The under appreciated drive for sense making

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Original citation:

Chater, Nick and Loewenstein, George. (2015) The under-appreciated drive for

sense-making. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2015.10.016

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ContentslistsavailableatScienceDirect

Journal

of

Economic

Behavior

&

Organization

jo u r n al ho me p ag e :ww w . e l s e v i e r . c o m / l o c a t e / j e b o

The

under-appreciated

drive

for

sense-making

Nick

Chater

a,∗

_,

_George

_Loewenstein

b

a_Behavioural_Science_Group,_Warwick_Business_School,_University_of_Warwick,_Coventry_CV4_7AL,_UK

b_Department_of_Social_and_Decision_Sciences,_Carnegie_Mellon_University,₅₀₀₀_Forbes_Avenue,_BP_208,_Pittsburgh,_PA_15213,_USA

a

r

t

i

c

l

e

i

n

f

o

Articlehistory:

Received14October2015 Accepted28October2015 Availableonlinexxx

Keywords:

Sense-making Drive Motivation Simplicity

Informationavoidance Conﬁrmationbias

a

b

s

t

r

a

c

t

Thispaperdrawsattentiontoapowerfulhumanmotivethathasnotyetbeenincorporated intoeconomics:thedesiretomakesenseofourimmediateexperience,ourlife,andour world.Weproposethatevolutionhasproduceda‘driveforsense-making’whichmotivates peopletogather,attendto,andprocessinformationinafashionthataugments,and com-plements,autonomoussense-making.Alargefractionofautonomouscognitiveprocesses aredevotedtomakingsenseoftheinformationweacquire:andtheydothisbyseeking simpledescriptionsoftheworld.Insomesituations,however,autonomousinformation processingaloneisinadequatetotransformdisparateinformationintosimple representa-tions,inwhichcase,weargue,thedriveforsense-makingdirectsourattentionandcanlead ustoseekoutadditionalinformation.Weproposeatheoreticalmodelofsense-makingand ofhowitistradedoffagainstothergoals.Weshowthatthedriveforsense-makingcan helptomakesenseofawiderangeofdisparatephenomena,includingcuriosity,boredom, ‘ﬂow’,conﬁrmationbiasandinformationavoidance,esthetics(bothinartandinscience), whywecareaboutothers’beliefs,theimportanceofnarrativeandtheroleof‘thegoodlife’ inhumandecisionmaking.

1. Introduction

Inhis1864masterpiece,Utilitarianism,JohnStuartMillembracedBentham’sUtilityPrinciple,but proposedamore expansiveconceptionofutilitythanthepurelypleasureandpain-basedconceptproposedbyBentham.Withhisfamous statementthat“itisbettertobeahumanbeingdissatisfiedthanapigsatisfied;bettertobeSocratesdissatisfiedthanafool satisfied,”(260)Milldrewattentiontotheimportanceofinsightandwisdom,andofappreciating‘higher’pleasuressuch asartandmusic.Insightandknowledge,Millfelt,weregoals,aboveandbeyondtheseekingofpleasureandavoidanceof pain,thatpeopleshouldanddostrivefor.Yetsubsequentimplementationsofdifferentconceptionsofutilityineconomic theoryhaverarelydealtwiththetypesof‘higher’pleasuresdiscussedbyMillinasubstantivefashion.Eventhebroadest notionsofutilitythathavebeenproposed,forexample‘egoutility’orbelief-basedutility,failtoaccountfortheenormous time,moneyandattentionalresourcesthatpeopledevotetosense-making.

Inthispaperweposittheexistenceofa‘driveforsense-making’which,weargue,isanalogoustobetterknowndrivessuch ashunger,thirstandsex.Wereviewdiverseresearchonsense-makingfrompsychology,thenlayoutthebasicelements ofatheoreticalmodelofutilitymaximizationthatincorporatessense-makingasaningredientofutility.Inourmodel, individualshavetwogoalsthatdrivetheirbehavior:(1)toconstrueourlivesinapositivefashion(valence);and(2)to

∗ Correspondingauthor.

E-mailaddresses:[email protected](N.Chater),[email protected](G.Loewenstein).

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2015.10.016

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construeourlivesinawaythatmakessense(sense-making).Giventhatbothinvolveeventsoccurringpurelyinthemind, theymightseemtofavoralifeconsistingofpurelymentalactivity—e.g.,fantasizingthatone’slifeisdesirableandmakes sense.However,bothofthesetendenciesareseverelyconstrainedbythebrain’sautonomoussense-makingcapabilities, whichareinvoluntaryandhavethesoleobjectiveofmaximallysimplifyinginformation(i.e.,arenotinﬂuencedbyvalence). Wecanmakedeliberate(non-autonomous)decisionsaboutwhethertocollectinformation,butwehavenoabilitytodictate howwewillinterprettheinformationwecollect,nor,ofcourse,tochoosewhatwewilldiscoverwhenwechoosetocollect information.

Themodelhasnovelimplicationsbothforwhenpeoplechoosetoobtainoravoidinformation,butalsoformoreordinary economicdecisions.Giventheconstraintsonself-deceptioninherentintheautonomousprocesses’soleconcernwith sense-making,inmostsituationsthesafestandmostdirectroutetowardensuringthatourimageofourlivesisfavorableand makessense,istolivealifethathaspositivefeaturesandthatcanbemadesenseof.Wediscussawiderangeofapplications ofthemodel,includingcuriosity(thedesireforinformationforitsownsake),boredom,ﬂow(thepleasureofsense-making), conﬁrmationbias,informationavoidance,consumerchoice,estheticpreferences(includingbothartandscience),concern aboutothers’beliefs,conspiracytheoriesandreligion,theimportanceofnarrative,andtheroleofthe‘goodlife’indecision makingandlifesatisfaction.

2. Sense-makingandsimpliﬁcation

TheOxfordEnglishdictionarydefinesadriveas“aninnate,biologicallydeterminedurgetoattainagoalorsatisfya need”(Stevenson,2010,p.535),andthisis thesenseinwhichweusethetermhere.Duetoprofoundlimitationson howmuchinformationthebraincanprocessandstore,aswellasthedesireforefficiencyincommunication,evolution hasproducedelaborateneuralmechanismsfor thesimplificationanddistillationofinformation. Suchprocessesguide perception,language,memory,andawiderangeofothercognitiveprocesses.Knowingthattheobjectinfrontofoneisa table,forexample,wecansafelyassumethatitissolid,flat,elevatedfromtheground,canholdalaptopanddrinks,aswell asmyriadotherpropertiesthataredifficulttoenumeratebecausetheyaresofullyassimilatedinourmentalrepresentations oftablesthatweareunawareoftheirexistence.

Theviewthatperceptionandcognitionseekstomakesenseoftheworldhasalongandvariedhistory.Forexample, Gestaltpsychology,aschoolofpsychologythatthrivedintheearly20thcentury,wasconcernedwiththeacquisitionof meaningfulperceptionsinachaoticworld.Gestaltpsychologistsenumeratedaseriesof‘laws’or‘principles’dictatinghow themindmakessenseoftheenvironmentbyconstructingglobalwholes—‘Gestalts’—fromotherwisechaoticstimuli(Koffka, 2013/1935;RockandPalmer,1990).

Fig.1showssomeclassicstimulithatdemonstrateGestaltprinciples.Inthelefthandstimulus(duetothecelebrated ItalianpsychologistKanizsa,1979),postulatinganinvisiblesquarethatcoverssomeoftheblackblobs‘makessense’ofthe missingelements.Similarly,thecentralstimuluscanbestbemadesenseofbypostulatinga3Dwhite‘wireframe’cube whichpartiallyoccludestheblackcirclesseenasbehindit.Theintegratednatureofthisinterpretationismadeparticularly evidentinvirtueoftheambiguityofthewire-framecube—itisaso-calledNeckercube,muchdiscussedpsychologyand neuroscience).Whenthecube‘flips’fromappearingtobeviewedfromaboveandtiltedtotheviewer’sleft,toappearingto beviewedfrombelowandtiltedtotheviewer’sright,theblackcirclesattheverticesofthecubecorrespondinglyappear tochange‘depth.’Thethirdfigure,Idesawa’s(1991)sphere,isperhapsevenmoreremarkable.Thebraincreatesasmooth whitesphere(whichappears,tomanyobservers,tobeabrighterwhitethanthesurround)radiatingconicalblackspinesin threedimensions,fromacollectionofflatblackgeometricshapes.AccordingtoGestalttheory(e.g.,Chater,1996;Pomerantz

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andKubovy,1986),thesphere-with-spinesisconstructedbecauseitprovidesasimpleexplanationofthepreciseoutlines andlocationsoftheblackshapes.Finally,thewell-knownRubinvase,orface-vasestimulus(whichcanbeperceivedeither asavaseorastwofacesinprofile),illustrateshowtheelementsofastimuluscanbeinterpretedverydifferently,depending onthe‘whole’intowhichtheyareassimilated.Flippingbetweenthefaceandvaseinterpretationsinvolveschangingwhich partoftheimageis‘figure’andwhichis‘ground.’Giventhatthebrainencodesfiguresintermsofconvex‘bumps’rather thanconcave‘hollows’(HoffmanandRichards,1984),thefeaturesencodedinthefaceinterpretation(nose,lips)are,onthe vaseinterpretation,notevenencodedaspartsofthestimulusatall,butaslyingbetweenthesefeatures.Thisstimulusisa classicillustrationofdifferentconceptsfromGestaltpsychology,includingtheidea(embodiedinourmodel)thatthebrain canonlymakesenseoftheworldinonewayatanypointintime—thatis,weseethefaceorthevase,butnotboth.

Ifthebrainhasadriveforsense-making,thenitpresumablyrequiressomemeasureofhowmuchsensedifferent interpre-tationsmake,whethertheseareinterpretationsofperceptualstimuli(seeFig.1),ormoreabstractaspectsoftheenvironment. Paralleltraditionsinphilosophy(Kemeny,1953),psychology(HochbergandMcAlister,1953),neuroscience(Blakemore, 1993)andstatistics(Rissanen,1987andWallaceandFreeman,1987)havesuggestedthatexplanationscanbeviewedas

encodingthedatatheyseektoexplain;thatthecomplexityofanexplanation,foraparticularsetofdata,canbemeasured bythelengthoftheresultingcode.

