We take up Part II of the lectures on Remedial Law. You are through with Part I – criminal procedure and evidence. You were forced to read criminal procedure ahead of civil procedure because that is the curricula that
is required by the board of legal interpretation for law schools. You see, criminal procedure is taken up in 2nd
year – much ahead of civil procedure. Criminal procedure really is taken up by 2nd year law students and then
civil procedure is taken up by 3rd year law students. The other reason why there was a lecture on criminal
procedure ahead of civil procedure is to emphasize that, although learned in criminal procedure that, generally, the criminal action carries the civil aspect of the case, with regard to the civil aspect of the case, we usually do not apply the rules for civil procedure.
X X X the defendant – the accused –, after he enters the plea of not guilty, is not required to file an answer to the civil aspect of the case. It is enough that he pleads not guilty. That plea of not guilty is also a denial of this probable civil remedy. This is also the reason why, in a civil aspect that is brought along by the criminal action, we don’t apply the rule on specific denial. This is required in civil cases. In a criminal case, the plea of [not] guilty is not considered a specific denial if we apply the rules on civil cases because the plea of not guilty will… if there is a plea of not guilty, the court cannot compel the accused to explain why he is entering such plea. If he chooses to plead not guilty, the court can do nothing about it. The court cannot ask the accused: what are your reasons? what are your defenses? Unlike in a purely civil action where there is a civil complaint filed against the defendant and the defendant simply tells the court in his answer, “I deny liability”. If we apply civil procedure, that is a judicial admission of liability. In fact, that kind of denial in a civil case may lead to a judgment on the pleadings. In civil, purely civil cases, – not the civil aspect of a criminal case – there is always a need for specific denial which is not, again, required in the civil aspect of a criminal case. So do not have the impression that although a criminal case carries with it, generally, the civil aspect of the case… We don’t apply civil procedure to the civil aspect. That criminal case which carries with it the civil aspect will always be governed by criminal procedure, not by civil procedure.
The only difference, probably, that can be cited with respect to procedural rules governing the civil aspect of a criminal case will be the quantum of evidence. You learned in criminal procedure that the guilt of the accused shall be demonstrated by proof beyond reasonable doubt. But in so far as the civil aspect of the case is concerned, the quantum should only be preponderance of evidence. So that, in a criminal case, it is very likely that the accused will be acquitted of the crime but he can be held civilly liable because the quantum of evidence used, in so far as the civil aspect, is not proof beyond reasonable doubt but only preponderance of evidence. But just like in criminal procedure, we always start with the topic on jurisdiction of courts. With respect to jurisdiction over civil actions, we have several laws governing jurisdiction of courts in civil cases. Primarily, we
have the Constitution. And then we have the Judiciary Act of 1948 – that is R.A. 296. And then we have this B.P. 129 – the Judiciary Reorganization Act – and its amendments. And then we have the law creating the family court – I think it was in 1997. And then the law creating the Sandiganbayan. Because we have so many substantive laws governing jurisdiction of courts X X X identified the general law on jurisdiction in this country. The general law on jurisdiction in our country is B.P. 129. All other laws are special laws governing jurisdiction. So that if you find the conflict between B.P. 129 and the special law on jurisdiction, we just apply the rule on statutory construction: the special law prevails over the general law. A good example is the provision in B.P. 129 on the jurisdiction of a regional trial court. X X X In testing the jurisdiction of a regional trial court, B.P. 129 says that a Regional Trial Court exercises exclusive original jurisdiction over the enumeration of cases, one of which is cases which were cognizable by the then Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court. So we have all these in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court and then B.P. 129 provided that, thereafter, the jurisdiction of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court shall be exercised by the Regional Trial Court in the concept of exclusive original jurisdiction. But X X X in the Family Court law, which is a special law, it is provided that a Family Court has exclusive original jurisdiction over cases involving marriage, adoption, guardianship of minors, X X X criminal cases and civil cases that involve a minor. There is then a conflict now between B.P. 129 and the law creating the Family Court. But since the law creating the Family Court is a special law, its provisions will prevail over that of B.P. 129. That is why these civil cases in adoption… they are no longer cognizable by the Regional Trial Court. They are cognizable by the Family Court.
We also meet in our classroom discussion the legal maxim that jurisdiction is a matter of substantive law. But that is not necessarily true. What is governed by substantive law, in so far as jurisdiction is concerned, is jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the nature of the case. This is the aspect of jurisdiction that is governed by B.P. 129 and the other substantive laws on jurisdiction. There are other aspects of jurisdiction aside from jurisdiction over the subject matter or over the nature of the action. One aspect of jurisdiction is jurisdiction over the person of the litigants. That is not governed by B.P. 129. That is governed by the Rules of Court. Another one is jurisdiction over the property involved. That is also not governed by B.P. 129. It’s governed by the Rules of Court. Jurisdiction over the issues of a case – that is not governed by B.P. 129. That is governed by the Rules of Court. So jurisdiction, as part of substantive law, is limited to the authority of a court to decide in so far as the subject matter is concerned or the nature of the action. But when it comes to jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, jurisdiction over the issues… these are aspects of jurisdiction that are governed by procedural law – mostly, by the Rules of Court.
