly push India's atomic capacities to a full range of weapon frameworks. India has so far concentrated on the foundation and upgrade of its ground and ocean based conveyance frameworks: the development of four atomic controlled ballistic submarines for constant adrift

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obstacle and ground-based intercontinental range competent rockets. Past this, this report features that India's key weapons complex has investigated and built up extra weapons frameworks that could be made atomic competent ought to there be political will. Generally, times of capacity breakout happened around India's turning point atomic tests (1974 and 1998). In such examples, the activity of the key weapons complex in creating 'innovation demonstrators' (science attainability extends that scale-up to a potential framework), has pre-empted political basic leadership to receive such advances as military abilities. The improvement pathway of the Agni is one such illustration wherein the choice to embrace ground-based long-run rockets as an atomic conveyance framework was taken after researchers had exhibited the plausibility of an indigenous nuclear capable ballistic rocket, instead of the science and innovation division being coordinated by basic leadership expert.

The procedure of Indian science advancements leading the pack over approach course is the reason India's mechanical idleness should raise concerns. Past the foundation and further improvement of India's current set of three capacities, new innovations formed into abilities in accordance with the capacities of major atomic weapons forces would enable India to float towards a 'maximalist' atomic arms stockpile using both strategic and key atomic weapons in a graduated heightening stance. For instance, air-propelled supersonic/hypersonic journey rockets, tipped with low-yield atomic warheads, and combined with new fifth era warrior flying machine could be considered by Indian arrangement producers soon as a way to decisively end customary clash. India's duty to 'No First Use' and to a most extreme striking back just stance would be disintegrated by these new conceivable abilities. This report additionally features the conceivable disintegration of political control of the atomic stockpile. For the most part, the Indian elucidation of an atomic weapon incorporates the mating of the fissile material pit with the warhead and conveyance framework itself .Traditionally, India's atomic weapons have been held de-mated and under the control of various bodies, requiring a between organization framework told immovably by a political body (the Nuclear Command Authority led by the Prime Minister) to amass and send the atomic arms stockpile. The Agni V intercontinental range fit ballistic rocket is pre-mated in an indistinguishable way from the pre-mated ballistic rockets utilized on-board Arihant-class SSBNs. This will significantly affect atomic approach and summon and control

Third, India's logical edifices (atomic, rocket, and space) are inadequately isolated. The atomic program in India has been halfway submitted to universal shields, yet this remaining parts restricted and enables India to practice true atomic weapons state benefits with respect to the creation of extraordinary fissile material. India has

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put resources into new extraordinary fissile material generation offices. This huge unsafeguarded atomic fuel cycle incorporates various elements performing double thoughtful and military capacities.

India's space program is committed to common and serene purposes, and generally this remaining parts the case. Examples of verifiable innovation exchange from common rocketry to military rocket programs is maybe no longer a functioning worry as rocket programs are self-supporting and have accomplished key turning points. A reverse innovation stream, from military to regular citizen area, remains a plausibility. Military and common researchers and specialists keep on meeting cautiously in discussions and gatherings, which should raise worries about cross-field obscuring. Household understudies and worldwide visitors are visit participants and these science and innovation spaces are a multiplication hazard.

Fourth, poor partition in these key areas ought to hone the requirement for tight fare controls on impalpable exchanges and substantial exchange to India. While end-client observing agreements are in actuality for a few elements, this report drives forward the basic for delicate enterprises to receive 'Know Your Customer' best practices. This report features the unpredictable connections of India's local innovative construct, and of complicity to the atomic weapons program. Fifth, Indian substances are at forward multiplication hazard. The potential risk lies with the re/fare of touchy things and information out of India to remote forces. The residential business providing India's vital weapons complex and the nation's atomic program have achieved adequate specialized development to send out skill and unmistakable atomic and rocket related products. The Indian government's help for its household industry even with worldwide authorizations and innovation foreswearing has proceeded since the standardization of exchange relations in 2008. A science and innovation culture of independence and import substitution has framed, and despite the fact that India's vital parts stay dependent on imports, the adjust of local provided merchandise and imported products will tend towards residential arrangements in the coming years. This is one convincing motivation behind why drawing India into firm non-multiplication duties would improve worldwide security for the more extended term. India has made solid strides towards actualizing a control list (SCOMET), synchronizing it with key control administrations, and receiving best practices for organizations; this exertion must be managed.

In conclusion, more prominent care and consideration should be paid to the present issues with India's atomic power while likewise envisioning a future move in India's capacities. Looking forward, there remains space for India to be drawn into firm non-multiplication consistence.

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furnishes data with respect to the level

Case Study 3: Pakistan

Current Situation

Pakistan keeps up a lead in the quantity of nuclear warheads when contrasted with most outstanding adversary India, as indicated by an evaluation by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute on Monday, revealed The Times of India. The Indian distribution noticed that the nation was currently dependent on building up a prevention capacity which concentrated on survival in dread of strikes by Pakistan. As indicated by the daily paper, Islamabad has 140-150 atomic warheads, when contrasted with 130 atomic warheads possessed by New Delhi. China, contrasted with the two nations, has 280 atomic weapons. Nine days into 2017, Pakistan did the first-since forever flight trial of the Babur-3, its new atomic able submarine-propelled voyage rocket (SLCM). A variation of the Babur-3 ground-submarine-propelled voyage rocket (GLCM), this SLCM will see Pakistan's atomic obstacle go to ocean—most likely at first on board its Agosta 90B and Agosta 70 submarines, however in the end, maybe even on board new Type 041 Yuan-class submarines Pakistan is relied upon to secure from China. Sea-based weapons can aggravate crisis stability concerns in the India-Pakistan dyad and present unique command-and-control challenges for Pakistan, which may be required to place these weapons at a higher level of readiness during peacetime. Finally, Pakistan’s internal security environment will remain a concern with a submarine-based deterrent.

