Aznar vs. Garcia, G.R. No. L-16749, Jan. 3, 1963 FACTS:
Edward Christensen, who at his death was a US citizen but domiciled in the Philippines, left a will, devising unto Maria Helen a certain amount of money and giving the rest of his estate to Maria Lucy. Helen opposed the partition on the ground that she is deprived of her legitime. Her contention is that the law of California directs that the law of the domicile (Philippines) should govern the will. ISSUE: Whether or not the national law or the domiciliary law should apply
HELD:
The intrinsic validity of wills is governed by the national law of the decedent. In the present case, the national law of Edward is the laws of California. However, there were two conflicting California laws regarding succession. One isOne is enunciated in In Re Kaufman (which does enunciated in In Re Kaufman (which does not provide for legitimes) and another is not provide for legitimes) and another is Ar
Art. t. 94946 6 of of ththe e CaCalilifofornrnia ia CiCivivil l CoCodede (w
(whihich ch pprrovoviiddes es ththat at tthe he lalaw w of of ththee d
domomicicilile e apappplilieses). ). SC SC heheld ld tthahat t tthehe na
natitiononal al lalaw w is is ArArt. t. 94946, 6, whwhicich h is is ththee co
confnflilict ct of of lalaws ws rurule le of of CaCalilifofornrniaia.. The reason is that In Re Kaufman applies only to residents while Art. 946 is specific to non-residents. Thus, since Art. 946 contains a refer-back to Philippine laws (the law of the domicile), then Maria Helen is entitled to her legitime.
Bellis vs. Bellis, G.R. No. L-23678, June 6, 1967 FACTS:
Amos Bellis, a US citizen, died a resident of Texas. He left two wills -- one devising a
certain amount of money to his first wife and three illegitimate children and another, leaving the rest of his estate to his seven legitimate children. Before partition, the illegitimate children who are Filipinos opposed on the ground that they are deprived of their legitimes.
ISSUE: Whether the applicable law is Texas law or Philippine laws
HELD:
Applying the nationality rule, the law of Texas should govern the intrinsic validity of the will and therefore answer the question on entitlement to legitimes. But since the law of Texas was never proven, ththe e dodoctctririne ne of of
pr
prococesessusual al prpresesumumptptioion n wawas s apapplplieied.d. Hence, SC assumed that Texas law is the Hence, SC assumed that Texas law is the same as
same as PhiliPhilippinppine e lawslaws, , which upholdswhich upholds the nationality rule.
the nationality rule.
Renvoi doctrine is not applicable because Renvoi doctrine is not applicable because there is no conflict as to the nationality there is no conflict as to the nationality and domicile of Bellis. He is both a citizen and domicile of Bellis. He is both a citizen an
and d a a rresesididenent t oof f TeTexaxass. . SSo o eveveen n iif f ass
assumiuming ng the law the law of of TexTexas as appapplielies s thethe domiciliary rule, it is still Texas law that domiciliary rule, it is still Texas law that governs because his domicile is Texas. governs because his domicile is Texas. Gibbs v. Government of Philippine Islands Facts:
Gibbs and his wife were American nationals, domiciled in California. They acquired lands in the Philippines. The wife died in California. Gibbs was appointed administrator of the intestate proceedings instituted in Manila. Gibbs asked the cour t to adjudicate to him lands acquired in the Philippines not under our laws on succession but because in accordance with the law of California, the community property of spouses who are citizens of California, upon the death of the wife previous to that of the husband, belongs absolutely to the surviving husband without administration. CFI granted such to Gibbs upon proof of California law. The register of deeds refused to transfer such properties on the ground of non-payment of inheritance tax. Gibbs argued that the conjugal right of a California wife in a community property is a personal right and even if this was a case of succession, California law would still apply.
Issue: is Gibbs exempt from inheritance tax? Held:
Th
The e apappepellllee ee cocontntenends ds ththat at ththe e lalaw w of of Cal
Califoifornirnia a shoshould uld detdetermermine ine the the natnatureure and extent of the title, if any, that was and extent of the title, if any, that was vested in Eva Johnson Gibbs citing article vested in Eva Johnson Gibbs citing article 9 of the Civil Code. But that, even if the 9 of the Civil Code. But that, even if the nature and extent of her title under said nature and extent of her title under said certificates be governed by the law of the certificates be governed by the law of the Philippine Islands, the laws of California Philippine Islands, the laws of California govern the succession to such title, citing govern the succession to such title, citing the second paragraph of article 10 of the the second paragraph of article 10 of the Civil Code.
Civil Code.It is argued that the conjugal right of the California wife in community real estate in the Philippine Islands is a personal right and must, therefore, be settled by the law governing her personal status, that is, the law of California. But our attention has not been called to any law of California that incapacitates a married woman from acquiring or holding land in a foreign jurisdiction in accordance with the lex rei sitae.
The trial court found that under the law of The trial court found that under the law of California, upon the death of the wife, the California, upon the death of the wife, the en
entitirre e cocommmmununitity y pprropoperertty y wwitithohoutut admin
administraistration tion belobelongs ngs to to the the survisurvivingving husband; that he is the absolute owner of husband; that he is the absolute owner of al
all l ththe e cocommmmununitity y prpropopererty ty frfrom om ththee moment of the death of his wife, not by moment of the death of his wife, not by
virtue of succession or by virtue of her virtue of succession or by virtue of her death, but by virtue of the fact that when death, but by virtue of the fact that when the death of the wife precedes that of the the death of the wife precedes that of the hu
husbsbanand d he he acacququirires es ththe e cocommmmununitityy p
prrooppeerrtty, y, nnoot t aas s aan n hheeiir r oor r aas s tthhee be
benenefificiciarary y of of hihis s dedececeasased ed wiwifefe, , bubutt be
becacaususe e shshe e nenevever r hahad d momore re ththan an anan inchoate interest or expentancy which is inchoate interest or expentancy which is extinguished upon her death.
extinguished upon her death.However, the argument of the appellee apparently leads to this dilemma: If he takes nothing by succession from his deceased wife, how can the second paragraph of article 10 be invoked? Can theCan the appellee be heard to say that there is a appellee be heard to say that there is a le
legagal l susuccccesessision on undunder er ththe e lalaw w of of ththee Philippine Islands and no legal succession Philippine Islands and no legal succession under the law of California?
under the law of California? It seems clear that the second paragraph of article 10 applies only when a legal or testamentary succession has taken place in the Philippines and in accordance with the law of the Philippine Islands; and the foreign law is consulted only in regard to the order of succession or the extent of the successional rights; in other words, the second paragraph of article 10 can be invoked only when the dece ased was vested with a descendible interest in property within the jurisdiction of the Philippine Islands.
