Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law
Volume 1971
Article 18
1-1-1971
Chapter 15: State and Local Government
Herbert P. Gleason
William H. Kerr
Thomas H. Martin
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Gleason, Herbert P.; Kerr, William H.; and Martin, Thomas H. (1971) "Chapter 15: State and Local Government,"Annual Survey of
CHAPTER 15
State and Local Government
HERBERT P. GLEASON, WILLIAM H. KERR,
and
THOMAS H. MARTIN§15.1. Introduction. During the 1971 SuRVEY year, there were no dramatic alterations in the course of state and local government law; neither the legislature nor the Supreme Judicial Court embarked upon radical changes in policy or procedure. Perhaps the two most important changes were legislative: cities, towns, counties, and districts were placed upon a new fiscal accounting year,1 and a housing court was established for the city of Boston;2 but several court decisions and other legislation handed down during the year are also worthy of note. The court decisions of general significance are discussed in Part A of this chapter; the more important legislation, including the change to the fiscal year and the establishment of the Housing Court, is discussed in Part B; and the subject of rent control is separately discussed m Part C.
A.
CouRT DECISIONS§15.2. Election contests. In the two election cases presented to the Supreme Judicial Court, the Justices displayed a lack of sympathy for substantive electoral imperfections, while proving themselves forgiving with respect to imperfections of form. At issue in Chamberlain v. Board
of Registrars of Harwich4 was the counting of a tie-breaking ballot.
The voters of Harwich had been asked if they would accept a statute that would subject the town police force, excepting the chief, to the provisions of the civil service laws;2 although the contested ballot clearly contained an X in the YES box, the voter had written the words "including chief" on the ballot beneath the summary of the provisions of the statute in question. The registrars had counted the ballot as a yes vote, whereupon certain voters had petitioned for a writ of
manda-HERBERT P. GLEASON is corporation counsel for the city of Boston.
The late WILLIAM H. KERR was senior Jegaf assistant and researchist in the City of Bos-ton Law Department.
THOMAS H. MARTIN is an assistant corporation counsel for the city of Boston.
§15. I. 1 Acts ofl971, c. 766, amending and making effective Acts of 1969, c. 849.
2 ld. c. 843. .
§15.2. 11970Mass.Adv.Sh.1705,265N.E.2d591.
2 The specifiG question was whether the voters would accept the provisions of G.L.,
§15.2 STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 379
mus, alleging an improper counting of the votes. The trial court ruled in favor of the registrars after finding that the voter "might have real-ized" that the chief might have been subject to the civil service laws in spite of an indication to the contrary in the summary of the question on the ballot, and that the voter was indicating his approval of the ques-tion regardless of the status of the chief. On appeal, the Supreme Judi-cial Court held: "[W]here a voter by comment upon the choice given to him places upon the election officials the task of determining whether they can ascertain with required certainty what his intent was upon the choice given, his ballot is to be counted as a blank. "3
Since the question of the intent of a voter is a conclusion of law, the Court felt free to review the trial court's finding on appeal. The Court found error in the trial court's conclusion that the voter had intended to vote in favor of the question; the trial judge's conclusion appe~red to the Court to be conjectural. The Justices also felt it necessary to dis-courage "gratuitous editorial comment" on ballots where such com-ment is either a distinguishing mark, which is forbidden by statute,4 or is a qualification of the voter's expressed preference: "[A] voter who changes the proposition put to him has not 'substantially complied with the requisites of the election law . . . .' "5
The Court in Chamberlain seems to have formulated a test which, if
strictly construed, is so exacting as to eliminate any ballot containing any comment whatsoever. It seems that the test is not whether the intent of the voter is clearly expressed, but whether the election officials have to make a decision as to the voter's intent. If the election officials have to ask themselves whether they have to make a decision, the Court would invalidate the ballot in question. Such a test might invalidate a ballot even though the voter's intent is unambiguous. By holding every comment on a ballot a failure to comply with the requisites of the election laws, the Court would override the voter interest test as expressed in O'Brien v. Board of Election Commissioners of Boston:
[I]£ the intent of the voter can be determined with reasonable cer-tainty from an inspection of the ballot, . . . effect must be given to that intent . . . provided the voter has substantially complied with the requisites of the election law . . . . 6
The Court's test as expressed in Chamberlain seems overly strict in
terms of the facts of the case and unnecessarily strict as a general stan-dard. Where a comment on a ballot does not put into question the intent tent of the voter-that is, where his intent can be reasonably ascertained upon examination-the voter ought not to be disenfranchised. The Court did not indicate whether the ballot was invalid for all questions
5 l970Mass. Adv. Sh.l705, 1708,265 N.E.2d59l, 593-594.
4 The relevant statute is G.L., c. 54, §80, which provides: "Except as authorized by this chapter, no voter, election officer or other person shall place on a ballot any mark by which it may be identified; nor shall any person place a mark against any name upon a ballot not cast by himself."
51970Mass.Adv.Sh.l705, l708,265N.E.2d591,594.
380 1971 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW §15.2
thereon or merely invalid for the question to which the comment was directed.
In Desjourdy v. Board of Registrars of Voters of Uxbridge,? the
petitioner and one of the respondents had been candidates for the same town office. The respondent had won on the original tally of the ballots, and both the petitioner and respondent petitioned for a recount. On recount, the petitioner lost again. He then petitioned for a writ of mandamus against the registrars, seeking certification as the holder of the contested office; he alleged the improper counting of certain ab-sentee ballots on the recount. At trial, the judge ruled that Desjourdy's petition for recount was procedurally defective8 and that the recount
was therefore defective; the court did not reach the substantive issues raised. Finding the petitioner's procedural defects to be insubstantial, the Supreme Judicial Court on appeal ruled the recount valid and moved to a consideration of the merits of the petitioner's case.
The threshold question for the Court was whether it could pass on the validity of the absentee ballots at all. In order for the validity of the ballots to be placed in issue, the petitioner must have challenged their validity in his original petition for a recount.9 The Court implied that
the petitioner had done so by alleging in the recount petition that the absentee ballots were in error. The Court then examined the absentee ballots, found them wanting with respect to properly executed affida-vits, and declared them defective, thus giving the victory to the peti-tioner.
In the course of its decision, the Court drew an important distinction between the instant case and DePetrillo v. Registrars of Voters of
Rehoboth.10 In DePetrillo, the initial loser had petitioned for a
re-count, but his petition had challenged only the accuracy of the tally itself. The registrars had not considered the validity of any of the ab-sentee ballots, and the Supreme Judicial Court had held that, in ac-cordance with the terms of the statute,11 the validity of the absentee
ballots could be considered neither by the registrars on their own mo-tion nor by a trial court pursuant to a petimo-tion for a writ of mandamus.
