1957-1963
by
Hanno Weisbrod
Precis
1. Introduction
Page i 1 I Strenothening the Alliance After Suez
2. Foreign Policy Cooperation•
Australia's Supportive Role in the
Cold I.!Jar 30
3. Toke~m1 Australia's Contributions to Collective Security in South
East Asia 72
Laos Vietnam China Sea to Anzus
76 94 109 123 137 4. Defence and Technical Cooperation 148 II The Alliance and Security Threats
5. Australia's Security Worries about Dutch New Guinea
6. Australia's Support for Malaysia
191 246 Ill The Alliance and Internal Politics
7. North West Cape Naval Communication
Station 293
B. Australia's Decision to Buy the
f-111 334
IV Conclusion 371
Bibliography 392
Charts a
Defence Statistics 28
Defence Spending and Total Government
Expenditure 29
Precis
This dissertation is an account of Australia's re-orientation of security thinking after the "cathartic experience" of the 1956 Suez crisis. It treats of the Australian Government's realistic assessment of the
changed power relationships after Suez and its determina-tion to maximise the security guarantee of its most
powerful Western ally in the Pacific.
The story reveals Australia's increasing reliance in defence matters on the United States, where she had .. ·· .. formerly strive·n to sati-sfy ·her security ·needs by
balancing her ties between Great Britain and the United States. It discloses how the Menzies Government conscious-ly strove to make itself a politicalconscious-ly indispensable alconscious-ly
to the United States. Judging the country's. internal development needs to have priority, the Liberal Country Party coalition Government deliberately curtailed defence spending. Instead, it substituted foreign policy co-operation with the United States for supstantive contri-butions to the collective defence effort.
This policy of the Menzies Government was success-ful in several respects. Externally Australia was able to secure firm American guarantees for Australian security interests and implicit support for most of her foreign policy goals. Internally the reliance on American
strength allowed the Government to concentrate on devel-opment. Through a conscious policy of assiduously
cul-tivating close personal contacts with American officials at all levels, the Menzies Government succeeded in
..
strengthened the bonds of goodwill between the two Governments. The last two chapters illustrate how that special relationship operated in Australian
domestic politics to the advantage of the Menzies Gov-ernment. The study ends in ·late 1963, the year which marks the end of "tokenism" in Australia's defence efforts.
Methodology
The approach of this study has been to document Australia's increasing reliance on the United States for th.e satisfaction. of· her security needs. This dissertation thus seeks to continue works which treat Australia's search for regional security in earlier
periods.
Research has been based on conventional sources such as the various official publications of the two governments, the open literature in the field, as well as an extensive survey of newspapers and journals .•
Important insights were made possible by a series
' .
HISTORICAL SETTING*
In a study such as this which treats with a speci-fie time period, it is tempting to look at the actions of Government leaders merely within the context of the specific events then occurring. Such a "slice-of-time" approach would be misleading since most of Australia's security concerns have been constants in that country's foreign policy dating back to the early days of the separate colonies in.the late 18th Century. One of the reasons for this policy consistency is that some of the top leaders of both the Labor Opposition and the ruling conservative coalition Government between 1957 and 1963 had been in Commonwealth politics for 20 to 50 years and in addition received their political training under other older leaders whose entry into politics pre-dated the Con-federation of Australia in 1900. Thus, the thoughts
and actions of the Menzies Government, as well as those of the Opposition during the 1950's and 1960's was very much infl~enced by attitudes they formed or that ·were transmitted to them many years previous. Indeed most of the responses of Australian political leaders to the security problems facing their country during the 1957-1963 period evidenced the historical continuity of the attitudes of the leader-ship of the country whether those leaders were from Labour or from conservative parties.
What were these concerns? To an outside observer, it may appear that Australia's safety has been enviably
*
References used for this historical review are mostly secondary sources. Therefore in this subsection only, the writer has decided to list the secondary ~ources in the bibliography rather than cite them individually in the text...
secure from earliest times to the present. The anti-podean continent was under the protection of Great Britain, the grestest naval Power until World War I and one of the Great Powers after that. Indeed, the willingness of successive Australian Commonwealth
Governments to let Britain conduct Australia's foreign relations, to the casual observer might appear to be evidence that Australians considered security concerns so insignificant that they could be handled by London. For, it was not until 1937 that a liaison officer was attac~sd to the British Embassy in.Washingtori • . Only in April 1939, did the "gathering storm" convince a new Prime Minister that "in the Pacif.ic Australia must re-gard herself as a principal providing herself with her own information". And although Robert Garden Menzies felt that his Government "must, of course, act as an integral part of the British Empire," he reminded his countrymen that the "primary risk in the Pacific is borne by New Zealand and [Australia]". He summed up the deci-sive difference in threat perception with the now classic sentences "What Great Britain calls the Far East is to us the near north."l
Menzies merely gave succinct expression to what had always been a basic source of anxiety for Australians. Far from enjoying the safety afforded them by their
geographic remoteness from any threatening power, Australians considered their isolation a security detriment. One
of their constant fears was that the principal protecting
power first Britain and recently the United States -might ignore Australian views, interests or even threats to their security because their country was so far away.
Some fundamentals for dealing with real or
imagined threats were generally agreed upon by Australians of all political persuasions from earliest time on to the present. First, out of the awareness of being tiny groups of settlers on a vast continent came the belief that their security depended on the closest possible association
with the ''Mother Country" and the British Empire. This is why, prior to 1939, leaders of all parties would have regarded it as foolhardy for Australia not to conduct her foreign relations through the British Foreign Office. Sir George Pearce, the Minister of External Affairs in
the Bruce Government, explained that his Government pre-ferred to establish "a branch of the External Affairs
Oepartment ••• under the control of an officer of such stand-ing and character as to enjoy the confidence of the For-eign Office''• Menzies, as Prime Minister, was said to have been anxious as late as 1939, that independent Australian representation abroad ~riuld lead tb a ~iiuation ~here wily foreigners would cross-trump between Australian and British diplomats. He feared that this might injure the close relations between the two countries and thus be deleterious to Australia's security. Therefore, it was with some hesitation that the Government finally acted to send Australia's first Minister to Washington.
islands in the South Pacific or at least keep them out of the hands of any -hostile or potentially hostile powers. When the Imperial Government did not always
accede to Australian pressures for annexation of islands, the colonists were disappointed or alarmed. Their
anxiety over this issue was one of the important factors that led to federation. Colonial leaders felt that only through united strength could Australia press her views in London successfully (or failing that, gain direct con-trol over the islands). Fear of foreign possession of the islands led Prime Minister Hughes to dema~d, first, re-cognition for an "Australian Monroe Doctrine" in the Southern Pacific and then at the Versailles Peace
Con-ference for exclusive control over Eastern New Guinea. This anxiety about foreign possession by a potentially expansionist power was the major motive behind Australia's inability in the 1950's to countenance the departure of the friendly Dutch from West New Guinea.