H
Hoowweevveerr, , tthhe e ccoouurrt t hheelld d tthhaat t iit t iiss pr
princincipliple e firfirmly mly estestablablishished ed thathat t to to thethe la
law w of of ththe e ststatate e in in whwhicich h ththe e laland nd isis situated we must look for the rules which situated we must look for the rules which g
govoverern n iits ts desdescecentnt, , alalieiennatatiionon, , anandd ttrraannssffeerr, , aannd d ffoor r tthhe e eeffffeecct t aanndd c
coonnssttrruuccttiioon n oof f wwiilllls s aannd d ootthheerr conveyances.
conveyances. This fundamental principle is stated in the first paragraph of article 10 of our Civil Code as follows: "Personal property is"Personal property is subject to the laws of the nation of the subject to the laws of the nation of the owner thereof; real property to the laws owner thereof; real property to the laws of the country in which it is situated. of the country in which it is situated. Under the provisions of the Civil Code and Under the provisions of the Civil Code and the
the jurjurispisprudrudencence e preprevaivailinling g herhere, e, thethe wife, upon the acquisition of any conjugal wife, upon the acquisition of any conjugal pr
propeopertyrty, , becbecomeomes s immeimmediadiateltely y vesvestedted with an interest and title therein equal to with an interest and title therein equal to that of her husband, subject to the power that of her husband, subject to the power of management and disposition which the of management and disposition which the law vests in the husband.
law vests in the husband.It results that the wife of the appellee was, by the law of the Philippine Islands, vested of a descendible interest, equal to that of her husband and thethe descendible interest of Eva Johnson Gibbs descendible interest of Eva Johnson Gibbs in the lands aforesaid was transmitted to in the lands aforesaid was transmitted to her heirs by virtue of inheritance and this her heirs by virtue of inheritance and this tr
tranansmsmisissision on plplaiainlnly y fafalllls s wiwiththin in ththee language of section 1536 of Article XI of language of section 1536 of Article XI of Cha
Chaptpter er 40 40 of of the the AdAdminminististratrative ive CodCodee which levies a tax on inheritances. which levies a tax on inheritances. Fleumer vs. Hix
Fleumer vs. Hix 54 Phil 610 Facts:
The petitioner is a special administrator of the estate of Edward Hix. He alleged that the latter’s will was execute d in Elk in s, West Virginia on Novembe r 3, 1925 by Hix who had his residence in that jurisdiction, and that the laws of that state govern. To thi s en d, th e petit ioner su bmitt ed a
cop y of Sect ion 38 68 of Act s 1882 , c.84 as found in West Virginia Code, annotated by Hogg, Charles E., vol.2 1914, p. 1690 an d as cert ified to by th e Director of National Library.
The Judge of the First Insta nce however denied the probate of the will on the grounds that the will did not show the following:
• acknowledgment by Hix in the
presence of 2 competent witnesses
• Witnesses subscribed to will in
presence of the testator, and of each other
Hence, this appeal. Issue:
Is it necessary to prove in this jurisdiction the existence of such law in West Virginia as a prere quisi te to the allowance and recording of said will?
Held:
Yes. The laws of the foreign jurisdiction do not prove themsel ves in our court s. The courts of th e Philippine Islands are not authorized to take judicial notice of the laws of the various states of the Am er ican Union. SucSuc h h lawlaw s s musmus t t be provbe prov ed ed asas facts
facts.
Here the requirements of the law were not met.
• Ther e was no sho win g that the boo k
from which an extract was taken was printed or published under the authority of the state of West Virginia, as provided in Sec 30 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
• Nor was the extract from the law attested by the certificate of the officer having charge of the srcinal, under the seal of th e State of Wes t Virginia as provided in Sec 301.
• No evi den ce was intr odu ced sho win g
that the extract from the laws of West Virginia was in force at the time the alleged will was executed.
• Due execution of the will was not
established: only showed testimony of the petitioner
The court therefore did not err in denying the probate of the will. The existence of such law in West
Virginia must be proved.
Miciano v. Brimo Miciano v. Brimo
Decedent is a Turkish citizen. He left a will stating that he wishes to dispose of his properties in accordance with Philippine Laws. His brother, Andre Brimo opposed the partition. The appellant's opposition is based on the fact that the partition in question puts into effect the provisions of Joseph G. Brimo's will which are not in accordance with the laws of his Turkish nationality, for which reason they are
void as being in violation or article 10 of the Civil Code which states that testamentary successions shall be governed by the national law of the deceased. He was therefore excluded from the inheritance pursuant to a clause in the decedent’s will that anyone who would oppose the decedent’s wish to dispose his estate under Philippine law shall have his share annul or cancelled.
Issue:
Whether or not the declaration that Turkish laws are impertinent to this case;
Whether or not the appellant’s exclusion from the will is valid?
Held: 1stissue
The oppositor did not prove that saidtestamentary dispositions are not in accordance with the Turkish laws, inasmuch as he did not present any evidence showing he did not present any evidence showing what the Turkish laws are on the matter what the Turkish laws are on the matter , and in the absabsencence e of of evievidendence ce on on sucsuchh laws, they are presumed to be the same laws, they are presumed to be the same as those of the
as those of the Philippines.Philippines.
The refusal to give the oppositor another opportunity to prove such laws does not constitute an error. It is discretionary with the trial court, and, taking into consideration that the oppositor was granted ample opportunity to introduce competent evidence, the Court finds no abuse of discretion on the part of the lower court in this particular. There is, therefore, no evidence in the record thatno evidence in the record that the national law of the testator Joseph G. the national law of the testator Joseph G. Brimo was
Brimo was violaviolated in ted in the testamentathe testamenta ryry disp
dispositiositions ons in in questquestion ion whichwhich, , not not beingbeing co
contntrarary ry to to ouour r lalaws ws in in foforcrce, e, mumust st bebe complied with and executed.
complied with and executed. 2ndissue
The institution of legatees in this will is conditional, and the condition is that the instituted legatees must respect the testator's will to distribute his property, not in accordance with the laws of his nationality, but in accordance with the laws of the Philippines. The fact is, however, that the said condition is void, being contrary to law, for article 792 of the civil Code provides the following:
Imp
Impossossiblible e conconditditionions s and and thothosese co
contntrarary ry to to lalaw w or or gogood od momoraralsls shall be considered as not imposed shall be considered as not imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or and shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in any manner whatsoever, legatee in any manner whatsoever, even should the testator otherwise even should the testator otherwise provide.
provide.
And said cocondndititioion n is is cocontntrarary ry to to lalaww b
beeccaauusse e iit t eexxpprreesssslly y iiggnnoorrees s tthhee testator's national law when, according to testator's national law when, according to article 10 of the civil Code above quoted, article 10 of the civil Code above quoted, suc
such h natnationional law al law of of the testthe test atoator r is is thethe o
onne e tto o ggoovveerrn n hhiis s tteessttaammeennttaarryy dispositions. dispositions. PCIB VS. ESCOLIN PCIB VS. ESCOLIN 56 SCRA 266 FACTS:
Linnie Jane Hodges died giving her testamentary provisions to her husband. At the
time of her
death, she was citizen of Texas but, was, however domiciled in the Philippines. To see whether
the testamentary provisions are valid, it is apparent and necessary to know what law
should be
applied. ISSUE:
Whether or not laws of Texas is applicable. RULING:
Prior evidence already presented to prove the existence of Texas Law.