In Desjourdy, however, the loser had challenged the validity of the
absentee ballots in his petition for recount; and the registrars, as a
7 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 133,266 N.E.2d 672.
8 The trial court ruled that the petitioner had failed to specify where the election records were in error and had failed to include a certificate as to the number of registered voters signing his petition for recount, contrary to the requirements of G.L., c. 54, §135. The Supreme Judicial Court, on appeal, held that a challenge of absentee ballots on grounds of noncompliance with the applicable statute was sufficient to specify where the election records were in error. It was also determined that a lack of certification of a petition that led to a concededly accurate recount was not so substantial an irregularity as to invalidate the recount.
9 As required by G.L., c. 54, §135, which demands that the petitioner specify "wherein [the subcribers to the petition J deem . . . [the election J records . . . to be in error. . . . "
10342Mass.l3, 171 N.E.2d843(1961).
§15.3 STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 381
matter of discretion, had refused to consider his challenge. In the latter case, the Court held that validity of the absentee ballots could be challenged by a petition for a writ of mandamus. The message of the Court to disappointed candidates seems clear: If one seeks to attack the validity of the ballots cast in an election, one must challenge the validity of the ballots in a petition for recount.
§15.3. Retirement of public officers and employees. In two cases presented to the Supreme Judicial Court during the 1971 SuRVEY year, the Justices were called upon to clarify the amount and nature of public service that could be included in determining the eligibility of public servants for sertain pension benefits. Both cases involved G.L., c. 32, §58:
A veteran who has been in the service of the commonwealth, or of any county, city, town or district or any housing authority, for a period of [30] years in the aggregate, shall, at his own request, with the approval of the retiring authority, be retired from active service at [65] per cent of the highest annual rate of compensa-tion . . . payable to him while he was holding the grade held by him at his retirement. . . . 1
In both cases, the widows of the retired employees were seeking the benefits of continued retirement payments to which they were entitled under Section 58B of Chapter 32.2
In Bianchi v. Retirement Board of Somerville,3 the retired employee
had been a dentist continuously employed on a part-time basis by the city as a supervisory school dentist from 1930 to 1967. He had received certification by the Civil Service Department and a permanent appoint-ment to his position in September 1930. In 1965, the city retireappoint-ment board had concluded that in the event Dr. Bianchi sought retirement under Section 58, he would be allowed a retirement credit of half a year's service for each full year he had been employed on a part-time basis. Dr. Bianchi petitioned for a declaratory judgment as to his rights and the trial court affirmed the board's decision, apparently on the assumption that the statutory requirement of 30 years of service meant 30 years of full-time service. On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court held that each calendar year during which Dr. Bianchi was employed on a regular part-time basis must be considered as one full year toward the 30 years of employment required by Section 58.
An element of confusion arose in the case because of the makeup of Chapter 32, the chapter of the General Laws that governs various
pen-§15.3. 1 G.L., c. 32, §58 was amended by Acts of 1968, c. 700. No contribution on behalf of a veteran is necessary for the veteran to be eligible for payments under Section 58. 2 G.L., c. 32, §58B, prior to its amendment by Acts of 1970, c. 697, provided: "A veteran who is entitled to be retired under [Section 58] may . . . elect to receive a lesser yearly amount . . . during his lifetime, with the provision that upon his death leaving as a survivor his spouse at the time of retirement two thirds of the yearly amount of such lesser pension shall be continued during the lifetime of and paid to such spouse." In the Bianchi case, the suit was being prosecuted by Dr. Bianchi's executor for the benefit of his widow; in Sullivan, infra, the suit was being prosecuted by the retiree's widow.
382
1971 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW §15.3sion arrangements. As the Court pointed out in its opinion, the retire-ment of veterans is covered by Sections 56 to 60, and "[g]enerally speak-ing, sections of c. 32 other than §§56-60 apply to the retirement of veterans only if they are expressly applicable thereto by such other sections or by §§56-60."4 The principal exceptions to the general statement, noted the Court, were Sections 90A to 102, which applied as a rule to most or all retirement systems or retirees. Although Section 4 of the chapter authorized a retirement board to determine how years of part-time service were to be equated to years of full-time service, the Court ruled that the application of Section 4 to Section 58 by the board and the trial court was unjustificable: "There is no language in §§56-60 or in §4(2)(b) making the latter statute applicable to veterans' pen-sions."5 The Court, comparing Section 58 with other sections in Chap-ter 32, further pointed out that the legislature was capable of making special provisions for part-time employees if it so desired. Finally, the Court observed that Section 58 measured the amount of the pension payment in terms of the "annual rate of compensation" of the em-ployee; by thus pegging the level of the pension payments to the total compensation received by employees, the statute in effect took into account the lower wages that would be paid to part-time employees. To read the statute as requiring 30 years of full-time service would effectively prevent any part-time employee (all of whom must retire at age 70) from ever retiring under Section 58.
In Sullivan v. Boston Retirement Board,6 the plaintiff's late husband
had served in an unpaid position on the Boston School Committee from 1934 to 1942 and as sheriff of Suffolk County from 1939 until his death in 1968; he lacked less than two years of service as sheriff to be eligible to retire under Section 58. The plaintiff sought to have her late husband's service as school committeeman tacked on to his service as sheriff so as to aggregate more than the 30 years of service required by Section 58. The Court held that it could not-that the legislature had not intended that unpaid service be included under Section 58. In reaching its conclusion, the Court relied in part upon the fact that if the deceased had continued at his post on the school committee for 30 years, by the terms of Section 58 he would not be entitled to receive a pension because his annual rate of compensation would have been zero. The Court felt it would be unreasonable to permit the tacking on of service that was noncompensible and that by itself would not satisfy Section 58. Because the petitioner claimed rights under a retirement scheme that was noncontributory, the Court considered the scheme sufficiently analogous to a gratuity to warrant construing the words of the statute strictly as against petitioner's claim.7
4 ld. at lOll, 270 N.E.2dat 795.
5 ld. at 1012,270 N.E.2dat 795.