You’ll also notice that in B.P. 129 that B.P. 129 does not mention anything about the Supreme Court. B.P. 129 begins with the Court of Appeals and goes down to the Regional Trial Court, the inferior courts, and in the last part, there is a mention of the Shari’a Court. So where does the Supreme Court derive its authority in exercising
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case or over the nature of the action? Of course, it is vested by the Constitution itself. But if we read the Constitution on the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, the Constitution classifies the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court only into 2 kinds, that is: original jurisdiction X X X and appellate jurisdiction. But the Constitution does not say that the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is exclusive – it’s just plain original. The Constitution does not also tell us that the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is exclusive appellate. It only says that Supreme Court exercises appellate jurisdiction over the following cases. We now ask whether the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is exclusive or coordinate with other courts. And yet, in most law books, there is always an item concerning exclusive original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and also exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. The basis of all these commentary is the old Judiciary Act of 1948. The Judiciary Act of 1948 talks about the Supreme Court. It confers jurisdiction upon the Supreme Court in a very thorough manner such that the Judiciary Act of 1948 provides for exclusive appellate jurisdiction, exclusive original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. In other words, we still enforce and recognize the Judiciary Act of 1948. It has not been repealed by the Judiciary Reorganization Act. B.P. 129 did not repeal the old Judiciary Act. The old Judiciary Act is still in force. But what’s repealed by B.P. 129, in so far as the old Judiciary Act is concerned, are provisions of the Judiciary Act of 1948 which are inconsistent with B.P. 129. So do not be of the impression that we no longer have the Judiciary Act of 1948. We still enforce and recognize the Judiciary Act of 1948. The best argument to support this statement is found in Sec. 9 of B.P. 129. If you read Sec. 9, that’s the section providing for the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. In Sec. 9 of B.P. 129, there is an enumeration of cases that are allocated to the Court of Appeals exercising original jurisdiction and exclusive appellate jurisdiction. It is in that last part of Sec. 9. That part which talks about appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. We notice a clause in Sec. 9 saying that the Court of Appeals exercises appellate jurisdiction over cases decided by the Regional Trial Court or quasi-judicial bodies in said laws that are assigned to the Supreme Court under the provisions of the Judiciary Act of 1948. That’s the best proof that the Judiciary Act of 1948 is still in force. It is expressly recognized as existing up to the present by the provisions of B.P. 129.
When it comes to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under the Constitution as stated, the Constitution provides for a limited number of cases over which the Supreme Court can exercise original jurisdiction and over limited number of cases over which the Supreme Court can exercise appellate jurisdiction. And as we said earlier, these are not exclusive. The exercise of original jurisdiction is not exclusive. The exercise of appellate jurisdiction by the Supreme Court as provided by the Constitution is likewise not exclusive. Why do we say this? We have to read the provisions of the Constitution together with the provisions of B.P. 129 in allocation of jurisdiction with the other courts. The cases that are assigned to the Supreme Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction involve cases involving ambassadors, ministers and consuls. And then there’s also the vesting upon the Supreme Court of original jurisdiction over cases involving petitions for certiorari, petition for mandamus X X X. If we read the provisions of the Constitution together with B.P. 129, we will find out that the same authority
is given by B.P. 129 to other courts like the Court of Appeals. Again, in Sec. 9, B.P. 129 provides that the Court of Appeals also exercises original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus, quo warranto, or habeas corpus. And then under the Chapter on the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court , B.P. 129 also vests upon the Regional Trial Court a similar authority. The Regional Trial Court shall exercise original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus, and quo warranto. So if we take the Constitution together with B.P. 129, there are, in effect, 3 courts in our judiciary which exercise original jurisdiction over these petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus. They are the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, and the Regional Trial Court. Which means to say, theoretically, that if a petitioner feels that his rights have been violated let’s say through a grave abuse of discretion committed by a lower court, he can file a petition for certiorari or prohibition or mandamus against this judicial officer with the Supreme Court, or with the Court of Appeals, or with the Regional Trial Court upon his choice. Theoretically, that is the implication where the Constitution and B.P. 129 have given 3 different courts a similar jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus. So for purposes of jurisdiction, there is nothing wrong if, for instance, there is a case pending before an inferior court (a Municipal Trial Court or a Municipal Circuit Trial Court) and this inferior court gravely abuses its discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, and the aggrieved