Togetanintuitivesenseofhowtheapproachworks,imagineourencodinglanguageisEnglish,andsupposethatone personisattemptingtodescribetheimagesinFig.1withsufficientprecisionthatanotherpersonisabletorecreatethem. So,inFig.1,highleveldescriptions,suchas‘thereisafieldofdifferentsizedblackblobs,withapurewhitesquareinfront,’ ‘theeightverticesofawhitewireframecubeareatthecenterofequal-sizedblackcircles,’or‘aperfectlywhitesphereis radiatingblackthorn-likeconesinalldirections,’arelikelytobemuchmoreusefulthananattempttodescribetheprecise outlinesandlocationsof2Dblackshapes.Ofcourse,forthereceiverofthemessage,thedetailneedstobespecifiedtoo; butitwillbemuchmoreefficienttoaskaboutthesizeandlocationofthewhitesquare,thewireframeorthespines, ratherthanfocusingatthelevelof2Doutlines.Theessenceoftheideaisthatinterpretingdatabyimposingsomesenseor structurehelpsthebrainencodedataefficiently;sowecaninvertthislogic,andusethebrevityoftheencodingusingthat interpretationasameasureoftheamountofsensethatitmakesofthedata.Itisthennaturaltoassumethat,otherthings beingequal,thebrainwillpreferthebriefestexplanationthatitcanfind.

Thoughusefulindrivingintuitions,naturallanguageisapoorchoiceforcodingforavarietyofreasons,mostobviously becauseofitsimprecisionandambiguity,andlessobviouslybecausetheveryideaofcodelengthsinnaturallanguageleadsto paradoxes(e.g.,theBerryparadox,Chaitin,1995).Toavoidtheseproblems,itturnsoutthatwecaninsteaduseaprogramming language,inthesenseusedincomputerscience:suchlanguagesareprecise,unambiguousandparadox-free;andappear,in principle,richenoughtoexpressanywell-deﬁnedinterpretationorstructure.Indeed,theideaofmeasuringthecomplexity ofexplanationsbycodesinaprogramminglanguageisthecoreofarichmathematicaltheory,Kolmogorovcomplexity (LiandVitányi,2009),whichhasavarietyofpsychologicalapplications(e.g.,Chater,1999andChaterandVitányi,2003, 2007).Inthispaper,though,weleavethesetechnicalissuesconcerningmeasuresofcode-lengthsaside.Wefocusinstead onmodelinghowsense-makingcanfunctionasadrive.Here,wemerelynotethatsuchquantiﬁcationofsense-makingis bothfeasibleandhasbeenwidelyexploredinpriorwork.

Wehavenotedthatthebrainattemptstomakesenseoftheworld;thatsense-makingmaybemeasuredbythesimplicity oftheexplanationofthedata,andthatsimplicitymay,inturn,bemeasuredbycode-length.Yetwhyshouldtherebeadrive forsense-making,asweargueinthispaper?Indeed,whyshouldsense-makinghaveanyaffective‘valence’ormotivational forceatall?Affectivestatesaretypicallyviewedasinvolvedwithmotivation:weseekpleasant,andavoidunpleasant, sensations.Butsense-makingappearstooperateautonomously,irrespectiveofconsciouscontrolormotivationalstate. Indeed,theprocessofunderstandingthephysicalandsocialworldis,toalargedegreeatleast,areﬂex(Fodor,1983).Our visualandauditorysystemsautomaticallymakesenseofsensoryinput;wecannotdecidewhetherornottounderstandwhat peoplearesaying,orwhetherornottogothroughthecomplexinferentialprocessesrequiredtorecovertheirintentions andmotives(e.g.,Clark,1996;Levinson,2000),whetherornottoappreciatethesigniﬁcanceofwhatwearetold,andsoon. Indeed,anylackofautonomyforsuchprocessescouldbehighlydangerous:ifwehadtheabilityto“seewhatwewantto see,”inaliteral,ratherthanametaphoricalsense,thiswouldappearentirelytounderminetheinformationalgatheringrole ofthesenses.Buttotheextentthatsense-makingisautonomous,wemightexpectittobeaffectivelyneutral—wedonot needseemtorequiremotivationtomakesenseoftheworldanymorethanweneedmotivationtomaintainourbalanceor toblinkwhenanobjectrapidlyapproachesoureyes.

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tobreathewillprovidepowerfulmotivationtocomeupforairwhenwearedivingoruseaninhalerifwearesufferingan asthmaticattack,complementingautonomousrespiratoryprocesses.

Wesuggest,then,thatsense-makingprocessesmaybeasautomaticasdigestionandrespiration,butthat,analogousto theseotherdrives,insomesituationsthemotivationalsystemisrequiredinordertoprovidetheappropriatematerialsupon whichtheseprocessescanoperate.Althoughmostsense-makingmechanismsoperateautonomously,withoutconscious awarenessordeliberatedirection,insomesituations,informationprocessingaloneisinadequatetotransformdisparate informationintosimplerrepresentations.Insuchsituations,weargue,ourbrainshaveevolvedmechanismstomotivate ustogather,attendto,andprocessinformationinafashionthataugments,andcomplements,autonomoussense-making. Suchactionscantaketheformofdeliberateinternalprocesses,suchassearchingmemoryordirectingattention,ormaking minimalactions,suchasshiftingone’sgaze,oractionsvaryingincomplexityfromwebsearchesortotakingacourse,hiring aprivatedetectiveorfundingaresearchprogram.Inshort,wehaveadriveforsense-makingbecausewefrequentlyneed todirectand“feed”ourautomaticsense-makingmachineryappropriately.

Mostdrives,furthermore,operateviaacarrotandstick.Thestickistheaversivefeelingwhichariseswhenthedrive isnotmet.Onefeels uncomfortable,forexample,whenone’sbodytemperaturerisesabove,orfallsbelow,the98.6◦F set-point.Thecarrotisthepleasureofsatisfyingthedrive,whichintensifieswiththestrengthofthedriveitself,apattern thatpsychologistscall‘aliesthesia’.Continuingwiththetemperatureexample,anythingthathelpstorestoreourbody’s temperatureset-point,likeputtingone’shandincoldwateronahotday,orinhotwateronacoldday,feelsgood.The driveforsense-makingfitssuchapattern:Theinabilitytomakesenseofstimuli,orforthatmatterofone’slife,isgenerally aversive,andsense-makingisespeciallypleasurablewhenthedriveforsense-makinghasbeenactivated.Thus,forexample, itismuchmorepleasurabletogettheanswertoaquestionifthequestionisaskedfirst,withapauseforonetocomeup withtheanswer,thanifthequestionandansweraredeliveredatthesamemomentintime(HseeandRuan,2014).

Differentdriveshavedifferenttriggers,someinvolvinginternalbodilystatesandsomeinvolvingexternalstimuli.For example,thestrengthofthesexdriveatanypointintimedependsbothonthebody’sstate(e.g.,hormonelevels,which, inturncandependontimeofday,timeofthemonth,andtimesincelast sex),andexternal—e.g.,visual—stimuli.The driveforsense-makingis,again,notanexception;itsactivationdependsbothoninternal(cognitive)statesandexternal, informational,stimuli.

2.1. Fourkeyfeaturesofsense-making

Severalobservationsaboutsense-makinganditsconnectiontosimplificationprovidethefoundationforourbasic the-oreticalframework.Thefirstisthatbothsenseandsense-makingarepleasurable(andtheiroppositesareaversive).So,for example,thestimuliinFig.1maygiveus(anadmittedlymodestamountof)pleasurebecausewehavecanmakesenseof themsuccessfully;and,inaddition,theexperienceofsense-makingisitselfpleasurable:Wemayexperienceamomentary positive‘frisson’whenwesuddenly‘find’anelegantinterpretation(thewhitesquare,thewire-framecube,thewhite,spiny, sphere,orthe‘facesinthevase’).Thus,aswithcontemporarytheoriesofdecisionmakingwhichpositthatpeoplederive utilitybothfromoutcomestatesandfromchanges(ordeviationsfromreferencepoints),sense-makingisafunctionof bothlevels(sense)andchangesinthesenseonehasmade(sense-making).Pleasurefromsensecaptures,forexample,both thesatisfactionofbeingabletotellacoherentstoryaboutourlife,butalsothesatisfactionofgainingnewinformation thatleadstoarefinementofthatstory.Exante,atleastonaverage,weshouldalwaysexpectnewinformationtoenhance sense-making.However,thisisnotalwaysthecase.Forexample,aneatstoryonemayhavetoldaboutone’slifecouldbe disruptedbythearrivalofnewinformation,leadingtoanegativechangeinsenseandtheoppositeofsense-making.Indeed, aswediscussbelow,fearofsuchorder-disruptinginformationcanleadtoinformationavoidanceandconfirmationbias.

Thesecondprincipleisthatnotallsense-makingisequallypleasurable.Sometypesofsense-makingaremoreimportant

tousthanothers,andpleasurefromsense-making(aswellaspainfromfailurestomake sense)dependscriticallyon importance.Forexample,itisfarmorepleasurabletomakesenseofone’slifethantosolveaSudokupuzzleoracrossword, anditismorepleasurabletomakesenseofone’sownlifethantomakesenseofsomeoneelse’s.Wegainstilllesspleasure fromaimlesslyglancingaroundtheroom,orstaringvaguelyoutofthewindow.

Somepiecesofinformationaremoreimportanttousthanothersnotmerelybecauseofthe‘interest’ofthetopic,but becausetheyarea‘key’whichallowsustoprovideabetterexplanationofmanyotherthingswemaybeinterestedin. Soacquiringasmallamountofnewinformationmight,inprinciple,substantiallyreducethecomplexityofawiderbody ofinformation.Forexample,ﬁnallydiscoveringtheperpetratorofawhodunitonehasbeenimmersedinforweeksis typicallymorepleasurablethandiscoveringtheperpetratorattheendofashort-story,inpartbecausetheinformation bringscoherencetoalotmoreinformationintheformercasethaninthelatter.And,ofcourse,bothofthesearemore pleasurablethanbeingtoldtheidentityofthecriminalinawhodunitonehasnotread.

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example,purelyinformationalconsiderationsshouldbeabletoexplainwhywegetmorepleasurefromsolvingoneSudoku puzzlethananother,orfromsolvingaSudokupuzzleoverplayingagameofTetris.