Overview

• Nuclear Infrastructure

Pakistan's atomic program is construct fundamentally in light of exceptionally improved uranium (HEU), which is created at the A. Q. Khan inquire about lab at Kahuta, a gas rotator uranium advancement office. The Kahuta office has been in task since the mid 1980s. By the mid 1990s, Kahuta had an expected 3,000 axes in task, and Pakistan proceeded with its quest for extended uranium improvement abilities.

In the 1990s Pakistan started to seek after plutonium generation abilities. With Chinese help, Pakistan assembled the 40 MWt (megawatt warm) Khusab inquire about reactor at Joharabad, and in April 1998, Pakistan declared that the reactor was operational. As per open proclamations made by US authorities, this unsafeguarded substantial water reactor creates an expected 8-10 kilotons of weapons review plutonium every year, which is sufficient for one to two atomic weapons. The reactor

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could likewise create tritium on the off chance that it were stacked with lithium-6. As per J. Cirincione of Carnegie, Khusab's plutonium creation limit could enable Pakistan to create lighter atomic warheads that would be less demanding to convey with a ballistic rocket.

Plutonium partition apparently happens at the New Labs reprocessing plant alongside Pakistan's Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology (Pinstech) in Rawalpindi and at the bigger Chasma atomic power plant, neither of which are liable to IAEA assessment.

• Nuclear Arsenal

The Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) gauges that Pakistan has constructed 24-48 HEU-based atomic warheads, and Carnegie reports that they have delivered 585-800 kg of HEU, enough for 30-55 weapons. Pakistan's atomic warheads depend on an implosion plan that uses a strong center of exceedingly improved uranium and requires an expected 15-20 kg of material for every warhead. As per Carnegie, Pakistan has additionally created a little yet obscure amount of weapons review plutonium, which is adequate for an expected 3-5 atomic weapons. Pakistani experts guarantee that their atomic weapons are not gathered. They keep up that the fissile centers are put away independently from the non-atomic explosives bundles, and that the warheads are put away independently from the conveyance frameworks. In a 2001 report, the Defense Department battles that "Islamabad's atomic weapons are likely put away in part shape" and that "Pakistan presumably could collect the weapons decently fast." However, nobody has possessed the capacity to find out the legitimacy of Pakistan's affirmations about their atomic weapons security.

Pakistan's dependence essentially on HEU makes its fissile materials especially helpless against redirection. HEU can be utilized as a part of a moderately basic firearm barrel-type outline, which could be inside the methods for nstate on-screen characters that plan to gather an unrefined atomic weapon.

The fear monger assaults on September eleventh raised worries about the security of Pakistan's atomic stockpile. As indicated by squeeze reports, inside two long periods of the assaults, Pakistan's military started migrating atomic weapons segments to six new mystery areas. Presently, Gen. Pervez Musharraf shot his knowledge boss and different officers and confined a few presumed resigned atomic weapons

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researchers, trying to find fanatic components that represented a potential risk to Pakistan's atomic stockpile.

Concerns have likewise been raised about Pakistan as a proliferate of atomic materials and ability. In November, 2002, soon after North Korea confessed to seeking after an atomic weapons program, the press revealed charges that Pakistan had given help with the advancement of its uranium enhancement program in return for North Korean rocket advances.

• Foreign Assistance

Before, China assumed a noteworthy part in the advancement of Pakistan's atomic framework, particularly when progressively stringent fare controls in western nations made it troublesome for Pakistan to secure materials and innovation somewhere else. As indicated by a 2001 Department of Defense report, China has provided Pakistan with atomic materials and mastery and has given basic help with the development of Pakistan's atomic offices.

In the 1990s, China composed and provided the overwhelming water Khusab reactor, which assumes a key part in Pakistan's creation of plutonium. A backup of the China National Nuclear Corporation additionally added to Pakistan's endeavors to extend its uranium enhancement capacities by giving 5,000 uniquely designed ring magnets, which are a key segment of the orientation that encourage the rapid turn of rotators.

As per Anthony Cordesman of CSIS, China is additionally answered to have given Pakistan the outline of one of its warheads, which is moderately advanced in plan and lighter than U.S. furthermore, Soviet planned original warheads.

China additionally gave specialized and material help in the fulfillment of the Chasma atomic power reactor and plutonium reprocessing office, which was worked in the mid 1990s. The undertaking had been started as an agreeable program with France, yet Pakistan's inability to sign the NPT and unwillingness to acknowledge IAEA shields on its whole atomic program made France end help.

As indicated by the Defense Department report referred to above, Pakistan has likewise gained atomic related and double utilize and hardware and materials from the Former Soviet Union and Western Europe.

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On a few events, under the expert of changes to the Foreign Assistance Act, the U.S. has forced endorses on Pakistan, cutting off financial and military guide because of its quest for atomic weapons. Nonetheless, the U.S. suspended endorses each time advancements in Afghanistan made Pakistan a deliberately critical "bleeding edge state, for example, the 1981 Soviet occupation and in the war on fear based oppression.

