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Lessons Learned and Key Recommendations from the Virginia Tech Tragedy

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(1)

Lessons Learned and Key Recommendations from the

Virginia Tech Tragedy

(2)

University Setting

Virginia Tech is a sprawling campus in rural Blacksburg, Va.

Campus population: 35,000 students 131 buildings

5 full-time officers patrolled the campus &

9 additional officers in offices

The only alert systems in place were

rudimentary phone trees and email

(3)

First Incident

7:15 AM April 16, 2007

6:47AM – Seung-Hui Cho spotted outside West Ambler Johnston Hall (WAJ).

7:02AM – Emily Hilscher dropped off by boyfriend at WAJ.

7:15 Cho entered WAJ Hall dormitory

room 4040 and shot 19 year old student Emily Hilscher.

R/A Ryan Clark went to investigate loud

noises and was also fatally shot.

(4)

West Ambler Hall

7:15 AM

Harper Hall

(5)
(6)

First Incident

Cho left the building leaving bloody foot prints.

7:17 a.m. – Cho’s access card swiped at Harper Hall where he changes out of his bloody clothes.

7:20 a.m. – VTPD receives call that a female student may have fallen from her loft bed.

7:24 a.m. – VTPD officer arrives at room 4040 to

find two people shot inside the room.

(7)

First Incident – continued

7:30-8:00 a.m. – Based on preliminary interview with Hilscher’s friend, police concluded it was a

domestic incident and the prime suspect was her boyfriend who had left the campus.

7:51 a.m. – VTPD notifies Exec. V.P. which triggers meeting of university Policy Group

8:25 a.m. – VT Policy Group meets to plan how to notify students of the homicides

9:26 a.m. – Warning message sent via email to

campus staff, faulty and students about the dorm

shooting.

(8)

Virginia Tech Campus

(9)

Second Incident-Norris Hall

While police investigated the double

homicide, Cho mails a package from the Blacksburg Post Office to NBC News.

9:15 a.m. - 9:30 a.m. Cho seen outside Norris Hall. He chains the doors shut on three main entrances.

On one door he places a note warning the

door is connected to a bomb.

(10)

Norris Hall Note

Written by Cho 4/16/07

Peter Marone, Director Va. Dept of Forensic Science

(11)

Second Incident

9:40 a.m. - Cho begins shooting in classrooms on second floor.

9:45 a.m. – First police officers arrive within 3 minutes of receipt of call. Attempts to enter the chained doors failed.

9:50 a.m. – Police shoot open an ordinary lock on a fourth entrance not chained and go to the second floor.

9:51 a.m. – Cho shoots himself in the head just

as police reach the second floor

(12)

Second Incident

Cho’s shooting spree lasted about 11 minutes.

The massacre continued for 9 minutes after the first 9-1-1 call.

He fired 174 rounds, killed 30 people in Norris Hall plus himself and wounded 17.

Police found 17 empty magazines each capable of holding 10-15 live cartridges (122 for the

Glock pistol and 81 for the Walther pistol).

(13)

University Plan and Security

Key Findings:

The Emergency Plan was deficient

– No threat assessment team

– No provision for an active shooter scenario

– No critical incident command level authority for campus police in decision making hierarchy

Crisis Communication Plan

– Emergency message protocol was cumbersome, untimely, and problematic

– An all campus population alert is critical when

there is imminent danger

(14)

University Setting and Security

Key Findings:

No active shooter response training or procedures for faculty/staff/students

No classrooms could be locked from inside The Emergency Response Plan did not

reflect the primary role of campus police as

law enforcement

(15)

University Setting and Security

Emergency Planning- Lessons Learned

Check exterior door hardware to ensure that they are not

subject to being chained shut.

Classrooms and offices should be able to be locked from the inside.

Take bomb threats seriously. Students and

staff should report them immediately, even if

most do turn out to be false alarms.

