Winters_PS589_ForeignAid_Syllabus.pdf

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Political Science 589 Fall 2014

Wednesday 3:30 – 5:50 p.m. 404 David Kinley Hall

Prof. Matthew S. Winters [email protected] Office: 315 David Kinley Hall Office Hours: Wednesday 2:00 – 3:00 p.m., or by appointment

Topics in International Relations: Foreign Aid

Course Description

This seminar provides an intensive study of the literature on foreign aid, drawing mostly from political science and economics and to a lesser extent from the broader domain of development studies. The course has been structured with the goal of improving our understanding of the quantitative analytical methods used in analyzing foreign aid allocation and effectiveness. It therefore includes a number of methodological readings to help us diagnose the challenges and pitfalls of the empirical literature that we will read. This focus on empirical methodology is expected to help students in international relations and comparative politics make better research design decisions when dealing with time-series cross-sectional data. By the conclusion of the course, students should have a better understanding of claims that are made in the literature about (1) the reasons for foreign aid; (2) the development effectiveness of foreign aid; (3) the way in which foreign aid donors allocate aid and make project design decisions; (4) the differences between bilateral and multilateral aid; (5) bureaucratic pathologies that affect the development industry; and (6) the unintended consequences of foreign aid, among other topics. Students also should have a greater familiarity with the available foreign aid data and its strengths and weaknesses.

Course Goals

One of the core goals of this course is to help students think through the challenges of analyzing time-series cross-sectional data. While we will approach these challenges through the lens of foreign aid allocation and effectiveness, the methodological insights that students gain from the course will be applicable to the study of a wide variety of other phenomenon.

More generally, the course will acquaint students with core concepts and institutions in development. The first two weeks and the final week of the course, in particular, deal with broader issues of the development industry.

The material covered in this course is likely to be most useful for students planning on taking a specialized exam in international political economy. For students seeking to prepare for the general field exam in international relations, the broader seminar on international political economy might be preferable.

Course Requirements

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is also expected that students will interact deeply with the assigned readings and come to class prepared to discuss and critically analyze those readings.

First, students will author a report comparing national and international data about foreign aid flows.

The vast majority of studies that we will read this semester depends on donor-supplied information about aid flows. Sometimes the information comes from individual donors (e.g., studies of U.S. aid flows that rely on USAID’s Greenbook), but more often the information comes from donor reporting to the OECD-DAC (Development Assistance Committee) or donor information collected under the AidData Initiative. There is a big question, however, about the extent to which these numbers reflect recipient governments’ understanding of what foreign aid is and how much of it they are receiving.

As a class, we will collect information from recipient country governments about incoming foreign aid flows and compare this to the information produced by donors. Each student will be responsible for choosing a recipient country from which to obtain data and then comparing the acquired data to the data contained in the standard foreign aid datasets. Each student will produce a country-specific report.

Ultimately, our goal will be to present overall conclusions from this series of reports to the broader research community, ideally in the form of a class-authored journal article.

The goal of this assignment is to help you (and all of us) understand a fundamental type of international data and the potential problems with its use. By extension, this should help you to understand potential strengths and weaknesses of other data sources that you will encounter in your careers as political scientists.

Second, students will critically replicate one of the assigned empirical papers. The specific paper will be chosen in consultation with the instructor, and all students in the class will replicate a different paper.

Replication involves (a) reassembling the original data that the authors have used and (b) recreating the analysis that the authors have conducted. Although students may be able to find replication materials available online for specific articles, it is strongly preferred that students work independently of these replication materials to the extent possible (e.g., reassembling publicly available data that the authors have used; creating new statistical code). The reason for duplicating these steps even if full replication materials are available is that replication materials often omit some of the (possibly mistaken) steps that the authors have taken, and only by going back to a point as early as possible in the research process will all of these steps be revealed.

Critical replication involves going beyond this initial step of simply reproducing the authors’ original results to interrogating those results in some meaningful way by, for instance, (a) changing the model specification, (b) adding potential omitted variables to the model, or (c) using different statistical tests than used in the original paper.

From both the original replication and then any critical extensions, students are expected to comment on the accuracy and robustness of the original results.