• Pakistan's Nuclear Doctrine

A few sources, for example, Jane's Intelligence Review and Defense Department reports keep up that Pakistan's rationale in seeking after an atomic weapons program is to counter the danger postured by its important opponent, India, which has prevalent regular powers and atomic weapons.

Pakistan has not marked the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) or the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). As per the Defense Department report refered to above, "Pakistan stays ardent in its refusal to sign the NPT, expressing that it would do as such simply after India joined the Treaty. Therefore, not the greater part of Pakistan's atomic offices are under IAEA shields. Pakistani authorities have expressed that mark of the CTBT is to Pakistan's greatest advantage, however that Pakistan will do as such simply in the wake of building up a residential agreement on the issue, and have denied any association with India's choice."

Pakistan does not comply with a no-first-utilize teaching, as prove by President Pervez Musharraf's announcements in May, 2002. Musharraf said that Pakistan did not need a contention with India but rather that in the event that it came to war between the atomic furnished adversaries, he would "react with full may." These announcements were deciphered to imply that if squeezed by a mind-boggling ordinary assault from India, which has unrivaled customary powers, Pakistan may utilize its atomic weapons.

Case Study 4: Japan

The regime in 2000 adopted a policy of radioactive waste disposal by means of burying it underground, by soliciting municipalities across the land available to serve as a site for the process. The final choice was made when a town in the Kochi Prefecture applied in 2007, however only to be retracted when local opposition arose complaining of the financial predicament of the municipality. No progress was made once the mayor of the locality in question was ousted in the next election.

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Recently in 2015 howeverthe Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry presented a revised draft that encapsulated the new policy, making voluntary waste management by individual towns simpler, calling for a “direct disposal” of spent fuel as waste without reprocessing it.This could potentially replace the policy atthe time of reprocessing spent fuel and reusing extracted plutonium and uranium as reactor fuel by encouraging operators of nuclear plants to increase their capacity for temporary storage of spent fuel— given that the final disposal storage site is not expected to be ready in the near future.

Three general principles are employed in the management of radioactive wastes: • Concentrate-and-contain (non radioactive)

• Dilute-and-disperse (non radioactive) • Delay-and-decay (unique to radioactive)

The following methods are currently being contemplated as long-term solutions for storage of nuclear waste.

a) Space

While this means appears to be the most appropriate for permanently shirking this responsibility, by posing no more risk of accidently stumbling upon the waste than when using radioactive shielding for space travel, the technicalities of its release beyond the Earth’s atmosphere is the major drawback. Not only would the rocket used need to provide enough power to escape the earth’s gravity in order to not leave the waste in orbit and by extension increase chances of this waste to reenter the earth’s environment due to collision with satellites, and other orbiting waste or spacecraft; but the large delivery rocket would also be expensive and an accident during launch could have catastrophic results.

Under the sea bed

As the rock formations below the seabed are comparatively more stable than those on landmass, the risk of exposure to seismic activity is reduced. Moreover, there is no major fear of radioactive waste contaminating ground water for potential human consumption. The greatest charm of under sea burial is simultaneously its greatest drawback. The taxing nature of waste extraction would prevent accidental or malicious disturbing of the waste. This cost is also the major deterrent from underwater burial.

b) Large geological formations on land

Once tectonically stable rock formations are located, the radioactive waste may be vitrified and buried in caverns and sealed again with stone once the process is

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complete. Despite the expense and peril that this entails this is the most viable option available.

The Pangaea Proposal

The major research in the 1990s identified Australia, southern Africa and western China as having the potential geological credentials for a deep waste repository. As a commercial venture, the area would be equipped with a port and rail layout for this sole purpose. The objectives of the Pangea proposal are still relevant to present legislation of the matter;

To provide an economic and environmentally responsible disposal option. To provide a safe and secure transportation service to the repository location. To provide the host country with the opportunity to gain substantial economic benefits and to play an important role in enhancing security and non-proliferation efforts for the benefit of all nations.

Energiewende in Germany

The Energiewende is the planned transition by Germany to a low carbon, environmentally sound, reliable, and affordable energy supply, relying heavily on renewable. Most if not all coal-fired generation will need to be retired. Legislative support for the Energiewende was passed in late 2010 and includes greenhouse gas reductions of 80–95% by 2050 and a renewable energy target of 60% by 2050, coupled with transparency in energy policy. The Berlin-based policy institute Agora Energiewende noted, "While the German approach is not unique worldwide, the speed and scope of the Energiewende are exceptional". Significant progress has been made on its GHG emissions reduction target, achieving a 27% decrease between 1990 and 2014. However the country will need to maintain an average GHG emissions abatement rate of 3.5% per year to reach its goals, equal to the maximum historical value thus far.

Another tangent for debate is the natural role climate change plays in deterring nuclear development for the third world. Plagued with the affects of pollution in air, water and land, developing megacities are considered incapable of grappling with the burden of the nuclear industry and waste management.

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The Middle Eastern Crisis: A Summary

When asked in a 1984 Newsweek poll where they believed was the greatest threat of a conflict situation that might escalate to nuclear war the majority of top tanking American military officers responded clearly: the Middle East. This was at a time when Congress was debating a Pentagon budget that would increase spending for Third World intervention by 34 percent. Some of the “power projection” weapons systems were “dual capable” in other words, able to fire nuclear as well as conventional warheads. Today the US military accumulation in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf, largely accomplished under the cover of the Iran-Iraq war, has made Southwest Asia a key strategic theater equipped with numbers and quality of nuclear blast-hardened command posts more advanced than those of NATO.