litigant decides to file a petition for certiorari or prohibition or mandamus directly to the Supreme Court. There is nothing wrong with that theoretically in so far as the issue of jurisdiction is concerned. Because the Constitution has vested upon the Supreme Court original jurisdiction to entertain these petitions together with the Court of Appeals and together with the Regional Trial Court. But the choice given by B.P. 129 and the Constitution over the jurisdiction of these petitions is only theoretical. It has been greatly limited by certain procedural rules. That is with respect to certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus. The limitation is known as hierarchy of courts. Certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus, procedurally, are governed by Rule 65. If you read Rule 65, you will meet a section, I think it’s Sec. 4, which speaks about hierarchy of courts. This is a limitation given to the right of a petitioner to file a petition directly with the Supreme Court. That’s a petition for certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus, or even quo warranto. While theoretically we can file the case with the Supreme Court, we should follow the procedural principle of hierarchy of courts. In Rule 65, it is expressly provided that petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus would be filed directly with a Regional Trial Court or the Court of Appeals. If we analyze carefully Sec. 4 of Rule 65, that is a severe limitation of the right of an aggrieved party x x x as provided for in the Constitution. So although one of the basic principles why Congress enacted B.P. 129 was to do away with the concept of concurrence in jurisdiction, B.P. 129 has not been able to do away entirely with concurrent jurisdiction. B.P. 129 does not use the word concurrent in vesting jurisdiction upon the courts. The law classifies the jurisdiction only into original jurisdiction, appellate jurisdiction, original and exclusive, appellate and exclusive. Unlike in the past, under the old Judiciary Act of 1948, where the law expressly contained provisions that conferred concurrent jurisdiction over certain cases upon different courts which resulted, really, in confusion. That’s one of the purposes why we now have the Judiciary Reorganization
Act – to do away with concurrence in jurisdiction. Generally, B.P. 129 has been able to do away with this concept in concurrence of jurisdiction except with respect to certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus since the Constitution and B.P. 129 allocate original jurisdiction upon 3 courts X X X, then it is safe to conclude that these 3 courts exercise original and concurrent jurisdiction over these petitions.
With respect to the Court of Appeals, B.P. 129 classifies the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals into original and exclusive jurisdiction, original jurisdiction, and then exclusive appellate jurisdiction. With respect to the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, there is only 1 case over which the Court of Appeal can exercise exclusive original jurisdiction. And that is annulment of judgment of a Regional Trial Court. Because the Constitution as well as B.P. 129 provide for certain cases only that could be adjudicated by the Supreme Court and by the Court of Appeals in the exercise of their original jurisdiction, we cannot classify the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals as courts of general jurisdiction although they are the 2 highest courts of the land. The Supreme Court, although it is the Supreme Court, is not a court of general jurisdiction. It is still a court of limited jurisdiction. Its authority is limited to those provided in the Constitution. Outside of those provided in the Constitution, the Supreme Court does not exercise jurisdiction over other cases. The same is true with the Court of Appeals. In Sec. 9 of B.P. 129, the authority of the Court of Appeals is very limited in so far as exclusive original jurisdiction is concerned. There is, as we said, only 1 case over which the Court of Appeals can exercise exclusive original jurisdiction. That is a petition to annul a judgment of a Regional Trial Court.
If the Court of Appeals is given the authority to annul the judgment of a Regional Trial Court, does not the conferment of this authority carry with it the authority of the Court of Appeals to annul the judgment of an inferior court, which is lower in rank than a Regional Trail Court? That is a logical argument. If the Court of Appeals can annul a judgment of a Regional Trial Court, it should be reasonable that the Court of Appeals can also annul the judgment of an inferior court. But that is not to construe jurisdiction over the subject matter or over the nature of the action since the Court of Appeals since a court of limited jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals can only annul the judgment of a Regional Trial Court. It cannot annul the judgment of an inferior court. Does it mean to say that, while the decision of a Regional Trial Court can be annulled in a case filed before the Court of Appeals, that the decisions of an inferior court is immune from annulment by the Court of Appeals? That is right. The decision of a Regional Trial Court can be annulled by the Court of Appeals because that is what B.P. 129 provides. But the decision of an inferior court is immune from annulment by the Court of Appeals. But the decision of an inferior court can be annulled by the Regional Trial Court. Why is this so? Is it so provided in B.P. 129 that a Regional Trial Court can annul the judgment of an inferior court? There is really nothing provided in B.P. 129. If you read B.P. 129, I think the jurisdiction of the RTC starts with Sec. 19, there is no provision on the Regional Trial Court’s jurisdiction which expressly confers upon a Regional Trial Court an authority to annul a judgment of an inferior court. Nothing is provided in that matter in B.P. 129.