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Finally, the course is organized as a reading seminar, where students are expected to attend all sessions, complete all readings, and come to class fully prepared to discuss the readings. The class is designed to be highly participatory. In order to facilitate my instruction, students should e-mail three or four discussion questions to me by 5:00 p.m. the day before the seminar meeting. These questions should reflect the interactions that you have had with the readings. They should demonstrate evidence of engagement with the concepts, theories, data, and methods used by the authors and the conclusions drawn by the authors.

Although there sometimes seems to be an expectation that students offer devastating critiques or brilliant addendums to readings, the most educational moments for a class easily can come from questions that express a shortcoming of comprehension (particularly about methodological choices). Please ask such questions, although please ask them in a way that demonstrates that you have in fact attempted to answer them yourself.

The goal of these weekly questions is to facilitate you interacting with the readings as a consumer in the way that you will interact with most academic output that you encounter over the course of your career.

The due dates for the two core assignments are as follows:

Data Report

Agree on Selected Country with Instructor 19 September Share Country Dataset with Instructor 3 October

First Draft of Report 31 October

Final Draft of Report 21 November

Replication Exercise

Agree on Article with Instructor 26 September Provide Replication Plan to Instructor 17 October

First Draft of Replication 14 November

Final Draft of Replication 12 December

The distribution of grading is as follows:

Preparation of Discussion Questions 10 percent

Class Participation 10 percent

Data Report First Draft 15 percent

Data Report Final Draft 20 percent

Replication Plan 10 percent

Replication First Draft 15 percent

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Schedule of Meetings and Readings

Readings listed under “Additional Readings” are suggested for your reference. All other readings are required. The instructor reserves the right to make changes to the reading list over the course of the semester. Students also are encouraged to make suggestions about modifications to the schedule of readings and/or to bring particular readings of interest to the instructor’s attention.

1. 27 August – NO CLASS – American Political Science Association Annual Meeting

2. 3 September – Debates and Data: Understanding the Landscape of the Foreign Aid Literature

Radelet, Steven. 2006. “A Primer on Foreign Aid,” Center for Global Development Working Paper No. 92, Washington, D.C., 24 pp.

Paul, Elisabeth. 2006. “A Survey of the Theoretical Economic Literature on Foreign Aid,” Asian-Pacific Economic Literature 20(1): 1-17.

Wright, Joseph and Matthew Winters. 2010. “The Politics of Effective Foreign Aid,” Annual Review of Political Science 13: 61-80.

Tierney, Michael J., et al. 2011. “More Dollars than Sense: Refining Our Knowledge of Development Finance Using AidData,” World Development 39(11): 1891-1906.

Easterly, William. 2001. The Elusive Quest for Growth: Economists’ Adventures and Misadventures in the Tropics. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, chs. 2 (“Aid for Investment”) and 3 (“Solow’s Surprise: Investment is Not the Key to Growth”), pp. 25-69.

3. 10 September – Why Does Foreign Aid Exist? And Should It?

Methods Reading: Beck, Nathaniel and Jonathan N. Katz. 2011. “Modeling Dynamics in Time-Series–Cross-Section Political Economy Data,” Annual Review of Political Science 14(1): 331–52.

Morgenthau, Hans J. 1962. “A Political Theory of Foreign Aid,” American Political Science Review 56(2): 301–309.

Bauer, P.T. 1974. “Foreign Aid, Forever?” Encounter 42: 15-28.

Martins, Bertin. 2005. “Why Do Aid Agencies Exist?” Development Policy Review 23(6): 643-63.

Sachs, Jeffrey D. 2005. The End of Poverty: Economic Possibilities for Our Time. New York: Penguin Press, chs. 13 (“Making the Investments Needed to End Poverty”) and 15 (“Can the Rich Afford to Help the Poor?”), pp. 244-265 and 288-308.

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Additional Readings

Azam, Jean-Paul and Jean-Jacques Laffont. 2003. “Contracting for Aid,” Journal of Development Economics 70: 25-58.

Pritchett, Lant and Michael Woolcock. 2004. “Solutions When the Solution Is the Problem: Arraying the Disarray in Development,” World Development 32(2): 191–212.

4. 17 September – Foreign Aid Effectiveness I: Economic Growth

Methods Reading: Sovey, Allison J. and Donald P. Green. 2011. “Instrumental Variables Estimation in Political Science: A Reader's Guide,” American Journal of Political Science 55(1): 188-200.

Burnside, Craig and David Dollar. 2000. “Aid, Policies, and Growth,” American Economic Review 90(4): 847-68.