Athirdprincipleisthatthepleasuresandpainsofsenseandsense-makingdependonexpectations.Perhapsone distinc-tivefeatureofthestimuliinFig.1isthatthedegreeofsense-makingpossibleisunexpected:e.g.,normally2Dshapesand patchesdonotsupportsuchcomplexinterpretations.Inothersituations,however,wemightgointoasituationwithhigh expectationsofsense-making,butfindourselvesdisappointedorfrustrated.Priorresearchindiversedomainshasfound thatpleasureandpaintendstoresultfromcomparisonofattainmentstoreferencepoints(KahnemanandTversky,1979), whichareveryoftendeterminedbyexpectations(K ˝oszegiandRabin,2006).Weproposethatsense-makingisnoexception. Suchreference-dependencecanexplainwhywefindstimuliaversivewhentheyaresurprisinglydifficulttomakesenseof (e.g.,blurryimagesortext,mis-spellings,orevengrammaticalerrors).Dependenceonexpectationsappearstoberequired tocapturethefactthat,inamuseum,wederivenopleasureorpainfromtheblankwallsbetweenpaintingsbecausewe don’thaveanyexpectationsthatsenseistobefoundintheseexpanses.Likewise,thefeelingthatthereissensetobemade, butweareunabletomakeit,canbeagonizing,asexemplifiedbypeoplewhofruitlesslyruminateaboutkeyeventsintheir lives,inafutileefforttomakesenseofthem.

Afourthprincipleisthatthepleasuresandpainsofsense-makingarenotsymmetric.Consistentwiththenotionofloss aversion(KahnemanandTversky,1979)andthemoregeneralphenomenonthatthebadtendstobestrongerthanthe good(Baumeisteretal.,2001),negativedeviationsfromexpectationstendtobemoreaversivethanpositivedeviations arepleasant.Thus,believingonehasmadesenseofasituation,butthendiscoveringonehasnot,isanoverallaversive experience,despitethefactthatoneisleftinthesamesituationinwhichonebegan.Likewise,receivinginformationthat challengesthesenseonehasmadeoftheworld,butthenhavingthatinformationdiscredited,leavesoneworseoff(albeit partlyduetonewappreciationofthefragilityofthesenseonehasmade)thanonewasattheoutset.

3. Asimplemodelofsense-making

Wesupposethatthereisapsychologicaldistinctionbetweenknowledgeaboutaspectsofourlives,K,thatweareat anygivenmomentattemptingtoexplain;andgeneralbackgroundknowledge,B,e.g.,aboutthephysicalandsocialworld. Thatis,K,representstheinformationthatthebrainiscurrentlytryingtomakesenseof.Thisboundaryis,asweshallsee, ﬂexible.Atonemoment,wemaybefocusingpurelyontheinterpretationofavisualstimulus,suchasthoseinFig.1,sothat

Kmaybelimitedtocurrentperceptualinput;atanothermoment,wemayreﬂectonhowourlife,orourrelationships,are progressing,sothattheknowledgethatweareattemptingtoexplainisfarbroader.Wesuggest,though,thatweareonly ableexplainsomesubsetofourknowledgeofourlives,K,atanymoment;wetreatanythingelsethatweknowaspartof ourbackgroundknowledge,B.1

Weproposethatpeopleformtheexplanation,e(K|B),oftheto-be-explainedknowledge,K,whichbestﬁtsthatknowledge, giventhebackgroundknowledgeB.Weassumethattheprocessofinferringthisexplanationisindependentoftheir evalua-tionsoftheirlives,justasitistypicallyassumedinperceptionthatthefavoredperceptualinterpretationisautonomousand henceindependentofthegoalsofanagent(e.g.,Fodor,1983;Pylyshyn,1999).2_For_clarity,_and_in_line_with_the_observation concerningperceptualorganizationthatpeoplecanonlyentertainasingleexplanationofasensoryinput(e.g.,theface/vase ofFig.1)oroftheirlifeatanymoment,weassumethate(K|B)correspondstothesinglesimplestexplanationorconstrual ofK,ratherthanaprobabilitydistributionoverconstruals.

Thus,

e(K|B)=argmin

e C

e_,_K_|_B

_, ₍₁₎

whereC(e,K_|B)isthecode-lengthforencodingknowledge,K,usingexplanationebasedonbackgroundknowledgeB.This termitselfcanbeexpressedasthesumofthecode-lengthoftheexplanationeitself,C(e|B),andthecode-lengthrequired tospecifyknowledgeKgiventheexplanation,C(K|e,B).Thatis,C(e,K|B)=C(e|B)+C(K|e,B).Apreferredexplanationwill beitselfsimple(asmeasuredbythecode-lengthC(e|B)butalsoaccurate,henceprovidingasimplecodefortheknowledge theindividualseekstoencode,asmeasuredbyC(K|e,B).Thisisafoundationalassumptionofourmodelofsense-making: Givenbackgroundknowledge,theautonomousprocessprefersthesimplestexplanationoftheto-be-explainedinformation,

K,thatitcanﬁnd.Thisisadifﬁcultoptimizationproblem—indeed,ingeneralitisuncomputable;thatis,nocomputable

1_As_our_attentional_focus_shifts,_the_boundary_between_the_information_that_we_are_attempt_to_explain,_K_,_and_the_background_knowledge_that_we

presuppose,B,maychangeinimportantways.Forexample,whilewemaymomentarilybeattemptingtomakesenseoftheimmediateactionsofthe charactersinourworkofliterature,ﬁlmorplay(sothattherelevantK,inthemoment,isquitenarrow),itmaybethatwhenwebroughtthemourattention tothinkaboutourownlife,thepeoplearoundus,oroursociety(i.e.,wenowshifttoamuchbroaderK),theanalysisoftheworkofarthaschangedour interpretationofthesemuchbroaderaspectsofourlives.Aswenotebelow,thedegreetowhichanexperienceoraworkofartcanbemadesenseofinand ofitself,or,rather,changeshowwemakesenseofotheraspectsofourlives,maybeimportantindistinguishingexperienceswhichwetaketobe“deep” fromthoseweconsidertobe“shallow”(e.g.,solvingaSudokuproblempresumablyhasnowiderimplicationsbeyondthestimulusitself).

2_Although_a_useful_{simpliﬁcation,}_this_is_may_be_unrealistic._There_is_a_wealth_of_research_in_psychology_that_appears_to_show_that_even_our_most_basic

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Fig.2.Stimuliwhichareinitiallypuzzling,butwhichareactuallysurprisinglyfamiliar.

Source:Fukushima(2001).

processcanmapsetsofdataintotheirshortestdescriptions.Butthisisnotunexpected—theproblemofmakingbestsense ofourenvironmentisinevitablyanopen-endedproblem,closelyrelatedtocreatingthebestpossiblescience.

Now,supposethatwelearnanewpieceofinformationthatmightpotentiallymodifyourconstrualoftheknowledge,K, thatwearetryingtomakesenseof.Wemodelthisbyaddinganewpieceofinformation,a,toourbackgroundknowledge, whichthenbecomesB∪{a}.Now,ourbestconstrualofourlife,inthelightofa,writtene(K|B∪{a}),is:

e(K|B∪{a})=argmin

e C(e

_,_K_|_B_∪_{_a_}₎ ₍₂₎

Itcould,ofcourse,bethataisirrelevanttomakingsenseofwhatweknowofourlife(theknowledge,K),andsothebest choiceofconstrualremainsunchanged(i.e.,e(K|B∪{a})=e(K|B)).Butitisalsopossiblethataleadstosomeupdatingofthe bestconstrual.Forexample,gettingsomepositive(ornegative)teachingfeedbackmaymakeusre-construepast,perhaps somewhatambiguous,remarksaboutourteachingperformance;learningamedicalfactmightrequireustoreinterpret somesymptomswehavebeenexperiencing;andsoon.

Justasinscience,asinglepieceofinformation(acrucialobservationorexperiment)canchangeourcurrentchoiceof best‘theory.’Indeed,evenwithoutanynewinformation,wemayfindourselves‘flipping’betweentworoughlyequallygood interpretations.Wemight,forexample,oscillatefromfeelinggenuineconfidenceinourabilitiesandsuspicionthatother peoplearegivingusapparentlypositivefeedbackonlyoutofkindness;betweenbelievingthatourcompanystrategywill winnewcustomersandfearingthatitwillfailhopelessly;andsoon.Insuchcases,theremaybelittleevidenceavailableto decidebetweeninterpretations.

Thistypeof‘Gestaltswitch’isillustratedintheNeckerCube(Fig.1,wherewealternatelyinterpretthecubeastilted downwardstotheleftorupwardstotheright)andface-vastillusion(alsoinFig.1);anditoftendiscussedinthephilosophy ofscience(e.g.,Kuhn,1962,Schefﬂer,1972;Wright,1992).Forthisreason,thebestexplanationisnot,strictly,afunctionof therelevantknowledgetobeexplained,K,andbackgroundknowledge,B,becausethesameknowledgecanleadtodifferent interpretations(whereasafunction,ofcourse,canonlymaponeinputontoasingleoutput).Nonetheless,purelytokeep ournotationsimplebelow,wewillignorethepossibilityofsuchspontaneous‘ﬂips’andsupposethatthebrainchoosesa singlebestconstrualorexplanationeofknowledge,K,givenbackgroundB,sothatwewillwritethebestconstrualeasa functione(K|B)oftherelevantknowledge.

Now,onlearninga,thecomplexityofournewbestexplanation(C(e,K|B∪{a}))maybemoreorlessthanthecomplexity ofourpreviousexplanation,C(e,K|B).Forexample,supposethatKconcernsrelevantaspectofourvisualinput,whenlooking atthestimulishowninFig.2.

Youmayhavespottedthehiddenpattern(takeamomenttoseeifyoucanfindit).Butifnot,consideringtheadditional pieceofinformationa=“thesearethefirstsixlettersofthealphabet,inblockcapitals.”Withthisinformationinmind, thesepatternssuddenlybecomeeasiertomakesenseof.And,ofcourse,accordingtothisinterpretation,thecodeforthe stimuli,K,willbefarshorter.Forexample,imaginetryingtoconveytheseshapesbyawrittendescription:oncewehave the‘key’thattheseareblockcapitalletters,withvariousocclusions,itbecomespossibletoencodethemreasonablybriefly, bydescribingthecolor,thickness,andfontofthelettersandthendescribingthesizesofcentersofthe‘white’circles,lines, andsoon,thatoverlaythem(noticetoexpressthiscode,weneedtodrawonbackgroundknowledge,B,aboutthelettersof thealphabet,fonts,colors,shapes,andsoon).Bycontrast,describingthempurelyashighlyirregularpatternswillrequire anextremelylongandconvoluteddescription.So,withthe‘hint’a,thatthestimulusisasequenceofletters,thecodeforK

becomesfarsimpler,andhencemakesfarmoresense:thatis,ourestimateofC(e,K|B∪{a}))ismuchlessthanourestimate ofC(e,K_|B))—onlywiththehintcanwemakesenseofthestimulus.3

Whileaddingnewinformation,a,toourbackgroundknowledge,B,typicallymakesourencodingofthedatamoreefﬁcient, theoppositeisalsopossible.Wemight,forexample,betoldthatthepatternsinFig.2aremarkingsonatabletfromAncient Egypt,orimagespickedupfromascanofthesea-bed.Iftheseassertionsweresufﬁcientlycredible,thenwewouldneedto

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jettisonourapparentlyefﬁcientencoding(thoughitmightstillhelpusrememberthepatterns),becauseitisinconsistent withourbackgroundknowledge(therewasnoLatinalphabetinAncientEgypt,andsoon).

