This reviewer is prepared by D2013 and is included in the 2010
ADAPT kit. The D2013 Constitutional Law 1 Reviewer is for the
EXCLUSIVE use of UP Law Students.
All rights are reserved.
LSG Online Academic Library - A Project of UP LSG Secretariat
http://uplsg.org
!" D2013 Consti1 Reviewer
Prof. Jardeleza SY 2009-2010
SUPREMACY OF THE CONSTITUTION
A. Fundamental law as overriding standard of validity in case of repugnancy
If two laws – one being a law or a statute and the other one a constitutional precept – are irreconcilably in conflict with each other, the court, by means of judicial review, must choose between the two. But since the Constitution is superior to any act of legislature, it being an enactment of the sovereign people, the Constitution must prevail.
Marbury vs. Madison Facts:
William Marbury, in a petition, challenged James Madison, then Secretary of State of the United States to show cause why a mandamus should not issue commanding the latter to deliver the commission of the former as justice of the peace in the district of Columbia. Madison contended that Marbury’s designation as justice of the peace was made in a form of a “midnight appointment” and is therefore unconstitutional.
Ruling:
This case declared, for the first time, an act of Congress unconstitutional, thus establishing the doctrine of judicial review. The Supreme Court held that a portion of the Judiciary Act of 1789, which authorized the court to issue a writ of mandamus, was unconstitutional and thus invalid. Chief Justice Marshall declared that in any conflict between the Constitution and a law passed by Congress, the Constitution must always take precedence. B. Supremacy of the Constitution enforced through judicial review One of the ways of enforcing the supremacy of the Constitution is through judicial review. Judicial review is the power of a court to settle actual
controversies between real conflicting parties thrugh the applications of a law. It involves the duty of the court of pronouncing void any such act which does not square with its own reading of the Constitution. When the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any
superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it the by the Constitution.
Angara vs. Electoral Commission Facts:
Angara was elected representative of Tayabas, Quezon and was already proclaimed a member of the National Assembly when Ynsua protested to the ELECOM. Angara filed a motion to dismiss the protest but since his motion was denied by the ELECOM, he filed an original action in the SC
questioning the jurisdiction of the ELECOM to hear the protest of Ynsua, provided that ELECOM was under the National Assembly which already proclaimed him as its member as the elected representative of Tayabas, Quezon.
Ruling:
[1] When there’s an actual case or controversy, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and among the integral constituent units thereof.
[2]The judiciary has judicial power, and included in this power is judicial review. The Court has the discretion whether or not to exercise this power. Hence, it produced standards for justiciability.
Tañada vs. Cuenco Facts:
There were only two parties in the Senate, namely Nacionalista Party and Citizens Party and the minority party (Citizens Party) has only one seat in it, filled in by Tañada. The Constitution provides that the Senate Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of three members nominated by the party with the largest number of votes in the Senate and another three members nominated by the party with the second largest number. Tañada, after
#" nominating himself, refused to nominate two more Senators so the said slots
were filled in by two more members of the Nacionalista Party. Ruling:
To those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure.
C. Acts of government must conform to the norms of the Constitution The concept of the Constitution as the fundamental law, setting forth the criterion for the validity of any public act whether proceeding from the highest official or the lowest functionary, is a postulate of our system of government. The three branches of government, in the discharge of their functions, have no choice but to yield obedience to the commands of the highest law of the land. Sovereignty belongs to the people and the Constitution is a written instrument through which the people entrust to government a measure of its own sovereignty and no more. What is thus entrusted to the government is limited power. Hence every act of government must conform to the terms of empowerment set by the Constitution.
Mutuc vs. COMELEC Facts:
Mutuc is a candidate for the Constitutional Convention called during the second Marcos term. COMELEC approved his candidacy but prohibited him from using jingles in his campaign. Mutuc contended that the prohibition was a violation of his right to free speech.
Ruling:
As a branch of the executive department, although independent of the President, to which the Constitution has given the exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections, the power of decision of the COMELEC is limited to purely administrative questions. The COMELEC cannot exercise any authority in
conflict with or outside the law, and there is no higher law than the Constitution.
Osmeña vs. COMELEC Facts:
Osmeña assails the constitutionality of RA 7056, “An Act Providing for the National and Local Elections on 1992, Pave Way for Synchronized and Simultaneous Elections Beginning 1995”.
Ruling:
RA 7056 was declared unconstitutional because it violated several provisions of the Constitution, especially the provision on synchronization of elections. The mere absence of a provision in the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the holding of separate elections does not mean that the Constitution did not intend the holding of simultaneous or synchronized elections. Moreover, the legislature cannot extend the term of officers since it is clearly not mandated by the Constitution.
D. Constitutional Construction
The primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may also be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly by the explanation offered by the framers.
Nitafan vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue Facts:
Judges seek to prohibit the Commissioner of Internal Revenue from making any deduction of withholding taxes from their salaries. They submit that any tax withheld from their compensation as judicial officers constitutes a decrease of diminution of their salaries, contrary to the provisions of Art. VIII, Sec.10 of the 1987 Constitution.
$" The court accorded due respect to the intent of the people, through the
discussions and deliberations of their representatives, in the spirit that all citizens should bear their part of the cost of maintaining the government and should share the burden of general income tax equitably. The framers of the Constitution, as the alter ego of the people, have expressed in unmistakable terms the meaning and import of Art. VIII, Sec. 10 of the Constitution, which says that members of the judiciary are NOT exempt from paying income taxes.
THE 1987 CONSTITUTION II. The 1987 Constitution A. The Provisional Constitution
In virtue of Proclamation No. 1 of the Batasang Pambansa issued on February 25, 1986, Mr. Marcos was sworn in by Chief Justice Ramon Aquino at Malacañang. However, in defiance of the 1973 Constitution and without the sanction of the Batasang Pambansa, Corazon Aquino was proclaimed first woman President of the Republic of the Philippines. Aquino turned her back from the 1973 Constitution whose officials
(members of the Batasan), had denied her the presidency and chose instead to govern under a provisional constitution by virtue of Proclamation No. 3, also known as the “Freedom Constitution”. Article 4 of the Freedom Constitution provided for the adoption of a new constitution, which paved way for the creation of the 1987 Constitution.
Lawyers’ League for a Better Philippines vs. Pres. Aquino Facts:
Petitioners alleged that the Aquino gov’t is illegal because it was not established pursuant to the 1973 Constitution.
Ruling:
The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter since it belongs to the realm of politics where only the people of the Philippines are
the judge. The Aquino government is not merely a de facto but it is in fact and law a de jure government
In Re: Saturnino Bermudez Facts:
A lawyer questions Article 18 of proposed 1986 Constitution regarding who the provision refers to when it says President and Vice President. The court dismisses it outright for lack of jurisdiction and a cause of action.