• Nuclear proliferation, whether in fact or myth, continues. According to Israeli reports, a Syria nuclear project was “reduced to dust by Israeli jets”, thus raising skeptical concerns over the legitimacy of Syrian reconciliation with regards to their chemical weapons stockpiles. Not a fan of mutual assured destruction itself, Israel is believed to have significantly vast undeclared arsenal.

• Iraq pursued nuclear capabilities under Saddam for decades; the centerpiece of his nuclear efforts was the Tuwaitha nuclear complex,south of Baghdad. • The site was bombed by Iran in 1980, by Israeli warplanes in 1981 attack and

the USA in 1990 soon afterwards, targeting main reactors. Israel in response inaugurated a pre-emptive strike policy that was subsequently named after then-Prime Minister Menachem Begin.

• Iran was stopped from approaching weapons capability, which it denied seeking, through a deal with world powers. The 2015 agreement limiting the atomic program brought — as North Korean leader Kim Jung Un undoubtedly has noted significant economic benefits in its wake.

• The KSA first began exploring a nuclear power program in August 2009 and it set up the King Abdullah City for Atomic and Renewable Energy in 2010 to develop plans for the future. However these ambitions have been dismissed many a time as a smoke and mirrors game, as the kingdom is falling behind on education, is yet to develop its own model of a car suffers from countless other deficiencies which make the prospects of a nuclear Saudi Arabia appear

very distant.

In 2011, Riyadh announced plans to build 16 nuclear reactors over 20 years. According to an article by the World Nuclear Association, construction was set to begin in 2016.

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Deterrence: A Concept

Introduction

Establishing effective deterrence against attacks in space and against the use of hybrid warfare tactics are the two most urgent priorities. The use of hybrid and terrorist tactics of warfare has gained newfound salience in the land domain of warfare, the likelihood that future military clash will envelop strife in space and the internet has risen fundamentally. Not just has the United States' capacity to discourage hostility in the conventional air, land, and ocean areas of fighting been thrown in question, yet new prerequisites to stop future animosity in the spaces of room and the internet have likewise emerged. At the point when an adversary has no motivating force to start or heighten strife at any given intercession or acceleration edge in any given space of fighting—both vertically and on a level plane inside that area and along the side into at least one extra areas of fighting—fruitful cross-space discouragement can be said to be as a result. Thisstudy guide focuses on the new challenges of deterring aggression in three of those five domains:

Types of Deterrence

Deterrence by punishment plans to make a contention excessively difficult or hazardous also, in this manner pressure the adversary into maintaining a strategic distance from or ending it. Full scale punishment/discipline can be incongruent with endeavors to pressure a foe to settle on a coveted choice: It is hard to impact an assailant when it has nothing left to lose. Deterrence by denial/foreswearing is coercive to a limited extent yet basically inclines toward dangers to control the circumstance adequately to deny the enemy key alternatives or gains. As a general suggestion, at whatever point plausible, prevention by foreswearing is to be wanted to prevention by discipline on the grounds that the last requires persistent pressure, though the previous includes control. Including prevention by foreswearing and discouragement by discipline, no less than four extra unique sorts of prevention can be recognized; they are neither totally unrelated nor commonly thorough:

1. General deterrence is said to be in actuality when the adjust of intensity is steady and no on-screen character is thinking about mounting an assault on another. General prevention can be in actuality at the worldwide level or at a provincial level.

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2. Immediate deterrence is required when a performer begins to examine or plan for military activity, along these lines releasing an emergency or crisis and making general discouragement break down.

3. Direct Deterrence, otherwise called focal prevention, includes a deterrent debilitating a potential attacker with striking back to keep the attacker from utilizing military power against the deterrer's most imperative interests, for example, its country. Since coordinate prevention includes the protection of essential interests, it is for the most part accepted to include a dependable threat.

4. Extended Deterrence includes a deterrer debilitating striking back against a potential assailant trying to anticipate

Successful deterrence identified in the classic texts appear to be persistently used by developed countries. China demonstrated an ability to attack U.S. satellites in low Earth orbit (LEO) and in geosynchronous Earth orbit (GEO) in 2007 and 2013, respectively. Beijing demonstrated its ability to conduct rendezvous and proximity operations with U.S. satellites, in 2016. Russia demonstrated similar capabilities in 2015 and 2016. Both China and Russia have thus made it clear that they have the capability to carry out and may be contemplating crippling blows on U.S. space-based assets at the outset of a conflict.

This is a prime example of developed nations exerting their power and using it against the international community as a means to protect themselves or to inflict harm upon other states in order to gain what they wish to be so in terms of politics or to help identify themselves to be the largest superpower in the global arena.