61971 Mass.Adv. Sh. 545,268N.E.2d678.
7 By Chapter 894 of the Acts of 1971, amending G.L., c. 32, §4, the legislature provided
§15.4 STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 383
§15.4. Collective bargaining,! In Holyoke Police Relief Assn. v. Mayor of Holyoke,Z the Supreme Judicial Court was presented with the task of reconciling two statutes regulating policemen's days off. General Laws, c. 41, §1llD provides for a three-week vacation for policemen who have worked from five to ten years, and a four-week vacation for those who have worked more than ten years. General Laws, c. 14 7, § 16C provides that police officers are to be excused from duty for two days out of every seven; Section 17 of Chapter 147 provides that in no case should the number of days off granted to a policeman be less than 104 per year in towns accepting Section 16C, that such days off should be in addition to any annual vacation, and that such annual vacation should not be diminished on account of the operation of Sec-tion 17. Through their bargaining agent, the Holyoke police contended that they were entitled to take a three-week (or four-week) vacation and to have at least an additional 104 days off throughout the year. The city contended that the three (or four) weeks of vacation granted by Section lllD consisted of working days only, and that three calendar weeks of vacation time included 6 days of the 104 days granted police-men by Section 16C. The trial court ruled in favor of the police, and the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the vacation granted by Section ll1D should be computed on the basis of calendar weeks without regard to other days off.
As a matter of statutory interpretation, the conclusion reached by the Court seems unassailable. The Court first examined Section ll1D standing alone and concluded that if it were enacted by a political sub-division with no other enactment being made regarding vacations, policemen would be entitled to three calendar weeks of vacation as a result. If the political subdivision had previously adopted Section 16C and, as urged by the city, the language of Section 1 I 1D were construed to mean work week rather than calendar week, the length of the police-men's annual vacation would have been diminished on account of Section 16C-a result that would be in contravention of the express terms of Section 17. One wonders, however, if either the policemen or the city at the time of the adoption of Section 111D intended the result reached by the Court. Section 16C was adopted by the city in 1952, and
system of which he is a member the amount of money that would have been paid yearly into the fund if the employee had been paid $2500 a year, plus interest thereto as of the date of payment into the fund. School committee members are not affected by the amend-ment, however.
§15.4. 1 Two other cases involving collective bargaining, Sheahan v. School Comm. of Worcester, 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1073, 270 N.E.2d 912, and Fitchburg Teachers Assn. v. School Comm. of Fitchburg, 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1253, 271 N.E.2d 646, were also de-cided during the 1971 SuRVEY year. In Sheahan, the Court dealt with the question of whether a school committee had been bound by an arbitration award; in Fitchburg Teachers Assn., the Court considered whether the school committee had the power to agree to pay teachers for unused sick leave days. Both of these cases are fully discussed in §6.8 supra.
384 1971 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW §15.4
Section 111D was not adopted until five years later. That it apparently took the police thirteen years to discover the extent of their allowed vacation indicates that they, at least, were not fully aware of the im-port of the passage of Section 111D. It is suspected that both the city and the police thought that 111D would yield a three- or four-week vacation and leave the five-day work weeks untouched. The case stands as a warning to cities and towns that would leap to adopt a statute without fully exploring the consequences thereof.
B.
LEGISLATION§15.5. Competitive bidding. By Chapters 6601 and 6932 of the Acts of 1971, the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority and the Massachu-setts Parking Authority are required, when selling real property, to advertise publicly for bids. A notice that such real property is for sale must be run in two daily ne~spaj:Jers published in the city of Boston; if the property is not located in Boston, notice must also be run in a newspaper that publishes in the city or town that is the situs of the real property involved. Notice must be published once a week for three successive weeks, such notice consisting of the time and place where information concerning the real property may be obtained, the time and place of the opening of the bids, and the statement that the authori-ty in question reserves the right to reject any or all bids. All bids must be sealed and are to be opened publicly by the authority; the land is to go to the highest responsible bidder. The authority may require that a bond accompany such bid, and has the right to reject all the bids and readvertise the land for sale. The new chapters also make applicable to both authorities certain provisions of the General Laws relative to public works contracts and bidding procedures3 in the same manner as such provisions are applicable to the Commonwealth.
§15.6. Statutory modifications to the civil service laws. Civil service law was extensively modified by the Acts of 1971,1 most notably with respect to the civil service rights of armed forces veterans and aliens and with respect to provisional employees. Chapter 1792 provides that an employee shall be -deemed to have permanently and voluntarily separated himself from his position if he is absent without authority from his job for more than 14 consecutive days that cannot be charged to sick leave or vacation. The appointing authority for the position held by the absentee may, in its discretion, restore the absentee to
§15.5. 1 Amending Acts of 1952, c. 354, §5, which added clause (q) (Mass. Turnpike Authority).
2 Amending Acts of 1958, c. 606, §5, by adding to clause (j) (Mass. Parking Authority). 3 The provisions made applicable to both authorities include G.L., c. 149, §§26-29 (provisions regulating the term of public employment); §§44A-44L (fair competition for bidders on construction of public works); c. 30, §§39F-39M (certain general provisions on public contracts relative to state departments).
§15.6. 1 The following chapters of the Acts of 1971 involved the civil service laws: Chapters 179, 180-182, 185-188, 195, 197,212-214,219-221,232-235,237,289,671, 677, 683, 685, 731, and 796.
§15.6 STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 385
his former office if he gives a satisfactory written explanation of his absence within 14 days after his return.
Chapter 1803 embodies an attempt on the part of the legislature to
aid VietNam veterans who wish to enter the civil service. The statute provides that a person who missed an opportunity to take an open, competitive civil service examination because he was in the armed forces during the Viet Nam conflict shall be permitted, upon his re-turn to civilian life, to take a comparable examination and, upon pass-ing, to be placed on an eligible list for civil service appointments so long as such a list exjsts. Chapter 181,4 however, repeals provisions
of the civil service law that had provided reinstatement rights to those veterans of the armed forces who had held civil service positions or who were already on eligible lists prior to their call to active duty. Returning veterans, presumably, are now governed by the general reinstatement provisions.5
Rights of aliens in the civil service were affected both favorably and unfavorably by Chapter 188,6 which struck certain sentences of Section
36 and all of Section 3 7 of Chapter 31 of the General Laws. On the one hand, Chapter 188 prevents an alien from being provisionally em-ployed in a civil service position if there are citizens of the United States available therefor; on the other hand, Chapter 188 prevents an alien from being dismissed from a civil service position for which an eligibility list exists merely upon complaint by any citizen of the Commonwealth. The effect of Chapter 188, when read with Section 12 of Chapter 31 (which prevents the director of civil service from placing an alien on an eligible list) and Section 15G of Chapter 31 (whiCh pre-vents a provisional appointment or promotion from being continued when the director certifies a list of three eligible persons willing to accept), is to permit aliens to remain in civil service positions unless there is established an eligible list of at least three persons willing to accept the position occupied by the alien.