Ruling:
Petitioner's allegation of ambiguity or vagueness of the aforequoted provision is manifestly gratuitous, it being a matter of public record and common public knowledge that the Constitutional Commission refers therein to incumbent President Corazon C. Aquino and Vice-President Salvador H. Laurel, and to no other persons.
Philippine Bar Association vs. COMELEC Facts:
Petitioners assail the validity of BP Blg. 883 which calls for a snap election for the positions of President and Vice President. They filed a petition to prohibit the enforcement of the BP on the basis of its unconstitutionality. Ruling:
Petition was dismissed since there are less than the required ten (10) votes to declare BP Blg. 883 unconstitutional. The issue of whether or not incumbent President Marcos should be allowed to run has turned into a political
question, which can be truly decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity at the scheduled election. Since it is a political question, it is outside the ambit of the courts. The Court cannot stand in the way of letting the people decide through their ballot, either to the give the incumbent president a new mandate or elect a new president.
B. Adoption and Effectivity of the 1987 Constitution Provisional Constitution, Art. V: ADOPTION OF A NEW CONSTITUTION
%" S1. Within sixty (60) days from date of this Proclamation, a Commission
shall be appointed by the President to draft a New Constitution. The Commission shall be composed of not less than thirty (30) nor more than fifty (50) natural born citizens of the Philippines, of recognized probity, known for their independence, nationalism and patriotism. They shall be chosen by the President after consultation with various sectors of society.
S2. The Commission shall complete its work within as short a period as may be consistent with the need both to hasten the return of normal constitutional government and to draft a document truly reflective of the ideals and aspirations of the Filipino people.
S3. The Commission shall conduct public hearings to ensure that the people will have adequate participation in the formulation of the New Constitution. S4. The plenary sessions of the Commission shall be public and fully recorded.
S5. The New Constitution shall be presented by the Commission to the President who shall fix the date for the holding of a plebiscite. It shall become valid and effective upon ratification by a majority of the votes cast in such plebiscite which shall be held within a period of sixty (60) days following its submission to the President.
1987 Const., Art. XVIII, S27: This Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held for the purpose and shall supersede all previous Constitutions.
Proclamation No. 58 (Proclaiming the ratification of the 1987 Constitution): “xxx that the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines adopted by the Constitutional Commission of 1986, including the Ordinance appended thereto, has been duly ratified by the Filipino people and is therefore effective and in full force and effect.”
De Leon v. Esguerra (1987)
Facts: During 1982 Barangay elections, petitioners were elected Brgy Capt and Brgy Councilmen respectively under BP 222 (Brgy Election Act of 1982). Memoranda signed Feb 8, 1987 by respondent OIC Gov Esguerra designated other people for said positions. Petitioners wanted these Memos nullified as S3/BP222 states that their terms of office "shall be six (6) years which shall commence on June 7, 1982 and shall continue until their
successors shall have elected and shall have qualified," or up to June 7, 1988. Also, petitioners contend that with CON87 ratification, respondent OIC Gov. no longer has the authority to replace them and to designate their
successors.
A3/S2/PROVCON, promulgated Mar 25, 1986: All elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973 Constitution shall continue in office until otherwise provided by proclamation or executive order or upon the designation or appointment and qualification of their successors, if such appointment is made within a period of one year from February 25,1986. (NOTE: this ends Feb. 25, 1987).
Ruling: Was the designation of respondents validly made (during the one-year period which ended on February 25, 1987 pursuant
toA3/S2/PROVCON)? NO. While Feb. 8, 1987 is still within the one-year deadline pursuant to PROVCON, PROVCON must be deemed overtaken by A18/S27/CON87. CON87 overtook PROVCON when former was ratified in a plebiscite Feb. 2, 1987.
Dissent (J. Sarmiento): For him, CON87 is made effective Feb. 11, 1987 and not Feb. 2, 1987. Quoting that A18/S27/CON87 says that CON87 “shall take effect immediately upon its ratification xxx” he argues CON87 “takes effect on the date its ratification shall have been ascertained [as in Proclamation 58], and not at the time the people cast their votes… the will of the people as of that time, had not, and could not have been, vet determined.XXX”. III. Popular Sovereignty and Constituent Power
A. Popular sovereignty and its collective powers 1. Constituent power
&" ARTICLE V: SUFFRAGE (A5 has only two sections)
Section 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen years of age, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one year, and in the place wherein they propose to vote, for at least six months immediately preceding the election. No literacy, property, or other substantive requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of suffrage.
Section 2. The Congress shall provide a system for securing the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot as well as a system for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad.
The Congress shall also design a procedure for the disabled and the illiterates to vote without the assistance of other persons. Until then, they shall be allowed to vote under existing laws and such rules as the Commission on Elections may promulgate to protect the secrecy of the ballot.
Bernas notes on A5/CON87 Suffrage as right and duty
• Concept of suffrage (right to vote) started as a statutory right and evolved into a CON right. In the CON73, it took the form of an obligation. The obligation has been removed by the CON87. 3. Legislative power through Initiative and referendum A6 (The Legislative Department)/S1/CON87:
Section 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and referendum.
A6/S32/CON87: Section 32. The Congress shall, as early as possible, provide for a system of initiative and referendum, and the exceptions therefrom, whereby the people can directly propose and enact laws or approve or reject any act or law or part thereof passed by the Congress or local legislative body after the registration of a petition therefor signed by at
least ten per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters thereof.
Bernas notes on A6 (The Legislative Department)/S32/CON87: Initiative and Referendum
• Current implementing law is RA6735, some of the details of which are:
Sec. 5. Requirements. — (a) To exercise the power of initiative or referendum, at least ten per centum (10%) of the total number of the registered voters, of which every legislative district is represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters thereof, shall sign a petition for the purpose and register the same with the Commission.
xxx
(c) The petition shall state the following:
c.1. contents or text of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed, as the case may be; c.2. the proposition;
c.3. the reason or reasons therefor;
c.4. that it is not one of the exceptions provided herein; c.5. signatures of the petitioners or registered voters; and
c.6. an abstract or summary in not more than one hundred (100) words which shall be legibly written or printed at the top of every page of the petition.
xxx
Sec. 6. Special Registration. — The Commission on Election shall set a special registration day at least three (3) weeks before a scheduled initiative or referendum.
Sec. 7. Verification of Signatures. — The Election Registrar shall verify the signatures on the basis of the registry list of voters, voters' affidavits and voters identification cards used in the immediately preceding election.
II
'" Sec. 8. Conduct and Date of Initiative or Referendum. — The Commission
shall call and supervise the conduct of initiative or referendum.
Within a period of thirty (30) days from receipt of the petition, the Commission shall, upon determining the sufficiency of the petition, publish the same in Filipino and English at least twice in newspapers of general and local circulation and set the date of the initiative or referendum which shall not be earlier than forty-five (45) days but not later than ninety (90) days from the determination by the Commission of the sufficiency of the petition. Sec. 9. Effectivity of Initiative or Referendum Proposition. — (a) The Proposition of the enactment, approval, amendment or rejection of a national law shall be submitted to and approved by a majority of the votes cast by all the registered voters of the Philippines.