Since we are talking about annulment of judgment, we might just as well go to the procedural principles and X X X to Rule 47 – and that’s the rule on annulment of judgment. You will notice it is Rule 47 of the Rules which gives us the procedure to be followed when it comes to annulment of judgment The annulment of judgment mentioned in Rule 47 is the annulment of judgment conferred by B.P. 129 to the Court of Appeals. In Rule 47, we
will notice that the 1st part – the 1st few sections of that very short rule – speaks about how a petition to annul a
judgment of a Regional Trial Court is filed with the Court of Appeals… what the Court of Appeals can do after the filing of the petition. But in the last 2 or 3 sections of Rule 47, the topic is suddenly changed from annulment of judgment rendered by a Regional Trial Court to annulment of judgment rendered by an inferior court. So there is a jump from annulment of judgments rendered by the Regional Trial Court to annulment of judgment rendered by an inferior court. And in these last few sections of Rule 47, the Supreme Court says that a judgment of an inferior court can be annulled although there is again no mention B.P. 129. And the court that has jurisdiction – original exclusive jurisdiction – to annul a judgment rendered by an inferior court is a Regional Trial Court. Can we not challenge the Supreme Court under Rule 47 to a Regional Trial Court of authority to annul the judgment of an inferior court considering that B.P. 129 does not expressly give to a Regional Trial Court authority to annul the judgment of an inferior court? We cannot because, under B.P. 129, there is an allocation to the Regional Trial Court of jurisdiction to entertain and decide all kinds of actions which are not especially given to other courts. In other words, that provision of B.P. 129 is the justification why our books treat the Regional Trial Court as a court of general jurisdiction. In fact, it is only the Regional Trial Court that is considered as a court of general jurisdiction in our system and it is because of that provision in B.P. 129. If you conceive about an action and then you start asking yourself which court has jurisdiction over this action. But then you go through a process of elimination. If you entertain the idea of going to the Supreme Court, then you just read the Constitution. And then you eliminate the Supreme Court if it has no authority under the Constitution. Then you go to the Court of Appeals. Then you read B.P. 129. If, under B.P. 129, the Court of Appeals does not have jurisdiction then it does not really have jurisdiction. Then you go to an inferior court. If an inferior court also does not have jurisdiction, then you can be sure it is a Regional Trial Court that has jurisdiction over the case. That is the principle is followed by Rule 47 when the Supreme Court, in the last few sections of Rule 47, inserted a provision saying that with respect to the decisions of an inferior court, it is a Regional Trial Court that has exclusive original jurisdiction. Because while there is an action known as annulment of judgment rendered by an inferior court, since substantive laws have not allocated authority to decide these cases to any other court, then it follows that it is a Regional Trial Court that has jurisdiction over these cases.
In our study of Rule 47, the threshold case that you probably read or was assigned to read is that case of Islamic Da’wah v. Court of Appeals. In that case, the Supreme Court traced the history of annulment of judgment as an
action. The Supreme Court mentioned that in the past, before B.P. 129, the Supreme Court had from the start recognized the propriety, the regularity of filing a petition for the annulment of judgment rendered by a court. And before B.P. 129, the Supreme Court said that annulment of judgment of an inferior court can be entertained by a Regional Trial Court. How about a judgment rendered by a Regional Trial Court? Can it be entertained by a coordinate court? By another Regional Trial Court? The Supreme Court said yes because a Regional Trial Court is a court of general jurisdiction. That’s the reason why in B.P. 129, the Court deemed it necessary to incorporate this provision giving exclusive authority to the Court of Appeals to annul a judgment rendered by the Regional Trial Court – to do away with the anomalous situation then obtaining, before B.P. 129, where a Regional Trial Court can annul a judgment rendered by another Regional Trial Court. Because there was no specific provision in substantive law which allocated unto other courts this authority to annul a judgment of a Regional Trial Court. So, because of B.P. 129, we now have a situation where the Court of Appeals can annul the judgment of a Regional Trial Court expressly provided. And it is a Regional Trial Court that can annul the judgment of an inferior court.
How about the Court of Appeals? Can the Supreme Court annul a judgment of the Court of Appeals, given that the Supreme Court is the highest court of the land? The answer is no. Because there is nothing provided in the Constitution which gives to the Supreme Court authority to annul a judgment of the Court of Appeals. So while we have an action to annul a judgment of a Regional Trial Court, an action to annul the judgment rendered by an inferior court… there is no recognized action, under the Constitution or under B.P. 129 or under the Judiciary Act of 1948, authorizing the Supreme Court to annul the judgment rendered by the Court of Appeals. Although there is 1 isolated decision by the Supreme Court which mentioned that the Court of Appeals itself can annul its own decision. But that is not so provided in B.P. 129. If we rely solely on substantive laws like the Constitution and B.P. 129, there is no such action as annulment of judgment rendered by the Court of Appeals. It does not mean to say that the judgment of the Court of Appeals is immune from annulment. There could still be an annulment if the Supreme Court will exercise what we call its equity jurisdiction. Rule 65, most likely, could be a remedy in order to annul the judgment of the Court of Appeals based on the same grounds that are given in Rule 47. But there is no actual, recognized by substantive law, that is filed for the purpose of annulling the judgment of the Court of Appeals. But B.P. 129 recognizes the propriety of a petition to annul the judgment rendered by the Regional Trial Court. It also recognizes the propriety of filing an action to annul the judgment of an inferior court.