The appointment of provisional civil service employees is further controlled by Chapter 214 of the Acts of 1971.7 That chapter provides
that in emergency conditions provisional employees may be appointed at the discretion of the director, even though such employees may not possess the qualifications and requirements applicable to the position to which they have been appointed. If no emergency exists, the appoint-ment of provisional employees is still at the discretion of the director, but he must take into account information provided by the appointing authority as to the qualifications for the position and the ability of the applicant to meet such qualifications. There are as yet no standards by which the director is to be guided in determining whether an emer-gency exists.
Finally, there are two other provisions that should be mentioned.
3 Acts of 1971, c. 180, amending Acts of 1967, c. 399, §I. 4 Acts of 1971, c. 181, repealing G.L., c. 31, §§27, 28.
5 The general reinstatement provisions are G .L., c. 31, §§46A -461.
386 1971 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW §15.6
Chapter 235,8 by permitting the director of civil service to remove as well as grant credit when reviewing an applicant's civil service exami-nation upon the applicant's request, is aimed at discouraging requests for review of the director's initial grading of examination papers by threatening the applicant with loss of some of his marks on the exami-nation. Chapter 731,9 to conform with the Emergency Employment Act of 1971,10 provides that only unemployed or underemployed per-sons (as defined by the act) who are residents of the municipality involved may be appointed to temporary positions created pursuant to the employment act.
§15.7. Gambling. Two provisions of the Acts of 1971 legalized
means of gambling within the Commonwealth. Chapter 486 provides that certain organizations that conform to specified statutory require-ments are not barred by G.L., c. 271, §6B from setting up or promoting "the game commonly known as skilo or any similar game regardless of name. "1 The statutory requirements for the licensing of the game commonly called beano are set forth in Chapter 486 as the new Sections
52 to 55 of Chapter 147 of the General Laws.2 The organizations eligible to obtain licenses to conduct the game are fraternal organiza-tions having chapters or branches in at least one other New England state; religious organizations "under the control of or affiliated with an established church of the commonwealth"; certain veterans' organi-zations; volunteer, nonprofit fire companies; and volunteer, nonprofit ambulance services, all of which, to receive a license, must have been in existence for at least five years prior to June 1, 1968.3 Application for a license must be made to the commissioner of public safety,4 but such application must be approved by the governing body of the city or town.5 Licenses shall be issued only if the citizens of a city or town in which the game is to be conducted have elected to have such licenses granted. The receipts from such games as are conducted shall be used
8 Acts of 1971, c. 235, amendingG.L., c. 31, §l2A.
9 Actsofl971,c. 731 (a special act).
1°42
u.s.c.
§§4883(5)-4883(6).§15.7. 1 Acts of 1971, c. 486, §I, amendingG.L., c. 271, §6B.
2 Acts of 1971, c. 486, §3.
! Ibid. It appears that Chapter 486 may be constitutionally suspect. Because it does not
include in its recital of favored institutions charities, nonprofit educational institutions, and religious organizations not affiliated with an established church in the Common-wealth, the statute may be attacked on equal protection grounds. Cf. Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U.S. 553 (1931). But see Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. Public Service Commn., 295 U.S. 285 (1935). Because it arbitrarily sets a precise cut-off date to limit organizations that may conduct beano, the statute may be further challenged on equal protection grounds. Cf. Mayflower Farms v. TenEyck, 297 U.S. 266 (1936). By excluding rf'ligious organizations not affiliated with or controlled by an established church of the Common-wealth, the statute may be violative of Article XII of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights and also may be a denial of equal protection. Cf. Dalli v. Board of Educ., 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 237, 267 N.E.2d 219.
4 Acts of 1971, c. 486, §2, insertingG.L., c. 271, §22B.
§15.8 STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 387
to pay prizes and expenses; a tax of 10 percent of the gross receipts is to be paid to the Commonwealth. The net profits are the property of the organization conducting the game and must be used for "charitable, religious or educational purposes"; no profits may be distributed to members of the organization conducting the game, and no one is "entitled to a percentage of any money received as a result of conducting said game. "6 Each year, the Commonwealth will return to cities and towns in which the game has been conducted one-half of all licensing fees and taxes received as a result of the conducting of the game in the particular city or town.7
By Chapter 813 of the Acts of 1971, the legislature authorized the creation of a state lottery commission, gave the commission the discre-tion to conduct a state lottery and to determine what kind of lottery was to be run and how the lottery was to be administered, and set forth other provisions with respect to the lottery.8 The revenue received from the sale of lottery tickets is to be used to pay prizes and expenses; the net profits are to be distributed as set forth by statute to cities and towns of the Commonwealth.9 The statutory scheme of distribution is designed to return the greater amounts of money to cities and towns having lesser per capita property valuations.
§15.8. Housing court for the city of Boston. The legislature, during the 1971 SuRVEY year, addressed itself to the problems of housing
in the city of Boston. Chapter 843 of the Acts of 197Jl created the Housing Court of the City of Boston, a court of superior and general jurisdiction which is to commence operation on January I, 1972. The subject matter jurisdiction of the court is concurrent with that of the district and superior courts, and extends to all crimes and civil actions "concerned with the health, safety or welfare of any occupant of any place used, or intended for use as a place of human
6 Ibid, inserting G.L., c. 147, §52. A fair reading of the statute would indicate that members of the organization conducting the game may be paid from the receipts for their time. The provision prohibiting the distribution of profits to members of the organiza-tion would not prevent such payments, because profits are measured after the payment
of expenses, and payments to members for their time spent managing the game would properly be classified as expenses. The provision prohibiting the payment of "a per-centage of any money received as a result of conducting said game" clearly prohibits compensation based on a percentage of the receipts, but just as clearly does not prohibit an hourly rate of compensation. Unfortunately, the statute does not require that the annual report of organizations licensed to conduct games contain a statement of expenses.
7 Acts of 1971, c. 486, §3, insertingG.L., c. 147, §55.
8 Acts of 1971, c. 813, §2, insertingG.L.,c. 10, §§22-36.
9 The net proceeds are to be distributed to cities and towns according to an "equalizing municipal grant" formula computed by multiplying the number of persons residing in each city or town times $10 times an equalizing municipal percentage that is the propor-tion which the equalized valuapropor-tion per person in the commonwealth bears to the equal-ized valuation per person in tht; city or town. This formula ensures that every city or town will share in the proceeds of the lottery, but that poorer communities (as deter-mined by comparing equalized valuations) will receive more money per capita than richer ones. G.L., c. 10, §25.