How,doessimplicityrelatetosense-making?Weproposethattheamountofsensethatwemakeofknowledgeabout someaspectourlives,K,oranyotherbodyofinformation,isinverselyrelatedtothecomplexityoftheexplanationweare abletocreate.Thebrainiscontinuallyseekingthesimplestexplanation,andhencetheexplanationcorrespondingtothe shortestcode.

S(e(K|B)=f(−e,K|B)), (3)

wherefisastrictlypositivemonotonicfunction.4_It_follows_immediately_that_the_explanation_that_minimizes_code_length, isthesameasthecodewhichmaximizesthedegreeofsense-making:

e(K|B)= argmax

e S(e,K|B)= argmin

e C(e,K|B) (4)

Here,wehavedevelopeda modelofhowthebrainattemptstoﬁndtheexplanationtomakethemostsenseofgiven information,whetheramomentarysensoryinput,orourknowledgeofourentirelife,inlightofbackgroundinformation. Sense-makingisrelatedtothesimplicitybywhichthegiveninformationcanbeencoded—thebrainseeksthesimplest explanationthatitcan.Ifwehaveadriveforsense-making,thenitisnaturaltoconjecture,aswehavenotedabove,that sense-making,i.e.,ﬁndingsimplerexplanations,shouldbepleasurable;andtheoppositeshouldbeaversive.But,ofcourse, whenweexplainourlives,orencounternewinformationthatmightmodifysuchexplanations,wearenotconcernedonly withthedegreeofsense-making;wearealsoconcernedwithwhatthecurrentsensewehavemade,e(K|B),saysabouthow ourlifeisgoing.Sense-makingmight,inprinciple,leadustoawonderfullycompactexplanationofourlivesasconsistingof relentlesscalamity.Inshort,sense-makingisnotouronlydriveormotivation.Inthenextsectionweconsiderhow sense-makingcanbecombinedwithotherfactors—lumpingtogetherallsuchotherfactorsintoasinglequantityofutility,for analyticaltractability.

3.1. Sense-makingandutility

Anexplanation,e(K|B),ofourlivesmaypaintourlivesinagoodorapoorlightandmaysuggestarosyorgloomyfuture inthelightoftheaspectsofourlife,K,thatwearethinkingabout.Ofcourse,ifKreferstosomethingextremelyspecific,such astheimmediatesensoryinput,thentheexplanatione(K|B)mayhavenosignificantimplicationsforourlivesatall.But oftentheinformation,K,thatwearetryingtoexplainwillconcernourownbehaviororperformance,ourrelationshipswith significantpeopleinourlives,andsoon.Inthesecases,whichexplanationwesettleonmayhavesubstantialimplications forourevaluationofourlives.Letuscallaperson’sevaluationofhowpositively(ornegatively)someaspectoflife,K,is going,V(e(K|B)),parallelingthetermintroducedaboveformuchsensetheycanmakeoftheirlife,S(e(K|B)).

Weassumethatindividualspursuetwocorrespondinggoals:(1)toviewtheirworldandtheirlifeaspositivelyaspossible, and(2)tomakemaximalsenseoftheirlives.Weassumethataperson’s“absolute”utility,UA(e|K,B),dependsontheabsolute

valuationoftheirlifeandtheabsoluteamountofsensetheycanmakeofit:

UA(e(K|B))=+UA(V(e(K|B)),S(e(K|B))) (5)

WemakethefurthernaturalassumptionthatUA(e(K|B))isincreasinginbotharguments.

Butabsoluteutility,UA,isonlypartofthestory.FollowingK ˝oszegiandRabin(2006),weallowthatpeople’soverallutility

dependsbothonabsoluteutilityandonhowthecomponentsofthisutilitydepartfromexpectations.Thatis,weassume thatpeoplecareseparatelyaboutwhethertheirconstrual,e(K|B)oftheirlifeisbecomingmoreorlesspositive;andwhether itimpliesthattheirlifeismakingmoreorlesssense.

Ifchangesrelativetoexpectationsarekey,asintheK ˝oszegi-Rabinframework,thenapersonwillcareaboutthedegree towhich,afterlearningnewinformationa(sothatherbackgroundknowledgeisnowB∪{a}),herlifeisbetterorworse thanitspriorvalue,givenherpreviousbackgroundknowledgestateB.Wecallthisreference-dependentvalueterm,VR,and

write:

VR(e(K|B∪{a}))=V(V(e(K|B∪{a}))−V(e(K|B))), (6)

whereVisaloss-aversevaluefunctionofthetypeusedinprospecttheory(i.e.,concaveingains,convexinlosses,and

wherelossesloomlargerthanthecorrespondinggains,KahnemanandTversky,1979).Similarly,areference-dependent sense-makingterm,SR,i.e.,thechangeinthedegreetowhichlifemakessenseinthelightofa,canbewritten:

SR(e(K|B∪{a}))=S(S(e(K|B∪{a}))−S(e(K|B))), (7)

whereSissimilaraloss-aversevaluefunctionofthesamegeneralform.Lossaversionhas,ofcourse,importantimplications

fortheimpactofinformation.Forexample,ifabringsbadnewsconcerningone’sevaluationofhowone’slifeisgoing(e.g.,

4_Below_we_do_not_place_any_explanatory_burden_on_the_functional_form_of_f_,_so_we_could_take_it_to_be_the_identity_function._It_is_possible_that_a_more

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poorteachingratings,afailedgrantapplication,orasharepricecollapse)and/ormakesone’slifemakelesssense(e.g.,one learnsthatacherishedstoryaboutone’schildhoodis,infact,probablyafalsememory),thenone’sabsoluteutilitywill bereduced.Thatis,ourabsolutelyutilitywillfallfromUA(e(K|B))toalowervalueUA(e(K|B∪a)).Butifonesubsequently

discoversthataisentirelyfalse—e.g.,thepersonfromwhomweoverheardthisinformationwasactuallytalkingabout someoneelseentirely,otherthingsbeingequal,theabsoluteutilitytermwillnowreturntoitspreviousvalue,UA(e(K|B)).5

However,duetolossaversion,thechangesinthereference-dependentvalueandsense-makingterms,VRandSRwillnot

‘cancelout’whenaisﬁrstaddedandthenrescinded.Whetheraincreasesordecreasesvalueorsense,itsbeingdiscredited willalwaysleaveoneworseoffthanpriortoreceiptoftheinformation,because,duetolossaversion,thenegativechange willalwaysoutweighthepositiveone.Thisﬁts,forexample,ourintuitionthatexperiencingafearwhichthenturnsoutto beunfoundedis,overall,anegativeexperience,orthathearinggoodnewswhichturnsouttobeillusory,isalsounpleasant overall.

Valuationandsense-makingwilloftenmoveinoppositedirectionsuponthereceiptofnewinformation.Forexample, newsofone’schild’sarrestfornarcoticspossessionmighthelptomakesenseofawiderangeofotherwiseincomprehensible information(e.g.,whyhismoodsweresoerratic),thusraisingS,butwouldcertainlyhaveanegativeimpactonV.Incontrast, learningthatsomeoneyoususpectedmightdislikeyouhaddedicatedabooktoyoumightﬁllyouwithpleasure,yetdisrupt theneatsenseyouhadmadeofyourrelationshipwiththeindividual.Thefactthatinformationcanoftenhaveopposite effectsonsense-makingandvaluemightalsohelptoexplainthecommonobservationthat,afterreceivinglong-anticipated newsthatturnsouttobebad,wecansometimeshaveastrongfeelingofrelief:Perhapsthisfeelingarisesbecause,though theoutcomeisnotwhatwehadhopedfor,thecertaintyofourknowledgeputsusbackinapositiontomakesenseof ourlives.Morebroadly,such‘bitter-sweet’reactions,whichseemaubiquitouspartofhumanexperience,seemtorequire explanationintermsofpotentiallyantagonisticforces,suchasoptimizingVandS,andaredifﬁculttounderstandinany unitaryaccount(e.g.,whereweareinterestedonlyinoptimizingV).

Overallortotalutility,UT,inthelightofnewinformationa,isanincreasingfunctionofthreequantities:theabsolute

utilityofthestatewhenaisknown(itselfdependingonvaluationandsense-making),andthetworeference-dependent terms:

UT(K,a|B)=+UT{UA(e(K|B∪{a})),VR(e(K|B∪{a})),SR(e(K|B∪{a}))}, (8)

or,morecompactly,

UT(a)=+UT{UA(a),VR(a),SR(a)}, (9)

whereUT(a),thetotalutilityafterlearningnewinformationa,isassumedtobeincreasingineachofthethreearguments.

Forsimplicity,wecan,thoughweneednot,assumetheseutilitytermsareadditive,sothatourtotalutilitytermUT,inthe

lightofdataa,canbewritten:

UT(a)=˛UA(a)+ˇVR(a)+SR(a), (10)

where˛,ˇ,andareconstants.Here,the“reference”levelforvalenceandsense-making,V(e(K))andS(e(K))isdetermined beforethenewinformationaisknown.

Inthemodeljustdescribed,asaresultofreference-dependence,expectationsmattercritically.Forexample,weshould finditaversive,ifweexpectedtofinallylearntheidentityofthecriminalinthelastepisodeofanextendedTVseries, todiscoverthattheanticipatedinformationisnotforthcoming(perhapsbecausetheproducersdecidedtoaddasecond season).Ifthefinalepisodedidpromisetorevealtheperpetrator,moreover,butourcableconnectionfailedatthecrucial momentofrevelation,ourfrustrationwouldlikelybeevenmoreprofound.

4. Applications

Inpriorsections,weoutlinedanaccountofadriveforsense-making,explainedhowanaccountofsense-makingcanbe integratedintoexistingaccountsofutilityanddecisionmaking,andﬁnallyexploredhowsense-makingmaybeimportant inunderstandinghowweassessthevalueofnewinformation.Inthissection,weshowhowthedriveforsense-making, andthespeciﬁctheoreticalperspectivejustoutlined,canhelptomakesenseofawiderangeofdisparatephenomena.