Third, there was the fear that the small European population in Australia might .be engulfed by Asiatics. Out of this came the belief that immigration of Europeans, preferably of British stock must be encouraged. At the same time it was agreed that the inflow of Asians and other coloured races had to be prevented. This has led to
the restrictive immigration policy known as the White Australia policy.
Fourth, it was recognized that in order to develop a viable economy, Australian Governments had to concentrate
spending. Both could be provided by close association with Great Britain. In their relations with Great Bri-tain, Australian leaders were vociferous in their demands for trade advantages but most circumspect in their
actions on foreign policy. It became a general guideline for successive Commonwealth Governments that Australia should support the international policies of their prin-cipal guarantors of security. This was done partly out of loyalty to the British Crown, but it was also done to stake a moral claim for unstinting support on Australian security concerns. In addition, it was felt that the
st~en~th of the ~ritish Empire and. hence colle6tive ~ecurity, would be enhanced if the Dominions presented a united
front. As will be seen below, similar reasoning on this led the menzies Government to give loyal support to the United States as the leader of the Western world.
An extension of the policy goal to make the bonds between the protecting power and Australia indissoluble related to the sacrifice of war. From earliest colonial times, it was accepted that if Great Britain became
involved in war, Australia would respon& by mobilizing and volunteering generous contributions of fighting men and any materials she could provide. Again the reason was mainly loyalty to the Crown. But it was also from the feeling that Australia had to do her share if she wanted to be helped when she faced danger. Yet as soon as the fighting was over, Commonwealth Governments would revert to the emphasis on development. Australia's defence
1
country would again rely on the protective power of the security guarantor. The charts at the end of the Intra-duction show that this pattern held true during the Men-zies era.
While historically there has been little disagree-ment on Australia's security needs and on the essentiality of great Power protection to satisfy them, there have
been some differences between successive Governments on the methods they employed to make their views heard in London - or in Washington. One can roughly classify
these methods into two broad approaches. On~ can also identify one approach with the Labor Party and the other with the conservative parties.1 In international affairs, the Labor Party historically has displayed an assertive nationalism tinged with idealism. Its leaders have pub-licly voiced criticism of the protecting Power(s). At
times they have vociferously demanded that Australian views be heard and accorded respect. The approach of the conservatives has been to make Australia's voice heard through quiet diplomacy. They generally felt that Australia ought to foster good private relations with
the leaders of the po~erful ally. Australian interests could then be communicated directly, but behind the scenes.
The first approach is probably connected with the proclivity for radicalism of the Australian Labour movement. The second approach may stem from a natural bend of conservative political leaders towards decorum
1
The conservatives today are the Liberal and Country Parties who make up the Government coalition. The Liberal Party was forged out of the United Australian Party, which in turn was formed from the Nationalist
and good manners. In addition, individual personalities shaped the policies of their parties or their Govern-ments if they happened to be in power. They thus left a permanent imprint upon youn~er leaders who came to power in the 1950's. Also it should not be overlooked that some Government leaders formulated their individual approach to the execution of foreign policy as a
reac-tion against the conduct of previous leaders. This can be illustrated by looking at the reactions of conserva-tives to Billy Hughes and Herbert V. Evatt. Hughes' abrasive style of diplomacy had offended manr at home and abroad. When he was finally dislodged from the Prime Ministership in 1923, his successor, Stanley Melbourne
Brucel markedly changed the style of Australia's diplomacy. Bruce, who had resented the public posturing of his pre-decessor, was to appoint R.G. Casey 2 as liaison officer
to London. His function was to establish close contacts with the Foreign Office, to obtain information about any matter that concerned Australia while it still was in a formative stage, and to pass back Australian suggestions on such matters befor~ a final decision ~ad bee~ reached.
It ushered in a period of such quiet diplomacy that
Aust~alia almost submerged her national identity in inter-national affairs.
Evatt, as Minister for External Affairs from 1941-1949 swung in the opposite direction again. Not for him
the quiet, urbane, behind-the-scenes effort of Menzies in London or Casey in Washington, Evatt went to these capitals during the war to "pound on the doors'' and to demand that
1
Later Viscount Bruce of Melbourne. 2
Australia be admitted to the councils that controlled the conduct of the war and the post-war settlement. He resented Great Power domination as illustrated by the 1943 Cairo Declaration in which Roosevelt, Churchill and Chiang Kai-shek decided on the disposition of the Japanese islands in the Pacific. In response, Evatt
called a conference with New Zealand to set up a regional zone of defence comprising the South West and South
Pacific. The resultant agreement of January 19441 carved out an area of responsibility in the South Pacific which was to ensure that the two countries would have a say-so in post-war settlements. Evatt's intense efforts to reduce the exclusive privileges of the Big Powers at the United Nations Conference in San Francisco was a second illustration of his conviction that the small and middle Powers ought to have a greater say in shaping collective security. A third instance of Evatt's touchiness about Great Power domination came in the Manus Island contra-versy. It appears that Evatt insisted that in return for allowing the United States to continue to haNe post-war
use cif the ·naval and air base that the United States Navy had built there during the war in the Pacific, Australia wanted the United States to enter into a security arrange-ment with Australia and other Commonwealth Governarrange-ments 2 to allow mutual access to all bases in the Pacific. The effort failed as the United States refused to enter into an agreement and later dismantled the base. In general, Evatt's efforts to increase Australia's international
1944. 2-9.
lAustralian-New Zealand Agreement signed 21 January Text in Current Notes, Vol. 15, January 1944, pp.