(16)

University Setting and Security

Emergency Planning Recommendations

Universities should do a risk analysis (threat

assessment) and then choose a level of security appropriate for their campus.

Institutions of higher learning should have a threat assessment team that includes representatives

from:

– law enforcement;

– human resources;

– student and academic affairs;

– legal counsel; and

– mental health services.

(17)

University Setting and Security

Emergency Planning Recommendations Students, faculty, and staff should be trained annually about responding to various emergencies and about the notification systems that will be used.

Universities and colleges must comply with the Clery Act, which requires

timely public warnings of imminent

danger.

(18)

University Setting and Security

Campus Alerting Recommendations

Campus emergency communications systems must have multiple means of sharing information.

In an emergency, immediate messages must be sent to the campus community

that provide clear information on the nature of the emergency and actions to be taken.

Campus police as well as administration officials should have the authority and

capability to send an emergency message.

(19)

University Setting and Security

Police Role & Training Recommendations

The head of campus police should be a

member of a threat assessment team as well as the emergency response team for the

university.

Campus police must report directly to the senior operations officer responsible for emergency decision making.

The mission statement of campus police

should give primacy to their law enforcement

and crime prevention role.

(20)

Law Enforcement Lessons Learned

Campus police everywhere should train with local law

enforcement agencies on

response to active shooters and other emergencies.

Police should escort survivors out of

buildings, where circumstances and

manpower permit.

(21)

Campus Mental Health Services Recommendations

Universities should promote the sharing of student information internally, and with the student’s family, when significant

circumstances pertaining to health and safety arise.

Incidents of aberrant, dangerous, or

threatening behavior must be documented and reported immediately to a college’s

threat assessment group, and must be acted upon in a prompt and effective manner to

protect the safety of the campus community.

(22)

Campus Mental Health Services Recommendations

Colleges and Universities must have a system that links troubled students to :

– appropriate medical and counseling services;

– either on or off campus; and

– balance individual’s rights with rights of all

others for safety.

(23)

Campus Mental Health Services Recommendations

Policies and procedures should be

implemented to require professors and staff encountering aberrant, dangerous, or threatening behavior from a student to report them to the Dean.

Reporting requirements must be clearly established and reviewed during

annual training.

(24)

Campus Emergency Management Lessons Learned

A Unified Command Post should have been established.

A Unified Command Post should have been staffed by those having statutory authority.

– In this incident, law enforcement would have been the lead agency.

The Unified Command should communicate

directly with EOC and policymaking group.

(25)

Campus Emergency Management Lessons Learned

Failure to open an Emergency Operations Center (EOC) led to communications and coordination issues during the incident.

– The EOC is usually located at a pre-

designated site that can be quickly activated having 2 main goals:

Support emergency responders

Ensure continuity of operations

within campus community

(26)

Campus Emergency Management Lessons Learned

The EOC should NOT

function as the incident commander.

The policy making group should function within the EOC.

A Joint Information Center should be established within the EOC to

coordinate all public information.

(27)

Campus Emergency Management Response Recommendations

A unified command post should be established and operated based on the NIMS Incident Command System model.

An Emergency Operations Center must be activated during a mass casualty

incident.

(28)

Campus Emergency Management Recovery Recommendations

Recovery plans should include a section on victim services that addresses the significant impact of homicide and other disaster-

related deaths on:

- survivors; and

- the role of victim service providers.

When a family assistance center is created after a mass casualty event, victim

advocates should be called in immediately.

(29)

Campus Emergency Management Recovery Recommendations

Both short- and long-term counseling should be made available to first responders,

students, staff, faculty members, and university leaders.

Universities and colleges should work with their local government partners to improve plans for mutual aid in all areas of crisis

response, including that of victim services.

(30)

Source:

Mass Shooting at Virginia Tech

April 16, 2007

Report of the Virginia Tech Review Panel

Presented by Ron Ellis, Director

School & Campus Security Training Program Illinois Terrorism Task Force

[email protected]

References

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