With regards to psychological warfare, general discouragement can be said to be in constrain when such strategies are most certainly not being utilized to challenge the adjust of intensity or mount assaults on others. Immediate discouragement implies the fruitful business of measures to keep the further work of fear monger strategies after their first utilize. In perspective of the persistent and continuous universal military crusades against the Islamic State in Iraq what's more, Syria, al Qaeda, al Mourabitoun, Boko Haram, al Shabaab, Abu Sayyaf, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, and the Taliban, among others, in the Levant; in Syria and Iraq; in North, East, and West Africa; and in South and East Asia, the adequacy of U.S. What's more, united general and prompt discouragement against non state performers utilizing psychological militant strategies can be said to be low. Coordinate discouragement of psychological warfare involves counteracting assaults on the U.S. country. No significant, mass-setback assaults on the United States have repeated since 9/11. Be that as it may, a critical number of occasions, for example, those at

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Fort Hood in November 2009, Boston in April 2013, San Bernardino in December 2015, and New York City in November 2017, by and large including more than 370 losses, have occurred. While a far more noteworthy number of assaults may have occurred had the United States not fortified country security after the 9/11 assaults, coordinate discouragement of assaults on the U.S. country still can't be said to be high. Broadened discouragement of psychological oppression involves anticipating psychological militant assaults on partners through the danger of striking back. Demonstrations of hostility by non state on-screen characters utilizing fear monger strategies against a noteworthy number of U.S. partners have repeated with some normality since the 9/11 assaults. Such assaults additionally proceed to be mounted in spite of the way that the United States is as of now connected with against their instigators militarily in various auditoriums of military activities. Since U.S. mediation for the benefit of companions also, partners against fear monger associations in different performance centers of activities has not lessened the utilization of fear monger strategies of fighting, the U.S. limit with regards to expanded prevention of hostility by nonstate on-screen characters utilizing psychological militant strategies can be said to be low.

Surprise: with regards to fear mongering, strategic shock includes getting cautioning of an assault yet neglecting to have sufficient energy to take measures to move potential casualties out of mischief's way or thwart the assault. Open, Western social orders are loaded with potential delicate targets helpless to fear based oppressor assault. Shy of draconian severe measures or the restrictively costly "hardening" of potential focuses all through whole social orders, promote strategic astonishment at the hands of non state performing artists utilizing fear monger strategies seems, by all accounts, to be inescapable.

Technology: The impetus for non state performers to strike first utilizing psychological oppressor strategies is high. Rehashed assaults have demonstrated that the assailant to-target proportion is low: It just takes one aircraft to execute handfuls; three psychological oppressors slaughtered 90 regular people amid a November 2015 assault at the Bataclantheater in Paris. Besides, the parts expected to develop ad libbed hazardous gadgets and people willing to collect, convey, and explode them keep on being accessible in wealth. Vital slack in this manner supports the aggressor. Doctrine: A very much explained and extensively spread U.S. national convention/doctrine by which to discourage assaults by non state performing artists does not seem to exist. The striking nature and believability of U.S. convention are, along these lines, low, just like the United States' notoriety for discouragement in the nonstate performing artist subarea of the land space of warfare.68 In-area prevention: In-space techniques of discouragement can be utilized to deny nonstate

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performing artists the preferences that they look for in utilizing awry fear monger strategies. Developed insight participation, arbitrary quests out in the open spots, and occasional irregular surges in the level of security at clear targets increment the likelihood that assailants will be impeded, accordingly diminishing the danger of strategic amazement. Blocking the likelihood of positive attention and guaranteeing negative media scope rather could lessen the normal incentive to the assailant of mounting an assault. A coordinated, global vital interchanges crusade could raise the normal expenses and lower the normal advantages of assaults by nonstate on-screen characters by accentuating the accompanying:

1. the Islamic wrongness of such strategies, when Islam is manhandled to legitimize them

2. the low achievement rate of such assaults

3. the disappointment of such battles to accomplish their political destinations 4. their counterproductive nature, defaming Muslims and causing sanctions 5. Observational proof that such assaults usher hard-line government officials,

less slanted to bargain, into office.

The Power that Developed Nations Possess

Cyber Warfare

Enablers/Empowering agents: The suppositions and necessities for fruitful prevention for the most part give off an impression of being met in the digital space. A few rivals do, in any case, seem to have a moderately high craving for going out on a limb in the digital space. This suggests it will, at any rate at first, be more difficult to deflect such on-screen characters from future demonstrations of digital hostility. It is hard to decide if adversaries' conduct in the digital space can be clarified as heedlessness conceived out of deficient involvement with the constraints and symptoms of such fighting or whether it is the consequence of chilly, careful computation by rivals that they would be advantaged by heightening in this domain. Types of Deterrents: Because endeavors to change the adjust of intensity in the digital area have been in progress for quite a while, general discouragement can be thought to be very low. Due to the certainty that we have seen rehashed and proceeding with occurrences of both rival PC organize abuse (spying and taking of data) and adversary PC arrange attack, immediate deterrence of cyber warfare can likewise be regarded to be low.

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Surprise: With the conceivable special case of zero-day abuses (the misuse of beforehand obscure PC working framework or on the other hand programming shortcomings), the likelihood of vital astonishment in the digital space looks low; the danger is well-known. Barring a incapacitating first strike on both the business and administrative digital barrier assets of the United States or its partners, the capacity to prepare assets in light of a cyber attack gives off an impression of being high, and the likelihood of strategic astonishment in this way gives off an impression of being low. Be that as it may, the impetuses and assets required for the private part to ensure basic framework against cyber attack are considerable also, likely not in place.

Technology: The United States' capacity to dissuade rivals specifically inside the digital area is a capacity both of the predominance of arranged PCs in the objective nation and of that nation's level of interconnectedness with the outside world. For a few nations (e.g., Russia, China), consequently, open doors for coordinate discouragement might be high; for others (e.g., North Korea), they might be lower.