It is necessary that the Texas law be ascertained. Here it must be proven whether a
renvoi will
happen or whether Texas law makes the testamentary provisions valid. In line with
Texas law,
that which should be proven is the law enforced during the death of Hodges and not in
any other
time.
The Supreme Court held that for what the The Supreme Court held that for what the Texas law is on the matter, is a question Texas law is on the matter, is a question of
of fafact ct to to be be reresosolvlved ed by by ththe e evievidedencncee tha
that t wouwould ld be be prpreseesentented d in in the the proprobatbatee court. Texas law at the time of her death court. Texas law at the time of her death (and not said law at any other time). (and not said law at any other time). Article 16 of the Civil Code provides that Article 16 of the Civil Code provides that “th
“the e natnationional al law of law of the persothe perso n n whowhosese su
succccesessisioon n iis s unundder er coconsnsididereratatioion,n, w
whahatetevever r mamay y bbe e tthe he nanatturure e oof f ththee pr
propeoperty rty and and regregardardlesless s of of the the coucountrntryy whe
whereirein n saisaid d prpropeoperty rty may may be be foufound”nd”,,
shall prevail.
shall prevail.However, the Conflict of Law of Texas, which is the “national law” of the
testatrix, Linnie Jane Hodges, provide that the domiciliary law (Philippine law — see paragraph 2, supra) should govern the testamentary dispositions and successional rights over movables (personal properties), and the law of the situs of the property (also Philippine law as to properties located in the Philippines) with regards immovable (real properties). Thus applying the “Renvoi Doctrine”, as approved and applied by our Supreme Court in the case of “In The Matter Of The Testate Estate of Eduard E. Christensen”, G.R. No. L-16749, promulgated January 31, 1963, Philippine law should apply to thePhilippine law should apply to the Wi
Will ll of of LiLinnnnie ie JaJane ne HoHodgdges es anand d to to ththee successional rights to her estate insofar successional rights to her estate insofar as her
as her movablemovable andand immovableimmovable assets inassets in the
the PhiPhiliplippinpines es are are conconcercernedned.. We shall not, at this stage, discuss what law should govern the assets of Linnie Jane Hodges located in Oklahoma and Texas, because the only assets in issue in this motion are those within the jurisdiction of this motion Court in the two above-captioned Special Proceedings. Nota bene: When can foreign law be given Nota bene: When can foreign law be given judicial notice
judicial notice
1. If the court of the forum is familiar of the law
2. Or it is within the actual knowledge of the court
Suntay v. Suntay Suntay v. Suntay
Jose B. Suntay died intestate leaving properties in the Philippines and a house in China. He is survived by children from the 1stmarriage and
a child and his widow from the 2 nd. Intestate
proceedings were instituted. Thereafter the widow filed a petition for a probate of a will but was later denied when the will was lost after the filing of said petition. On appeal, the petition was granted since there was sufficiency to prove the loss of the will. In spite of the fact that a commission from the probate court was issued on 24 April 1937 for the taking of the deposition of Go Toh, an attesting witness to the will , on 7 February 1938 the probate court denied a motion for continuance of the hearing sent by cablegram from China by the surviving widow and dismissed the petition. In the meantime the Pacific War supervened. After liberation, Silvino claimed to have found a will by his father which was filed, recorded and probated in the Amoy district court, Province of Fookien, China and thus filed a petition in the intestate proceedings praying for the probate of the will.
Issue:
May a will filed, recorded, and probated in China be reprobated in the Philippines? Held:
As to the will claimed to have been executed on 4 January 1931 in Amoy, China, the law on the point in Rule 78.
Section 1 of the rule provides: W
Wilills ls pproroveved d anand d aallllowowed ed in in aa forei
foreign gn countrcountry, y, accoraccording to ding to thethe la
lawws s of of susuch ch cocoununtrtry, y, mmay ay bbee allowed, filed, and recorded by the allowed, filed, and recorded by the pro
proper per CouCourt rt of of FiFirst rst InsInstantance ce inin the Philippines.
the Philippines. Section 2 provides:
When a copy of such will and the When a copy of such will and the a
alllloowwaanncce e tthheerreeooff, , dduullyy authenticated,
authenticated, is filed with a petition for allowance in the Philippines, by the executor or other person interested, in the court having jurisdiction, such court shall fix a time and place for the hearing, and cause notice thereof to be given as in case of an original will presented for allowance.
Section 3 provides: If
If it appeit appe ars at ars at the hearthe hear ing thating that the will should be allowed in the the will should be allowed in the Ph
Phililipippipinenes, s, ththe e cocoururt t shshalall l soso al
allolow w itit, , anand d a a cecertrtifificicatate e of of ititss all
allowowancance, e, sisignegned d by by the the JudJudge,ge, an
and d atatteteststed ed by by ththe e seseal al of of ththee courts,
courts,to which shall be attache d a copy of the will, shall be filed and recorded by the clerk, and the will shall have the same effect as if originally proved and allowed in such court. The fact that the municipal district court The fact that the municipal district court of Amoy, China, is a probate court must of Amoy, China, is a probate court must be proved.
be proved. The law of China on procedure in the probate or allowance of wills must also be proved. The legal requirements for the execution of a valid will in China in 1931 should also be established by competent evidence. There is no proof on these points. There is no proof on these points. The unverified answers to the questions The unverified answers to the questions propounded by counsel for the appellant propounded by counsel for the appellant to the Consul General of the Republic of to the Consul General of the Republic of Ch
Chinina a obobjejectcted ed to to by by cocoununsesel l fofor r ththee appe
appellee, llee, are are inadinadmissimissible,ble, because apart from the fact that the ofoffifice ce of of CoConsnsulul Gen
Generaeral l doedoes s not qualinot quali fy fy and make and make thethe pe
persrson on whwho o hoholdlds s it it an an exexpepert rt on on ththee Ch
Chininesese e lalaw w on on prprococededurure e in in prprobobatatee ma
matttterers, s, if if ththe e sasame me be be adadmimitttteded, , ththee adv
adverserse e parparty ty wouwould ld be be depdeprivrived ed of of hishis righ
right t to confront and to confront and crosscross-exam-examine theine the witness.
witness.Consuls are appointed to attend to trade matters.