Rajan, Raghuram G. and Arvind Subramanian. 2008. “Aid and Growth: What Does the Cross-Country Evidence Really Show?” Review of Economics and Statistics 90(4): 643–65.

Clemens, Michael A., Steven Radelet, Rikhil R. Bhavnani, and Samuel Bazzi. 2012. “Counting Chickens When They Hatch: Timing and the Effects of Aid on Growth,” The Economic Journal 122(561): 590-617.

Mekashaa, Tseday Jemaneh and Finn Tarp. 2013. “Aid and Growth: What Meta-Analysis Reveals,” Journal of Development Studies 49(4): 546-83.

Doucouliagosa, Hristos and Martin Paldam. 2013. “The Robust Result in Meta-analysis of Aid Effectiveness: A Response to Mekasha and Tarp,” Journal of Development Studies 49(4): 584-87.

Boone, Peter. 1996. “Politics and the Effectiveness of Foreign Aid,” European Economic Review 40: 289-329.

Burnside, Craig and David Dollar. 2004. “Aid, Policies, and Growth: Revisiting the Evidence,” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 3251, Washington, D.C., 36 pp.

Roodman, David. 2004. “The Anarchy of Numbers: Aid, Development, and Cross-Country Empirics,” Center for Global Development Working Paper No. 32, Washington, D.C., 62 pp.

Roodman, David. 2008. “Through the Looking Glass, and What OLS Found There: On Growth, Foreign Aid, and Reverse Causality,” Center for Global Development Working Paper No. 137, Washington, D.C., 36 pp.

5. 24 September – Foreign Aid Effectiveness II

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Wright, Joseph. 2008. “To Invest or Insure? How Authoritarian Time Horizons Impact Foreign Aid Effectiveness,” Comparative Political Studies 41(7): 971-1000.

Girod, Desha M. 2012. “Effective Foreign Aid Following Civil War: The Nonstrategic-Desperation Hypothesis,” American Journal of Political Science 56(1): 188–201.

Isham, Jonathan, Deepa Narayan, and Lant Pritchett. 1995. “Does Participation Improve

Performance? Establishing Causality with Subjective Data,” World Bank Economic Review 9(2): 175-200.

Denizer, Cevdet, Daniel Kaufmann, and Aart Kraay. 2013. “Good Countries or Good Projects? Macro and Micro Correlates of World Bank Project Performance,” Journal of Development Economics 105: 288–302.

Isham, Jonathan, Daniel Kaufmann, and Lant H. Pritchett. 1997. “Civil Liberties, Democracy, and the Performance of Government Projects,” World Bank Economic Review 11(2): 219-42.

Kosack, Stephen. 2003. “Effective Aid: How Democracy Allows Development Aid to Improve the Quality of Life,” World Development 31(1): 1-22.

Dunning, Thad. 2004. “Conditioning the Effects of Aid: Cold War Politics, Donor Credibility, and Democracy in Africa,” International Organization 58: 409-23.

Bearce, David H. and Daniel C. Tirone. 2010. “Foreign Aid Effectiveness and the Strategic Goals of Donor Governments,” Journal of Politics 72(3): 837-51.

Wright, Joseph. 2010. “Aid Effectiveness and the Politics of Personalism,” Comparative Political Studies 43(6): 735-62.

6. 1 October – Foreign Aid and Institutional Change

Svensson, Jakob. 2000. “Foreign Aid and Rent-Seeking,” Journal of International Economics 51: 437-461.

Knack, Stephen. 2001. “Aid Dependence and the Quality of Governance: Cross-Country Empirical Tests,” Southern Economic Journal 68(2): 310-29.

Djankov, Simeon, Jose G. Montalvo, and Marta Reynal-Querol. 2008. “The Curse of Aid,” Journal of Economic Growth 13: 169-94.

Licht, Amanda. 2010. “Coming into Money: The Impact of Foreign Aid on Leader Survival,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 54(1): 58–87.

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Aronow, Peter, Allion Sovey Carnegie, and Nikolay Marinov. 2013. “The Effects of Aid on Human Rights and Democracy: Evidence from the Rotating Presidency of the Council of the European Union,” working paper, 60 pp.

Remmer, Karen. 2004. “Does Foreign Aid Promote the Expansion of Government?” American Journal of Political Science 48(1): 77-92.