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Today the idea of hard and fast nuclear war is seldom discussed. There are worries about Iran and North Korea's atomic projects and fears that psychological militants may get hold of an atomic bomb. Be that as it may, the dread of a war in which the point is to wipe out the whole populace of a foe has startlingly reduced. In 1962, the idea of commonly guaranteed decimation began to have a noteworthy influence in the guard arrangement of the US. President Kennedy's Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, set out in a discourse to the American Bar Foundation a hypothesis of adaptable atomic reaction. Generally it implied accumulating an immense atomic armory. In case of a Soviet assault the US would have enough atomic capability to survive a first rush of atomic strikes and strike back. The reaction would be massive to the point that the adversary would endure "guaranteed pulverization". Consequently the genuine reasoning of atomic discouragement was set up. On the off chance that the opposite side realized that starting an atomic strike would likewise unavoidably prompt their own particular pulverization, they would be nonsensical to press the catch.

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Before, wars had been battled by vanquishing your adversary on the war zone by prevalent utilization of power. However, MAD was a radical flight that bested the regular perspective of war. The period of MAD proclaimed another dread, with natives realizing that they could be destroyed inside a matter of minutes at the dash of a catch a few a huge number of miles away. "The focal thing was the general population had no control," says Dr Christopher Laucht, a teacher in British history at Leeds University. "You were helpless before political leaders. Aside from the dread that one side would accomplish something moronic, there was additionally the dread of innovation and the subject of 'imagine a scenario in which a mischance happened.

Eight months after McNamara's discourse the idea of MAD was nearly put under a magnifying glass by the Cuban Missile Crisis. At last the two superpowers gave ground and the issue was turned away however humankind had never come so near doomsday.

Following a time of Cold War armistice in the 1970s, pressure climbed again in the 1980s. By this point the Soviet Union had numerous more warheads, and it was ordinarily said that there were sufficient atomic arms on Earth to wipe the planet out a few times.

The dread of approaching assault turned into a piece of regular discussion. Kids hypothesized in the play area about the primary indications of an atomic assault - hair and fingernails dropping out - and whether one could survive an atomic winter. In 1983 there were various Russian false cautions. The Soviet Union's initial cautioning framework erroneously got a US rocket coming into USSR airspace. Around the same time, NATO's military arranging activity Able Archer drove some Russian administrators to infer that a NATO atomic dispatch was up and coming.

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A series of movies and TV arrangement in the 1980s - from War Games, Threads, and When the Wind Blows - mirrored these feelings of dread.

Now and again the dark cleverness radiated from impossible spots. In 1984 President Ronald Reagan broadly said in a radio sound check: "My kindred Americans, I'm satisfied to reveal to you today that I've marked enactment that will prohibit Russia for eternity. We start shelling in five minutes."

The experts attempted to offer consolation. In the UK a well known open data battle Protect and Survive gave individuals guidance on the most proficient method to construct an atomic safe house. It was later ridiculed by When the Wind Blows, which depicted an elderly couple constructing their sanctuary and dying in the atomic consequence.

Two decades after the Cold War finished, there are still in excess of 17,000 atomic warheads around the globe, the lion's share as yet pointing forward and backward between the US and Russia. Be that as it may, MAD as an open dread has vanished. "Vulnerable War there was a little danger of absolute atomic disaster," says Paul Rogers, teacher of peace learns at Bradford University.

Today the hazard isn't so much Armageddon yet an "elusive incline" of expansion, he says. North Korea is thought to have around 10 warheads, Rogers notes, while Iran is believed to be near an atomic bomb.

Some have guessed Saudi Arabia could take after if Iran succeeds and it's been recommended that Israel as of now has in excess of 100 warheads.

The most genuine remain off today isn't the US and Russia yet the possibility of an atomic trade amongst India and Pakistan in which "several millions would pass on", Rogers recommends. What's more, the risk in any of these territorial question is that the US and Russia get sucked in and what started as a war between two neighbors goes worldwide.

"The dread of atomic war has lessened somewhat in light of the fact that the hazard has retreated essentially with the finish of the Cold War," says Nick Bostrom, executive of Oxford University's Future of Humanity Institute. "Be that as it may, another factor may be basic changes in hazard mold - it ending up more famous as of late to stress over a dangerous atmospheric devotion, for instance."

More quick stresses are psychological militant assault, pandemic malady, and financial emergency.

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Robert Harris in his ongoing novel The Fear Index analyzed the advanced tension that breakers the danger of ground-breaking innovation with unbridled monetary markets.

The fundamental character, who runs a flexible investments, comments: "Dread is driving the world as at no other time... The ascent in advertise instability, as we would like to think, is an element of digitalization, which is overstating human emotional episodes by the phenomenal spread of data through the web."

These are current feelings of trepidation that John F Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev, driving the superpowers at the tallness of the Cuban Missile Crisis, would battle to grasp.

Be that as it may, the finish of the Cold War hasn't evacuated the atomic warheads. Relations amongst Russia and the West have decayed as of late. China, whose atomic program is minimal comprehended in the West, is multiplying its military spending. India and Pakistan remains a potential flashpoint. So for what reason don't individuals fear atomic war as they used to?

For some examiners the world is presently a less steady place than it was amid the Cold War. And all the major geopolitical showdowns still spin around atomic weapons, says Dr Nick Ritchie, instructor in worldwide security at the University of York.

"No less than a few hundred American and Russian atomic rockets stay on 'hard caution' equipped for being propelled inside minutes. Regardless of whether that isn't really the approach or goal, the frameworks and practices stay set up."

The phantom of MAD stays regardless of whether individuals would rather not

consider it.

Can Artificial Intelligence Upend Nuclear Capability?