The order of the municipal district court The order of the municipal district court of
of AmAmoyoy, , ChChinina, a, dodoes es nonot t pupurprporort t toto probate or allow the will which was the probate or allow the will which was the subject of the proceedings.
subject of the proceedings.In view thereof, the will and the alleged probate thereof cannot be said to have been done in accordance with the accepted basic and fundamental concepts and principles followed in the probate and allowance of wills. Consequently, the authenticated transcript of proceedings held in the municipal district court of Amoy, China, cannot be deemed and accepted as
proceedings leading to the probate or allowance of a will and, therefore, the will referred to therein cannot be allowed, filed and recorded by a competent court of this country. Li
Likekewiwisese, , ththe e prprococeeeedidingngs s hahad d in in ththee municipal district court of Amoy were for municipal district court of Amoy were for the
the purpurpospose e of of taktaking the ing the testestimtimony ony of of two attes
two attes tinting g witwitnesnesses ses to to the the wilwill l andand tha
that t the the ordorder er of of the the munimunicipcipal al disdistritrictct c
coouurrt t oof f AAmmooy y ddooees s nnoot t ppuurrppoorrt t ttoo probate the will.
probate the will.In the absence of proof that the municipal district court of Amoy is a probate court and on the Chinese law of procedure in probate matters, it may be presumed that the proceedings in the matter of probating or allowing a will in the Chinese courts are the a deposition or to a perpetuation of testimony, and even if it were so it does not measure same as those prov ided for in our laws on the subject. It is a proceedings inIt is a proceedings in r
reem m aannd d ffoor r tthhe e vvaalliiddiitty y oof f ssuucchh p
prrococeeeeddininggs s pperersosonanal l nonotitice ce or or bbyy pu
publblicicatatioion n or or boboth th to to alall l ininteterereststeded pa
partrtieies s mumust st be be mamadede. . ThThe e ininteterereststeded parties in the case were known to reside parties in the case were known to reside in
in the the PhiPhiliplippinpines. es. The The evievidendence ce shoshowsws that no such notice was received by the that no such notice was received by the iinntteerreesstteed d paparrttiiees s reressiiddiing ng iin n tthhee Philippines
Philippines. The proceedings had in the municipal district court of Amoy, China, may be likened to or come up to the standard of such proceedings in the Philippines for lack of notice to all interested parties and the proceedings were held at the back of such interested parties.
The decree appealed from is affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.
In re: Johnson In re: Johnson
Emil H. Johnson, a native of Sweden and a naturalized citizen of the United States, died in the city of Manila, leaving a holographic will and is signed by himself and two witnesses only, instead of three witnesses required by section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. However, a petition was presented in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila for the probate of this will, on the ground that Johnson was at the time of his death a citizen of the State of Illinois, United States of America; that the will was duly executed in accordance with the laws of that State; and hence could properly be probated here. Petitioner contends that the decedent is not a citizen of Illinois and prays to annul the decree of probate and put the estate into intestate administration, thus preparing the way for the establishment of the claim of the petitioner as the sole legitimate heir of her father.
Issue:
Whether or not judgment from which the petitioner seeks relief should be set aside because the testator was not a resident of the
State of Illinois and the will was not in conformity with the laws of that State. Held:
Emil Johnson was a citizen of the State of Illinois. In the absence of clear proof to the contrary it should be presumed that a person naturalized in a court of a certain State thereby becomes a citizen of that State as well as of the United States.
IIn n SSeeccttiioon n 66225 5 oof f tthhe e CCoodde e oof f CCiivviill P
Prroocceedduurre e iit t iis s ddeeccllaarreed d tthhaat t ""tthhee allowance by the court of a will of real or allowance by the court of a will of real or personal property shall be conclusive as personal property shall be conclusive as to its due execution."
to its due execution."
The due execution of a will involves conditions relating to a number of matters, such as the age and mental capacity of the testator, the signing of the document by the testator, or by someone in his behalf, and the acknowledgment of the instrument by him in the presence of the required number of witnesses who affix their signatures to the will to attest the act. ThThe e prproooof f of of alall l ththesesee requisites is involved in the probate; and requisites is involved in the probate; and as to each and all of them the probate is as to each and all of them the probate is conclusive.
conclusive.Our reported cases do not contain the slightest intimation that a will which has been probated according to law, and without fraud, can be annulled, in any other proceeding whatever, on account of any supposed irregularity or defect in the execution of the will or on account of any error in the action of the court upon the proof adduced before it. We are not unmindful of the fact that when a citizen of one State leaves it and takes up his abode in another State with no intention of returning, he immediately acquires citizenship in the State of his new domicile. This is in accordance with that provision of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States which says that every citizen of the United States is a citizen of the State where in he resides. ThThe e efeffefect ct of of ththisis pr
proviovisision on nenecescessasaririly ly is is ththat at a a pepersrsonon trans
transferrferring ing his domicile from his domicile from one Stateone State to
to ananototheher r loloseses s hihis s cicititizezensnshihip p in in ththee State of his srcinal above upon acquiring State of his srcinal above upon acquiring citizenship in the State of his new abode. citizenship in the State of his new abode. The acquisition of the new State citizenship extinguishes the old. That situation, in our opinion, hahas s no no ananalalogogy y to to ththat at whwhicichh ar
arisises es whwhen en a a cicititizezen n of of an an AmAmerericicanan Sta
State te comcomes es to to resreside ide in in the Philithe Phili ppippinene Isl
Islandands. s. HerHere e he he canncannot acquirot acquir e e a a newnew cit
citizeizenshnship; nor ip; nor by by the mere the mere chachange of nge of do
domimicicile le dodoes es he he lolose se ththat at whwhicich h hehe brought with him.
brought with him.
Proper rule in taking judicial notice: Proper rule in taking judicial notice: The proper rule is to require proof of the statutes of the States of the American Union whenever their provisions are determinative of the issues in any action litigated in the Philippine courts. Collector vs. Fisher
Collector vs. Fisher
Facts:
This case relates to the determination and settlement of the hereditary estate left by the deceased Walter G. Stevenson, and the laws applicable thereto. Walter G. Stevenson (born in the Philippines on August 9, 1874 of British parents and married in the City of Manila on January 23, 1909 to Beatrice Mauricia
Stevenson another British subject) died on February 22, 1951 in SaSan n FrFrananciciscsco,o, California,
California,U.S.A. whereto he and his wifewhereto he and his wife moved and
moved and estaestablishblished ed their permanenttheir permanent residence
residence since May 10, 1945. In his will executed in San Francisco on May 22, 1947, and which was duly probated in the Superior Court of California on April 11, 1951, Stevenson instituted his wife Beatrice as Stevenson instituted his wife Beatrice as his sole heiress to the following real and his sole heiress to the following real and pe
persrsononal al prpropoperertities es acacququirired ed by by ththee spouses while residing in the Philippines. spouses while residing in the Philippines. Ancillary administration proceedings were instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila for the settlement of the estate in the Philippines. In due time Stevenson's will was duly admitted to probate by our court and Ian Murray Statt was appointed ancillary administrator of the estate, filed a preliminary estate and inheritance tax return with the reservation of having the properties declared therein finally appraised at their values six months after the death of Stevenson. Preliminary return was made by the ancillary administrator in order to secure the waiver of the Collector of Internal Revenue on the inheritance tax due on the 210,000 shares of stock in the Mindanao Mother Lode Mines Inc. which the estate then desired to dispose in the United States. Acting upon said return, the Collector of Internal Revenue accepted the valuation of the personal properties declared therein, but increased the appraisal of the two parcels of land located in Baguio City by fixing their fair market value. After allowing the deductions claimed by the ancillary administrator for funeral expenses in the amount of P2,000.00 and for judicial and administration expenses in the sum of P5,500.00, the Collector assessed the state the amount of P5,147.98 for estate tax and P10,875,26 or inheritance tax, or a total of P16,023.23. Both of these assessments were paid by the estate.