Fearon, James D., Macartan Humphreys, and Jeremy M. Weinstein. 2009. “Can Development Aid Contribute to Social Cohesion after Civil War? Evidence from a Field Experiment in Post-Conflict Liberia,” American Economic Review 99(2).

Wright, Joseph. 2009. “How Foreign Aid Can Foster Democratization in Authoritarian Regimes,” American Journal of Political Science 53(3): 552-71.

Morrison, Kevin. 2012. “What Can We Learn about the ‘Resource Curse’ from Foreign Aid?” World Bank Research Observer 27(1): 52-73.

Askarov, Zohid and Hristos Doucouliagos. 2013. “Does Aid Improve Democracy and Governance? A Meta-Regression Analysis,” Public Choice 157: 601-28.

7. 8 October – Aid Allocation I

Methods Reading: Neumayer, Eric. 2003. The Pattern of Aid Giving: The Impact of Good Governance on Development Assistance. New York: Routledge, chs. 4 (“Research Design”) and 5 (“Aggregate Aid, Western Bilateral, and Multilateral Aid”), pp. 33-70.

Methods Reading: Humphreys, Brad R. 2013. “Dealing with Zeros in Economic Data,” unpublished manuscript, University of Alberta, available at

http://www.ualberta.ca/~bhumphre/class/zeros_v1.pdf.

Alesina, Alberto and David Dollar. 2000. “Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?” Journal of Economic Growth 5(1): 33–63.

Berthélemy, Jean-Claude. 2006. “Bilateral Donors’ Interest vs. Recipients’ Development Motives in Aid Allocation: Do All Donors Behave the Same?” Review of Development Economics 10(2): 179-194.

Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce and Alastair Smith. 2009. “A Political Economy of Aid,” International Organization 63: 309–40.

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Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce and Alastair Smith. 2007. “Foreign Aid and Policy Concessions,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 51(2): 251–84.

Claessens, Stijn, Danny Cassimon, and Bjorn Van Campenhout. 2009. “Evidence on Changes in Aid Allocation Criteria,” World Bank Economic Review 23(2): 185-208.

Fleck, Robert K. and Christopher Kilby. 2010. “Changing Aid Regimes? U.S. Foreign Aid from the Cold War to the War on Terror,” Journal of Development Economics 91(2): 185–97.

Harrigan, Jane and Chengang Wang. 2011. “A New Approach to the Allocation of Aid Among Developing Countries: Is the USA Different from the Rest?” World Development 39(8): 1281–93.

8. 15 October – Aid Allocation II

Dietrich, Simone. 2013. “Bypass or Engage? Explaining Donor Delivery Tactics in Aid Allocation," International Studies Quarterly 57(4): 698-712.

Nielsen, Richard. 2013. “Rewarding Human Rights? Selective Aid Sanctions against Repressive States,” International Studies Quarterly 57(4): 791-803.

Jablonski, Ryan. 2014. “How Aid Target Votes: The Effect of Electoral Strategies on the Distribution of Foreign Aid,” World Politics 66(2): 293-330.

Büthe, Tim, Solomon Major, and André de Mello e Souza. 2012. “The Politics of Private Foreign Aid: Humanitarian Principles, Economic Development Objectives, and Organizational Interests in the Allocation of Private Aid by NGOs,” International Organization 66(4): 571-607.

Muchapondwa, Edwin, Austin M. Strange, Daniel Nielson, Bradley Parks, and Michael J. Tierney. 2014. “‘Ground-Truthing’ Chinese Development Finance in Africa: Field Evidence from South Africa and Uganda,” WIDER Working Paper 2014/031, 19 pp.

Miller, Daniel C. 2014. “Explaining Global Patterns of International Aid for Linked Biodiversity Conservation and Development,” World Development 59: 341-59.

9. 22 October – Domestic Politics of Foreign Aid Donors

Schraeder, Peter J., Steven W. Hook, and Bruce Taylor. 1998. “Clarifying the Foreign Aid Puzzle: A Comparison of American, Japanese, French, and Swedish Aid Flows,” World Politics 50: 294-323.

Thérien, Jean-Philippe and Alain Noel. 2000. “Political Parties and Foreign Aid,” American Political Science Review 94(1): 151-62.