4.1. Curiosity

Curiosityis,perhaps,themostobviousapplicationofourtheoreticalframework.Curiosity,bydeﬁnition,refersto intrin-sicallymotivatedseekingafterinformation—i.e.,intheabsenceofanticipatedmaterialpayoffs,ormorebroadly,wherethe informationweare‘curious’abouthasnoimplicationsforourevaluationVofourlives.Inourframework,curiositycanbe easilyunderstoodasamanifestationofthedriveforsense-making.

Curiosityinourframeworkcouldariseintwosituations.Intheﬁrst,anindividualmightgetnewinformationbutbe unabletomakesenseofit.Inthatcase,curiositywouldbefocusedonthedesireforinformationthatcouldmakesense

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ofthenewinformation.Thus,forexample,thewebsite‘Upworthy’presentsvisitorswithaseriesofheadlinessuchas“If YouHaveToTellYourKidsThisStuff,ThenYouProbablyAren’tAWhitePerson,”and“SomeThinkIt’sJustPlainKinky, ButTheAmountOfTrustThisLifestyleTakesIsStaggering”whichevokecuriositybypresentingintriguingbutconfusing informationthat,thevisitorisimplicitlypromised,canbemadesenseofbyclickingonthelink.

Inthesecondcase,curiousityistriggeredbytheperceptionthatnewinformationcouldhelptomakesenseofexisting, stored,information.Ascientist,forexample,wouldbetremendouslycurioustolearnaboutanewtheorythatcouldmake senseofotherwisedisparate,unorganizeddatainhisorherfield,andwouldalsobecurioustoobtainnewinformationwhich, integratedwiththeexistingdata,mightresultinsuchacomprehensiveunderstanding.Similarly,apersonmayresearch theirfamilyhistoryinthehopeof‘makingsense’oftheirlives;readabout19thcenturyRussianhistorytotryto‘make bettersense’ofmuchlovedRussiannovels;orporeoveramapofalocationwheretheyhavebeenonawalkingholiday,to understandtheterrain.Note,too,thatcuriosityaboutfictionalstories,whichmaybepowerfulenoughtokeepusreading orwatchingformanyhours,canbeunderstoodintermsofthesense-makingterm,S,butfictionaleventstypicallydonot, ofcourse,havedirectimplicationforourvaluation,V,ofourownlives.

Aliteraturereviewbyoneoftheauthors(Loewenstein,1994)proposedthatcuriosityderivesfor“aninformationgap” thatbecomessalienttothecuriousindividual,andidentifiedfourkeypropertiesofcuriositythatanytheoryshouldseek toaddress:(1)itsintensity,(2)transienceanddependenceonimmediatestimulus,(3)associationwithimpulsivity,and (4)tendencytodisappointwhensatisfied.Inourformulation,curiosityarisesfromsuchagap,definedbythecomparison betweentheamountofsimplificationoccurringatamomentintimeandtheamountofsimplificationthatisdeemedtobe immediatelypossible.Curiositymay,ofcourse,beunsatisfiedifweareunabletoperformtherelevantaction(e.g.,clicking thelink,askingapersonakeyquestion,peeringtoseewhatsomeoneisreading,andsoon),inwhichcasewewouldexpect thecuriositytobereplacedwith,oratleastmixedwith,frustration.

Lossaversion,inourmodel,helpstoexplaincuriosity’sintensity;lossaversionmeansthatpeoplewillbeespecially stronglymotivatedtoengageinsense-makingwhentheyperceiveagapbetweenhowmuchsense-makingtheyhave achievedandhowmuchtheybelievecouldbeachieved.

Curiosity’stransienceanddependenceonimmediatestimuli,inourmodel,canbeexplainedbythetransienceof expec-tationsofsense-making(whichservesasthereferencelevelinourmodel).Theclassicexampleofcuriosity’stransienceis whenoneiswalkingbehindsomeoneandbecomescuriousofwhattheylooklikefromthefront;assoonastheyturnthe corneranddisappear,curiositytendstovanishalmostinstantly.Suchapatterniswellexplainedbyanaccountinwhichthe individual’sdisappearancevirtuallyeliminatesthepotentialtoobtainthemissingperspective,thusalteringexpectations andcuriosity.

Curiosity’sassociationwithimpulsivityiseasilyaddressedbytheproposalthatsense-makingisadrive,similartohunger, thirstandsexualdesire,allofwhicharecommonlyassociatedwithimpulsivebehavior.Drivestendtonaturallyincrease one’spreferencefordrive-relatedconsumption(indeed,thatistheirveryfunction),butfuturedrivelevelsareuncertain.So immediatedrivestendtopromoteimmediateconsumption,andthedriveforsense-makingisnoexception,exceptthatthe ‘consumption’initscase,involvesinformationacquisition.

Finally,thetendencytodisappointwhensatisﬁedisalsoexplainedbylossaversion,whichampliﬁesanindividual’s motivationtoobtaininformation(“wanting,”touseterminologyproposedbyBerridge,1996)withoutnecessarilyhavinga commensurateimpactonpleasurefromobtainingtheinformation(“liking,”inBerridge’sterminology).

4.2. Boredom

Boredom,inourframework,arisesfromtheabsenceofsense-makingandthecomparisonofthispaucityofsense-making tosomehigherbaselinepointofreferencethenegativefeelingassociatedwiththeinabilitytoengageinsense-making. Boredomhastwoelements.First,wehavethefeelingthattherearenoactions,Q,thatwecantakethatarelikelytoleadto information,a,thatwillhelpusmakesenseofanyinformation,K,thatweareinterestedin.So,whenconsideringactions,

Q,whichmightleadtosuchdata,wesuspectthat

SR(e(K|B∪{a}))

_Q islow.Thismightariseif,forexample,weareina

waitingroomstockedwithmagazinesdetailingthelivesofcelebritieswecarenothingabout;ifwearestuckahotelwith onlytheprospectoffutilechannel-hopping;ifwecometoahaltinarailwaytunnelandallwecanscanfromthewindow isthereﬂectionofouremptycarriage;orifwestuckinanunchallengingandrepetitivejob,fromwhichwearelearning nothingnew.

Thereisasecondelementofboredom:thatthereisnoprospectofshiftingourattentiontosomenewKwhichwecan makesenseof.Thus,wecansometimestaveoffboredom,byviewingourenvironmentinadifferentway:e.g.,wondering whethercelebritymagazinesmaybetellingussomethingaboutthehumancondition;comparingthenewsagendafrom differentchannels;puzzlingabouttheexplanationofthedouble-reﬂectionsincarriagewindows;orthinkingaboutlast night’sexcitingTVdramaduringadayofrepetitivework.ButattemptingtoshiftKiseffortful,andmaybeimpossibleif,for example,onaconferencecallweneedtopayattentiontowhatissaid.Inshort,then,weareboredwhenourdriveforsense makingisthwarted,andthereisnothingwecando,eitherbyouractions,a,orbychangingthe‘topic’K,toﬁndanything thatwebothwantto,andareableto,makesenseof.

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of‘mentaleffort’istheoutputofmechanismsdesignedtomeasuretheopportunitycostofengaginginthecurrentmental task.Accordingtothisalternativeaccountthekeytowhetheranactivityisboring(ormentallyeffortful)iswhetherthetask inquestionisseenasvaluable.

Ouranalysisofboredomisdifferentfromtheopportunitycostaccount.First,ouraccountdoesnotviewboredomas relatedtoanegativefeelingofmentaleffort.Accordingtoouraccount,wecanbeboredwhileexperiencingnofeelingof mentaleffort—indeed,thisistypicallythecasewhenourcontextandtaskisunder-stimulatingorrepetitive.Conversely,we canfeelastrongsenseofmentaleffort,e.g.,whensolvingacross-wordpuzzleorSudoku,eventhoughthetaskclearlyhasno extrinsic‘value’andisapurelyanentertainment.Indeed,werethisnotthecase,sucheffortfulpastimeswouldpresumably universallybeperceivedasboring,andtheirvastpopularitywouldbemysterious.Moreover,ouraccountalsodoesnot predictthatthefeelingthatataskisvaluablewilldecreaseone’sboredomwithit—soatasksuchadetectingveryrare signalsofenemyaircraftonaradarmonitormayberecognizedasvitallyimportantbutalsoasdreadfullyboring.Instead, thekeydeterminantofboredomaccordingtoouraccountisthe(in)abilitytoengageinsense-making.

Bothaccountscanmakesenseofsomesalient‘facts’aboutboredom.Oneisthattasksthatrequireminimalamountsof attentioncanbemoreboringthantasksthatdon’trequireanyattention(e.g.,staringatablankwall).Boththeoriescan accountforthisobservationbynotingthattaskswhichdon’trequireattentionallowformind-wandering(inouraccount, activelychangingK),tosomethingthatcanbeverymuchassociatedwithsense-making—e.g.,thinkingaboutastory,a puzzleorone’sownlife.Anotherinterestingfactaboutboredomisthatpeoplerarelyreportbeingboredwhentryingto gotosleep,evenunsuccessfully—thisisespeciallypuzzling,giventhatattemptsatsleeptypicallyinvolveminimalsensory stimulation.Ouraccountofboredomwouldexplainthisobservationbynotingthatexpectationsaboutsense-making,and hencetheappropriatereferencepoints,arelikelytobeverylowinthissituation;theperiodbeforesleepisnottypicallya timeofsubstantialsense-making,probablybyevolutionarydesign,sothereisnoexpectationthatsensewillbemadeand hencenounfavorablecomparisonwithactualsense-making.

4.3. Flow,andtheshort-circuitingofsense-making

‘Flow’(Csikszentmihalyi,1990)referstoastateofconcentrationorcompleteabsorptionwithanactivityoneisengaged in.Flowistheantithesisofbothboredomandcuriosity,initsdeterminants,consequences,andinthefeelingsitevokes. Contrarytoboredom,ﬂowisassociatedwithhighlevelsofsense-making,andcontrarytocuriosity,thereisnocravingfor missinginformation.Inouraccount,expectedsensemakingishigh;andsuchexpectationsaretypicallyachieved.