Th
The e anancicillllarary y adadmimininiststrratatoor r fifileled d inin am
amenendeded d esestatate te anand d ininheheriritatancnce e tataxx ret
return urn in in purpursuasuance nce of of his his resreservervatiationon m
maadde e aat t tthhe e ttiimme e oof f ffiilliinng g oof f tthhee preliminary return and for the purpose of preliminary return and for the purpose of availing of the right granted by section 91 availing of the right granted by section 91 of the National Internal Revenue Code. of the National Internal Revenue Code. Beatrice Mauricia Stevenson assigned all her rights and interests in the estate to the spouses, Douglas and Bettina Fisher, respondents herein.
The ancillary administrator filed a second amended estate and inheritance tax return. This return declared the same assets of the estate stated in the amended return of September 22, 1952, except that it containedit contained new claims for additional exemption and new claims for additional exemption and de
deduductctioion n to to wiwit: t: (1) (1) dededuductctioion n in in ththee am
amouount nt of of P4P4,0,00000.0.00 0 frfrom om ththe e grgrososss estate of the decedent as provided for in estate of the decedent as provided for in Se
Sectctioion n 86861 1 (4(4) ) of of ththe e U.U.S. S. FFededereralal
Internal Revenue Code which the ancillary Internal Revenue Code which the ancillary admin
administraistrator tor averreaverred d was was alloallowablwable e byby way of the reciprocity granted by Section way of the reciprocity granted by Section 12
122 2 of of ththe e NaNatitiononal al InInteternrnal al ReRevenvenueue Code
Code, as then held by the Board of Tax Appeals in case No. 71 entitled "Housman vs. Collector," August 14, 1952; and (2) exemption from the imposition of estate exemption from the imposition of estate an
and d ininheheriritatance nce tataxexes s on on ththe e 21210,0,000000 shares of stock in the Mindanao Mother shares of stock in the Mindanao Mother Lo
Lode de MinMineses, , InInc. c. alalso so pupursrsuauant nt to to ththee reciprocity proviso of Section 122 of the reciprocity proviso of Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code.
National Internal Revenue Code.In this last return, the estate claimed that it was liable only for the amount of P525.34 for estate tax and P238.06 for inheritance tax and that, as aas a c
coonnsseeqquueennccee, , iit t hhaad d oovveerrppaaiid d tthhee government
government. The refund of the amount of P15,259.83, allegedly overpaid, was accordingly requested by the estate. TheThe Collector denied the claim.
Collector denied the claim.For this reason, action was comme nced in the Court of First Instance of Manila by respondents, as assignees of Beatrice Mauricia Stevenson, for the recovery of said amount. Pursuant to Republic Act No. 1125, the case was forwarded to the Court of Tax Appeals which court, after hearing, rendered decision :
that: (a) the onone-e-hahalf lf (½(½) ) shsharare e of of ththee surviving spouse
surviving spousein the conjugal partnership property as diminished by the obligations properly chargeable to such property shouldshould be
be deddeductucteded from the net estate of the deceased Walter G. Stevenson, pursuant to Section 89-C of the National Internal Revenue Code; (b) the intangible personal propertythe intangible personal property belonging to the estate of said Stevenson belonging to the estate of said Stevenson is exempt from inheritance tax,
is exempt from inheritance tax,pursuant to the provision of section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code in relation to the California Inheritance Tax Law but decedent's estate is not entitled to an exemption of P4,000.00 in the computation of the estate tax; (c) for purposes of estate and inheritance taxation the Baguio real estate of the spouses should be valued at P52,200.00, and 210,000 shares of stock in the Mindanao Mother Lode Mines, Inc. should be appraised at P0.38 per share; and (d) the estate shall be entitled to a deduction of P2,000.00 for funeral expenses and judicial expenses of P8,604.39.
Issue: whether or not foreign law needs to be proved in our jurisdiction?
Ruling: It is
It is well-well-settlsettled that ed that foreforeign laws ign laws do notdo not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and prove themselves in our jurisdiction and ou
our r cocoururts ts arare e nonot t auauththororizized ed to to tatakeke judicial notice of them.
judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved. Section 41, Rule 123 of our Rules of Court prescribes the manner of proving foreign laws before our tribunals. However, although we believe it desirable that these laws be proved in accordance with said rule, we held in the case of Willamette Iron and Steel Works v. Muzzal,61 Phil. 471, that "a reading of sections 300 and 301 of our Code of Civil Procedure (now section 41, Rule 123) will convince one that these sections do not exclude the presentation of other competent evidence to prove the existence of a foreign law." In that." In that
case, we considered the testimony of an case, we considered the testimony of an a
attttoorrnneey-y-aatt--llaaw w oof f SSaan n FFrraanncciissccoo,, California who quoted verbatim a section California who quoted verbatim a section of
of CalCalifoifornirnia a CivCivil il CodCode e and who and who stastatedted that the same was in force at the time the that the same was in force at the time the obligations were contracted, as sufficient obligations were contracted, as sufficient evi
evidendence ce to to estestablablish ish the the exiexistestence nce of of said law.
said law. In line with this view, we find no error, therefore, on the part of the Tax Court in considering the pertinent California law as proved by respondents' witness.
Phil Trust Company vs. Bohanan Phil Trust Company vs. Bohanan Facts:
Appeal against an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Hon. Ramon San Jose, presiding, dismissing the objections filed by Magdalena C. Bohanan, Mary Bohanan and Edward Bohanan to the project of partition submitted by the executor and approving the said project.
The Court of First Instance of Manila, Hon. Rafael Amparo, presiding, admitted to probate a last will and test ament of C. O. Bohanan, executed by him in Manila. In the said order, the court made the following findings: According to the evidence of the opponents the testator was bboorrn n iin n NeNebbrraasskka a aanndd th
thererefeforore e a a cicititizezen n of of ththat at ststatate, e, or or atat least a citizen of California where some of least a citizen of California where some of his properties are located
his properties are located. This contentioncontention is
is untuntenenabablele. Notwithstanding the long residence of the decedent in the Philippines, his stay here was merely temporary, and he continued and remained to be a citizen of the United States and of the state of his pertinent residence to spend the rest of his days in that state. His permanent residence or domicile in the United States depended upon his personal intent or desire, and he selected Nevada as his homicide and therefore at the time of his death, he was a citizen of that state. NobodyNobody ca
can n chchoooose se hihis s dodomimicicile le or or pepermrmananenentt res
resideidence nce for him. for him. ThaThat t is is his exclushis exclus iveive personal right.
personal right.