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Baker, Andy and Jennifer Fitzgerald. 2012. “Racial Paternalism and Mass Support for Foreign Aid,” Institutions Program Working Paper, University of Colorado at Boulder, 42 pp.

Bauhr, Monika, Nicholas Charron, and Naghmeh Nasiritousi. 2013. “Does Corruption Cause Aid Fatigue? Public Opinion and the Aid-Corruption Paradox,” International Studies Quarterly 57(3): 568–79.

Pallage, Stephane and Michel A. Robe. 2001. “Foreign Aid and the Business Cycle,” Review of International Economics 9(4): 641–72.

Tingley, Dustin H. 2010. “Donors and Domestic Politics: Political Influences on Foreign Aid Effort,” Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance 50: 40-49.

Van der Veen, A. Maurits. 2011. Ideas, Interests and Foreign Aid. New York: Cambridge University Press, chs. 1 – 5, pp. 1-138.

10. 29 October – Bureaucratic Politics of Foreign Aid

Ferguson, James with Larry Lohmann. 1994. “The Anti-Politics Machine: ‘Development’ and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho,” The Ecologist 24(5): 176-81.

Easterly, William. 2002. “The Cartel of Good Intentions: The Problem of Bureaucracy in Foreign Aid,” Policy Reform 54(4): 223-50.

Cooley, Alexander and James Ron. 2002. “The NGO Scramble: Organizational Insecurity and the Political Economy of Transnational Action,” International Security 27(1): 5–39.

Barnett, Michael N. and Martha Finnemore. 2003. “The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations,” International Organization 53(4): 699–732.

Weaver, Catherine. 2008. Hypocrisy Trap: The World Bank and the Poverty of Reform. Princeton: Princeton University Press, chs. 2 (“The World Bank Hypocrisy Trap”) and 4 (“Good Governance and Anticorruption: From Rhetoric to Reality?”), pp. 19-43 and 92-139.

Murdie, Amanda. 2014. “Scrambling for Contact: The Determinants of Inter-NGO Cooperation in Non-Western Countries,” Review of International Organizations 9: 309–31.

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11. 5 November – International Financial Institutions

Methods Reading: Humphreys, Macartan, Raul Sanchez de la Sierra, and Peter van der Windt. 2013. “Fishing, Commitment, and Communication: A Proposal for Comprehensive Nonbinding Research Registration,” Political Analysis 21(1): 1-20.

Thacker, Strom C. 1999. “The High Politics of IMF Lending,” World Politics 52(1): 38-75.

Dreher, Axel, Jan-Egbert Sturm, and James Raymond Vreeland. 2009. “Development Aid and International Politics: Does Membership on the U.N. Security Council Influence World Bank Decisions?” Journal of Development Economics 88: 1-18.

Humphrey, Chris and Katharina Michaelowa. 2013. “Shopping for Development: Multilateral Lending, Shareholder Composition and Borrower Preferences,” World Development 44 (April): 142– 55.

Bayer, Patrick, Christopher Marcoux, and Johannes Urpelainen. 2014. “When International Organizations Bargain: Evidence from the Global Environment Facility,” Journal of Conflict Resolution.

Dreher, Axel and Martin Gassebner. 2012. “Do IMF and World Bank Programs Induce Government Crises? An Empirical Analysis,” International Organization 66(2): 329-58.

Frey, Bruno S. and Friedrich Schneider. 1986. “Competing Models of International Lending Activity,” Journal of Development Economics 20: 225-45.

Stone, Randall W. 2004. “The Political Economy of IMF Lending in Africa,” American Political Science Review 98(4): 577-91.

Marchesi, Silvia and Emanuela Sirtori. 2011. “Is Two Better Than One? The Effects of IMF and World Bank Interaction on Growth,” Review of International Organizations 6: 287–306.

Stone, Randall W. 2011. Controlling Institutions: International Organizations and the Global Economy. New York: Cambridge University Press. 256 pp.

12. 12 November – Policy Conditionality / Aid Fungibility

Svensson, Jakob. 2000. “When is Foreign Aid Policy Credible? Aid Dependence and Conditionality,” Journal of Development Economics 61: 61-84.

Isham, Jonathan and Daniel Kaufmann. 1999. “The Forgotten Rationale for Policy Reform: The Productivity of Investment Projects,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 114(1): 149-84.