2
status were successful, and the Australian Minister may have endeared himself to the world's small Powers.
However, his strident nationalism and his curious "impartiality" towards the Soviet Union in the Cold War, antagonized Australia's two principal security
protectors.
The leaders of the Government that came to power in Australia in December 1949 disagreed sharply with the previous Government's handling of foreign policy. To men like R.G. Menzies, P.C. Spender and R.G. Casey, Evatt's priorities for safeguarding Australi~'s security were considered to be reversed. These men were
sus-picious that Evatt had subordinated Australia's security interests to his personal ambitions, especially regarding the United Nations. It will be recalled that each of these men had previous experience in the conduct of
Australia's security affairs1 which had influenced
thei~
thinking on the means for achieving security for Australia.In the Government's first policy statement on foreign policy,2 Spender, as Minister for External
·· Affairs gave notice that his Government il..ould not place as great a reliance on the United Nations for safeguarding Australia's security as Evatti He also stated his Govern-ment's intention to build up as close a relationship with the United States as Australia had with Great Britain.3 In what appeared to be a slap at Evatt's public sniping at American policy, Spender said his Government's approach
1
casey was liaison officer in London from 1924-29 and Australia's first Minister in Washington from 1940-41. Menzies was Prime Minister from lg39-41. Spender was a Cabinet Minister with varying portfolios between 1939-41 and he was a member of the Advisory War Council during
the war.
2For the text see Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol. 206, 9 March 19SO, pp. 6 21-40 (Hereafter CPD HR.).
would be to concentrate on the "avenues of co-operation" and to put an end to "petty disagreements".!
Spender's aim was not merely the revival of the de facto war-time alliance, that had been inaugurated by Prime minister Curtin's famous plea for American help in December 1941. 2 With single-minded determination, he worked quietly on establishing a close rapport with
American leaders in order to lay the groundwork for a Pacific Pact. After Australia's prompt diplomatic and combat support for the United States in the Korean con-flict, and the understanding shown by the Menzies Government for a non-punitive Peace Treaty with Japan, the American Government became more receptive towards a security pact. However, when the American Government proved reluctant to be drawn into an arrangement which would underwrite Britain's colonial possessions in the Far East, Spender and his Government accepted the ex-elusion of Great Britain from such a pact as a necessary price for an American guarantee for Australia's s~curity. It is noteworthy as an illustration not only of the
· · new style of diplomacy but also th·e im.portance which the menzies Government attached to the goal of an American alliance, that Spender resigned as Minister for External Affairs and went as Australia's Ambassador to Washington
!Ibid., P• 636.
2After the situation in the Pacifi~, especially in Singapore, Curtin had declareda "The Australian Government •••
regards the Pacific struggle as primarily one in which the United States and Australia must have the fullest say in the direction of the democracies' fighting plan. Without any in-hibitions of any kind, I make it quiet clear that Australia looks to America, free of any pangs as to our traditional links or kinships with the United Kingdom. We know the prob-lems that the United Kingdom faces ••• But we know, too, that Australia can go and Britain can still hold on. We are,
therefore, determined that Australia shall not go, and shall exert our energies towards the shaping of a plan, with the United States as its keystone, which will give our country some confidence of being able to hold out until the tide of battle swings against the enemy." Article published in the Melbourne Herald, 27 December 1941. (Emphasis added.)
1 to conclude the ANZUS Treaty.
While Spender had concentrated on establishing close relations with the United States, Menzies with his strong Empire orientation set out to forge the closest possible links with Great Britain. 2 The Prime Minister and the experienced R.G. Casey in their annual visits to Britain (and other capitals) concentrated on setting up confidential relationships of trust and complete confi-dance at the highest level. Though Menzies had fully supported Spender's moves on ANZUS and he had no ani-mosity towards the United States, it is c~ear that up to 1956 the Prime Minister's emotional attachment to the Crown led him to look primarily to Britain for leadership
on matters affecting Australia's security interests. It was only after the traumatic experience of the Suez
crisis that the Prime Minister was able to accept
emo-tionally as well as intellectually, that the United States was more important for Australia's long-term security than
the country's erstwhile security guarantor.
The year 1957 marked t~e beginning of a fundamental reorientation of Australia's security thinking. This
was a shift from reliance on British assessments of inter-national security priorities to an almost total acceptance of American interpretations of security threats. This did not signal an abandonment of ties with Britain. On the contrary, as will be shown in the next chapter, Menzies believed that the two greatest English-speaking
demo-cracies must work in close concert against the monolithic
1
More about ANZUS below in Chapter 3. 2
Communist threat. Nonetheless, the relationship be-tween Australia and the United States became so close that the Menzies Government derived direct domestic benefit from the Australian-American alliance. 1
THREAT PERCEPTION IN THE EARLY 1950's
Australia's perception of the source of threat to her security was changed fairly radically by the outbreak of hostilities in Korea.2 With the signing of a Peace Treaty with Japan accompanied by the
simul-taneous publication of the ANZUS Treaty draft,3 the Government's fears about a resurgence· of Japanese
militarism were assuaged. Instead "International Commu-nist aggression" became the dominant topic of Australian security thinking.4 Government leaders no longer feared that the Australian continent would be involved directly in a global war.5 No direct threat of invasion was en-visaged "because of the limited maritime capability of any probable enemy in the Pacific".6 Also there would
1
See below Chapters 7 and B. 2
for an extensive treatment of Australian post-World War II threat perceptions, see Henry Albinski, Australia's Search for Re ional Securit , (unpublished
Ph. D. dissertation, 1959 , and the same author's Australian Policies and Attitudes Toward China, (Princeton University Press, 1965), PP• 135-188.
3
Richard N. Rosecrance, Australian DiplomacJ and Japan 1945-1951, (Melbourne University Press, 1962 • Also J.G. Starke, The ANZUS Treaty Alliance, (Melbourne University Press, 1965), chapter 1.
4
Statement by the Minister of External Affairs, R.G. Casey,
f£Q
HR 216, 4 March 1952, P• 750.5
Statement by Minister for Defence, Sir Philip McBride, ibid., 21 February 1952, p. 181.