Wherefore, the court finds that the testator C. O. Bohanan was at the time of his death a citizen of the United States and of the State of Nevada and declares that his will and testament, is fully in accordance with the laws of the state of Nevada and admits the same to probate. Accordingly, the Philippine Trust Company, named as the executor of the will, is hereby appointed to such executor and upon the filing of a bond in the sum of P10,000.00. The executor filed a project of partition dated January 24, 1956, making adjudications, in
accordance with the provisions of the will. The wife Magadalen
The wife Magadalen a C. a C. BohanaBohanan and n and herher two children question the validity of the two children question the validity of the testamentary provisions disposing of the testamentary provisions disposing of the est
estate ate in in the the manmanner ner aboabove ve indindicaicatedted,, claimi
claiming that ng that they have been they have been deprdeprived of ived of the legitime that the laws of the forum the legitime that the laws of the forum concede to them.
concede to them.
Moreover, the court below had found that the testator and MagdMagdalena C. alena C. BohanBohanan an werewere ma
marrrrieied d on on JaJanunuarary y 3030, , 19190909,, and that divorce was granted to him on May 20, 1922; that sosomemetitime me in in 19192525, , MaMagdgdalalena ena C.C. Bo
Bohanhanan an mamarrrrieied d CaCarl rl AaAaroron n anand d ththisis mar
marriariage ge was was subsubsissistinting g at at the the timtime e of of
the death of the testator
the death of the testator. Since no right tono right to sh
sharare e in in ththe e ininheheriritatancnce e in in fafavovor r of of aa d
divivororceced d wiwife fe exexisistts s in in ththe e SStatatte e of of Nevada
Nevadaand since the court below had already found that there was no conjugal property between the testator and Magdalena C. Bohanan, the latter can now have no longer claim to pay portion of the estate left by the testator.
Issue:
whether the estementary dispositions, especially those for the children which are short of the legitime given them by the Civil Code of the Philippines, are valid?
Ruling:
The old Civil Code, which is applicable to The old Civil Code, which is applicable to th
this is cacase se bebecacaususe e ththe e teteststatator or didied ed inin 1
1994444, , eexxpprreesssslly y prproovviiddees s tthhaatt succes
successionsional al rightrights s to to perspersonal onal proppropertyerty are to be earned by the national law of are to be earned by the national law of the person
the person whose succession is in question. Says the law on this point:
Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the order of succession as well as to the extent of the successional rights and the intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is in question, whatever may be the nature of the property and the country in which it is found. (par. 2, Art. 10, old Civil Code, which is the same as par. 2 Art. 16, new Civil Code.) In the proceedings for the probate of the will, it was foun d out and it was decided that the testator was a citizen of the State of Nevada because he had selected this as his domicile and his permanent residence. It is not disputed that the laws of Nevada allo w a testator to dispose of all his properties by will. It does not appear that at time of the hearing of the project of partition, the above-quoted provision was introduced in evidence, as it was the executor's duly to do. The law The law of of NevNevadaada,, being a foreign law can only be proved in being a foreign law can only be proved in o
ouur r ccoouurrtts s iin n tthhe e ffoorrm m aannd d mmaannnneerr provided for by our Rules, which are as provided for by our Rules, which are as follows:
follows: SEC. 41.
SEC. 41. Proof of public or official record Proof of public or official record .. — An official record or an entry therein, — An official record or an entry therein, when admissible for any purpose, may be when admissible for any purpose, may be ev
evididenenceced d by by an an ofoffificicial al pupublblicicatatioionn th
therereoeof f or or by by a a cocopy py atatteteststed ed by by ththee off
officeicer r havihaving ng the legal the legal cuscustodtody y of of thethe record
record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. . . . (Rule 123).
We have, however, consulted the records of the case in the court below and we have found that during the hearing on October 4, 1954 of the motion of Magdalena C. Bohanan for withdrawal of P20,000 as her share, the foreign law, especially Section 9905, CompiledCompiled Nevada Laws was introduced in evidence Nevada Laws was introduced in evidence by app
by appellanellant's t's counsecounsel. Agail. Again said ln said lawsaws presented by the counsel for the executor presented by the counsel for the executor an
and d adadmimitttted ed by by ththe e CoCoururt t duduriring ng ththee he
heararining g of of ththe e cacase se on on bebefofore re JuJudgdgee Rafael Amparo.
Rafael Amparo.
In addition, the other appellants, children of the testator, do not dispute the above-quoted provision of the laws of the State of Nevada. Under all the above circumstances, we are constrained to hold that the pertinent law of Nevada, especially SeSectctioion n 999905 05 of of ththee Com
Compilpiled ed NevNevada Laws of ada Laws of 1921925, 5, can becan be ta
taken ken jujudidicicial al nonotitice ce of of by by usus, , wiwiththououtt proof of such law having been offered at proof of such law having been offered at the hearing of the project of partition. the hearing of the project of partition. As in accordance with Article 10 of the old Civil Code, the validity of testamentary dispositions are to be governed by the national law of the testator, and as it has been decided and it is not disputed that the national law of the testator is that of the State of Nevada, already indicated above, which allows a testator to dispose of all his property according to his will, as in the case at bar, the order of the court approving the project of partition made in accordance with the testamentary provisions, must be, as it is hereby affirmed, with costs against appellants.
Zalamea vs. CA Zalamea vs. CA Facts:
Petitioners-spouses Cesar C. Zalamea and Suthira Zalamea, and their daughter, Liana Zalamea, purchased three (3) airline tickets from the Manila agent of respondent TransWorld Airlines, Inc. for a flight to New York to Los Angeles.
The tickets of petitioners-spouses were purchased at a discount of 75% while that of their daughter was a full fare ticket. All three tickets represented confirmed reservations. Petitioners received notice of the reconfirmation of their reservations for said flight. On the appointed date, however, petitioners checked in at 10:00 a.m., an hour earlier than the scheduled flight at 11:00 a.m. but were placed on the wait-list because the number of passengers who had checked in before them had already taken all the seats available on the flight. Liana Zalamea appeared as the No. 13 on the wait-list while the two other Zalameas were listed as "No. 34, showing a party of two." Out of the 42 names on the wait list, the first 22 names were eventually allowed to board the flight to Los Angeles, including petitioner Cesar Zalamea. The two others, on the other hand, at No. 34,
being ranked lower than 22, were not able to fly. As it were, those holding full-fare tickets were given first priority among the wait-listed passengers. Mr. Zalamea, who was holding the full-fare ticket of his daughter, was allowed to board the plane; while his wife and daughter, who presented the discounted tickets were denied boarding.
Even in the next TWA flight to Los Angeles Mrs. Zalamea and her daughter, could not be accommodated because it was also fully booked. Thus, they were constrained to book in another flight and purchased two tickets from American Airlines at a cost of Nine Hundred Eighteen ($918.00) Dollars.
Up
Upon on ththeieir r ararririvaval l in in ththe e PhPhililipippipinenes,s, pet
petitiitioneoners rs filfiled ed an an actaction ion for for damdamageagess b
baasseed d oon n bbrreeaacch h oof f ccoontntrraacct t oof f aaiirr carriage before the Regional Trial Court of carriage before the Regional Trial Court of
Ma
Makatkati. i. As As afafororesesaiaid, d, ththe e lolowewer r cocoururtt ruled in favor of
ruled in favor of petitioners.petitioners.