If a judgment of a Regional Trial Court, if a judgment of an inferior court can be the subject of annulment by the Court of Appeals or by the Regional Trial Court, as the case may be, can we not also seek the annulment of a judgment rendered by a quasi-judicial body or an administrative agency? After all, these quasi-judicial bodies, they also exercise the functions of a court. That is, the adjudicate, they determine the rights and liabilities of the
litigants in the cases that are presented before them. This is also a settled issue. Annulment of judgment under B.P. 129, as procedurally explained by Rule 47, does extend to annulment of judgment of quasi-judicial bodies. There is no such thing as annulment of a judgment of a quasi-judicial body or an administrative body unless the law creating the quasi-judicial body or a chapter of that administrative body allows the petition to be filed for the annulment of these decisions of quasi-judicial bodies. In other words, we cannot file a petition under Rule 47 for the annulment of the decision of a Civil Service Commission or a Securities and Exchange Commission. You will notice that in Rule 47, which follows, literally, the provisions of B.P. 129, it is provided that Rule 47 refers to an action filed by a petitioner to annul the judgment rendered by a Regional Trial Court in a civil case. That is clearly provided in Rule 47, which is what, literally, what B.P. 129 provides. B.P. 129 provides that the Court of Appeals can annul a judgment of a Regional Trial Court. Now, the procedure, as given in Rule 47, is the Court of Appeals can allow the judgment of a Regional Trial Court in a civil action. So if the action is not a civil action, it is simply a criminal action or it is a decision rendered by a quasi-judicial body, then we cannot make us of Rule 47.
Since Rule 47 says that the annulment contemplated in B.P. 129 – the authority given to the Court of Appeals to annul the judgment – refers to a judgment of a Regional Trial Court in a civil action. Does it mean to say that the judgment of a Regional Trial Court acting as a criminal court cannot be the subject of annulment under Rule 47? You know very well that a Regional Trial Court could act as a civil court and it could also act as a criminal court because the Regional Trial Court exercises original jurisdiction over both civil actions and criminal actions. With respect to the exercise by the Regional Trial Court of authority over civil actions, the decision of a Regional Trial Court in these civil actions could be the subject of annulment of judgment by the Court of Appeals under Rule 47. But if the decision rendered by a Regional Trial Court is a decision in a criminal case, even if we can challenge the validity because of the lack of jurisdiction or collusion or fraud, if the decision rendered by the X X X [Regional Trial Court] is a decision in a criminal case, we cannot use Rule 47. Rule 47 is not a remedy to annul a judgment rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its jurisdiction as a criminal court. So you do away with the impression that Rule 47 is a remedy to annul a judgment rendered by a Regional Trial Court in all kinds of actions. Sec. 1 of Rule 47 is very clear. The decision of the Regional Trial Court must be in a civil case so that it can be the subject of annulment under B.P. 129, in relation to Rule 47. Does it mean to say then a decision of a Regional Trial Court in a criminal case cannot be annulled? The answer is yes, under Rule 47. But a decision of a Regional Trial Court in a criminal case can be annulled but not under Rule 47. It can still be annulled by filing a petition for habeas corpus. Habeas corpus is the equivalent of annulment of judgment rendered by the RTC in a civil case because B.P. 129 is very clear that, in relation to Rule 47, what can be annulled under Rule 47 is only a decision of a Regional Trial Court in a civil case. If a party desires to challenge the validity of a decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court in a criminal case, he should not resort to Rule 47. He should file a petition for habeas corpus.
Is there a difference actually between Rule 47, that is a petition to annul the judgment rendered by a Regional Trial Court in a civil case, to a petition for habeas corpus, which is a special proceeding but designed to set aside the decision of a Regional Trial Court in a purely criminal case? There are substantial differences. Annulment of judgment under Rule 47 is what we call as a direct attack on a final and executor judgment. The only purpose why a party X X X resorts to Rule 47 is to have the decision declared null and void – nullified and set aside. But in a criminal case where the decision of the RTC may not be valid because of the same reasons given in Rule 47 – lack of jurisdiction or extrinsic fraud – the remedy is habeas corpus which is not a direct attack on the judgment rendered by a Regional Trial Court. Habeas corpus, in other words, is an indirect attack on the judgment of a Regional Trial Court in this criminal case. Why is it an indirect attack unlike annulment, which is a direct attack on a judgment? In habeas corpus, where it is filed in order to nullify a decision of a Regional Trial Court in a criminal case, the principal relief which the petitioner in habeas corpus seeks is to declare that the petitioner has been deprived of his liberty unlawfully – unlawful deprivation of a right… that is the principal relief which habeas corpus seeks. It is not principally to set aside a judgment of a Regional Trial Court in that criminal case. So that if you compare these remedies which seek to nullify or set aside the judgment of a Regional Trial Court in a civil case and in a criminal case, the remedies of the petitioner in a criminal case are more advantageous than simply compared to an annulment of judgment. Because annulment of judgment is a direct attack on the judgment. While in a criminal case, the detainee or prisoner can challenge the validity of the judgment of conviction although he is not attacking directly the validity of the judgment of conviction. He is attacking the validity of the deprivation of his liberty.