6
..
not be any great naval battles, but there was a threat to sea and air communications in the Pacific and Indian oceans and the adjoining seas. Therefore, a possible
1 submarine threat to shipping would need effective action.
In 1952 and 1953 the Government still thought that the "decisive conflicts" were as likely to occur in
Europe and the Middle East as in South East Asia. 2 There-fore the security of Australia was held to be directly affected by the Cold War activities around the world and by the Allied response to the Communist challenge.
Towards the end of 1953 the threat pe~ception began to change as the situation in Indo-China deterio-rated. After the fall of Dien Bien Phu and the French withdrawal, it appeared to Australians that "temporarily
there was no barrier between aggressive China and Australia".3
The Minister of Defence announced that the R.A.A.F. fighter wing in Malta would shortly be returned home.
There could no longer be talk of a "war station" in Europe or in the Middle East. The security of Australia was
.
threatened by aggressive Communis~ primarily in South E as t A s1a. . 4
This attitude about the source of threat to Australia's security which was adopted at that time is
the one which with little variation was held until problems developed with Australia's nearest neighbour. Indonesia's claims first to West New Guinea and later
1Ibid., 216, 21 February 1952, p. 181.
2McBride, ibid., HR 1, 1 October 1953, p. 915. 3
Casey noted that Indo-China is the same distance from Darwin as Perth is from Brisbane. Current Notes, Vol. 25, 26 July 1954, p. 469. Cf. statement by Casey in CPD HR 4, 10 August 1954, p. 96. Also "Seven Years of Military Planning and Change of Plan", in SMH, 24 August 1956.
to Northern Borneo were perceived as expansionist moves
which threatened Australia's concept of defence in
depth.1 However, the recurring crises in Laos, as well
as the deeping conflict in Vietnam, reaffirmed the
belief that "Communist imperialism" was the most
"threatening reality".2
• •
•
DEFENCE THINKING AND GOVERNMENT ACTION
Australian Government leaders have consistently
·.placed heavy emphasis· on· call ec ti ve security. In any future war, all the Western Powers would be
interdepen-dent a
••• no one country will survive without the others. Australia, therefore, must continue to rely upon a policy of collective security and must, in its own and in the general
in-terest, make the maximum possible contribution to the vital theatres in close co-operation with its allies.3
With the ANZUS Pact as a guarantee against a
repetition of a southward sweep of Japanese aggression,
Australian defence planners considered a defence of
northern Australia strategically unsound and economically
wasteful. Australia should prepare against threats to
the general security by Communist efforts to expand.
Because defence policy was based on allied strategy, to
meet this threat, Australian forces must be "readily
avaliable to meet our cold war obligations under the
United Nations Charter, and commitments undertaken as a
lsee Chapters 5 and 6 below.
2Sir Robert Menzies, Federal Election 1963, Policy Speech (Sydney, 1963), P• 6.
3
member of the British Commonwealth or as a result of
the ANZUS Pact".1 Therefore, Australia needed
well-equipped, highly mobile forces which could be rapidly . 2
concentrated where necessary.
ANZUS was very satisfactory from the point of
view of a direct security guarantee, but the absence
of Great Britain presented some problems. Prime
Minister Churchill was sensitive about his country's
exclusion. Australia, on the other hand, thought
that her security arrangements were still incomplete
as long as planning between the older ANZAM Defence
. . . 3
Committee and ANZUS were not integrated. Thus, it
is not surprising to hear Casey and Spender both saying
before ratification that ANZUS was not a complete and
final answer to the security problem in the Far East,
but rather a step in the right direction.4 Not only
would ANZUS need to be integrated with other existing
defence treaties, Casey said after ratification,5 but
responsibility for settling the affairs of the Pacific
1 Ibid. 2
Ibid., P• 916.
3
See description by Sir John Slessor quoted by Sir A1an Watta "In 1949 the Governments of Australia,
New Zealand and the United Kingdom had agreed to coordinate defence planning in an area known as the ANZAM region,
which includes the Australian and New Zealand homelands and the British territories in Malaya and Borneo, together with the adjacent sea areas." ANZAM was not a treaty or written agreement, but a term used to denote a consulta-tive arrangement by which Australia, Great Britain and New Zealand coordinated defence interests in this part of the world. Sir Alan Watt, The Evolution of Australian Foreign Policy 1938-1965, 1967, PP• 164-65. See also T.B. Millar, Australia's Defence, 1965, pp. 69-76.
4
Casey, CPD HR 213, 13 July 1951, P• 1709. Spender, Current Notes, Vol. 22, 12 July 1951, p. 400.
5
should devolve on a "much more broadly based organisa-tion".! But until a good opportunity presented itself, the Australian Government woul d not jeopardize the
strong American guarantee by pushing for an enlarge-ment of ANZUS.2
As early as February 1953, the Minister for External Affairs had revealed to the House of Repre-sentatives that discussions had been going on almost
continuously among the five powers most directly concerned with the security situation in South East Asia, viz.,
the· United Kingdom, the United States, France, Australia a~d · Ne~· zealand~ The talk~ had been about setting up
a Five-Power Staff Organisation but no concrete arrange-3
ments had been agreed upon.
However, as the crisis in Indo-China was reaching a peak just prior to the convening of the 1954 Geneva Conference on Indo-China, Australia joined Britain in resisting American pressures to conclude a collective security treaty quickly. After a visit to Saigon, Casey also became convinced that American plans for air attacks
•
.
to save the b~leaguered fortress at Dien Bien Phu would 4
not succeed. Australia was in a dilemma. The Government urgently desired the wider regional pact which the United States was offering, as it was to include Great Britain. However, it also firmly believed that military inter-vention "would be wrong" and would risk general war with
1CPD HR 218, 5 September 1952, p. 1503. 2
See Dean McHenry and Richard Rosecrance, "The 'Exclusion• of the United Kingdom from the ANZUS Pact", International Orqanisation, Vol. XII (Summer, 1958), PP• 322-326. Also SMH, 12 and 13 June 1953.
3
CPD HR 221, 18 February 1953, P• 19. Also SMH, 12 and l~une 1953.