Flowisgenerallyseenasagoodthing,butpeoplecan,andoftendo,experienceflowwhenengagedinactivitiesthat aredifficulttoconstrueasbeneficialtothem.Mostdrivescanbeeffectivelyshort-circuitedbyproductsandactivitiesthat activate,andappeartosatisfy,thedrivewhileprovidinglittlesustainedbenefit.Theconceptof‘emptycalories’fromfast foodthat,throughtheintroductionofsaltandfat,appealstoourevolutionaryprogrammingbutyieldslittlerealnutritional benefitisaparadigmaticexample;internetpornographyisanother.Modernelectronicgamemakersprovidetheanalogto theseexampleswhenitcomestosense-making.Gameslike“AngryBirds”givethebraintheperceptionofcontinual sense-making,eventhoughthesensethatismadefailstoadduptoanythinguseful.Asweindicatedabove,thepopularityofSudoku andcrosswords,aswellasotherpastimesincludingjigsawpuzzles,word-andpicture-search,spot-the-differenceproblems, andlogicproblems,aswellasdomestic‘organizing’activitieswithoutobviouspracticalfunction,suchasgardening,stamp andcoincollecting,andmanyartandcraftleisureactivities,suggeststhatcreatinganorganizedenvironment(andhence anenvironmentwhichwecanreadilymakesenseof)isintrinsicallyrewarding.

4.4. Conﬁrmationbias

Piaget(1954)drewacontrastbetweentwowaysofrespondingtoinformation:assimilation,whichinvolvesmaking senseoftheinformationinlightofexistingexplanationsoftheworld,andaccommodation,whichinvolvesadaptingsuch explanationstotakeaccountofnew,incongruent,information.Relatedly,Kuhn,intheStructureofScientiﬁcRevolution(1970), proposedthatsciencedoesn’tprogressinacontinuousfashion,butindiscontinuousjumps:inessence,whenassimilationof newdatatotheexistingframeworkisreplacedbyaccommodatingnewdatabythecreationofanewtheoreticalframework. But,bothincognitivedevelopmentandinscience,shiftingtoanewframework—i.e.,accommodatingratherthanmerely assimilating—isnotundertakenlightly.Indeed,therecanevenbeactiveresistancetotheneedforanewframework—as capturedinthephysicistMaxPlanck’sfamousquipthat“Scienceadvancesonefuneralatatime.”

‘Conﬁrmationbias’(e.g.,Nickerson,1998)iscloselyrelatedtothesephenomena.Itreferstothetendencyforpeopleto seekoutandinterpretinformationinafashionthattendstosupportexistingbeliefs,ratherthanrequiringthosebeliefstobe updated.Conﬁrmationbiasiswelldocumentedexperimentallyandinreal-worldsettings,butitsoriginsandmotivational underpinningshavebeenmuchlessstudied.

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explanations.Forthisreason,weshouldexpectpeopletobecome,tosomeextent,“stuck”inparticularinterpretationsof anambiguousimage(e.g.,theRubinface-vasestimulusofFig.1),yetoccasionallyﬂippingtheirinterpretationabruptly.

Whileimportant,the‘inertiathroughlocalsearch’styleofexplanationisfarfromacompleteaccount.Inparticular, itdoesnotexplaintheactiveresistancetonewexplanations(and,indeed,activedismissalofapparentlyawkwarddata) mentionedabove.Ouraccountprovidesanexplanationofthismotivation.WhenconsideringaparticularsetofdataK,anew explanationemayappearsuperiortoourcurrentexplanatione.Butifehaswideapplicationtootheraspectsofourlife, thenbyacceptingewemaybecommittedtorethinkingmayotherthings,K,K,K.Andbeforewedoso,wedonotknow whethertheseaspectsofourlifewillmakeusfeelbetteraboutourselvesorworseaboutourselves;orwhetherourlives willmakemoresense,orlesssense.Totheextentthatlossesloomlargerthangainsinthecontextbothofvaluations,V,and sense-makingS,(capturedinourmodelbythefactthatchangesinbothwithrespecttothereferencepointaremodulatedby prospect-theorystylefunctionsVandS),weshouldexpectpeopletobeaversetosuchre-thinking:thefearoftheresult

ofrethinkinghavingnegativeconsequencesislikelytooutweighthepossibilitythatitmayhavepositiveconsequences. Wesuspect thatthesense-makingterm,S,mayplayakey rolefortworeasons.First,peopleareoftenresistantto newknowledge,andconsequentexplanatorychangeindomainswhichappearirrelevanttotheirevaluationoftheirown lives—e.g.,whileactingasjurorsinacourtcase(Nickerson,1998).Second,peopletypicallyexperienceaperiodof disorien-tationbeforeexistingfactsarefullyassimilatedintothenewexplanation,duringwhichtheyhaveafeelingthatthefacts, oreventheirlives,nolongermakesense.Suchtemporarylossof‘sense-making’is,aswewouldexpect,oftenhighly aver-sive.Atherton(1999,p.88),inapaperon“resistancetolearning,”drewadistinctionbetween“additive”and‘supplantive’ learning(similartoPiaget’sbetweenassimilationandaccommodation)andsuggestedthatresistancetothelatterisgreater becauseofitsaccompanyingelementofloss:

“Thedepressionandconfusionexperiencedbypeopleexperiencingsupplantivelearningfollowsaverysimilarpattern tothatofthosepassingthroughcrises[...].Havingbeende-stabilised,theypassthroughaperiodofdisorientation,from whichtheyemergetore-orientation.”

4.5. Information-avoidance

Althoughcloselyrelatedtoconﬁrmationbias,informationavoidanceisworthyofseparatetreatmentbecauseourmodel providesanovelaccountofhowandwhyitoccurs.Informationavoidancepresentsakindofparadoxbecause,atsomelevel, toavoidinformationselectivelyonehastohaveatleastsomeideaaboutthecontentoftheinformation.Ifexpectationsare unbiased,moreover,thenpositivesurprisesshouldbeaslikelyasnegativesurprises.Soonemightsupposethattheprospect ofgoodorbadnewswouldbalanceoutandthattherewouldbenoparticularreasontoavoidinformation.

Different accountsof information avoidancehave beenproposed. One account,based ondisappointment aversion (K ˝oszegi,2003,2010)whichiscloselyrelatedtolossaversionandreference-dependenceinourmodel),positsthatnegative surprisesaremoreunpleasantthanpositivesurprisesarepleasant—ouraccountembodiesthisinsightasweshallseebelow. Another(Osteretal.,2013)assumesthatpeopleadoptoptimisticexpectations,butareawareatsomelevelthattheyare doingso,andsoavoidinformationtoprotectthemselvesagainsthavingtheirunrealisticexpectationsgetshattered.Yet athird(Karlssonetal.,2009)proposesthatknowingsomethingdeﬁnitivelyhasagreaterimpactonutilitythansimply suspectingsomething;wheninformationisexpectedtobeadverse,this‘impacteffect’motivatesinformationavoidance.6

Ourtheoreticalperspectiveprovidesarelatedbutsomewhatdifferentinterpretationfromtheseexistingaccounts.Note, firstthattheautonomyoftheinformationprocesssystem,infindingthesimplestexplanationofthedatawhichitiscurrently processing—i.e.,maximizingthesense-makingterm,S,impliesthatwecannotdirectlyinfluenceourconstrualofourlivesto improvethevaluetermV.Wearenotable,forexample,simplyabletowillinglymisperceive,i.e.,tomisread,ourteaching ratingsasacollectionof9sand10s,whentheyareactually2sand3s.Similarly,wearenotablewillfullytotellsourselves, falsely,that1representsthe‘top’ofthescaleand‘10’thebottom;oralternativelythatmostofourcolleagueswillberated asstraight1s,sothat2sand3srepresentastrongperformance.Theautonomyofthesense-makingsystemrequiresthatwe knowbadnewswhenweseeit,whichislikelyofcrucialevolutionaryimportance:Wereweabletoshapeourperception oftheworldtomaximizeV,notS,thenratherthancreatingamodeloftheworldthatmadethemostoftheavailable information,wewouldcreatea‘happydream’unconnectedtotheexternalworld.

But,thoughthedeliberativesystemcannotinﬂuencetheautonomoussystemdirectly,itcandosoindirectly—byaffecting whatinformationtheautonomoussystemhasavailabletoprocess.Sowhilethe‘digestiveprocesses’ofthesense-making systemmaybeautonomous,andoutsidetheinﬂuenceoftheaimofoptimizingvalue,its‘diet’isnot.Inparticular,wecan decidetoavoidsourcesofinformationthatwesuspectmayleadustobadevaluationsVofhowourlivesaregoing;and, giventhesevereattentionallimitsofthecognitivesystem,wecanalsoselectivelydecidewhatinformationtopayattention tofromthevastamountofinformationavailabletous.So,whilewecannotdecidetomisreadourteachingratingsinorder tomaintainourpositivemoodandpreserveapositiveself-image,wecandecidenottolookattheratingsfurther;or,ifwe haveglancedatthem,andnoticedanalarmingnumberofapparentlylowscores,wecanavertoureyes,putthemintothe recyclingbin,andvowinwardlytothinknomoreaboutthem.

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Forsimilarreasons,wemayalsoavoidsourcesofinformationthatmaythreatentodisturbourcurrentexplanations. Typically,ofcourse,learningmoreinformation,ifitisrelevantatall,islikelytohelpusunderstandtheworldbetter(e.g., thinkaboutthehintaboutthealphabetinFig.2).Althoughitispossiblethatnewinformationmayundermineourcurrent understanding(e.g.,learningthattheFig.2comesfromAncientEgypt,sothattheLatinalphabetcannothelpexplainthe pattern),thereceiptofinformationthatdecreasessense-makingislikelyfairlyrare.Indeed,thereisawell-knowntheoremin themathematicaltheoryofcoding,thedata-processinginequality(CoverandThomas,1991),whichstatesthattheexpected

code-lengthofasetofdata,inthelightofinformation,a,fromanyobservationorexperiment,A,cannotbegreaterthanthe initialcode-length:

C(K|B)≥

C(K|B∪{a})

_a

∈A (11)

Ifweassumethatsense-makingismerelytheinverseofcode-length(i.e.,finEq.(3)istheidentityfunction),thenthis wouldimplythatanyexperimentorobservationwill,inexpectation,improvesense-making.Note,though,that,aswith valuation,anychangeinsense-makingisassessedusingaprospect-theorystylevaluefunction,S,inwhichlossesloom

largerthangains.