You will also notice that Rule 47 is inserted in the 16 or 17 rules concerning appeals. In our Rules, the procedure for appeal starts with Rule 40 and it ends up with Rule 56. So from Rule 40 up to Rule 56, the topic of these 16 or 17 different rules is always cases on appeal. Except now Rule 47, that’s why the insertion is quite scandalous. Annulment of judgment should have been included in the enumeration of special civil actions because it is incorporated in the Rules on appeal but annulment of judgment has nothing to do with appeals. B.P. 129 considers annulment of judgment as an original action to be filed with the Court of Appeals or with a Regional Trial Court. And in Rule 47, particularly applied to a petition for annulment commenced before the Court of Appeals, you will notice that some of the features of a special civil action are carried by a petition to annul the judgment filed with the Court of Appeals. For instance, if a petition to annul a judgment of a Regional Trial Court in a civil case is filed before the Court of Appeals, the Court of Appeals has the authority to outrightly dismiss the petition. That is similar to Rule 65 where a court can outrightly dismiss a petition for certiorari if it is not meritorious on its face. That is, of course, provided in Rule 47. The Court of Appeals can outrightly dismiss a petition to annul a judgment. So if the petitioner has in mind stopping the execution or preventing the execution of a final and executory judgment rendered by the Regional Trial Court by making use of Rule 47, there is a big
chance he will not succeed because the Court of Appeals could outrightly dismiss a petition to annul a judgment filed before the Court of Appeals.
Since the judgment sought to be annulled under Rule 47 is a final and executor judgment, will the filing of a petition to annul the judgment be a good reason for the trial court to deny a motion for execution? Even if there is a petition to annul a judgment rendered by the Regional Trial Court, if that decision has become final and executory and it is not the subject of annulment of judgment, Rule 47 is not a justification for the trial court not to execute its final and executor judgment. So the prevailing party can still move for the execution of that judgment, notwithstanding the commencement and pendency of a petition to annul the judgment of the Regional Trial Court. The only remedy available to a petitioner in annulment of judgment before the Court of Appeals to stop execution is to apply for a provisional remedy of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order. That’s why in most petitions to annul a judgment filed with Court of Appeals, the petitioner variably applies for the issuance of a TRO or preliminary injunction. Without these provisional remedies, even if there is a petition with the Court of Appeals for the annulment of judgment of a Regional Trial Court in a civil case, that petition to annul a judgment will not prevent the execution of that final and executor judgment. Under Rule 47, in relation to B.P. 129, on annulment of judgments commenced before the Court of Appeals, is it correct to say that only the litigants before the Regional Trial Court can make us of annulment of judgment? That question has also been answered by the Supreme Court in the threshold case of Islamic Da’wah v. Court of Appeals. That case ruled that annulment of judgment, as contemplated in B.P. 129 and also as envisioned in Rule 47, does not prohibit a stranger from filing a petition to annul a judgment rendered by a Regional Trial Court although the petitioner may not have been a litigant in that particular case. He can do so as long as he can show that he will be prejudiced by the execution of the decision sought to be annulled.
You will also notice that the requirements in Rule 47 before annulment of judgment can be properly commenced are very strict. 1 of the requirements is that the petitioner must show that the remedies for motion for new trial, that is, petition for relief and appeal, are no longer available through no fault of his own. In other words, if the judgment has not yet become final and executor, a litigant cannot make use of annulment of judgment because he can still appeal. He has other remedies. He can file a motion for new trial. If he has filed a motion for new trial and that motion is denied and he neglects to appeal, so the judgment becomes final and executory, can he now properly file a petition to annul the judgment? Still no because his failure to appeal was through his own fault. He could just have appealed the judgment of the court. Let us say that the aggrieved party has failed to appeal, has failed to file a motion for new trial… and his failure to do so cannot be traced to his negligence or inexcusable conduct, can he now file a petition to annul the judgment in the Court of Appeals? Still the answer is no because there is still an available remedy to challenge a final and executor judgment. And that is a petition
for relief from judgment. The rules in 47 which apply the provision of B.P. 129 on annulment of judgment rendered by a Regional Trial Court are very, very strict. All the other remedies must not have been availed of through no fault of the petitioner. So even if we cannot fault the petitioner, as long as petition for relief from judgment is still a remedy, still available, we cannot resort to annulment of judgment under 47. In that case of Islamic Da’wah, the Supreme Court said that if we allow a stranger to avail of annulment of judgment of a Regional Trial Court in a civil case where he is not a party, then we should not also require the petitioner to satisfy the requirements like availability, availment of new trial, motion for new trial, or appeal, or petition for relief from judgment. The reason, according to the court, is that a stranger to a case cannot possibly cannot possibly make use of a motion for new trial or appeal or a petition for relief from judgment because these remedies, under the Rules, are available only to a litigant in a case. If the petitioner is not a litigant, he could not conceivably satisfy this requirement.