4
would do little to salvage the dire situation of the
french, but could conceivably cause the break-up of the 2
Geneva Conference. Casey felt ·that if a reduction of international tensions were to be achieved there was
"no more suitable or appropriate gathering of nations"
by which to achieve this than the Geneva Conference,
3 and therefore it should be given every chance to succeed.
Therefore, Casey continued to support the
British Government's refusal to assent to Dulles'
sug-gestions to form a military alliance before the Geneva
Conference as a Western bargaining counter du ·ng the
negotiations with the Communists. However, Casey worked
hard and apparently successfully to prevent an
irrecon-cilable split between Dulles and Eden before the Con-ference.4 During the Geneva Conference, at which
Casey wes present for the discussions on Korea, he again
acted as a bridge between the British and the Americans.5
After the Geneva C6nference, Menzies also pledged that
he and his Government would "work incessantly ••• to do all w~ can by negotiation and persuasion" td reconcile
the Anglo-American differences that had developed over
1
Ibid.
2
Ibid., P• 101. See also McBride's statement in Current Notes, Vol. 25, 14 April 1954, p. 294.
3
Casey in a speech at Geneva, ibid., 29 April, p. 357.
4
for a more detailed account of Casey's activities in the crucial pre-Geneva round of conferences see Henry S. Albinski, Australian Policies and Attitudes Toward China, 1965, pp. 146-148.
5
the handling of the Indo-China crisis. The Prime
Minister declared that it was vital for Australia's
defence to have "the closest concert between the
United States of America and the British Commonwealth".! Unfortunately, neither the Americans nor the
important Asian neutral states were willing to
asso-ciate themselves with a guarantee for enforcing the
Geneva settlement, and Menzies had to admit that the
final Indo-China settlement represented a substantial
victory for Communism. 2 The Government decided "in
the 1 i ght of the knowledge that a call ecti ve .defe nee treaty . . .
would be established in South East Asia, to support
the settlement and to deter any breach of it by the
Communists".3 The long-awaited and much discussed
South East Asian alliance was finally concluded in
Manila early in September 1954.4 Australia, New
Zea-land, the United Kingdom, the United States, Pakistan,
Thailand, and the Philippines, formed the Treaty's
membership. There were disappointingly few Asian· states in it, but on the other hand, Australia had an
·· Anglo-American commitmant to the defence "or South East Asia which she considered invaluable for her defence
posture.5 Australia gave assurances in advance of
the conference leading to the actual SEATO Treaty
1
Prime Minister's Statement on International Affairs, CPD HR 4, 5 August 1954, P• 68.
2
Statement of 22 July 1954, cited in Current Notes, Vol. 25, P• 469. Casey, CPD HR 4, 10 August
1954,
P•99.
3
casey, ibid., P• 103.
4
Debated for two months in the Australian Parlia-ment; final assent came 18 November 1954. Treaty cited in Commonwealth Acts, 1954, p. 250. It should be noted that
the tre~ty was ratified by an Act of Parliament with a preamble which stated that it was directed against Commu-nist aggression.
5CPD
negotiations that she would support the new pact
"with arms, with me~, with ships and instruments
of war". 1
In his major policy statement of August 1954,
the Prime Minister also stated that Australia must
have troops with the best equipment and high mobility
to respond to threats in South East Asia. He added
that it would be Governmen~ policy to prepare such .
forces to the "limit of Australia's financial
capa-city".2 This was not, however, an exhortation for a
greater effort. Rather, it was a ple~ for understanding
·why Australia was not sp'ending more. He saids
and
It is of real importance to the national security that we should have financial and economic s tability, that we should maintain industrial activity and employ-ment •••
••• we must balance our efforts, remembering always that it is a designed part of t he Communist cold war technique to put such a strain upon the democracies that de-fence expenditure and social and economic stability will come into conflict with ad-vantages either way going to the potential
aggressor.3 ·
Australia was serving notice that while she was willing
to make contributions to collective security, it could
not be expected that these would be massive
contri-butions.
Nonetheless, on 1 April 1955, the Prime Minister
announced that Australia would contribute a battalion
of infantry troops and supporting air and naval units
1 Menzies, ibid., 4, 5 August 1954, p. 69.
2
Ibid., P• 67.
3
1 to the formation of a Commonwealth Strategic Reserve. It appears that Australia had intended to join with Britain and New Zealand to help combat the Communist insurgency in Malaya and stabilize the security of the Malayan peninsula through the presence of Commonwealth
2
forces. Announcement of the decision was apparently held up pending clarification of the relationship of the Strategic Reserve to SEATO. As the Prime Minister had previously promised that Australia would support the collective security treaty with arms and men, he wanted the new commitment to be somehow related to SEATO. However, due in part to American reluctance to
have SEATO apply to Malaya (then still a British cola-nial possession), and partly due to American opposition to SEATO standing forces, the United States did not
wish to put a SEATO cover on the formation of the
Common-3
wealth Reserve. However, for domestic political rea-4
sons, the Prime Minister stated that Australian partici-pation in the Strategic Reserve-would be an important contribution to the security of the SEATO a~ea of which
5
the United States approved. In future debates, the
1
Statement by Menzies cited in Current Notes, Vol. 26, April 1955, PP• 278-80.
2
See Norman Harper, "Australia and the United States" in Garden Greenwood and Norman Harper, eds., Australia in World Affairs, 1950-55, (Cheshire, 1957), p. 189.
3
Ibid. See also Sir Alan Watt, Australian Defence Policy, 1951-1963, Major Aspects (ANU, Canberra, 1964), PP• 50-51.
4
The A.L.P. was violently opposed to the commit-ment on the grounds that the troops might be used to suppress legitimate opposition in Malaya. Evatt also felt that the presence of foreign troops would incite rather than subdue the terrorists. Cited in SMH, 2
April 1957, and 18 May 1957.
---5
Menzies Government would proudly refer to this
commit-ment as Australia's contribution to the collective
security of South East Asia.
The permanent stationing-of Australian forces
was indeed a change from traditional defence thinking.1
But it should be recalled that the forces stationed
there, though significantly useful in the anti-terrorist
campaigns, never represented more than a token
contri-bution.2 As the fighting in Korea subsided after 1952,
the defence effort was sharply curtailed and defence
spe~ding
was .keptbe~ow
$ 380 million per annum.3 Tho~gh budgetin~ $ ~00 miliion for defence each year,the Government deliberately prevented the Services from
spending between S 16-24 million annually of their
defence allocations.4 By 1957, the Government had
diverted some
S
166 million into so-called defence trustfunds. Before these funds were returned into the
Con-solidated Revenue Fund in 1957, the Government had used
the money to extend short-term loans to the States for
development purposes. 5
.