388 1971 ANNlJAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW §15.8
habitation," including appeals from the Boston Rent Board, orders of the building and housing inspection departments, and actions to recover possession of rental property. The court has equity jurisdiction concurrent with other courts of the Commonwealth, including the Supreme Judicial Court, of all cases and actions arising under its sub-ject matter jurisdiction.2 The court will sit in Suffolk County courthouse in Boston, but may (with the approval of city officials) sit in such other courthouses throughout Boston as may be convenient or expedient.3
There are several procedural provisions worth mentioning. Transfer of cases pending in other courts to the Housing Court may be had by any party thereto; removal, on the other hand, may not be had at all except that the Supreme Judicial Court may direct the transfer to itself, in whole or in part, of any case pending in the Housing Court, and may direct the disposition of any part of a case not transferred.'4 If two or more actions concerning the same housing accommodation are pend-ing, one in the Housing Court and another in any other court, the Housing Court may direct their consolidation under its jurisdiction.5 A party aggrieved of a final judgment or final decree of the Housing Court may, within three days after entry of the decree or five days after notice of such entry is sent, whichever is earlier, appeal directly to the full Supreme Judicial Court, provided that the filing of the appeal is accompanied by a bond.G
Among the powers given to the Housing Court is the power to appoint "housing specialists," who are to be selected by the judge, granted such powers and duties as the judge in his discretion shall prescribe, and retained at the pleasure of the judge. Such specialists
shall be knowledgeable in the maintenance, repair and rehabilita-tion of dwelling units, the problems of landlord and tenant as they pertain to dwelling units, the types of funds and services available to assist landlords and tenants in the financing and resolution of such problems and the federal and state laws, rules and regulations pertaining to the maintenance, repair and rehabilitation of such units and the financing and resolution of such problems.7
Although it comes into existence over expressed skepticism from within the judicial system,8 the court has the power and, potentially, the capacity, to handle the myriad problems arising from the landlord-tenant relationship.
2 Acts of 1971, c. 843, §1 (G.L., c.l85A, §3). 5 Ibid. (G.L., c. 185A, §4).
4 Ibid. (G.L., c. 185A, §22). s Ibid. (G.L., c. 185A, §22).
6 Ibid. (G.L., c. 185A, §26).
7 Ibid. (G.L., c. 185A, §16).
8 See Commonwealth of Mass., 14th Annual Report to the Justices of the Supreme
§15.10 STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 389
§15.9. Taking of land for taxes. By Chapter 716 of the Acts of 1971, the legislature shortened to six months the length of time between a sale or the taking of land for taxes and the time when a petition may be brought in the Land Court for a foreclosure of all rights of redemp-tion thereunder.1 Chapter 716 also provides that no sale of land after a tax taking shall give the purchaser thereof the right to enter into possession until six months after the date of the sale.z Sales or takings of land for nonpayment of taxes that occur after August 26, 1971, are subject to the new six-month period.3 The objective of the statute is to eliminate the long delays between the nonpayment of property taxes and the taking of the property by the governmental body to which the taxes were owed. In the past, the normal period between the nonpay-ment of taxes when due and the taking of the tax delinquent land for nonpayment has been six or more years; the long delay has enabled delinquent taxpayers to omit payment of real estate taxes altogether and to recover from rents their original investment, plus a satisfactory return thereon, before the taxing body could perfect its title. Although Chapter 716enables a city or town to foreclose after a total of 18 months, four or five years is still required to perfect title because of the enor-mous existing backlog of cases in the Land Court. Elimination of the case backlog and the administrative acceleration of tax-taking pro-cedures is necessary to enable the cities and towns to speed up enforce-ment procedures in cases where delinquent owners now are able to finance their holdings at the expense of the conscientious taxpayers. However, there are no signs of early improvement in the overburdened Land Court calendar.
§15.10. Parking; Streets; Litter. Several statutory changes were enacted during the 1971 SuRVEY year to enable cities and towns to deal more forcefully with those who contribute to the creation of contem-porary urban annoyances. To facilitate the collection of garbage or refuse, cities and towns are empowered by Chapter 83 of the Acts of 197}1 to remove or cause to be removed from public ways or private ways open to public use any vehicles parked within 100 feet of a sign making such parking illegal. The costs of the towing and any storage charges resulting therefrom are to be borne by the owner of the towed vehicle. By Chapter 358 of the Acts of 1971,2 police are authorized to enforce certain anti-litter laws3 by issuing a written notice to the offenQer to appear in court, the notice being similar to a parking ticket.
If the notice is the first, second, or third of the calendar year for the particular offender, the case will be disposed of upon payment of a $20 fine; for the fourth and succeeding violations each year, a fine of
§15.9. 1 Acts of 1971, c. 716, §I, amending G.L., c. 60, §65. The former period be-tween taking of the land and foreclosure was two years.
2 ld. §2, amending G.L., c. 60, §45. The former period between the sale and the entry in possession was two years.
'Id.§3.
§15.10. 1 AmendingG.L., c. 40, §21, by insertingclause(I6A). 2 AmendingG.L., c. 270, by inserting§I6A.
390
1971 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW §15.10$100 is prescribed. Other legislation was enacted to aid the city of Boston in solving its battles over places to park. By Chapter 899,4 Bos-ton is empowered to permit residents to park anywhere in the area immediately near their residences, even though such parking would otherwise be prohibited; while by Chapter 665,5 the city of Boston is authorized to tow any vehicle to which ten or more parking tickets have been assessed, and to retain such vehicle until all fines and all charges in connection with the towing are paid. The purpose of the latter statute is in part to reach out-of-state motorists who habitually ignore the receipt of parking tickets in Boston; success of the statute will depend upon the use of computerized data on offending motorists. §15.11. Fiscal cycle of political subdivisions. Prior to 1941, the Commonwealth and its departments managed their gover~ment ac-counts on a December I to November 30 accounting period, while the cities and towns were on a January I to December 30 calendar year accounting period.1 In 1941, the state government adopted a July I to June 30 fiscal year accounting period,2 but the governments of politi-cal subdivisions remained on the politi-calendar year. By Chapter 849 of the Acts of 1969, the legislature placed all cities, towns, counties, and dis-tricts on the July I to June 30 fiscal year, thus synchronizing their accounting periods with that adopted by the Commonwealth. Chapter 849 was to have become effective on July I, 1971,3 after an I8-month transition period commencing January I, 1970;4 but early in 1970 the chapter was amended to postpone the transition period for one year so as to commence January I, 1971.5 In April 1970, Chapter 849 was again amended to postpone its operation and was made effective July I, 1972, one-third of the way through an 18-month transition period beginning January 1, 1972.6 After further examination of Chapter 849, several discrepancies and omissions were noted, and, by Chapter 766 of the Acts of 1971, Chapter 849 was revised and its operation postponed for yet another year. Chapter 849, as amended by Chapter 766, is now effective July 1, 1973,7 six months into an 18-month transition period that commences January 1, 1973.8
Purpose of the legislation. The legislature's expressed purpose and
intent in enacting the new fiscal cycle was to conform the accounting periods of the Commonwealth's political subdivisions to that of the Commonwealth so as to facilitate implementing "improved budget and
4 Amending Acts of 1929, c. 263, §2, as appearing in Acts of 1964, c. 387 (a special law). 5 Amending Acts of 1929, c. 263, §2, as most recently amended by Acts of 1968, c. 494
(a special law).