If, as certified by the Commission, the proposition to reject a national law is approved by a majority of the votes cast, the said national law shall be deemed repealed and the repeal shall become effective fifteen (15) days following the completion of publication of the proposition and the certification by the Commission in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines.
However, if the majority vote is not obtained, the national law sought to be rejected or amended shall remain in full force and effect.
xxx
(c) A national or local initiative proposition approved by majority of the votes cast in an election called for the purpose shall become effective fifteen (15) days after certification and proclamation by the Commission.
Sec. 10. Prohibited Measures. — The following cannot be the subject of an initiative or referendum petition:
(a) No petition embracing more than one (1) subject shall be submitted to the electorate; and
(b) Statutes involving emergency measures, the enactment of which are specifically vested in Congress by the Constitution, cannot be subject to referendum until ninety (90) days after its effectivity.
4. Power of Recall
A9C(Constitutional Commissions; The COMELEC)/S2(1)/CON87: Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:
(1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall. Bernas notes on COMELEC:
Nature of the powers of the COMELEC
• Like the CSC, COMELEC is an administrative agency. As such, its powers are executive, quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative.
• Extensive administrative powers must be deemed possessed also by the COMELEC under the CON87 because of the broad language of S2(1) and S2(3). S2(3) grants power to “decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting elections,
including determination of the number and location of polling places, appointment of election officials and inspectors, and registration of voters.”
B. Amending of Revisionary Process 1. In general
Del Rosario v. COMELEC (1970)
(http://www.scribd.com/doc/4664395/Judicial-ReviewPop-Sovereignty-Constituent-Pow)
Facts: Simeon G. Del Rosario assails the constitutionality of RA 6132 (CONCON Act of 1970). He is temporary staff writer of Weekly Nation Magazine, and a permanent int’l Research Officer of SEA Treaty
Organization. He is on home leave and is waiting to be reinstated to his post in Bangkok by DFA.
(" He assails S5 and 8 of said law because they are oppressive. S5/RA6132
disqualifies a person elected as CONCON delegate from running for any public office in any election or to assume any appointive office or position in Govt until after final adjournment of CONCON. S8(a): “No candidate for delegate to the Convention shall represent or allow himself to be represented as being a candidate of any political party or any other organization, and no political party, political group, political committee, civic, religious, professional, or other organization xxx shall intervene in the nomination of any such candidate or in the filing of his certificate of
candidacy or give aid or support, directly or indirectly, material or otherwise, favorable to or against his campaign for election xxx”. He assails S21/RA6132 which involves appropriation of P29M for CONCON as such amount is a waste of money because CONCON has no time limit for its duration. His petition is recognized by virtue of his claim that he is a taxpayer and as such, he has an interest in the appropriation. Ruling: Is RA 6132 constitutional? Yes. One, Del Rosario failed to prove that he has rights which will be impaired if the law is enacted. Another, Congress can sit as a constituent body to propose amendments to the CON. Whether to amend it or not and the means for amending it are issues beyond Court jurisdiction. People will ratify CON and decide if only parts of it will be changed or it will be entirely overhauled. Thirdly, validity of questioned provisions has been upheld in previous Court decisions.
Imbong v. COMELEC (1970) (4664395)
Facts: Manuel Imbong and Raul Gonzales, both members of the Bar, assail the constitutionality of S19/RA 6132 because it prejudices their rights as interested candidates for delegates to CONCON.
S2: Apportionment of delegates. CONCON should be composed of 320 delegates apportioned among the existing representative districts according to the number of their respective inhabitants. Provided, each district is entitled to at least two delegates.
S4: All public officers and employees are considered resigned upon filing certificates of candidacy.
S5: Any elected delegate is disqualified from running for any public office while CONCON is ongoing.
S8: Political parties or other organizations prohibited from helping CONCON delegates during campaign period.
Ruling: Is RA 6132 valid? Yes.
1. S4 is valid in accordance with CON prohibition on public
employees/officials running for election. It does not deny them of due process or equal protection.
2. RA 6132 was enacted in Congress’ capacity as a legislative body exercising its broad lawmaking authority. They can grant powers and fix the qualifications and other requirements needed such as in the case of the CONCON delegates.
3. Congress has right to apportion the number of delegates per district. They can limit it if there are economic restraints. In this case, they were correct in using the preliminary population census taken by the Bureau of Census & Statistics. This method is fair. Though only provisional, it is still credible. We can’t really effect an absolutely proportional representation.
4. S5 does not deprive petitioners of their rights to due process and equal protection as provision merely protects institution by making sure that delegate will not take advantage of his position. This is similar to Consti prohibition. All people in the same class are subjected to the same law thus there is equal protection of law. 5. S8 prohibits material, moral, emotional assistance/support from
political parties or civic associations. Created to prevent clear and present danger of debasement of electoral process. Process has to be cleaned. This provides everyone an equal opportunity to take part in the electoral process. Although support of candidate is not a wrong in itself, law can make it mala prohibita.
Santiago v. COMELEC (1997) Facts:
1. In 1996, Atty. Jesus Delfin filed with COMELEC a petition to amend CON, to lift term limits of elective officials, by people’s initiative (PI). Delfin wanted COMELEC to control and supervise said PI the signature-gathering all over the country.
2. The proposition is: “Do you approve of lifting the term limits of all elective government officials, amending for the purpose Sections 4
)" and 7 of Article VI, Section 4 of Article VII, and Section 8 of Article
8 of Article X of the 1987 Philippine Constitution?” Said Petition for Initiative will first be submitted to the people, and after it is signed by at least 12% total number of registered voters in the country, it will be formally filed with the COMELEC.
3. COMELEC in turn ordered Delfin for publication of the petition. 4. Petitioners Sen. Roco et al moved for dismissal of the Delfin Petition
on the ground that it is not the initiatory petition properly cognizable by the COMELEC.
a. CON provision on PI to amend CON can only be
implemented by law to be passed by Congress. No such law has been passed.
b. RA 6735 provides for 3 systems on initiative but failed to provide any subtitle on initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative. This deliberate omission indicates matter of PI was left to some future law.
c. COMELEC has no power to provide rules and regulations for the exercise of PI. Only Congress is authorized by CON to pass the implementing law.
d. PI is limited to amendments to CON, not to revision thereof. Extending or lifting of term limits constitutes a revision. e. Congress nor any govt agency has not yet appropriated funds
for PI.
5. Respondents argue that
1. RA 6735 is the enabling law implementing PI. S9(b)/RA 6735 specifically provides that the proposition in an initiative to amend the Constitution approved by the majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite shall become effective as of the day of the plebiscite.
2. COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 pursuant to RA 6735 was upheld by the SC
3. The lifting of the limitation on the term of office of elective officials provided under the 1987 Constitution is not a “revision” of the Constitution, it is only an amendment. 4. The claim that COMELEC Resolution 2300 is ultra vires is
contradicted by (a) Section 2, ART IX-C of the Constitution and (b) Section 20 of RA 6735 which empowers the
COMELEC to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of the Act.
Ruling:
1. RA6735 was intended to include or cover PI on amendments to CON but, as worded, it does not adequately cover such intiative.
A17/S2/CON87 providing for amendments to CON, is not self-executory. While CON has recognized or granted the right of the people to directly propose amendments to CON via PI, the people cannot exercise it if Congress, for whatever reason, does not provide for its implementation.
a. 1st, contrary to the assertion of COMELEC, Sec 2 of the Act
does not suggest an initiative on amendments to the Constitution. The inclusion of the word “Constitution” therein was a delayed afterthought. The word is not relevant to the section which is silent as to amendments of the Constitution.
b. 2nd, unlike in the case of the other systems of initiative, the
Act does not provide for the contents of a petition for initiative on the Constitution. Sec 5(c) does not include the provisions of the Constitution sought to be amended, in the case of initiative on the Constitution.
c. 3rd, no subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution.
This conspicuous silence as to the latter simply means that the main thrust of the Act is initiative and referendum on national and local laws. The argument that the initiative on amendments to the Constitution is not accepted to be subsumed under the subtitle on National Initiative and Referendum because it is national in scope. Under Subtitle II and III, the classification is not based on the scope of the initiative involved, but on its nature and character.
National initiative – what is proposed to be enacted is a national law, or a law which only Congress can pass.
Local initiative – what is proposed to be adopted or enacted is a law, ordinance or resolution which only legislative bodies of the governments of the autonomous regions,
*" provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays
can pass.
2. Potestas delegata non delegari potest. What has been delegated, cannot be delegated. The recognized exceptions to the rule are: [1] Delegation of tariff powers to the President; [2] Delegation of emergency powers to the President; [3] Delegation to the people at large; [4] Delegation to local governments; and [5] Delegation to administrative bodies.
3. Empowering the COMELEC, an administrative body exercising quasi-judicial functions, to promulgate rules and regulations is a form of delegation of legislative authority. In every case of permissible
delegation, there must be a showing that the delegation itself is valid. It is valid only if the law (a) is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate; and (b) fixes a standard – the limits of which are sufficiently determinate and determinable – to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. RA 6735 failed to satisfy both
requirements in subordinate legislation. The delegation of the power to the COMELEC is then invalid.
4. COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300, INSOFAR AS IT
PRESCRIBES RULES AND REGULATIONS ON THE CONDUCT OF INITIATIVE ON AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION, IS VOID. COMELEC cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to implement the exercise of the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of initiative. It does not have that power under RA6735.
5. Whether the COMELEC can take cognizance of, or has jurisdiction over, a petition solely intended to obtain an order: (a) fixing the time and dates for signature gathering; (b) instructing municipal election officers to assist Delfin’s movement and volunteers in establishing signature stations; and (c) directing or causing the publication of the unsigned proposed Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution. COMELEC ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ENTERTAINING THE DELFIN PETITION. Even if it be conceded ex gratia that RA 6735 is a full compliance with the power of Congress to implement the right to initiate constitutional amendments, or that it has validly vested upon the COMELEC the power of subordinate legislation and that
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is valid, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in entertaining the Delfin Petition.
The Delfin Petition does not contain signatures of the required number of voters. Without the required signatures, the petition cannot be deemed validly initiated. The COMELEC requires jurisdiction over a petition for initiative only after its filing. The petition then is the initiatory pleading. Nothing before its filing is cognizable by the COMELEC, sitting en banc.
Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory petition under RA6735 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, it cannot be entertained or given cognizance of by the COMELEC. The petition was merely entered as UND, meaning undocketed. It was nothing more than a mere scrap of paper, which should not have been dignified by the Order of 6 December 1996, the hearing on 12 December 1996, and the order directing Delfin and the oppositors to file their memoranda to file their memoranda or oppositions. In so dignifying it, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and merely wasted its time, energy, and resources.
RA 6735 (Initiative and Referendum Law) as worded did not apply to constitutional amendment.
2. Proposals
a. By Congress and Constituent Assembly Almario v. Alba (1984) (Source: Diane Sayo digest)
Facts: BP 643 provides for a plebiscite on 27 Jan 1984 to either approve or reject CON amendments proposed by BP Res. 104, 105, 1120, 112 and 113. There are four separate questions answerable by YES or NO. Question No. 3 proposed by BP 105, provides that grant shall be an additional mode for the acquisition of lands, as part of A14/S11/CON73. Q4 proposed by BP 113 provides that a paragraph will be included in A14/S12/CON73 saying the state will undertake an urban land reform and social housing program
!+" wherein reasonable opportunities to acquire land and decent housing will be
made available, consistent with A14/S2/CON73. Petitioners: there has been no fair and proper submission to the people prior plebiscite. They ask for more time for the people to study meaning and implications of Res. 105 and 113.
Ruling: Petition dismissed for lack of enough grounds to postpone plebiscite. On the issue of voter’s awareness of the wisdom, desirability or danger of an abuse that may come about with Res. 105 and 113, though the “grant” as a form of acquiring land may mean either “homestead” or “free patents” or just plain giving away of land, petitioners failed to show voter’s lack of
discretion. Also, the Filipino people have long been aware of urban land reform and social housing, anyway. The wisdom of the proposed amendment is beyond court jurisdiction.
COMELEC and civic organizations including the IBP have been doing info-dissemination, that the petitioner’s request for 67 days (for Res. 105) and 42 days (for Res. 113) before ratification is too much. Also given, CON35 was ratified only after 36 days upon approval of Act No. 4200.
Dissents:
Teehankee, J.: Qs 3 and 4 do present a problem. They are unnecessary and redundant to the CON, since these are already encompassed in the “social justice and equity” responsibility of the government as provided by the CON. Also, there has been no ample time for the info-dissemination on the
implications of Q3; this is proven by the fact that even the judiciary is doubting its significance and consider it as unnecessary.
Abad Santos, J.: Populace is not yet fully prepared to decide on Qs 3 and 4. Best that plebiscite for these questions be held on a separate date.
Melencio-Herrera, J.: Number of days to which a proposed CON amendment is to be submitted in a plebiscite is within the power of the Batasan, and will depend on the date of publication of the Batas Pambansa on the Official Gazette.
Relova, J.: The people, especially those from the provinces, are not yet fully informed of the implications of Qs 3 and 4. In fact, the proposed
amendments have been translated only in Tagalog and Cebuano. The voter needs ample basis for an intelligent appraisal on the matter. (Note: the decision was given only two days before the plebiscite.)