Under t he policy of giving development first
1
Harper in Australia in World Affairs, 1950-55, op. cit., p. 189.
2
See more below in Chapter 6.
3
See charts on pp. 28-29. All figures are in Australian Dollars unless indicated otherwise.
4
See 29th Re art of the Public Accounts Committee, (Government Printer, 1956 , pp. 23, 27. Also SMH, 10 August 1956, Confidential Appendix, paras. 9, 248-49.
5
priority, Australia's defence establishment fell into
disrepair. The Government was reluctant to let the
Services buy equipment from overseas, especially when
the balance of trade was running against Australia.1
The country's developing economy had shortages in basic
materials which curtailed Australian defence production.
Australia also had critical labour shortages, and the
Government gave top priority to a massive immigration
programme. It was therefore reluctant to let the
man-power needs of the defence establishment conflict with
the demands of industry. By 1957 all thr~e defence
Services had serious personnel and equipment shortages,
and there was considerable criticism of the way
de-fence allocations had been spent.2 There was some
pub-lie pressure that Australia should overhaul her
de-fence set-up and re-orient her dede-fence thinking. This
coincided with the views of some high level defence
advisers inside the Government. 3 These officials felt
that Australia ought to coordinate her defence planning
and expenditure with SEATO military planning. They
1
see for example articles in The Economist, "Australia T i g h t e n s I t s B e 1 t" , 2 A p r i 1 1 9 55, p • 4 0 : " A us t r a 1 i a 1 P
re-carious Balance", 25 May 1957, p. 722.
2 .
Poss1bly the greatest single impetus for changes were the hearings of the Public Accounts Committee on Defence spending in August 1956. The hearings exposed irregularities in Service estimates and noted that there were serious deficiencies in regard to recruitment and equipment. The most sensational piece of evidence was the statement by Sir Frederick Shedden that Australia was not in 1956 - nor had it been in 1953 - ready for mobilisation. 29th Report of the Public Accounts Commit-tee, op. cit.
3
hoped that the establishment of the SEATO Military
Planning Office would provide a sorely needed focus
for Australia's defence effort. In the main, they
thought Australia should concentrate on providing a
few highly mobile ground forces to fit in with other
Allied forces. The United States would provide the
necessary sea and air power. In accordance with this
thinking, spending on the Navy and the Air Force was
to be curtailed and the Citizens Military Force to be
eliminated.
Evidence that.the Government was heeding these
voices came in a statement by the Minister for Defence,
who announced on 11 September 1956 that the Government
would review Australia's defence "in the light of SEATO
plans".1 On 4 October the Prime Minister told the
press that a committee would be set up to review the
defence establishment.2 On 4 April 1957, Menzies made
a comprehensive statement on the new direction of Australia's
defence effort. Most of the changes that the
abovemen-tioned defence advisers had recommended appeared to have
been incorporated into that speech, though some in
corn-promise form. Of major impact was the implied shift
in reliance from Great Britain to the United States as
part of the post-Suez evaluation of Australia's defence 3
logistics. The Prime Minister almost ruled out Australian
participation in a European war, when he said that
1 .
McBr1de, CPD HR 12, 11 September 1956, P• 371.
2
Cited in SMH, 5 October 1956.
3
Australia had to recognise that in any future war,
Australia would be Rfighting side by side with the 1
United States ••• under Seato or Anzus". In line with
this reasoning, he said his Government had taken a
look at the logistics aspect and had decided that in
a major war in the Pacific, the United Kingdom would not
be able to keep open the supply lines, while the
United States undoubtedly could. Therefore, his
Gov-ernment had decided that Australian forces and
equip-ment should be standardised ''wherever possible" with
those of the United States.2
It must be noted that Menzies thought global
war unlikely (except by accident or miscalculation)
due to the nuclear stalemate between the Soviet Union
and the United States. But l imited war, as in the
Middle East or in Indo-China, was always possible with
little or no warning. The most direct threat to Australia
lay in a "recrudescence of Communist aggression in
South Vietnam, in Laos or Cambodia, in Thailand or malaya".
It was "of immense importance~ to Australia that these
countries of South East Asia should not fall under
Communist aggression.3
As far as Australia was concerned, "there must be
an effective force to deal with attacks by conventional
arms in brushfire wars which would not necessarily
engage the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons".
As Australia was not a nuclear power and had no intentions
of becoming one in the immediate future, "we must
concen-1cPo HR 14, 4 April 1957, P• 573.
2
Ibid., P• 574.
3
trate our attention ••• on conventional forces armed with
the most modern of conventional weapons and equipped
with the greatest mobility".1 To provide this mobility,
the Government announced its intention to purchase
twelve C-130 Hercules transport planes from the United
States. The Government warned that since most of the
fighting in South East Asia would be jungle fighting,
the troops would need highly specialised training which
would be costly and slow. Also a lack of modern
equip-ment would inhibit a quick expansion past the one
bri-gade group in existence.2
However, the strategic thinking of the Prime
Minister's April 1957 policy statement was carried out
only incompletely. There were several reasons for this.
One of the major assumptions behind the stated aim of
concentrating Australian resources on "making an
opera-tional contribution to allied strategy" 3 was that the
SEATO Permanent Planning Staff would function as an
allied coordinating council. But hopes that the Military
Planning Office would achieve the operational or command
effectiveness that SHAPE had in NATO wer~ misplated.
Allied coordination of defence efforts among the signatory
nations for greatest efficiency of contributions just
never came about. In addition, the Australian Government's
plans to give the development of a highly mobile and
modern Army preference over the other two Services soon
came under pressure. Both the Royal Australian Navy and
the Air force demanded equal shares of the defence budget 4 and lobbied vigorously for major equipment purchases.
385.
libid., 16, 19 September 1957, p. 795. 2
mcBride, ibid., 15, 2 May 1957, P• 1050. 3
Ibid., P• 573.