If you compare the procedure in Rule 47 between annulment of judgment that is commenced before the Court of Appeals and annulment of judgment commenced before a Regional Trial Court, you will immediately notice a very significant difference. While the Court of Appeals has the authority to outrightly dismiss a petition to annul judgment, a Regional Trial Court cannot. So if there is a petition to annul a judgment filed before the Regional Trial Court and the subject judgment, of course, is one that has been rendered by an inferior court, the Regional Trial Court has no authority to outrightly dismiss that petition to annul the judgment. In so far as the Regional Trial is concerned in a petition to annul a judgment rendered by an inferior court, that petition to annul should be treated just like any other case. So after of the filing of petition to annul, the Regional Trial Court will issue a summons and then, having served upon the respondents, let the respondents file the answer, and then file the case, and then render the decision. That is the significant difference between annulment of judgments commenced before the Court of Appeals compared to annulment of judgment commenced before the Regional Trial Court.
In Rule 47, if the judgment is annulled, then it is declared void by the court. So it can no longer be enforced or, if that judgment has already been executed, the Court of Appeals or the Regional Trial Court can order restitution of properties if that is still possible. In analyzing Rule 47, the provisions of Rule 47 in relation to B.P. 129 on annulment of judgment conferred upon the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Court, I suggest that you also read a rule in evidence. That is, impeachment of a judicial record which you must have taken up. That is in Rule 132 of Evidence. Impeachment of judicial record. In that evidentiary rule, impeachment of judicial record means to discredit a judicial record. A judgment of a court if, of course, a judicial record. So we can discredit or set aside a judgment of the court under that principle of impeachment of judicial record. This is related to Rule 47 as well as to the provisions of B.P. 129 on annulment. In B.P. 129, there are no grounds for annulment mentioned at all. The grounds for annulment are contained in Rule 47 and also in Rule 132 of Evidence. If I’m
not mistaken, that would be Sec. 28 or 29 or 30 of Rule 132 in Evidence. The topic is impeachment of judicial record. In that evidentiary rule of impeachment of judicial record, there are 3 grounds X X X: 1) lack of jurisdiction, 2) fraud, and 3) collusion. If we compare that to Rule 47, there are only 3 grounds in Rule 47: 1) absence of jurisdiction over the subject matter, or 2) absence of jurisdiction over the person of the litigants, and then 3) extrinsic fraud. Rule 47 does not mention anything about collusion as a ground to annul the judgment. Does it matter? It does not matter. Collusion is encompassed by the term extrinsic fraud as a ground for annulment of judgment. So there is no conflict between impeachment of judicial record and the grounds mentioned in Rule 47 for the annulment of judgment.
We go back to B.P. 129 and talk about the jurisdiction of a Regional Trial Court. With respect to a Regional Trial
Court, the jurisdiction of a Regional Trial Court is founded on certain factors. The 1st one is whether or not an
action is incapable of pecuniary estimation. The other one is if the action is a real action – it involves title to or possession of real property. And then, if it does not involve real property or the action does not within the concept of incapable of pecuniary estimation, then it is the amount involved – whether it is properly for the recovery for money or for the recovery of personal property.
The 1st factor is an action incapable of pecuniary estimation. So if you come across of an action that is incapable
of pecuniary estimation, then that action is cognizable by a Regional Trial Court. Is it correct to say then that all actions incapable of pecuniary estimation are cognizable by a Regional Trial Court always? That also is not a correct assumption. If you read again B.P. 129, there are several actions incapable of pecuniary estimation which are not exclusively cognizable by a Regional Trial Court. For instance, annulment of judgment which we discussed a minute ago… Annulment of judgment is not capable of pecuniary estimation but B.P. 129 says that annulment of judgment rendered by a Regional Trial Court is cognizable only by the Court of Appeals. How about annulment of an arbitral award by a barangay court which could also be the subject of annulment of judgment under the Local Government Code? That is not capable of pecuniary estimation. Is it cognizable exclusively by the Regional Trial Court? The answer is no. Annulment of a judgment or an arbitral award by a barangay court acting as an arbitral body, although incapable of pecuniary estimation, is cognizable only by an inferior court. This is so provided by the Local Government Code. So the Local Government Code is a special law in this matter. If it conflicts with B.P. 129, then it is the special law that will prevail. Certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus. They are actions incapable of pecuniary estimation but they are not exclusively cognizable a Regional Trial Court. So the provision in B.P. 129 which allocates to a Regional Trial Court exclusive original jurisdiction over actions which are not capable of pecuniary estimation admits of several exceptions. And these several exceptions are also found in B.P. 129. So not all actions incapable of pecuniary estimation are cognizable only by a Regional Trial Court. There are such actions not capable of pecuniary estimation which are allocated not to a Regional Trial Court but to other courts under the provisions of B.P. 129.