Mabanag v. Lopez Vito (1947) -Adapt Facts:
A Resolution was passed Sep 18, 1946 proposing CON amendment. At the time this resolution was adopted, Senate was composed of 24 Senators. House of Reps, 98 members, minus two who resigned (Note: This is the petitioners claim). Sixteen (16) Sens. voted in favor of Reso and 5 against it; 68 Reps in favor, 18 against. Thereafter, Congress passed RA 73 calling a plebiscite to submit to the people the proposed amendment.
Petitioners assailed constitutionality of RA 73. They argue Congress may not by said act submit to the people proposed CON amendment embodied in the resolution, as Congress did not comply with CON provision requiring affirmative votes of ! members of Senate and of HOR, voting separately (18 in Senate and 72 in HOR).
Respondents denied Senate is composed of 24 Senators by excluding Jose Vera, Ramon Diokno and Jose Romero since the three suspended on account of alleged irregularities in their election. They also alleged HOR is
composed of only 90 and not 96. There was also a Reso for the suspension of the eight Reps for the same reason.
Ruling: Question involving a proposal which leads to ratification of a CON amendment shall be a political question. In Coleman v. Miller: the efficacy of ratification by state legislature of a proposed amendment to the Federal CON is a political question and hence not justiciable. If ratification of an amendment is a political question, a proposal which leads to ratification has to be a political question as well. Mr. Justice Black, in his concurring opinion in Coleman v. Miller: “Whether submission, intervening procedure or Congressional determination of ratification conforms to the commands of the Constitution, call for decisions by a political department of questions of a type which this Court has frequently designated as political”.
!!" A duly authenticated bill or resolution imports absolute verity and is binding
on the courts (Enrolled Bill Rule). In the case of Acts of the Phil
Commission of the Phil Legislature, when there is an existence of a copy signed by the presiding officers and secretaries of said bodies, it shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Act and of the due enactment thereof (S313/old Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2210). Note from Source: facts stated here are from the dissenting opinion, the majority opinion did not state all the facts.
Occena v. Commission (1981) – Source: The other aside from Berne Guerrero digest
Facts: Petitioners Samuel Occeña and Ramon Gonzales, lawyers and former delegates to 1971 CONCON sue as taxpayers. The suit against validity of three Batasang Pambansa Resolutions proposing CON amendments was filed on March 6, 1981. Petitions assert that CON73 is not the fundamental law, the Javellana ruling to the contrary notwithstanding.
Ruling: Petitions are dismissed for lack of merit. Has the CON73 force and applicability when the Batasang Pambansa resolutions were promulgated? YES. In Javellana v. Exec. Sec., dismissing petitions for prohibition and mandamus to declare invalid CON73 ratification, the SC concluded, “This being the vote of the majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force and effect.” It made manifest that as of January 17, 1983, the 1973 Constitution came into force and effect. With the cardinal postulate that what the SC says is entitled to respect and
obedience, a factor for instability was removed. CON73 is the time’s fundamental law.
Is the Interim Batasang Pambansa authorized to meet as a constituent body and propose CON amendments? CON73 Transitory Provisions vested the Interim National Assembly with the power to propose amendments upon special call by the Prime Minister by a vote of the majority of its members to be ratified in accordance with the Article on Amendments. When, therefore, the Interim Batasang Pambansa, upon the call of the President and Prime Minister Ferdinand Marcos, met as a constituent body, it acted by virtue of
such competence. It could and did propose the amendments embodied in the resolutions now being assailed. It is to be observed parenthetically that as far as petitioner Occeña is concerned, the question of the authority of the Interim Batasang Pambansa to propose amendments is not new.
Dissent: Teehankee, J. The CON has withheld from the President the power to propose CON amendments. Such power must come from the Interim National Assembly.
Gonzales v. COMELEC (1967)
Facts:
1. NATURE: Original Action in the Supreme Court. Prohibition with preliminary injunction:
a. to restrain (a) the COMELEC from enforcing Republic Act No. 4913, (b) the Director of Printing from printing the ballots pursuant to said Act and Resolutions, and (c) the Auditor General form passing in audit any disbursement from the appropriation of funds made in the said Act; and b. to declare said the Act as unconstitutional and void. 2. On 16 March 1967, Senate and HOR passed the following
resolutions:
a. R.B.H. (Resolution of Both Houses) No.1, proposing to amend Art. VI Sec. 5 of the Constitution of the Philippines, so as to increase the membership of the House of
Representatives from a maximum of 120, as provided in the Constitution, to a maximum of 180, to be apportioned among the several provinces as nearly as may be according to the number of their respective inhabitants, but each province was to have at least one member;
b. R.B.H. No. 2, calling a convention to propose amendments to the Constitution, the convention to be composed of two delegates from each representative district, to be elected in the general elections to be held on the second Tuesday of November, 1971;and
c. R.B.H. No. 3, proposing to amend Art. VI Sec. 16 of the same Constitution as to authorize Senators and the members
!#" of the House of Representatives to become delegates to the
aforementioned constitutional convention, without forfeiting their respective seats in Congress.
3. On 17 June 1967, the Congress passed a bill, which upon approval by the President, became Republic Act No. 4913, providing that the amendments to the Constitution proposed in the aforementioned Resolutions Nos. 1 and 3, be submitted for approval by the people, at the General Elections which shall be held on 14 November 1967. 4. On 21 October 1967, Petition L-28196 was filed; Petitioner
Gonzales, citizen, taxpayer and voter, claims to have instituted the aforementioned case as a class unit, for and in behalf of all citizens, taxpayers and voters similarly situated.
5. On October 31 1967, PHILCONSA filed a petition for review by certiorari for a resolution by COMELEC in a substantially identical case. It is a duly organized corporation and a civic and non-profit organization which aims to uphold the constitution of the
Philippines.
6. Senator Arturo Tolentino who opposed the earlier petition of PHILCONSA before the COMELEC was allowed to appear before the Court and objected on the following grounds:
a. The court has no jurisdiction over the case. b. The petition, if granted, would render Congress
inoperational.
c. The failure of Congress to enact a valid reapportionment law does not render it illegal and its subsequent acts null and void.
Ruling:
1. The issue whether or not a resolution of Congress, acting as a constituent assembly, violates the constitution is essentially a justiciable and not a political question.
a. The power to amend or propose amendments to the
constitution is not included in the general grant of legislative power to Congress, but is a part of the inherent powers of the people to make and amend their fundamental law.
b. Congress may therefore propose amendments merely because the constitution grants it the power to do so. When
exercising this power, Senators and members of the House do not act as members of Congress, but as elements of a constituent assembly that derive their authority from the constitution.
c. Since Congress derives its authority from the constitution when sitting as a constituent assembly, it does not have a final say on whether or not it is acting within or beyond its constitutional limits.
d. Therefore, the acts of Congress, when sitting as a constituent assembly, are subject to judicial review. In so far as this ruling is inconsistent with the stand taken in Mabanag vs Lopez Vito, the latter is deemed modified.