4
Since the Government continued to hold defence
ex-penditures constant _for the following five years,
the modernis~tion of the Services proceeded only 1
slowly. The strengths of the Services also remained
constant and Australia's actual manpower contribution
to the defence of South East Asia stayed the same.
Australia continued to place primary reliance
on the strength of its great and powerful friends. The
Government gratefully acknowledged that its security
depended "upon the ability and willingness of the
United States to defend and sustain the security of
coun-"tries that might be thriatened by Communist expansion
and aggression."2 The Government pointed out that the
United States had half a million men, 500 warships,
2,500 aircraft stationed in the Pacific. This provided
a shield of safety behind which the Government could
devote its energies to discharging its primary
respon-sibility which was strengthening Australia through
development. As Casey explained to an American audience,
his country could accept only. very limited collective
security obligations because "in terms of power politics,
1
one bottleneck had been the National Service
scheme. The manpower requirements for maintaining a large partially-trained reserve not only were mutually exclusive with the aims of building a highly professional Army, but the two were also contradictory in terms of the announced strategic doctrine. In 1957 the intake of the National Service scheme was reduced from 37,000 to 12,000 men per annum. In 1959 it was abolished. In addition, the Govern-ment reorganised the defence set-up in 1958. It started a re-equipment plan, which by 1963 saw every Service
getting major items of modern equipment. For more details see T.B millar, Australia's Defence, op. cit., pp.
93-143.
2
Casey, Speech at michigan State University, 6 October 1958, Current Notes, Vol. 29, p. 659.
3
..
Australia is a small country". It could therefore
"not afford to spread [its] butter too thin".1 Rather
it had to concentrate on long-term strength through
development.
The Australian Government coupled such
state-ments with promises that Australia would pull her
weight. For as the Minister for External Affairs
explained a
I should not expect that there is an Australian who would be venal enough to wish to have our wars fought for us by somebody ·else. Conse-quently, we Australians have to prove to the world in particular to our strong friends
-.· that we are worthy allies, and that we· will do all that we possibly can, by ourselves and for ourselves, to be worthy partners in the dread event of war.2
But since Australia's resources were so limited, the
Government would concentrate on foreign policy
coopera-tion in peace time. Casey explained it this waya
there was "an intimate link between defence and foreign
policy" which he defined asa
cit.
••• you should do everything humanly possible to avoid war breaking out. But if in spite of all your efforts, war does break out and you are involved in it, then enter that
war with as sttong friends as you"can. That is the simgle definition which reflects the policy [ofj this Government ••• 3
1
Casey, speech at Michigan State University, op.
2casey,-CPD HR 16, 19 September 1957, p. 795.
3
Defence statistics compared to other economic indicators 1
YEAR GNP TOT.GOVT. DEfENCE DEfENCE DEfENCE EXPEND.2 EXPEND. GNP Tot.Govt.
s
s
. S"
%
million million million
52-53 8278 1950.6 430.6 5.2 22.1
53-54 9038 1920.6 355.43 3.9 18.5
54-55 9645 1964.4 355.0 3 3.7 18.1
55-56 10427 2120.7 381.4 3.7 17.8
56-57 11355 2223.8 376.9 3.3 16.7
57-58 11598 2391.6 370.2 3.2 15.1
58-59 .12418 2584.5 378.6 3.1 14.3
59-60 13529 2804.8 387.2 2.9 13.8
60-61 14625 2987.8 396.3 2.7 13.3
61-62 14967 3286.2 406.2 2.7 12.4
62-63 16104 3502.2 428.1 2.65 12.2
63-64 18021 3883 520.9 2.9 13.4
64-65 19838 3974 608.9 3.1 15.3
65-66 20886 4492 747 3.6 16.6
66-67 22782 4978 9·5o. o4 4.2 19.1
859.5 3,8 17.3
67-68 24210 5133 5 1109 6 4 .• 6 21.6
977 4.0 19.0
1 Sourcesa Yearbook of the Commonwealth of Australia, Vols. 39-53a Summary of Budget Resul ts from Commonweal th of Australia Budget Speech, for each year from 1952-3 to 1966-7; Defence Statistics (Circulated by the Minister for Defence) for 1957, 1958, 1960, 1962; Defence Reports, for 1963-1968.
2 federal Expenditure on Goods and Services plus Transfer Payments to persons and Grants to States.
3 In some earlier Budgets this was shown as 379.4 and 371.0 respectively. The difference is accounted for by movement into Defence Trust funds, which was not a real expenditure. In later budget summaries this was corrected.
4 Less 90.553 million U.S. credit.
5 Estimated.
21
20
19
18
17
16
15
14
13
12
·,...;
6%
5
4
3
2%
"
''
... ,
'2-53
--- --
--
---
-
...
--
..,_----
..
--
--,..,-
...
---
---
---'---
...______
...
_
AUSTRALIA'S SUPPORTIVE ROLE IN THE COLD WAR
In 1957, Australia was just recovering from the
"cathartic experience" of the Suez crisis.1 In the
furore over the Israeli-Anglo-French invasion of Egypt,
the Menzies Government had felt itself compelled to
take sides between the two countries which jointly
corn-prised Australia's security guarantee. The
disagree-ments that the Australian Prime Minister had with the
American Administration over the handling of the Suez
crisis were fundamental, as they involved his concepts
o~ allied unity _and coll~ctive security, and of realism
and idealism in international affairs.
The Australian Prime Minister in a highly personal
move, had opted to support the British Government's
decision to use force to safeguard its interests in
2
the Suez Canal, and he had done so rather vehemently.
The disagreement over principles between the Menzies
Government and the Eisenhower Administration had been
at least as fundamental as that between the Eden Govern-•
ment and the United States, though there was none of
the personal antagonism that aggravated the relations
between Eden and Dulles.3
According to conventional theories of alliance
cohesion and disintegration, such fundamental conflicts
of national interests normally lead to alliance
break-1
See C. Hartley Grattan, The United States and
the Southwest Pacific, (Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1961), P• 228.
2For more detail, see Norman Harper, "Australia and Suez" in Greenwood and Harper, Australia in World Affairs 1950-1955 (Cheshire, Melbourne, 1957). Also Norman
Harper and David Sissons, Australia and the United Nations (Manhattan Publishing Co., 1959), PP• 126-135; and W.