Artificial Intelligence or "Man-made reasoning" and nuclear war have been fiction clichés for quite a long time. The present AI is amazing no doubt, yet specific, and remains a long ways from PCs that wind up mindful and betray their makers. In the meantime, mainstream culture does not do equity to the dangers that cutting edge AI

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undoubtedly shows, for example, its capability to make atomic war more probable regardless of whether it never applies coordinate control over atomic weapons. “There’s a “significant potential” for artificial intelligence to undermine the foundations of nuclear security, according to a new report published today by the RAND Corporation, a nonprofit, nonpartisan research organization. This grim conclusion was the product of a RAND workshop involving experts in AI, nuclear security, government, and military. “

“At the very core of this discussion is the concept of nuclear deterrence, in which the guarantee of “mutually assured destruction” (MAD), or “assured retaliation,” prevents one side from launching its nuclear weapons at an equally armed adversary. It’s a cold, calculating logic that has—at least to this stage in our history—prevented an all-out nuclear war, with rational, self-preservational powers opting to fight a Cold War instead. As long as no nuclear power maintains significant first-strike capabilities, the MAD concept reigns supreme; if a weapons system can survive a first strike and hit back with equal force, assured destruction remains in effect. But this arrangement could weaken and become destabilized in the event that one side loses its ability to strike back, or even if it starts to believe that it runs of the risk of losing that capability.

This equation incentivizes state actors to avoid steps that could destabilize the current geopolitical equilibrium, but, as we’ve seen repeatedly over the past several decades, nuclear powers are still willing to push the first-strike envelope. See: the development of stealth bombers, nuclear-capable submarines, and most recently Russian president Vladimir Putin’s unveiling of an invincible ballistic missile.” “ in the paranoid logic of nuclear deterrence, AI doesn’t have to actually provide this breakthrough in order for it to be destabilizing — the enemy only has to think that it provides a putative edge that puts its nuclear force at risk.

In the case of intelligent image processing, it’s not just paranoia. The U.S. Defense Department’s Project Maven aims to take reams of drone video and pick out objects automatically from full-motion video, enabling the analysis of massive quantities of video surveillance.”

Do these developments make it easier for developed nations to have an upper hand over developing nations? Where does this leave developing nations and does this justify their use of nuclear energy to protect their states?

Russian President Vladimir Putin recognized the military criticalness of AI when he announced in September that the nation that leads in man-made brainpower will in

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the long run govern the world. He might be the main pioneer to have put it so gruffly, yet other world forces have all the earmarks of being thinking also. Both China and the United States have declared eager endeavors to bridle AI for military applications, feeding fears of a nascent weapons contest.

In a similar September discourse, Putin said that AI accompanies "epic openings" and additionally "dangers that are hard to foresee." The gravest of those dangers may include atomic steadiness—as we portray in another RAND distribution that layouts a couple of the manners by which security could be stressed.

Key dependability exists when governments aren't enticed to utilize atomic dangers or compulsion against their foes. It includes something other than keeping up a tenable capacity to strike back after an adversary assault. Notwithstanding that obstacle, atomic strength requires confirmation and consolation. At the point when a country stretches out an atomic security certification to partners, the partners must be guaranteed that nukes will be propelled with all due respect regardless of whether the country expanding the assurance must put its own particular urban communities in danger. Foes should be consoled that powers developed for prevention and to ensure partners won't be utilized without incitement. Prevention, affirmation, and consolation are regularly inconsistent with each other, making atomic steadiness hard to keep up notwithstanding when governments have no enthusiasm for assaulting each other.

In this present reality where expanding quantities of adversary states are atomic equipped, the circumstance turns out to be relatively unmanageable. In the 1970s, four of the five pronounced atomic powers basically focused on their weapons on the fifth, the Soviet Union (Beijing, after its 1969 fringe conflicts with the Soviet Union, dreaded Moscow significantly more than Washington). It was a moderately basic two-sided remain off between the Bolsheviks and their numerous enemies. Today, nine atomic forces are trapped in covering key contentions—including Israel, which has not announced the atomic weapons store that it is broadly accepted to have. While the United States, the United Kingdom, France still stress over Russia, they additionally worry around an inexorably powerful China. Beijing's adversaries incorporate not only the United States and Russia but rather India also. India fears China as well, yet basically worries about Pakistan. What's more, everybody is stressed over North Korea.

In such an intricate and dynamic condition, groups of strategists are required to explore struggle circumstances—to distinguish alternatives and comprehend their consequences. Could AI make this activity less demanding? With AI currently beating human experts in the antiquated Chinese procedure diversion Go, and in

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addition in recreations of feigning, for example, poker, nations might be enticed to fabricate machines that could "sit" at the table in the midst of atomic clashes and go about as strategists.

Falsely keen machines may end up being less blunder inclined than people in numerous specific circumstances. However, for errands, for example, exploring strife circumstances, that minute is still far away later on. Much exertion must be used before machines can—or should—be depended on for predictable execution of the unprecedented errand of helping the world stay away from atomic war. Late research recommends that it is shockingly easy to trap an AI framework into achieving off base conclusions when an enemy gets the opportunity to control a portion of the sources of info, for example, how a vehicle is painted before it is captured.

In any case, AI could undermine the establishments of atomic solidness through means other than giving exhortation to strategists. Sensors and cameras are expanding in number all through the world; AI's developing capacity to make forecasts in view of data from these different sources may make countries stress that the rockets and submarines they rely on for guaranteed countering will wind up powerless. Amid the Cold War, the superpowers looked for devastating "first-strike" abilities, yet this was a hazardous system—every superpower ended up persuaded that the other may dispatch an incapacitating strike against it. With striking back avoided, whoever struck first would pick up a tremendous preferred standpoint. Along these lines the odds of inadvertent atomic war were significantly expanded. Such difficulties are considerably more full in this day and age. More states are atomic furnished—and AI innovation may loan additional believability to dangers against atomic retaliatory powers.