2. WON the Congress of the Philippines was a de facto Congress, and consequently, WON Congress did not have the authority to pass Resolution Nos. 1, 2, and 3 and RA 4913. NO. The failure of Congress to make a valid reapportionment does not render it illegal and its acts unconstitutional.
a. Congress actually passed a reapportionment bill within three years after the 1960 census but the same was declared unconstitutional because the apportionment taken therein was not made according to the number of inhabitants of the different provinces of the country.
b. The fact that Congress failed to enact a valid
reapportionment bill, however, does not render it illegal because the constitution provides that “until such apportionment shall have been made, the House of
Representatives shall have the same number of Members as that by fixed by law for the National Assembly, who shall be elected by the qualified electors from the present assembly districts”.
c. Since the constitution itself provides for the continuance of the existing districts in case Congress fails to make a valid reapportionment, , the status quo is therefore rendered legal and de jure.
3. WON amendments to the constitution can be submitted to the people for ratification in a general election instead of a special election. YES. The term “election” in Article XV of the 1935 Constitution refers to a “general” and not a “special” election.
!$" a. Article XV Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution reads: “The
Congress in joint session assembled, by a vote of three-fourths of all the members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives voting separately, may propose amendments to this Constitution or call a convention for that purpose. Such amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election which the amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification.” There is nothing in the said provision to indicate that the election therein referred to is a “special”, not a “general”, election.
b. The circumstance that the previous amendments were ratified in special elections merely indicate that Congress deemed it best to do so under the circumstances then obtaining, but does not negate its authority to propose amendments for ratification in a general election. 4. WON the submission of the proposed amendments to the people
violates the due process clause in the Constitution. NO. The term “due process” in Article I refers only to the provision of fair
opportunity but does not guarantee that the opportunity given will in fact be availed of. As long as fair and reasonable opportunity is given, the due process clause is not infringed.
a. Article 1 Section 1 (1) of the 1935 Constitution reads: “No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.” “Due process” in this provision refers only to providing fair opportunity. It does not guarantee that the opportunity given will in fact be availed of; that is the look-out of the voter and the responsibility of the citizen. As long as fair and reasonable opportunity is given, the due process clause is not infringed.
b. The following provisions of the assailed RA 4913 provide for a reasonable and fair opportunity for voters to cast an intelligent vote on the proposed amendments of Congress:
i. the publication of the proposed amendments in the Official Gazette at least 20 days before the election;
ii. the posting of notices in public buildings not later than 14 October 1967, to remain posted until after the elections;
iii. the placing of copies of the proposed amendments in the polling places;
iv. the provision by the COMELEC of copies of the same in English, Spanish, and whenever practicable, in the native languages, for free distribution; and v. the printing of the proposed amendments at the back
of the ballots.
c. The above provisions of RA 4913 also satisfy the
constitutional requirement in Article XV Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution that the proposed amendments be “submitted to the people for ratification”.
DISPOSITION: Six (6) members of the court believed that Resolution Nos. 1, 2, and 3 were constitutional and valid while only three (3) members believed that they violate the spirit of the constitution. With the number of votes in favor of declaring the assailed resolutions and republic act as unconstitutional being short of the required eight (8) votes, the petition is dismissed and the writs therein prayed for are denied.
b. By Constitutional Convention Tan v. Macapagal (1972)
Facts: October 6, 1971: Eugene Tan (Roxas City), Silvestre Acejas (Romblon), and Rogelio Fernandez (Davao City) as taxpayers submitted petition assailing validity of the Laurel-Leido Resolution (Res. 2127 of the Constitutional Convention). They claim that 1971 CONCON is without power under A15/S1/CON35 and RA 6132 to consider, discuss and adopt proposals which seek to revise CON35 through the adoption of another form of government. SC dismissed petition after which an MR is submitted. Ruling: Do the petitioners have the requisite standing to seek declaration of nullity of a resolution of the CONCON (Justiciability of the case)? NO. MR is denied. The Court shall exercise its power of judicial review only when the petitioners have requisite standing and the issue is ripe for adjudication.
!%" The person who assails validity of a statute must have a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement. This rule has been relaxed though where many decisions nullified, at the instance of taxpayers, laws providing for the disbursement of public funds. This nullification is based upon the theory that expenditure of public funds by an officer of the State for the purpose of administering an unconstitutional act constitutes misapplication of such funds which may be enjoined by the taxpayers. Moreover, where a constitutional question is raised, a Senator has usually been considered to possess of the requisite personality to bring a suit. Petitioners in the present case do not assert that they qualify under such categories.
The doctrine of separation of powers calls for the other departments being left alone to discharge their duties as they see fit. It is a prerequisite that something had been accomplished or performed by the executive or
legislative branch before a court may come into the picture. As long as any proposed amendment is still unacted on by it, there is no room for the interposition of judicial oversight. Only after the 1971 CONCON has made concrete what it intends to submit for ratification may the appropriate case be instituted.
c. By People’s Initiative Lambino v. COMELEC (2006) Facts:
1. Feb 15, 2006: Sigaw ng Bayan, in coordination with Union of Local authorities of the Phils (ULAP) embarked on a nationwide drive to gather the signatures to support the move to adopt the parliamentary form of government in the country through CHACHA. They proposed these changes:
a) S1,2,3,4,5,6,7/A6 b) S 1,2,3 and 4/A7
c) For the purpose of insuring an orderly transition from the bicameral- presidential to a unicameral-parliamentary form of government there shall be a new article XVIII entitled “Transitory Provisions”
2. Sigaw ng Bayan prepared signature sheets on the upper portions of which were written the abstract of the proposed amendments. Signature sheets were distributed nationwide to affiliated NGOs and volunteers and to local officials. Drafts of petition for initiative containing the propositions were also circulated to the local officials and multi-sectoral groups.
3. Alleged Sigaw ng Bayan held Barangay assemblies prior to inform people and explain the proposed amendments – then circulated signature sheets. Sig sheets were then submitted to local election officers for verification based on voter’s registration records. The respective local election officers issued certifications to attest the signature sheets have been verified. Verified signature sheets were then transmitted to the office of Sigaw ng Bayan for counting of signatures.
4. Aug 25, 2006: herein petitioners Raul Lambino and Erico
Aumentado filed with COMELEC a Petition for Initiative to Amend the Constitution entitled “In the Matter of Proposing Amendments to the 1987 Constitution through people’s initiative: A shift from bicameral presidential to unicameral parliamentary government…” They filed an amended petition to reflect the text of the proposed amendment that was actually presented to the people.
5. Petitioners prayed that Comelec issue an order:
a) Finding the petition to be sufficient pursuant to A17/S4/CON87
b) Directing the publication of the petition
c) Calling a plebiscite to be held not earlier than 60 and not later than 90 days after certification of the sufficiency of the petition
6. Several groups filed with COMELEC respective oppositions to the petition for initiative. ONE VOICE, Inc. alleged that COMELEC denied due course to the petition for initiative, citing Santiago vs. COMELEC ruling which permanently enjoined COMELEC from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on CON amendments until a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to provide for the implementation of the system. 7. COMELEC denied the Lambino petition.