Macmahon Ball, "The Australian Reaction to the Suez Crisis; July-December 1956", AJPH, Vol. 2, pp. 129-150.
3
Herman Finer, Dulles Over Suez The Theor and Practice of his Diplomacy Quadrangle Books, Chicago, 1964).
downs. 1 In 1956 "the U.S. not only failed to support
Britain in the Suez intervention; it resorted to
decisive political and economic sanctions to thwart 2
British purposes". Though Australia's national interest
was not as vitally involved as that of Great Britain
over the control of the Suez Canal, one would have thought
that Menzies' close alignment with the British in this
affair would have led to at least a loosening of the
bonds of alliance between Australia and the United
States.
The fact that this did not happen is largely due
to the efforts of the Minister for External Affairs,
R.G. Casey. He was in the United States at the same
time that his Prime Minister made scathing criticisms
of American policy. Casey was said not to have agreed
with Menzies over the latter's backing of Angle-French
invasion, and he apparently made it clear to American
officials that the Prime Minister was not expressing
Australian opinion.
However, just as the Suez crisis had not signaled
·· the end of the special relationshi~ between the United
States and Great Britain but instead had proved to be
the"amphitheaterof its rebirth", 3 so it became for
Australia the impetus for renewed efforts to improve the
Australian-American alliance. As the Australian Prime
Minister told the House of Representatives in April 1957,
the Suez crisis had proved that British logistic support
1see George Liska, Nations in Alliances The Limits of Interdependence (Baltimore, 1962), pp. 12, 26, 54-55.
2Raymond Dawson and Richard Rosecrance, "Theory
and Reality in the Anglo-American Alliance", World Politics, Vol. 19, October 1966, p. 49.
3
for Australia in a general war would be questionable.
The concomitant realization that this meant that
Australia's security depended more than ever on the
United States led to a greater emphasis on defence
co-operation with the United States. 1 More importantly,
it led to a conscious endeavour by the Menzies
Govern-ment to create such a close understanding between the
two countries that future administrations in Washington,
as well as any potential aggressors, would accept as
natural that the American guarantee for Australia's
security was irrevocable and automatic~2 .Jhis policy
consisted of making Australia a politically valuable
ally through active foreign policy co-operation and by
making token - but psychologically significant -
con-tributions to collective defence.
In examining the statements and actions of the
Australian Government on the Cold War issues, one may
be struck by the moralistic and legalistic approach of
its principal spokesmen.3 Also to be noted are the
expressions of support given to policy positions of
Britain or the United States which evidence an unflagging
1CPD
HR 14, 4 April 1957, PP• 571-73. 2
menzies stated that the primary value of Australia's alliances was moral rather than military, i.e. "indicating
to the aggressive elements in the world that they cannot divide and conquer ••• " Speech to the Commonwealth Parlia-mentary Association, Canberra, 6 November 1959, v.t.
3
For example, in the Cold War "it is not a case between the Soviet Union and the United States, but rather between the free countries, with free institutions, against countries with slave institutions ••• it is not America
against the Soviet Union, but Communism against all the rest of us", Menzies, speech to Commonwealth Club, 13 February 1961, v.t. Another time the Prime Minister said "The conflict in the world is a conflict between basic
sense of loyalty. These emanated mainly from the
Minister for External Affairs (to February 1960),
Mr (now Lord) Casey, and from the Prime Minister,
Sir Robert Menzies.1 It should be pointed out again
that Casey entered diplomatic service under the guidance
of Bruce in 1924, and that Menzies came into federal
politics in 1934. Both men were of conservative
back-grounds; both had a deep sense of loyalty towards
Great Britain. Both men were inclined to shun the
assertive manner of either a Billy Hughes or a Herbert
Evatt. Instead their statements on foreign policy
seemed tempered by a realistic assessment of Australia's
limited power. Both men displayed a keen awareness of
the value of loyalty towards the "great and powerful
friends".
The Prime Minister's strong interest in world
affairs was decisive in the direction of Australia's
foreign policy. Through his frequent supererogatory
intervention in the conduct of Australia's foreign
policy, he often displaced - and ~or a while replaced
-the Minister for External Affairs, 2 as the principal
spokesman for the Australian Government. Much of this
chapter will therefore necessarily deal with Sir Robert•s
attitudes and action.
• •
•
Through his active participation in the manoeuvres
lThe Minister for External Affairs (from December 1961 to May 1964), Sir Garfield Barwick was less given to extra-vagantly moralistic statements.
that tried to take the Suez Canal out of Nasser's hands
in 1956, Australia~s Prime Minister not only became
deeply involved in the crisis but he also bec~me
strongly committed. Indeed Menzies, as the head of
the mission that went to Cairo to negotiate with
Nasser, did nrit only see himself as a mediator, but
also as a strong advocate of the terms that he carried
with him from the Suez Canal Users Association Conference
in London.1
There were several reasons why the Australian
Prime Minister gave "his complete support for the
disas-trous policy of Anthony Eden during the Suez crisis of ·
1956, which isolated Australia not only from Afro-Asian
nations, but also from the United States!" 2 First,
Menzies' "emotional attachment to Great Britain" and all
the past glory she stood for demanded that he declare
Australia to be on her side. 3 He explained, "Australia
as one of the countries of the British Commonwealth"
should not hesitate to offer her opinion, and that "he
and his colleagues" would have felt badly if Australia
had remained silent and neutral "under circumstaGnces in
which that Government of the United Kingdom had been
assailed for taking action which Australia regarded as
4
both practical and courageous". It must have been
painful for the Prime Minister to observe the rift between
Great Britain and the United States. He realized that
al-though the British Government in his opinion had acted
1
speech to a dinner of Hobart businessmen, 10 April 1958, v.t.
2The phrase is Sir Alan Watt's in his book The Evolution of Australian Foreign Policy 1938-1965, ~303.
3
Ibid., P• 307.
4Menzies, Statement to the House, CPD HR 13, 1 November 1956, p. 2060; also ibid., 8 November 1956, p. 2115. It is more likely that the Prime Minister's Cabinet "colleagues" felt