§15.11. 1 G.L., c. 4, §7, recodifying St. 1905, c. 211, §1 (~he Commonweiilth and its
departments); G.L., c. 44, §§56 (towns), 56A (cities).
2 St.l941, c. 509, §1, amendingG.L., c. 4, §7. 3 Acts of 1969, c. 849, §79.
4 Id. §76.
5 Acts of 1970, c. 52, amending Acts of 1969, c. 849, §76. 6 Acts of 1970, c. 194, §§1 (transition period), 4 (effective date). 7 Actsofl97l,c. 766,§29.
§15.11 STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 391
appropriation procedures, and to improve the collection of property taxes."9 However, in order that the reasons behind the change in the
fiscal cycle to a July 1 to June 30 fiscal year may be better understood, some essentials of the Commonwealth's municipal finance must be explained. In the past, all the appropriation procedures and tax collec-tions relevant to a given accounting period occurred during that ac-counting period. Each town, for instance, would commence a new calen-dar year on January 1 without yet having appropriated any money for the operation of the municipal government for that year. The town budget would have been prepared in the latter months of the preceding year and the early months of the new one,10 but could not be approved
by the town so as to authorize expenditures pursuant thereto until presented to and approved by a town meeting, which might not be con-vened until February, March, or April of the current year.IJ Sometime in the spring of the year, the commissioner of corporations and taxation of the Commonwealth would prepare a summary of monies payable to the town from the Commonwealth;12 using the summary (which
is referred to as the "cherry sheet"), town officials would then be able to compute the amount of money the town would have to raise in taxes for the current year to meet the expenditures approved by the town meeting.13 The tax rate would then be computed on the basis of
property assessed a,s of the past January 114 and a tax bill sent out.
Although tax bills were due and payable on July 1,15 interest on
taxes would not start running until November.16 Most revenue would
therefore not be received by the town until November, even though the fiscal year to which the taxes related was almost over.
As might be expected, the timing of cash flow and the orderly hand-ling of funds were not facilitated under such circumstances. Towns appropriating funds for the operation of their governments in the cur-rent year would be at least six months into the accounting period be-fore the effect of the appropriations on the tax rate could be determined. In order to meet operating expenses, which are regularly spaced throughout the year, a town would necessarily have to borrow on short-term lines of credit against its anticipated tax revenues;17 such borrowing was not only unnecessarily expensive but also subject to vicissitudes of money markets-the tighter the money supply, the more
9 Acts of 1969, c. 849, §I. 10 See G.L., c. 41, §59.
11 ld. c. 40, §5. Town meeting dates are prescribed by law. Id. c. 39, §9. 12 Id. c. 58, §25A.
13 The "cherry sheet" actually contains both estimates of the state revenue that the town is entitled to receive and the Commonwealth's assessment of the town's share of state, county, and metropolitan costs. Report of the Fiscal Cycle Task Force of the City of Boston, app. at 10 [hereinafter cited as Fiscal Cycle Report].
1'Id. c. 59, §II. 15 Id.§57. 16 Ibid.
392
1971 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW §15.11the town would have to pay to borrow.I8 By far the greatest receipts of the town would occur in November, in effect in one lump sum; the occurrence of a deficit would not be indicated until practically the end of the year. From the point of view of town officials, programs that were to be implemented in the current year for the first time had to be entered into in January on the hope that necessary expenditures would be approved by town meetings; the alternative would be to forego the operation of the programs until the programs were approved, some two to four months into the current year. If the costs for the programs were not offset by short-changing other expenditures, the programs could not be entered into at all in January because expenditures made without appropriation could not exceed one-twelfth of the preceding year's expenditures.19 Finally,· there were occasionally problems of coordination between the state fiscal year and the town fiscal year. Because the state funds for towns would come out of two fiscal years of the Commonwealth, the Commonwealth was in the position of promising disbursements of tax receipts it was not yet planning to get.
The fiscal cycle legislation was designed to alleviate problems such as those noted above. The legislation will permit political subdivisions to determine and approve their appropriations before the commence-ment of the year to which the appropriations relate, thus enabling officials who must allocate and commit the funds to know the amount of money they will have available. Knowing the amount of money available, officials and department heads will be able to make more soundly based decisions about the programs and policies they can afford to carry out-and those they cannot-by weighing the costs and benefits against actual revenues available. The Commonwealth will also benefit by being able to foresee its tax revenues over the same year that it is promising money to towns. A municipality will be able, at the time the annual appropriations are approved, to project the impact of the appropriations on the tax rate more accurately because no ex-penditures for the year in question will yet have been made. Finally, Chapter 849 as amended· will improve the inflow of tax revenues by permitting the payment of property taxes in semiannual installments instead of annual installments as formerly. The use of two payments six months apart will substantially alleviate the expenses of temporary borrowings. 2o
The new fiscal cycle. During the first six months of 1974, cities, towns, counties, and districts will, for the first time, appropriate funds
18 The expenses resulting from such borrowing in anticipation of tax revenues were not at all an insignificant sum. In 1968 alone, the city of Boston incurred interest ex-penses of nearly $1 million on temporary loans needed to finance city government for the early months of the year. Press release by Mayor Kevin H. White, Nov. 26, 1968. In 1967, the city of Worcester had to resort to temporary borrowings in the total amount of $13.5 million during the first 8 months of the year to operate its government. Fis-cal Cycle Report, app.