!&" 8. Petitioners filed petitioned that SC set aside the August resolution of
the COMELEC, direct COMLEC to comply with A17/S4/CON87 and set the date of the plebiscite.
9. Other oppositors-intervenors like IBP and the Senate submitted COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to the Lambino petition for initiative as it merely followed the Santiago ruling by virtue of stare decisis. The oppositors also argued that:
a. Proposed changes are actually revisions, not mere amendments.
b. Petition for initiative does not meet the required number of signatories under A17/S2/CON87.
c. It was not shown the people have been informed of the proposed amendments as there was disparity between the proposal presented to them and the proposed amendments attached to petition for initiative. If indeed there was, the verification process was done ex parte rendering dubious the signatures attached to the petition.
d. Petitioners Lambino and Aumentado have no legal capacity to represent the signatories in the petition for initiative. 10. SOLGEN filed comment affirming position of petitioners, praying
inter alia for declaration of adequacy and sufficiency of RA 6735. 11. COMELEC claims the permanent injunction issued by SC against COMELEC from taking cognizance of petitions for initiative on amendments until a valid law is passed (Santiago ruling) covers not only the Delfin petition but also all other petitions involving constitutional initiatives.
Ruling: Resolution of COMELEC reversed and set aside. Petition remanded to COMELEC for further proceedings.
1. Have the petitions for initiative filed before the COMELEC complied with A17/S2/CON87? Oppositors and intervenors claim lack of number of signatures and no proper verification of signatures. The sufficiency of the Petition for Initiative and its Compliance with requirements of RA 6735 should be resolved by the COMELEC as it is the body that is mandated by the constitution to administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall.
2. Does the Santiago ruling bar the present petitions? NO. Stare decisis should not bar the re-examination of Santiago declaring RA 6735 insufficient but without striking it down as unconstitutional. The doctrine of separation of powers forbids this court to invade the exclusive lawmaking domain of Congress for courts can construe laws but not construct them. The 6 justices who ruled that RA 6735 is insufficient—cannot waylay the will of 6.3 M people (signatories) who are the bearers of our sovereignty and from whom all government authority emanates.
3. Do the proposed changes constitute an amendment of revision of the CON? Oppositors-intervenors submit that the proposed changes effect major changes in the political structure and system, the fundamental powers and duties of the branches of government, the political tights of people and the modes by which political rights may be exercised, substantial amendments that cannot be done through PI. Only simple and not substantial amendments can be done through PI. The
quantitative test will say that PI will only affect 2 out of the 18 articles of the CON. Garner gave three major parts of CON: 1) constitution of liberty; 2) constitution of government and 3) constitution of
sovereignty. Proposed changes will basically affect only the
constitution of government. The proposed changes will not change the fundamental nature of the state as democratic and republican.
a. Amendment defined: a formal revision or addition proposed or made to a statute, constitution pleading, order or other instrument, specifically a change made by addition, deletion or correction. Revision defined: re-examination or careful review for correction or improvement; general and thorough rewriting of a governing document in which the entire document is open to amendment.
b. According to Vicente Singco: Amendment refers only to particular provisions to be added or to be altered in a CON. Revision refers to a consideration of the entire CON and the procedure for effecting such change.
c. Makasiar: Amending envisages a change of specific
!'" 4. Under the foregoing views, substantial amendments are still
amendments and thus can be proposed by the people via initiative. Cardinal rule in interpreting CON: construe them to give effect to the intention of the people who adopted it. Unlimited power to make laws (legal sovereignty) is possessor is the legal sovereign.
Separate Opinion:
Ynares-Santiago, J: On QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE TEST, qualitatively, the initiative petition if successful, will undoubtedly alter not only our basic governmental plan but also redefine our rights as citizens in relation to the government. It will strike at the very foundation of our basic constitutional plan and is thus an impermissible CON revision that may not be effected through a PI.
Dissenting Opinion:
Puno, J: Puno cites Santiago case stated that CON provision granting the people the power to directly amend the CON via PI is not self-executory and that enabling law is necessary to implement this right. RA 6735 was
examined (majority of 8 members of court) said law was incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions in so far as initiative on CON amendments is concerned.
Santiago v. COMELEC (supra)
d. By the President during Emergency Sanidad v. COMELEC (1976)
Facts: Sep 2, 1976, Pres. Marcos issued PD 991 calling for a national referendum on October 16, 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies ("barangays") to resolve, among other things, the issues of Martial Law, the National Assembly, its replacement, the powers of such replacement, the period of its existence, the length of the period for exercise by the President of his present powers.
Twenty days after, FM issued PD 1031, amending PD 991, by declaring the provisions of PD 229 providing for the manner of voting and canvass of votes in "barangays" (Citizens Assemblies) applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite of October 16, 1976. (Presidential Decree No. 1031 repealed Section 4, of Presidential Decree No. 991.)
Same date of September 22, 1976, FM issued PD 1033, stating the questions to be submitted to the people in the referendum-plebiscite on October 16, 1976. The Decree recites in its "whereas" clauses that the people's continued opposition to the convening of the National Assembly evince their desire to have such body abolished and replaced thru a constitutional amendment, providing for a legislative body, which will be submitted directly to the people in the referendum-plebiscite of October 16.
The COMELEC was vested with the exclusive supervision and control of the October 1976 National Referendum-Plebiscite.
September 27, 1976, PABLO SANIDAD and PABLITO SANIDAD sought to enjoin COMELEC from holding and conducting the Referendum
Plebiscite on October 16; to declare without force and effect PDs 991 and 1033, insofar as they propose amendments to the CON, as well as PDs 1031, insofar as it directs COMELEC to supervise, control, hold, and conduct the Referendum-Plebiscite scheduled October 16. Petitioners contend that under CON35 and CON73, there is no grant to the incumbent President to exercise the constituent power to propose amendments to the new CON, thus the Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16 has no CON basis.
Another action was instituted by VICENTE M. GUZMAN, 1971 CONCON delegate, asserting that the power to propose amendments to or revision of the CON during the transition period is expressly conferred on the interim National Assembly under A17/S16/CON73.
Ruling: Petitions dismissed.
The President possesses the power to propose CON amendments. The power to legislate is constitutionally consigned to the interim National Assembly during the transition period. However, the initial convening of that Assembly is a matter fully addressed to the judgment of the incumbent President. And, in the exercise of that judgment, the President opted to defer convening of that body in utter recognition of the people's preference. As early as the referendums of January 1973 and February 1975, the people had already rejected the calling of the interim National Assembly. Likewise, in the period of transition, the power to propose amendments to the CON lies in the interim National Assembly upon special call by the President (See. 15 of
!(" the Transitory Provisions). Again, harking to the dictates of the sovereign
will, the President decided not to call the interim National Assembly. Would it then be within the bounds of the CON for the President to assume that constituent power of the interim Assembly vis-à-vis his assumption of that body's legislative functions? YES. If the President has been legitimately discharging the legislative functions of the interim Assembly, there is no reason why he cannot validly discharge the function of that Assembly to propose CON amendments which is but an adjunct, although peculiar, to its gross legislative power. With the interim National Assembly not convened and only the Presidency and the Supreme Court in operation, the urges of absolute necessity render it imperative upon the President to act as agent for and in behalf of the people to propose CON amendments. Otherwise the objective of a crisis government "to end the crisis and restore normal times" will be impeded.