On appeal, the respondent Court of Appeals held that moral damages are recoverable in a damage suit predicated upon a breach of contract of carriage only where there is fraud or bad faith. Since it is a matter of recordSince it is a matter of record that overbooking of flights is a common that overbooking of flights is a common and
and accacceptepted ed prpractactice ice of of airairlinlines es in in thethe United States and is specifically allowed United States and is specifically allowed under the Code of Federal Regulations by under the Code of Federal Regulations by the Civil Aeronautics Board, no fraud nor the Civil Aeronautics Board, no fraud nor bad faith could be imputed on respondent bad faith could be imputed on respondent TransWorld Airlines.
TransWorld Airlines. Ruling:
That there was fraud or bad faith on the That there was fraud or bad faith on the part of respondent airline when it did not part of respondent airline when it did not allow petitioners to board their flight for allow petitioners to board their flight for Los Angeles in spite of confirmed tickets Los Angeles in spite of confirmed tickets ca
cannnnot ot be be didispspututeded.. The U.S. law or regulation allegedly authorizing overbooking has never been proved. Foreign laws do notForeign laws do not prove themselves nor can the courts take prove themselves nor can the courts take judi
judicial notice of cial notice of them.them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved. WrittenWritten
la
law w mamay y be be evevididenenceced d by by an an ofoffificicialal publ
publicatioication n therethereof or of or by a by a copy attestedcopy attested by the officer having the legal custody of by the officer having the legal custody of tthhe e rreeccoorrdd, , oorr by his deputy, and accompanied with a certificate that such officer has custody. The certificate may be madeThe certificate may be made by a secretary of an embassy or legation, by a secretary of an embassy or legation, con
consul sul gengeneraeral, l, conconsulsul, , vicvice-ce-consonsul, ul, oror con
consulsular agent or ar agent or by any by any offofficeicer r in in thethe ffoorreeiiggn n sseerrvivicce e oof f tthhe e PPhhiilliippppiinneess stationed in the foreign country in which stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.
the seal of his office. 7
Respondent TWA relied solely on the statement of Ms. Gwendolyn Lather, its customer service agent, in her deposition dated January 27, 1986 that the Code of Federal Regulations of the Civil Aeronautics Board allows overbooking. Aside from said statement, no official publication of said code was presented as evidence. Thus, respondent court's finding that overbooking is specifically allowed by the US Code of Federal Regulations has no basis in fact.
Even if the claimed U.S. Code of Federal Even if the claimed U.S. Code of Federal Reg
Regulaulatiotions ns doedoes s exiexist, st, the the samsame e is is notnot a
apppplliiccaabblle e tto o tthhe e ccaasse e aat t bbaar r iinn accor
accordance with dance with the the princprinciple of iple of lex loci lex loci contractus
contractus which require that the law of which require that the law of th
the e plplacace e whwherere e ththe e aiairlrlinine e titickcket et wawass is
issusued ed shshouould ld be be apapplplieied d by by ththe e cocoururtt where the passengers are residents and where the passengers are residents and nationals of the forum and the ticket is nationals of the forum and the ticket is is
issusued ed in in susuch ch StStatate e by by ththe e dedefefendndanantt airline.
airline. 8Since the tickets were sold and
issued in the Philippines, the applicable law in this case would be Philippine law.
Existing jurisprudence explicitly states that overbooking amounts to bad faith, entitling the passengers concerned to an award of moral damages. In Alitalia Airways v. Court of Appeals, 9
where passengers with confirmed bookings were refused carriage on the last minute, this Court held that when an airline issues a ticket to a passenger confirmed on a particular flight, on a certain date, a contract of carriage arises, and the passenger has every
right to expect that he would fly on that flight and on that date . If he doe s not, then the carrier opens itself to a suit for breach of contract of carriage. Where an airline had deliberately overbooked, it took the risk of having to deprive some passengers of their seats in case all of them would show up for the check in. For the indignity and inconvenience of being refused a confirmed seat on the last minute, said passenger is entitled to an award of moral damages.
Wild V
Wild Valley Shipping alley Shipping Co. Co. Vs. CAVs. CA Facts:
The Philippine Roxas, a vessel owned by Philippine President Lines, Inc., private respondent herein, arrived in Puerto Ordaz, Venezuela, to load iron ore.
Upon the completion of the loading and when the vessel was ready to leave port, an official pilot of Venezuela, was designated by the harbour authorities in Puerto Ordaz to navigate the Philippine Roxas through the Orinoco River. The Philippine Roxas experienced some
vibrations when it entered the San Roque Channel. The vessel proceeded on its way, with the pilot assuring the watch officer that the vibration was a result of the shallowness of the channel.
The master (captain) checked the position of the vessel and verified that it was in the centre of the channel.
The Philippine Roxas ran around in the Orinoco River, thus obstructing the ingress and egress of vessels.
As a result of the blockage, the Malandrinon, a vessel owned by herein petitioner Wildvalley Shipping Company, Ltd., was unable to sail out of Puerto Ordaz on that day.
Subsequently, Wildvalley Shipping Company, Ltd. filed a suit with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch III against Philippine President Lines, Inc. and Pioneer Insurance Company (the underwriter/insurer of Philippine Roxas) for damages in the form of unearned profits, and interest thereon amounting to US $400,000.00 plus attorney's fees, costs, and expenses of litigation.
Issue: whether or not Venezuelan law is applicable to the case at bar?
Ruling: It is
It is well-well-settlsettled that ed that foreforeign laws ign laws do notdo not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and prove themselves in our jurisdiction and ou
our r cocoururts ts arare e nonot t auauththororizized ed to to tatakeke judi
judicial notice of cial notice of them.them.Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved.
For a copy of a foreign public document to be admissible, the following requisites are mandatory: (1) It must be attested by the(1) It must be attested by the officer having legal custody of the records officer having legal custody of the records or
or bby y hihis s ddepepututy; y; anand d (2(2) ) It It mumust st bbee a
accccoommppaanniieed d bby y a a cceerrttiiffiiccaatte e bby y aa se
secrcretetarary y of of ththe e emembabassssy y or or lelegagatitionon,, con
consul sul gengeneraeral, l, conconsulsul, , vicvice e conconsulsular ar oror consular agent or foreign service officer, consular agent or foreign service officer, and with the seal of his office.
and with the seal of his office. The latter requirement is not a mere technicality but is intended to justify the giving of full faith and
credit to the genuineness of a document in a foreign country.
With respect to proof of written laws, parol proof is objectionable, for the written law itself is the best evidence. According to the weight of authority, when a foreign statute is involved, the best evidence rule requires that it be proved by a duly authenticated copy of the statute.
At this juncture, we have to point out that the Venezuelan law was not pleaded before the lower court.
A foreign law is considered to be pleaded A foreign law is considered to be pleaded if there is an allegation in the pleading if there is an allegation in the pleading about the existence of the foreign law, its about the existence of the foreign law, its im
impoport rt anand d lelegagal l coconsnseqequeuencnce e on on ththee event or transaction in issue.
event or transaction in issue.