19 G.L., c. 44, §34.
§15.11 STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 393
and run their books on a July I to June 30 fiscal year.21 The appro-priations process will actually commence during the latter months of calendar year 1974, as would have been the case had the fiscal cycle not been changed, but the appropriations will relate to the fiscal year com-mencing July 1, 1974, instead of the calendar year starting January 1, 1974.22 For the most part, the appropriations timetable has not been altered; the modifications that have been made generally concern the content of the required budgetary reports. City department heads must report estimates and expenditures at the same time as usual, but the report must contain expenditures for the preceding fiscal year and the first four months of the current fiscal year, estimated expenditures for the next eight months of the current fiscal year, and a budget request for the subsequent fiscal year.23 At the close of the calendar ye.ar, the city auditor's report to the mayor must cover receipts and expenses for the first six months of the current fiscal year, estimates thereof for the next six months, and further estimates for the subsequent fiscal year.24 A report of identical substance must be filed by each town accountant.25 City or town assessors must be notified of six months' receipts and the estimated receipts for the next six months no later than February 1.26 A new deadline of February 15 is imposed upon the commissioner of corporations and taxation for determining the Commonwealth's share of the expenses of certain programs for which cities and towns are to be reimbursed. 27 Mayors of cities are given an additional 15 days, until March 1 or shortly thereafter, to submit their budgets,28 and city coun-cils are directed to wait an additionall5 days before preparing a budget on their own.29 Town meetings are now permitted to be held in May30 so as to allow as much information as possible to be gathered about the coming budget before it must be approved.31
Like the appropriations process, the returns process timetable has not been altered except to relate the process to the new fiscal cycle. In
21 The July I to June 30 fiscal year is imposed upon cities (Acts of 1971, c. 766, §17,
amending Acts of 1969, c. 849, §63, which amended G.L., c. 44 §56A), towns (id. §16, amending Acts of 1969, c. 849, §62, which amended G.L., c. 44, §56), counties (Acts of 1969, c. 849, §5, amending G.L., c. 35, §16), and districts (id. §46, amending G.L., c. 41, §120).
22 The largest single class of amendments in Chapters 766 and 849 is concerned solely
with changing statutory references to reflect the new fiscal year. Such amendments typically insert the word fiscal before the word year or replace the current year with the subsequent fiscal year. E.g., Acts of 1969, c. 849, §10. Such amendments have not been
dealt with in this chapter.
23 Acts of 1969, c. 849, §56, amendingG.L., c. 44, §31A. 24 Id. §58, amendingG.L., c. 44, §31A.
25 Id. §42, amendingG.L., c. 41, §60. 26 Id. §40,amendingG.L.,c. 41, §54A.
27 Id. §66, amending G.L., c. 58, §25A.
2s Id. §59, amending G.L., c. 44, §32.
29 Id. §60, amending G.L., c. 44, §32.
3D Id. §23, amending G.L., c. 39, §9.
394
1971 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW §15.11May, county treasurers must notify those officials who make returns to them that such returns are due.32 By June I5, sheriffs must account for the funds received by them.33 In July, county treasurers must make returns to the director of accounts for items received by the treasurers in criminal matters.34 Immediately after July I, county treasurers must pay to county officers any salary balances remaining due for the pre-vious fiscal year.35 During the period July I to IO, treasurers of coun-ties, cicoun-ties, towns, and districts are to enter in their books expenditures relating to the previous fiscal year.36 For all but counties, such expen-ditures will be as of June 30 of the preceding fiscal year.37 By July IO, county and town treasurers must pay their share of the costs of the Southeastern Regional Planning and Economic Development Dis-trict.38 Immediately after July IO, county treasurers must report on county receipts and expenditures for the preceding fiscal year,39 while county commissioners must report on county affairs.40 Before July I5, county treasurers are to return to the commissioner of corrections all amounts from the previous fiscal year on account of jails or houses of correction,41 and all county officers other than treasurers must return to the director of accounts such funds and accounts as are required by statute.42 Returns so made to the director of accounts must, before August, be reported to the governor and the legislature.43
Because of the timely operation of the appropriations procedure as outlined by the new fiscal cycle legislation, statutes permitting the ex-penditures of funds prior to the appropriation of the budget are no longer necessary. Accordingly, several of these statutes will be repealed when the new legislation becomes effective. With respect to annual municipal contracts made by municipal department heads (such as for data processing services or refuse collection), the legislation repeals a provision to the effect that such a contract made by a town for any year might be extended without appropriation on the same or more favor-able terms for any part of the first four months of the next year.44 As a result of the repealer, department heads may continue to let out annual municipal contracts during the spring, but the contracts will apply only to the upcoming fiscal year. Appropriations for annual contracts will
32 Acts of 1969, c. 849, §19,amendingG.L., c. 35,§40.
33 Id. §22, amendingG.L., c. 37, §22. 34 Id. §19,amendingG.L., c. 35, §40. 35 Id. §5, amendingG.L., c. 35, §16.
36 Id. §5, amending G.L., c. 35, §16 (counties); §63, as amended by Acts of 1971, c.
766, §17, which amended G.L., c. 44, §56A (cities); §62, as amended by Acts of 1971, c. 766, §16, which amended G.L., c. 44, §56 (towns); §46, amending G.L., c. 41, §120 (dis-tricts).
37 Ibid.
38 Acts of 1969, c. 849,§39, amendingG.L., c. 40B, §18. 39 Id. §7,amendingG.L., c. 35,§25.
40 Id. §8,amendingG.L., c. 35, §26.
41 Id.§I9,amendingG.L.,c. 35,§40. 42 ld. §20, amending G.L., c. 35, §45.
43 Id. §21, amendingG.L., c. 35, §46.
§IS. II STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 395
thus not be at all impaired, as they were in the past, by prior commit-ments for expenditures on the part of municipal officials.
The collective bargaining process will be impliedly affected by legis-lation that clearly repeals a power previously vested in cities and towns to make salary and wage increases retroactive to the beginning of the fiscal year. Salary or compensation increases for elected town officials45 or town employees46 may not be made retroactive by a vote of the town, nor may town officials make retroactive increases in compensation for persons appointed or employed by themY The result of these repealers in part will be to place a great deal of pressure upon municipal bargain-ing units to arrive in the sprbargain-ing at a collective bargainbargain-ing agreement covering the coming fiscal year. 48 Failure on the part of the bargain-ing unit to reach an agreement until after the start of the fiscal year will mean that any wage increase negotiated cannot be made retroactive to the start of the fiscal year. 49 The fiscal cycle legislation also repeals provisions that permit the expenditures of funds that have not yet been appropriated. The statute forbids the incurring of liabilities by town officers and city officers for carrying on their departments between January I and the date of the annual appropriation. 50 Neither county officers51 nor districts52 may make expenditures at all before the
annual appropriation is approved. The net result of the repealers noted above and the repealers of authority of the subdivisions to incur liabili-ties53 is that cities and towns may continue to operate during a fiscal year for which no appropriations have yet been made only so long as they have money left over from the previous fiscal year. Districts and counties, if no appropriations are forthcoming by the start of a fiscal year, will come to a complete halt unless special legislation is passed to continue the operation of the governments. 54 The only provision made in the fiscal cycle legislation for allowing expenditures outside of the fiscal year permits county commissioners who have agreed with cities and towns to allocate funds for highway construction and main-tenance to spend under such agreements, until September 30, the
un-45 Acts of 1971, c. 766, §10, amending Acts of 1969, c. 849, §44, which amended in part G. L., c. 41, §108.