Forthisreason,itisentirelypossiblethat,forsomepossibleobservationsorexperiments,A:

S(S)K|B))>S(S(K|B∪{a}))

_a_∈_A (12)

Thatis,theexpectedutilityfromachangeinsense-makingmaybenegativeforsomeexperimentsorobservations—and hencethesearesourcesofinformationthatwewillbemotivatedtoavoid.Anacademicwhohasdevelopedaparticular theory,forexample,mightstoprunningcriticalexperimentsthatcouldchallengethetheory.Presumably,iftheacademic trulybelievesthetheory,newdatashouldbemuchmorelikelytosupportthetheorythantorefuteit;howeverthedown-side ofthelattercouldeasilymorethanoutweighthemoreprobablebutsmallerupsideoftheformer.

Inthistypeofcase,avoidingsubjectingone’stheorytoareallyrigoroustestmaybemotivatedbothbythedesiretoavoid bothareductioninsense-makingandareductioninone’sevaluationofone’slife—if,forexample,one’ssenseofself-worth isconnectedtothevalidityofthetheory.Inmorecommonsituations,however,thesetwomotivesarelikelytobepitted againstone-another.Generally,importantnewinformationwilltendtosimplifytheencodingofcurrentinformation,aswe haveseenEq.(11).So,otherthingsbeingequal,onemightexpectthatgatheringnewinformationwillgenerallyimprove sense-making.Buttheanticipatedimpactofnewinformationonvalue,incontrast,hasaneutralexpectedvalue

V(e(K|B∪{a}))−V(e(K|B))

_a

∈A=0 (13)

From the point of view of absolute value, one should feel entirely indifferent about whether to obtain new information—lossesand gainswillbalanceout.But,becauselossesloom largerthangains,theexpectationofVR term

willtypicallybenegative(althoughthecurvatureofthevaluefunction,Vwillalsomatter—e.g.,theremaybeapositive

expectedevaluationwhereforexample,thereisahighprobabilityofmildlygoodnews,andasmallprobabilityofverybad news.So,forexample,onemightwanttoknowtheresultsofanexamwhereoneisalmostsureonehaspassed).

Thechoiceofwhethertolookornotataninformationsource,therefore,islikelytodependonthebalancebetweenthe typicallypositiveexpectationoftheSRtermandthetypicallynegativeexpectationoftheVRterm.Whetherwechooseto

lookatourteachingratings,investigatewhetherourspouseishavinganaffair,orwhetherourchildisengagedinillegal activities,willdependonwhethercuriosityovercomestrepidation,andthemostcommonconﬂictedpatternwillbetoseek informationthatwestronglysuspectwillmakeusmiserable(KrugerandEvans,2009).

Thereis,ofcourse,afurtherimpetustosampleinformation:Learningnewinformationmayhelptoinformdecision makingandallowustochangeouractionsinbeneﬁcialways.Althoughnewinformationcan,byillluck,sometimesleadusto switchtoworsedecisionoptions,theexpectedqualityofdecisionsshouldneverfallafterthereceiptofnewinformation(for arelevantformalresult,seeJuslinetal.,2006).Ingeneral,therefore,psychologicalfactorsthatleadustoavoidinformation willtendtohaveanegativeimpactondecisionquality.Forexample,suspectingthatherteachingratingsarebad,ateacher maynotlookatthem;andthereforenotgetvaluablefeedbackabouthowtoimprove(i.e.,notbeabletochangeheractions appropriately);andhencebecomelockedintoaspiralofpoorteaching.Similarly,nottakingamedicaltestmaymeanthat apersonisnottreatedearlyenoughtohalttheprogressofaseriousdisease,andsoon.

Inthesesituations,weshouldexpectinformationavoidancetobeespeciallyprevalentamongpeoplewhodiscountthe futureinanextreme,orhyperbolic,fashion,puttingdisproportionateweightonthepresent.Present-biaswouldleadtoa disproportionateweightingoftheshort-termcostsoflookingascomparedwiththelong-termbeneﬁtsofgainingthefeared information.

4.6. Consumerchoice

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studentschosethenotebookoverthelargercollection.Thispatternviolatesmonotonicity,whichisoneofthesimplestand widelyacceptedprinciplesofgooddecisionmaking.Itcanbeunderstoodasamanifestationofthepreferenceforsimplicity: “alldifferent”ismuchsimplertoencodethanthemish-mashofsameanddifferentcolorsthatwascreatedbytheaddition ofthetwosame-colorpens.

Eversandcolleaguesshowed,too,showedthathowitemswereorganizedmadeabigdifferencetochoicebehavior.For example,whenthetwopensintheaboveexamplewereseparatedfromtheotherpens,creatingoneall-differentsetand anotherall-sameset,thenpreferencesshiftedbackinfavorofthepensoverthenotebook.Similarly,whenpeoplechosesets ofbottlesofbeer,theypreferredthosewithasimpleorganization,eitherbeingalldifferentorallthesame;asetofbeers whichmostlydifferbuthavesomerepetitionswaslesspreferred.

Asabody,theseexperimentsshowthepeoplehaveastrongpreferenceforsetsofitemsthatcanbeorganizedsimply—in ourterms,theyareeasytomakesenseof.Indeed,theauthorsfurtherattributethesepreferencestothepreferenceforsets thatareeasilydescribed—i.e.,thathaveashortcode-length.Aﬁnalstudyinthepapersoughttoprovidestrongevidence thatthepreferenceforall-differentandall-samewas,infact,derivativeofthepreferencefordescriptivesimplicity.Inthis studystudentsmadechoicesbetweentwobox-setsofBBKingcompactdisks,whichweredeliberatelychosentobeabout comparableindesirability.Oneofthetwoboxsets,however,wasrandomlyselectedforeachsubjecttobedescribedasall havingbeenrecordedinBiloxi,orTupelo,twolocationswhichapretesthadidentiﬁedasnotparticularlydesirablelocations forarecordingtohavebeenmade.Despitetheundesirabilityoftheserecordinglocations,providingadescriptionthat,in effect,‘madesense’ofonecollectionortheothertendedtoincreasepreferenceforthatcollection.

4.7. Esthetics

Thequestionofwhysomepiecesofart,movies,plays,literatureetc.arewidelyappreciatedwhereasothersarenot hasreceivedsurprisinglylittleattentionfromsocialandbehavioralscientists,perhapsbecauseitisseenasaproblemtoo difﬁculttoyieldworkableinsights.Indeed,asrepresentedmostvividlybythefamouspaperbyStiglerandBecker(1977)

“Degustibusnonestdisputandum”(thereisnoarguingwithtastes),manyeconomistshavebeenadamantthattheorigin oftastesisatopicthatliesoutsideofthepurviewoftheirprofession.Althoughcertainlynotaddressingallrelevantcausal factors(e.g.,thereiscertainlyahugeamountofsocial‘herding’incumbentinartappreciation),ourframeworkdoesprovide somehintsaboutdeterminantsofesthetictastes.

Quiteanalogoustoourdiscussionoftwowaysthatthedriveforsense-makingplaysintocuriosity(i.e.,thedesiretomake senseofstimuliprovided,suchasriddles,andthedesireforinformationthatpromisestomakesenseofexisting,stored, information),onecanimaginetwowaysthatsense-makingplaysintoesthetics.

Theﬁrstisthatwearelikelytohaveapreferenceformaterialsthatcanbemadesenseof—booksandmovieswith coherentplots;representationalartandsoon.Thedesireforsense-makingwithinthestimuliprovidedisprobablymost characteristicofwhatissometimesreferredtoas“lowbrow”art—artthatisenjoyabletoexperiencebutdoesn’tleaveus withmuchinthelong-term.

Thesecondisthepreferenceforliterature,artandsoforththatmaynotprovidemuchsense-makinginandofitself,but helpsustomakesenseofotheraspectsofourlivesorourworld.ThepaintingGuernica,forexample,issomewhatpainfulto lookat,butgivesthevieweranewperspectiveonwar.AsSchmidhuber(2009,p.11)notesinapaperthatiscloselyrelated tothisone,“goodobserver-dependentartdeepenstheobserver’sinsightsaboutthisworldorpossibleworlds,unveiling previouslyunknownregularities.,connectingpreviouslydisconnectedpatternsinaninitiallysurprisingway.”

Eventhoughthesecondcategorycanhelptoexplainwhymuchartisanythingbutsimpletomakesenseof,itprobably doesn’tgosufficientlyfarinexplainingthepreferenceforsuchwork.Indeed,therealmostseemstobesomepleasure,orat leastexcitement,tobederivedfromartthatdoesn’tmakesenseoftheworld,orthatevendefiessense-making.Inaletterto hisbrothers,thepoetJohnKeatsusedtheterm“negativecapability”torefer,inlaudatoryterms,toasituationinwhich“a maniscapableofbeinginuncertainties,mysteries,doubts,withoutanyirritablereachingafterfactandreason.”(Bate,2009, p.249)Hecoinedtheterm(anditsdefinition)asacontrasttotheproclivitiesofthepoetColeridge,who,Keatscomplained tohisbrothers,was“incapableofremainingcontentwithhalf-knowledge.”Coleridge,accordingtoKeats,wassearching forasingle,higher-ordertruthorsolutiontothemysteriesofthenaturalworld,ataskwhichKeats,whosawtheworldas infiniteandimpenetrable,viewedascrass.

Thepleasuresofestheticsneednotbelimitedtothetraditionalarts.Sunstein(2015),forexample,inaninsightfulbook reviewtitled“HowStarWarsIlluminatesConstitutionalLaw,”writesaboutthepleasuresoflearning,intheclimacticscene ofTheEmpireStrikesBack,thatDarthVaderisLukeSkywalker’sfather.AsChrisTaylor(2014)expressesitinthebook thatSunsteinreviews,thissuddenlyexplains“atastrikewhyeveryonefromUncleOwentoObi-WantoYodahasbeenso concernedaboutLuke’sdevelopment,andwhetherhewouldgrowuptobelikehisfather.”Sunsteinarguesthatsimilar momentshappeninconstitutionallegalscholarship:“Inconstitutionallaw,manylawprofessorsargueforsuchmoments, forexamplebyrecognizingnewlimitsonthepowerofthefederalgovernmentornewrightsofvarioussorts.”