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Eng, Man Yan and Johannes Urpelainen. 2013. “The Domestic Sources of Donor Credibility: When and How Can Domestic Interest Groups Improve the Effectiveness of Threats and Promises?” Journal of Conflict Resolution OnlineFirst, 27 pp.

Feyzioglu, Tarhan, Vinaya Swaroop, and Min Zhu. 1998. “A Panel Data Analysis of the Fungibility of Foreign Aid,” World Bank Economic Review 12(1): 29-58.

van de Walle, Dominique and Ren Mu. 2007. “Fungibility and the Flypaper Effect of Project Aid: Micro-Evidence for Vietnam,” Journal of Development Economics 84(2): 667-685.

John Williamson. 1990. “What Washington Means by Policy Reform.” In Latin American Adjustment: How Much Has Happened? available at

http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/paper.cfm?researchid=486.

Adam, Christopher S. and Stephen A. O’Connell. 1999. “Aid, Taxation and Development in Sub-Saharan Africa,” Economics and Politics 11(3): 225-53.

Svensson, Jakob. 2003. “Why Conditional Aid Does Not Work and What Can Be Done about It?” Journal of Development Economics 70: 381-402.

Lahiri, Sajal and Pascalis Raimondos-Møller. 2004. “Donor Strategy under the Fungibility of Foreign Aid,” Economics & Politics 16(2): 213-31.

Hagen, Rune Jansen. 2006. “Buying Influence: Aid Fungibility in a Strategic Perspective,” Review of Development Economics 10(2): 267-84.

13. 19 November – Foreign Aid and Conflict / Democracy Assistance

Nielsen, Richard A., Michael G. Findley, Zachary S. Davis, Tara Candland, and Daniel L. Nielson. 2011. “Foreign Aid Shocks as a Cause of Violent Armed Conflict,” American Journal of Political Science 55(2): 219-32.

Savun, Burcu and Daniel C. Tirone. 2011. “Foreign Aid, Democratization, and Civil Conflict: How Does Democracy Aid Affect Civil Conflict?” American Journal of Political Science 55(2): 233-46.

Findley, Michael G., Josh Powell, Daniel Strandow, and Jeff Tanner. 2011. “The Localized Geography of Foreign Aid: A New Dataset and Application to Violent Armed Conflict,” World Development 39(11): 1995-2009.

Finkel, Steven E., Aníbal Pérez-Liñán, and Mitchell A. Seligson. 2007. “The Effects of U.S. Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building, 1990–2003,” World Politics 59(3): 404-40.

Scott, James M. and Carie A. Steele. 2011. “Sponsoring Democracy: The United States and

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Bush, Sarah. 2014. “The Power of Professionalization: How Non-Governmental Organizations Shape American Democracy Assistance,” unpublished manuscript, Temple University.

26 November – NO CLASS – FALL BREAK

14. 3 December – Local Attitudes toward Foreign Aid Projects

Andrabi, Tahir and Jishnu Das. 2010. “In Aid We Trust: Hearts and Minds and the Pakistan Earthquake of 2005,” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 5440. 56 pp.

Goldsmith, Benjamin E., Yusaku Horiuchi, and Terence Wood. 2014. “Doing Well by Doing Good: The Impact of Foreign Aid on Foreign Public Opinion,” Quarterly Journal of Political Science 9(1): 87-114.

Beath, Andrew, Fotini Christia, and Ruben Enikolopov. 2014. “Winning Hearts and Minds through Development: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Afghanistan,” unpublished manuscript, MIT, available at http://fotini.mit.edu/sites/default/files/documents/Hearts%20and%20Minds.docx.

Cruz, Cesi and Christina Schneider. 2014. “The Politics of (Undeserved) Credit-Claiming in Poor Quality Information Environments,” unpublished manuscript, University of California, San Diego.

15. 10 December – Reflecting on the Development Industry

Easterly, William. 2013. The Tyranny of Experts: Economists, Dictators, and the Forgotten Rights of the Poor. New York: Basic Books. 394 pp.

For the Future (or for Substitution): Additional Methods Readings

Wilson, Sven E. and Daniel M. Butler. 2007. “A Lot More to Do: The Sensitivity of Time-Series Cross-Section Analyses to Simple Alternative Specifications,” Political Analysis 15: 101-23.

De Boef, Suzanna and Luke Keele. 2008. “Taking Time Seriously,” American Journal of Political Science 52(1): 184-200.