3. Submission of Proposed Amendments Planas v. COMELEC (1973)
Facts: Mar 16, 1967, Congress passed a Resolution calling a convention to propose CON amendments. Pursuant thereto, the election of delegates to the convention was held on Nov. 10, 1970. The convention began to perform its functions on June 1, 1971. While convention was in session, President Marcos issued Proc. No. 1081 placing the entire Philippines under Martial Law.
On Nov. 29, 1972 the convention approved its Proposed Constitution of the Philippines. On Nov. 30, 1972 the President issued PD 73 submitting the proposed constitution to the people for ratification or rejection, setting the plebiscite on Jan. 15, 1973.
The instant petitions were filed seeking to nullify PD 73 on the grounds that the powers exercised therein are lodged exclusively in Congress and that there was no proper submission of the proposed CON to the people for lack of time and lack of freedom of speech, press, and assembly.
Jan. 7, 1973 the President issued General Order 20 postponing scheduled plebiscite until further notice and suspending his previous order of Dec. 17,
1972 temporarily suspending the effects of Proc. No. 1081 for purposes of free and open debate on the proposed constitution.
Ruling: Cases dismissed.
In view of these events relative to the postponement of the aforementioned plebiscite, the Court deemed it fit to refrain, for the time being, from deciding the aforementioned cases, for neither the date nor the conditions under which said plebiscite would be held were known or announced
officially. Furthermore, Congress is scheduled to meet in the regular session on Jan. 22, 1973 pursuant to CON35, and since the main objection to PD 73 is that the President does not have the authority to call a plebiscite and appropriate funds therefore, which Congress
unquestionably could do, the court deemed it more imperative to defer its final action on these cases.
There is unanimity on the justiciable nature of the issue on the legality of PD 73. On the validity of the decree itself, six: issue has become moot and academic, two: valid.
On authority of the convention to pass proposed CON or to incorporate therein specific provisions, four: issue moot and academic, five: valid. Four: convention had authority to continue its function despite proclamation of martial law.
On the question whether the proclamation of martial law affected the proper submission of the proposed constitution to a plebiscite, insofar as the essential freedom is concerned, a justice is of the opinion that there is a repugnancy between the election contemplated under A15/CON35 and the existence of martial law, and would, therefore, grant the petitions were they not moot and academic. Three: issue involves question of fact which cannot be predetermined, and martial law per se does not necessarily preclude the factual possibility of adequate freedom for the purposes contemplated. Tolentino v. COMELEC (1981)
Facts: The 1971 CONCON came into being by virtue of two resolutions of the Congress approved in its capacity as a constituent assembly convened for the purpose of calling a convention to propose amendments to the CON. After election of delegates held on Nov. 10, 1970, the Convention held its inaugural session on June 1, 1971. In the morning of Sept. 28, 1970, the
!)" Convention approved Organic Resolution No. 1, reading thus: "A
RESOLUTION AMENDING SECTION 1 OF ART. V OF THE
CONSTITUTION SO AS TO LOWER THE VOTING AGE TO 18." On Sept. 30, 1971, COMELEC "resolved" to follow the mandate of the Convention, that it will hold the said plebiscite together with the senatorial elections on Nov. 8, 1971 .
Arturo Tolentino filed a petition for prohibition, its main thrust being that Organic Act 1 and the necessary
implementing resolutions subsequently approved have no force and effect as laws in so far as they provide for the holding of a plebiscite co-incident with the senatorial elections, on the ground that the calling and holding of such a plebiscite is, by the Constitution, a power lodged exclusively in Congress as a legislative body and may not be exercised by the Convention, and that, under A15/S1/CON35, the proposed amendment in question cannot be presented to the people for ratification separately from each and all other amendments to be drafted and proposed by the CON.
Ruling: Does Organic Act No. 1 of the CONCON constitutional? NO. All the amendments to be proposed by the same Convention must be submitted to the people in a single "election" or plebiscite (Cannot submit amendments to the people piecemeal). In order that a plebiscite for the ratification of a CON amendment may be validly held, it must provide the voter not only sufficient time but ample basis for an intelligent appraisal of the nature of the amendment per se but as well as its relation to the other parts of the CON with which it has to form a harmonious whole. In the present context, where the Convention has hardly started considering the merits, if
not thousands, of proposals to amend the existing CON, to present to the people any single proposal or a few of them cannot comply with this requirement.
UNIDO v. COMELEC (1981) Source: Berne Guerrero summary
Facts: UNIDO is a political organization or aggrupation campaigning for "NO" votes to amendments to CON73 proposed by the Batasang Pambansa. COMELEC issued 3 resolutions:
• Res 1467 providing for Rules and Regulations for "equal opportunity" on public discussions and debates on the plebiscite questions to be submitted to the people on 7 April 1981.
• Res 1468 providing "equal time on the use of the broadcast media [radio and television] in the plebiscite campaign". • Res 1469 providing for "equal space on the use of the print
media in the 1981 plebiscite of 7 April 1981".
UNIDO addressed a letter to COMELEC to grant it the same opportunity as given President Marcos, who was campaigning for “YES”. It also requested radio and television coverage for its Plaza Miranda meeting. In denying this request, COMELEC said that Marcos conducts his pulong-pulong in light of the official government thrust to amend the constitution and in his capacity as President/Prime Minister and not as head of any political party. UNIDO or any of its leaders does not have the same constitutional prerogatives as those vested in the President/Prime Minister. Thus, UNIDO has no right to "demand" equal media coverage accorded President Marcos. UNIDO a sort of an MR. This the COMELEC denied so UNIDO brought case to SC. Ruling: Is UNIDO entitled to equal time, equal space and equal quality of exposure? NO. UNIDO has failed to persuade that grant of its petition is compelled by the provisions of the CON, the Election Code of 1978 and the general resolutions and regulations of COMELEC regarding equal
opportunity among contending political parties, groups, aggrupations or individuals. The COMELEC has indeed the power to supervise and regulate the mass media in such respect, but such authority arises only when there is a showing that any sector or member of the media has denied to any party or person the right to which it or he is entitled.
4. Ratification Javellana v. Exec. Sec. (1973)
Facts:
On January 20, 1973, just two days before SC decided the sequel of plebiscite cases, Javellana filed this suit against the respondents to restrain them from implementing any of the provisions of the proposed CON not found in the present CON35. This is a petition filed by him as a Filipino