4.8. Science

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motivemorecloselyrelatedtothecurrentperspective—thedesireforsense-making.AsGlynn(2010)pointsoutinhisbook “EleganceinScience,”scientistsaswellaslay-peoplecanbethrilledbytheirassimilationofanewtheoreticalperspective thatshedslightondisparate,otherwiseconfusing,facts.Wilkinson(2015),likewise,inanarticleonmathematicianYitang Zhang’ssolutionofthe“boundgaps”probleminmath,writesthat:

Puremathematics,asopposedtoappliedmathematics,isdonewithnopracticalpurposesinmind.Itisascloseto artandphilosophyasitistoengineering.“Myresultisuselessforindustry,”Zhangsaid.TheBritishmathematician G.H.Hardywrotein1940thatmathematicsis,of“alltheartsandsciences,themostaustereandthemostremote.” BertrandRussellcalleditarefugefrom“thedrearyexileoftheactualworld.”Hardybelievedemphaticallyinthe preciseaestheticsofmath.Amathematicalproof,suchasZhangproduced,“shouldresembleasimpleandclear-cut constellation,”hewrote,“notascatteredclusterintheMilkyWay.”EdwardFrenkel,amathprofessorattheUniversity ofCalifornia,Berkeley,saysZhang’sproofhas“arenaissancebeauty,”meaningthatthoughitisdeeplycomplex,its outlinesareeasilyapprehended.Thepursuitofbeautyinpuremathematicsisatenet.Lastyear,neuroscientistsin GreatBritaindiscoveredthatthesamepartofthebrainthatisactivatedbyartandmusicwasactivatedinthebrains ofmathematicianswhentheylookedatmaththeyregardedasbeautiful.

Wereproducethepassageinfullbecauseittouchesonsomanyofthethemesdiscussedinthispaper.First,thefactthat the“resultisuselessforindustry”highlightsthefactthatinsightisvaluedinitsownright,apartfromanymaterialgainsit confers.Second,Hardy’sviewthatamathematicalproofshouldresembleasimpleandclear-cutconstellation”asopposed toa“scatteredcluster”makesclearthatmathematicalproofsareverymuchamatterofsense-making,asdoesWilkinson’s descriptionofZhang’sproofas“deeplycomplex”butwith“outlines[that]areeasilyapprehended.”Frenkel’scommentthat Zhang’sproofhas“arenaissancebeauty”drawsconnectionsbetweenscientiﬁcinsightandestheticappreciation,asdoes thereferencetoneuroscienceresearch.

Thepleasurederivedfromsense-makingisnotonlyasourceofscientiﬁcprogress,butalsoofstagnation,becauseoncea scientisthasarrivedataparticularformofsense-making,andespeciallyiftheyareattachedtoitinvirtueofhavingproposed itoradopteditoveraspanoftime,theyarelikelytobecomeresistanttoabandoningit—forreasonscloselyrelatedtothose discussedinthesubsectionaboveonconﬁrmationbias.

4.9. Concernaboutothers’beliefs

Oneofthemostconsequential,yetrarelystudied,featuresofhumanmotivationistheextenttowhichpeoplecareabout others’beliefs.Peoplesortgeographicallyonthebasisofbeliefs,avoidinteractingwithpeopleholdingdifferentbeliefsand, whentheycan’tavoidinteractingwithpeopleholdingdifferentbeliefs,avoidthe‘conversationalmine-ﬁelds’associatedwith actuallydiscussingtheirdifferences.Peopleexposethemselvestomediaconsistentwiththeirexistingbeliefs,proselytize totrytobringothers’beliefsintoconformitywiththeirownand,attheextreme,seektosilencethosetheydisagreewith, insomecasesbytryingtokillthem.

Whydopeoplecareaboutothers’beliefs;whydon’twetakealive-and-let-liveattitudetowardwhatis,afterall,invisible inotherpeople’sminds?Ourtheoryofsense-makingprovidesonepossibleexplanation.Beliefs,accordingtothetheoretical perspectivepropoundedhere,arepartandparcelofsense-making;peoplechoosebeliefsthatfit withthelargersense thattheymake oftheworld.Anegativechangeinthedegreetowhich one’slife makessenseis aversive,andthis is especiallytrueasaresultoftheinclusionofthechangeterm,andisfurtherexacerbatedbylossaversion.Confronting beliefsthatareincompatiblewithone’sown,perhapsviaaninterpersonalencounterorexposuretomedia,accordingto thisperspective,isaversivebecauseitisimpossibletoescapetherecognitionthat(atleast)onesetofbeliefsmustbe wrong,anditmaynotbepossibletoconfidentlyruleoutthepossibilitythatitisone’sownbeliefs,andthesense-making theyarepartof,thataredeficient.(SeeGolmanetal.,2015,forarelated,andmorefullydevelopedperspectiveonthis issue.)

4.10. Conspiracytheoriesandreligion

A“conspiracytheory”(atermcoinedbyKarlPopper)is,accordingtoWikipedia,“anexplanatorypropositionthataccuses twoormorepersons,agroup,oranorganizationofhavingcausedorcoveredup,throughsecretplanninganddeliberate action,anillegalorharmfuleventorsituation.”Althoughconspiraciesundeniablydooccur,thetermhastakenonapejorative connotation(Moore,2002)duetothewidespreadperceptionthatconspiraciesaresuspectedtooccurfarmoreoftenthan theyactuallydo,aswellastotheunlikelynature(e.g.,implausibledegreeofcoordinationbetweendisparatecharacters)of manyconjecturedconspiracies.Socialscientistshavefoundthatconspiracytheoriesarewidespread,andthatconspiracy theoriesareespeciallyembracedbythepoor,minorities,andthosewhoexhibitlowlevelsoftrustandhighlevelsofeconomic insecurity(Goertzel,1994).

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thesubject,arguethattheappealofmanyconspiracytheories“liesintheattributionofotherwiseinexplicableevents tointentional action, andto anunwillingness toacceptthepossibility that signiﬁcantadverse consequences maybe a productofinvisiblehandmechanisms(suchasmarketforcesorevolutionarypressures) orofsimplechance,rather than of anyone’s plans” (p. 6).The authorsthen continue that “people do not liketo believe that signiﬁcantevents werecausedbybad(orgood)luck,andmuchprefersimplercausalstories.Inparticular,human“mindsprotestagainst chaos,”andpeopleseektoextractameaningfromabewilderingeventorsituation,ameaningthataconspiracymaywell supply.”

Interestingly,theexplanationsthathavebeenproposedfortheattractionofconspiracytheoriesmayalsohelptoexplain thepervasivenessofbeliefinGod.Park(2005)argues,andsupportswithcorrelationresearch,theideathattraumatic eventsstrengthenbeliefinGodbecauseofthethreattheyposetonon-randomness.Inastudyof169studentswhohad experiencedthedeathofasigniﬁcantotherinthepastyear,Parkfoundthat,intheshort-run,thosewhowerereligious sufferedagreaterdropinwell-beingfollowingthedeath,presumablybecausetheirmisfortunechallengedtheirbeliefin abenignpower.However,inthelong-term—i.e.,forthosewhohadexperiencedthedeathfurtherinthepast—theeffect reversed,andreligiositywasassociatedwithbettercopingandhighersubjectivewell-being.Kayetal.(2010)alsoargue thatattemptstocopewithperceptionsofrandomnessmaybeakeyfactorinreligiousbeliefs.“Afﬁrmingtheexistence ofacontrollingGod,”theauthorswrite,“mayprovideanexcellentmeansforinsulatingoneselffromtheaversivearousal associatedwithrandomness.”(p.216)Providingsome,albeitweak,experimentalevidenceforthisproposition,theauthors foundthatsubjectswhocompletedawordunscramblingexercisewhichexposedthemtowordsrelatedtorandomness(e.g., “chance,”“random”)asopposedtonegativewords(e.g.,“slimy”)butwhowerenotsubjecttoamisattributionmanipulation, reportedgreaterbeliefinsupernaturalcontrol.

Asshouldalreadybeevident,bothconspiracytheoriesandreligioncanpotentiallybeviewedasmanifestationsofthedrive forsense-making.However,theyrepresentquitedifferentapproaches.AlthoughSunsteinandVermeulepositapreference for“simplercausalstories,”manyifnotmostconspiracytheoriesareactuallyfantasticallycomplex.Forexample,thepopular conspiracytheorythattheU.S.governmentwasbehindthe9–11tragedyenvisionsthegovernmenthiringthehijackers, booby-trappingthebuildings(accordingtothedominanttheory,theairplanesalonewouldnothavebeensufﬁcienttocause theircollapse),andsoon.Inthelanguageofinformationtheory,thisisaverycomplicatedtheory(C(e|B)ishigh)thatmakes perfectsenseoftheworld(C(K|e,B)islow).Religiousbeliefsare,insomesense,theopposite;theyareaverysimpletheory: “godcauseseverything”(C(e|B)islow)thatmakessenseof,inthesenseofpredicts,almostnothing,leavingC(K|e,B)largely unchanged.

4.11. Theimportanceofnarrative

Anothermanifestationofthedriveforsense-makingis,likely,thehumanaffinityfornarrative—fortellingstoriesabout thingsthathelptomakesenseofthem.PenningtonandHastie(e.g.,1991,1992)findthatjurorsaremuchmorepersuaded bynarratives,whichmakesenseofthefacts,thanbylogicalarguments.Pennebakerfindsinnumerousstudies(see,e.g.,

PennebakerandSeagal,1999)thatwritingaboutanemotionalpersonalexperienceforaslittleas15minadayconfers mentalandphysicalbeneﬁtsinaslittleasthreedays.“Theactofconstructingstories...”PennebakerandSeagalwrite, “allowsonetoorganizeandremembereventsinacoherentfashion.[and]givesindividualsasenseofpredictabilityand controlovertheirlives.”(p.1243)AliceGregory(2015),inanarticleaboutatext-messagebasedcounselingservice,writes that“peoplewhospenttheirhigh-schoolyearschattingwithfriendsonlandlinesareoftendismissiveoftexting,asifit mightbeaphaseoneoutgrows,buttheformisunparalleledinitsabilitytorelayinformationconcisely.Theactofwriting, eveniftheproductconsistsofonlyahundredandfortycharacterscomposedwithone’sthumbs,forcesakindofreal-time distillationofemotionalchaos.”

JeromeBruner(inhisearlycareerapioneerofresearchonsense-making)focused,inlatecareer,onnarrative.Bruner, likePennebaker,viewstheconstructionofstoriesasanaturalhumanprocessthathelpspeopletomakesenseoftheirlives andultimatelyshapeshowtheylive.AsBrunerwrites,“Theself-tellingoflifenarrativesachievesthepowertostructure perceptualexperience,toorganizememory,tosegmentandpurpose-buildthevery‘events’ofalife.Intheend,webecome theautobiographicalnarrativesbywhichwe‘tellabout’ourlives.”(2004,p.694)Bruner’spointisthatpeopledon’tonly trytomakesenseoftheirlifebyforminganarrativeofit,butorganizetheirlifenotonlytoconformtothenarrativethey create,butwithaneyetowardburnishingitandmaintainingcohesion.