A review of the Complaint revealed that it was never alleged or invoked despite the fact that the grounding of the M/V Philippine Roxas occurred within the territorial jurisdiction of Venezuela.
We reiterate that under the rules of private international law, a foreign law must be properly pleaded and proved as a fact. In the absence of pleading and proof , the laws of a, the laws of a ffoorreeiiggn n ccoouunnttrryy, , oor r sttasattee, , wwiilll l bbee presumed to be the same as our
presumed to be the same as our own localown local or
or dodomemeststic ic lalaw w anand d ththis is is is knknowown n asas processual presumption.
processual presumption.
Board of Commissioners v. Dela Rosa Board of Commissioners v. Dela Rosa Facts:
On July 12, 1960, Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of William Gatchalian, was recognized by the Bureau of Immigration as a native born Filipino citizen following the citizenship of natural mother Mariana Gatchalian. On June 27, 1961, Willian, then twelve years old, arrives in Manila from Hongkong together with a daughter and a son of Santiago. They had with them certificate of registration and identity issued by the Philippine consulate in Hongkong based on a cablegram bearing the signature of the secretary of foreign affairs, Felixberto Serrano, and sought admission as Filipino citizens. On July 6, 1961, the board of special inquiry admitted the Gatchalians as Filipino citizens and issued an identification certificate to William. The board of commissioners was directed by the Secretary of Justice to Review all cases where entry was granted on the ground that the entrant was a Filipino citizen such included the case of William. As a result of the decision of the board of special inquiry which recommended for the reversal of the decision of the Board of Commissioners. Acting commissioner issued an order affirming the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry. On August 15, 1990, the Commission on Immigration and Deportatiion ordered the arrest of William and was released upon posting P 200,000 cash bond. Thus on the 29th of the same month, he filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the RTC of Manila. A motion to dismiss was filed but denied.
Issue:
Whether or not William Gatchalian is to be declared as a Filipino citizen
Held:
William Gatchalian is declared as a Filipino Citizen. Having declared the assailed marriage as valid, respondent William Gatchalian follows the citizenship of his father, a Filipino as legitimate child. Respondent belongs to a class of Filipinos who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of the constitution. In Moy Ya Lim vs. Commissioner of Immigration (41 SCRA 292 [1971]) and in Lee vs. Commissioner of Immigration (supra), this Court declared that:
(e)verytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative case, whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand.
An exception to the above rule was laid by this Court in Burca vs. Republic (51 SCRA 248 [1973]), viz:
We declare it to be a sound rule that where the citizenship of a party in a case is definitely resolved by a court or by an administrative agency, as a material issue in the controversy, after a full-blown hearing with the active participation of the Solicitor General or his authorized representative, and this finding or the citizenship of the party is affirmed by this Court, the decision on the matter shall constitute conclusive proof of such party's citizenship in any other case or proceeding. But it is made clear that in no instance will a decision on the question of citizenship in such cases be considered conclusive or binding in any other case or proceeding, unless obtained in accordance with the procedure herein stated.
Thus, in order that the doctrine of res judicata may be applied in cases of citizenship, the following must be present: 1) a person's citizenship must be raised as a material issue in a controversy where said person is a party; 2) the Solicitor General or his authorized representative took active part in the resolution thereof, and 3) the finding or citizenship is affirmed by this Court. Doctrine of processual presumption Doctrine of processual presumption Civil Code
Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad. (9a) Art. 16. Real property as well as
personal property is subject to
the law of the country where it is stipulated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found. (10a)
Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be governed by the laws of the country in which they are executed.
When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the Republic of the Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities established by Philippine laws shall be observed in their execution.
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have, for their object, public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country. (11a)
Art. 71. All marriages performed outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were performed, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous marriages as determined by Philippine law. (19a)
Art. 124. If the marriage is between a citizen of the Philippines and a foreigner, whether celebrated in the Philippines or abroad, the following rules shall prevail:
1.
If the husband is a citizen of the Philippines while the wife is a foreigner, the provisions of this Code shall govern their relations;2. If the husband is a foreigner and the wife is a citizen of the Philippines, the laws of the husband's country shall be followed, without prejudice to the provisions of this Code with regard to immovable property. (1325a) Art. 815. When a Filipino is in a foreign
country, he is authorized to make a will in any of the forms established by the law of the country in which he may be. Such will may be probated in the Philippines. (n)
Art. 816. The will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made with the formalities prescribed by the law of the place in which he resides, or according to the formalities observed in his country, or in conformity with those which this Code prescribes. (n)
Art. 818. Two or more persons cannot make a will jointly, or in the same instrument, either for their reciprocal benefit or for the benef it of a third person. (669)
Art. 819. Wills, prohibited by the preceding article, executed by Filipinos in a foreign country shall not be valid in the Philippines, even though authorized by the laws of the country where they may have been executed. (733a) Art. 829. A revocation done outside the
Philippines, by a person who does not have his domicile in this country, is valid when it is done according to the law of the plac e where the will was made, or according to the law of the place in which the testator had his domicile at the time; and if the revocation takes place in this country, when it is in accordance with the provisions of this Code. (n) Art. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent. (n) Rule 132 Sec. 25
Rule 132 Sec. 25
What attestation of copy must state. — Whenever a copy of a document or record is attested for the purpose of evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The
attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such court. (26a)
Rule 130 Rule 130 Section 45.
Section 45. Commercial lists and the like . — Evidence of statements of matters of interest to persons engaged in an occupation contained in a list, register, periodical, or other published compilation is admissible as tending to prove the truth of any relevant matter so stated if that compilation is published for use by persons engaged in that occupation and is generally used and relied upon by them therein. (39)
Section 46.
Section 46. Learned treatises. — A published treatise, periodical or pamphlet on a subject of history, law, science, or art is admissible as tending to prove the truth of a matter stated therein if the court takes judicial notice, or a witness expert in the subject testifies, that the writer of the statement in the treatise, periodical or pamphlet is recognized in his profession or calling as expert in the subject. (40a)
How to acquire nationality How to acquire nationality
1. by birth 2. by repatriation 3. by naturalization
4. by subrogation and cession how to lose a
how to lose a nationalitynationality 1. release 2. deprivation 3. expiration 4. renunciation domicile domicile 1. intent to stay 2. physical presence
3. conduct indicative of such intention Rep. Act No. 9225 Rep. Act No. 9225
signed into law by President Gloria M. Arroyo on August 29, 2003
SECTION 1. Short Title.-This Act shall be known as the "Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003."
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy.-It is hereby declared the policy of the State that allall Philippine citizens who become citizens of Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to another country shall be deemed not to ha
have ve lolost st ththeieir r PhPhililipippipine ne cicititizezensnshihipp under the conditions of this Act.
under the conditions of this Act.
SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship.-Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have who have lost their Philipplost their Philipp ineine c
ciittiizzeennsshhiip p bby y rreeaassoon n oof f tthheeiirr na
natuturaralilizazatition on as as cicititizezens ns of of a a foforereigignn co
coununtrtry y arare e heherrebeby y ddeeeememed d to to hahaveve