46 Ibid., amending Acts of 1969, c. 849, §45, which repealed G.L., c. 41, §108A. ' 7 N.45supra.
48 The ability of a city to grant compensation increases was originally restricted by Chapter 849, which provided that an ordinance increasing the compensation of munici-pal officers or employees would have to be approved by a two-thirds vote of the city coun-cil and would have to operate for more than three months during the calendar year in which it is passed. Acts of 1969, c. 849, §61, amending G.L., c. 44, §33A.
49 See James v. Mayor of New Bedford, 319 Mass. 74, 64 N.E.2d 638 (1946) (municipal employers may not give employees gratuities for work already performed; retroactive wage increase would be such a forbidden gratuity).
5o Acts of 1971, c. 766, §11, amending Acts of 1969, c. 849, §48.
5 1 Acts of 1969, c. 849, §4, amendingG.L., c. 35, §14. 52 Acts of 1971, c. 766, §II, repealingG.L., c. 44, §13A. 53 See discussion of debt provisions, infra.
396 1971 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW §15.11
expended balance of such allocations remaining from the prevwus fiscal year. 55
Debt provisions. Cities and towns are still able to incur debt in
anti-cipation of revenues, both for the current fiscal year and for the next fiscal year. The extent of such borrowing has been modified by the fis-cal cycle legislation and now is limited to the sum of the total tax levy of the fiscal year preceding the year in which the debt is incurred, plus the net amount received during the preceding fiscal year from the ex-cise tax on motor vehicles and trailers and the payments from the Com-monwealth in lieu of taxes for property taken for institutions or for metropolitan district purposes.56 Just as the officers of political
sub-divisions are prohibited from incurring liabilities prior to appropria-tion, so also are the political subdivisions. County commissioners no longer have the power to incur liabilities for the operation and main-tenance of regular county activities between the end of the fiscal year and the date of appropriations for the newly begun fiscal year,57 nor
may towns, cities, or districts borrow to make expenditures in a new fiscal year when no appropriations therefor have been made.58
A municipality may not, unless otherwise authorized by law, create debt in excess of statutorily specified percentages of its equalized valua-tion. 59 As a consequence, there are two categories of municipal debt:
debt inside the debt limit60 and debt outside the debt limit. 61 With respect
to debt inside the debt limit, the General Laws require that a certain percentage of the amount authorized by statute to be borrowed be ap-propriated currently by the city or town doing the borrowing.6 2 The appropriation so required is known as the "down payment." The fiscal cycle legislation makes it clear that the requirement that the down pay-ment be currently appropriated can be met by an appropriation made
during the preceding fiscal year for the upcoming fiscal year. The statute specifically provides that sums appropriated, voted, or trans-ferred in a fiscal year as down payment for a borrowing in the subse-quent fiscal year shall be deemed, for the purposes of the down payment, as being appropriated, voted, or transferred in such subsequent year.63
Borrowing within the debt limit is also modified in that one year debt may be incurred for the payment of final judgments rendered after the
55 Acts of 1971, c. 766, §4, amending Acts of 1969, c. 849, §16, which amended G.L., c. 35, §34A.
56 Acts of 1969, c. 849, §47 amendingG.L., c. 44, §4. 57 Id. §15, amendingG.L., c. 35, §34.
58 Acts of 1971, c. 766, §II, amending Acts of 1969, c. 849, §48, which amended G .L., c. 44, §§5 (towns), SA (cities), 5B (districts).
59 G.L., c. 44, §10. Equalized valuation is explained in G.L., c. 58, §IOC.
60 Those purposes for which debt inside the debt limit may be incurred are set forth in G.L., c. 44, §7.
61 Those purposes for which debt outside the debt limit may be incurred are set forth in G.L., c. 44, §8.
62 G.L., c. 44, §7.
§15.11 STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 397
fixing of the tax rate for the current fiscal year only if no other provi-sion has been made for such payment.64
Assessment and collection of taxes; Disbursements of funds. Taxes
shall be assessed and exemptions determined for any fiscal year as of January 1 of the calendar year in which the fiscal year commences, usually in the same manner in which they are presently assessed and de-termined. State and county taxes and certain assessments and charges65 will be assessed in amounts as estimated by the commissioner of cor-porations and taxation on or before March 1, unless the correct amounts are received prior to the time the tax rate is computed. 66 In determining the amount of tax title redemptions, sales of tax title possessions, and back tax receipts to be used in computing the tax rate for the next fiscal year, only those receipts collected between July 1 of the present fiscal year and March 31 or the last day of the month in which the tax rate is determined, whichever comes first, may be included.67 If the assessors of any city except Boston have not, prior to May 10, received a certifi-cate of appropriations for the next fiscal year, and if it appears to them, after inquiring of the city clerk, that such appropriations have not been voted, they must assess a tax as directed under the new Section 23 of Chapter 59 of the General Laws, on the basis of appropriations for the then-current fiscal year.68 The tax rate will of course be computed on the basis of the financial requirements for the fiscal year commencing July 1.
In order to even out the collection and disbursement of tax monies, the fiscal cycle legislation provides that payments of taxes by taxpayers and disbursements of tax monies by the Commonwealth or its sub-divisions shall occur twice a year. Local property taxes, as assessed, will continue to be fully due on July 1,69 now the beginning of the fiscal year rather than the middle. Interest on unpaid taxes will continue to be 8 percent per year.7o Interest will rqn from October 1 of the fiscal year on any part of one-half of the tax plus any betterment assessment, water rate, or annual sewer use charge that remains unpaid after No-vember 1.71 If any part of the tax remains unpaid after May 1 of the next calendar year, interest will run thereon from April 1.72 Taxes
assessed on omitted property and revised assessment taxes will bear in-terest in the same manner, except that such taxes assessed after Septem-ber 1 are due and payable on DecemSeptem-ber 31, and interest is triggered on
64 Acts of 1969, c. 849, §50,amendingG.L., c. 44, §7.
65 As covered by warrant of the state treasurer, required by G.L., c. 59, §20.
66Acts of 1971, c. 766, §19, amending Acts of 1969, c. 849 by inserting §66B, which amends G.L., c. 59, §21.
67 Id. §20,amending Acts of 1969, c. 849, §67, which amendedG.L., c. 59, §23. 68 Ibid.
69 G.L., c. 59,§57.
70 Ibid.
71 Acts of 1971, c. 766, §22, amending Acts of 1969, c. 849, §68, which amends G.L., c. 59, §57.