In the coming years, AI-empowered advance in following and focusing on enemies' atomic weapons could undermine the establishments of atomic steadiness; that is, countries may address whether their rockets and submarines are helpless against a first strike. Will AI some time or another have the capacity to control procedure choices about acceleration or notwithstanding propelling atomic weapons? Such capacities are off out yonder until further notice, yet the possibility that they will in the end develop is genuine—just like the need to see, at this moment, how AI could reshape the world's way to deal with atomic strength.

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The question of potential proliferation in the developing world merits thorough debate regarding the management and disposal of radioactive waste. The process is taxing for many, regardless of economic circumstance. Thus a variety of proposals to handle this responsibility have been tabled worldwide, as the problems they are faced with are also far reaching.

“Many nuclear power plants, particularly in the developed countries around the world, are nearing the end of their operating lives, ” as these nations enjoyed a lead in the nuclear race and their power plants have put more years behind them. This nuclear race was at its peak during the Cold War, which left its mark on twenty first century non-proliferation efforts in the form of left over radioactive waste from decommissioned nuclear missiles.

The concern over proper disposal is more a question of efficient management than technicalities. Typically represented by 5% of the total cost of the generated electricity, the cost of managing disposal may comfortably be extracted from the average national budget. Moreover, each country with nuclear capability has the ethical and legal responsibility to dispose, thus by default radioactive waste in the ideal scenario must be disposed in each of the approximately 40 countries involved - an unfeasible option – as this entails that Sweden and other counties with few plants of their own must invest in research for a local site for disposal out of obligation. The more tangible alternative was then the establishment of ‘commercial geologic repositories,’ which may last a predicted 100,000 years, pivoted around competition and funded by fees from countries whose waste is being disposed for them. The stable underground site in Yucca Mountain, Nevada serves as a paradigm.

The Environment Factor

The Demand for Clean Energy

In an increasingly environment-conscious age where the onus is on the energy sector to sustainably handle the growing energy demands, as sustainability becomes the ethical norm. A market determined carbon price incentivizes cleaner energy sources as compared to fossil fuels to enter the playing field in which wind, solar and nuclear are the main contenders.

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The growing involvement in global efforts to combat climate change appeared more tangible than ever when in 2015 over 140 nations expressed their approval of the UN’s Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) by agreeing to an 8% per capita reduction in CO2 emissions by 2025 and 9% by 2030. The role of India and China INDCs is noteworthy here with India pledging 246 GWe and China 352 GWe by 2030 on top of present world 178 GWe with regards to their solar capacity. Regarding wind, China pledged 345 GWe and India 78 GWe capacity by 2030 on top of 2015 world capacity. Also noteworthy among the policy responses to climate

change was the Kyoto Protocol.

Uranium Stewardship

“Stewardship involves the care and management of a commodity through its entire life cycle. For a mineral, this cycle generally encompasses exploration, mining, processing, refining, fabricating, use, recovery, recycling and disposal. Stewardship must be an integrated programme of action aimed at ensuring that all materials, processes, goods and services are managed throughout the life cycle in a socially and environmentally responsible manner.”

The appeals of stewardship, if well implanted are many. Not only does this foster lucrative economic relationships across the board, and enhance the social license of an industry to operate, but also it also entails low energy and water consumption, as well as less expenditure on other auxiliaries, and thus minimized harm to people and the environment.

Looking Ahead

Despite the difficulties in store for the IAEA and its safeguards system in the near future, this system is of immense importance for the conservation of global peace and security. As explained in the IAEA booklet, Verifying Compliance with Nuclear Non-Proliferation Undertakings, safeguards are a crucial aspect of the global nuclear security framework. Furthermore, the booklet explains that safeguards are also necessary for “regional and national security.” It must be understood that for all of the IAEA’s work, states’ intentions related to the use of nuclear material cannot always be predicted, and that “nuclear safeguards are only as good as the IAEA membership allows them to be.”

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Planning ahead, in its Long-Term Strategic Plan 2012-2013, the IAEA Department of Safeguards has highlighted a number of objectives, in addition to its plan of action for the improvement of Safeguards provisions. Moreover, It has decided to make safeguards “more objectives-based and information-driven,” addressing its shortcomings regarding verification. In addition, the IAEA acknowledges current advances in nuclear technology, and is preparing to meet new challenges by adapting its safeguards system accordingly. It also discusses the IAEA’s involvement in other nonproliferation activities, such as providing technical advice in the negotiation of a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT). Finally, the IAEA Department of Safeguards has made a renewed commitment to working effectively with Member States.

Questions a Resolution Must Answer

1. How will the activities of the IAEA have to adapt to the new standards of the future?

2. With new countries establishing nuclear facilities, what can the IAEA do to ensure that all of its nuclear material is effectively safeguarded?

3. What should the IAEA do to address the concerns of Member States that safeguards are being used to limit the growth and development of peaceful nuclear facilities in nonnuclear weapons states?

4. How should the Agency deal with issues of non-compliance?

5. Is it justified for developing nations to continue to grow their nuclear arsenal? 6. What should be done of the environmental damages done by nuclear energy?

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