With respect to real actions, that is title to or possession of property… this is now qualified by the amendment to B.P. 129 which expanded the jurisdiction of inferior courts. These are the actions involving title to or possession of real property: accion reinvindicatoria, accion publiciana… they are cognizable by a Regional Trial Court exercising exclusive original jurisdiction as long as the assessed value of the property is more than P20,000 or P50,000, as the case may be. So you have to relate it to the expanded jurisdiction of the inferior courts. But with respect to unlawful detainer and forcible entry – they are also actions involving possession of real property – then they are always cognizable exclusively by an inferior court, regardless of the assessed value of the property. Is it possible that an action is a real action and at the same time one that is not capable of pecuniary estimation? The answer is also yes. We have such actions. They are real actions but they are also incapable of pecuniary estimation. A good example is foreclosure of real estate mortgage since the property in mortgage to be foreclosed is a mortgage constituted over real property, then that foreclosure of real mortgage is a real action but, at the same time, it is not capable of pecuniary estimation because the issue to be resolved by the court – by the foreclosure court – is always this issue: does the mortgagee (the plaintiff) have the right to foreclose? That issue is not capable of pecuniary estimation. So what do we do in determining jurisdiction if an action is both a real action and one that is incapable of pecuniary estimation? What factor will be determinative of the jurisdiction of the court? Will it be the assessed value of the property or will it be the fact that the issue involved is not capable of pecuniary estimation? Again, this is a settle issue. The Supreme Court said that if an action carries the feature both of incapable of pecuniary estimation and a real action, like foreclosure of real mortgage, the determinative factor is the feature of incapable of pecuniary estimation. So it is a Regional Trial Court that will always have jurisdiction over foreclosure of real mortgage even if the assessed value of the property sought to be foreclosed is only P1,000. As long as the action is foreclosure of mortgage, the action is exclusively cognizable by a Regional Trial Court. So if you find in one action the 2 features which could be determinative of jurisdiction – incapable of pecuniary estimation and real action – the determining factor will always be that characteristic that it is not capable of pecuniary estimation. So it is a Regional Trial Court that will have jurisdiction. The feature of foreclosure of mortgage as a real action will only be important in determining the venue of the action but not the jurisdiction of the court. A similar action which applies the same principle is expropriation of a piece of land. Expropriation of a piece of land is also a real action because it involves title to or possession of real property. But expropriation of a piece of land will not take into account the assessed value of the land sought to be expropriated for purposes of determining jurisdiction over the case. According to the Court, expropriation, although it could be a real action, is also an action that is not capable of pecuniary estimation. So expropriation of real property, even if the assessed value again is P1,000, will always be cognizable by a Regional Trial Court.
When it comes to personal action under B.P. 129, the determining factor will be the amount sought to be recovered if it is purely a claim for money. Or if it is recovery of personal property, it is the value of the personal property according to the complaint. But when it comes to a pure collection suit – that is, the creditor is interested only in collecting money from the defendant – there are exclusions given in the amendment to B.P. 129. Excluding charges, interests, attorney’s fees, and damages. So the determining factor in a complaint for the recovery of money, in so far as jurisdiction of court is concerned, will only be the principal sought to be recovered. So that if the amount sought to be recovered by the plaintiff in his complaint against the defendant is P1,000,000 – a total of P1,000,000 – the conclusion that the case is cognizable by the Regional Trial Court will not be correct. A complaint to recover the totality of P1,000,000 could be cognizable exclusively by an inferior court if the P1,000,000 is the aggregate of the principal, the interest, the costs, the damages, the attorney’s fees… then we have to find out the principal which the plaintiff seeks to recover. If the principal is only P200,000 but P800,000 represent interest, damages, costs, and other excluded items, that will be cognizable by an inferior court. That is now settled.
Supposing that the complaint is for the recovery of damages. You know very well that in a complaint to recover damages, what is sought to be recovered is always money in terms of pesos and centavos. But under the amendment to B.P. 129, we should exclude the item of damages. Supposing the complaint is purely for damages, and the plaintiff seeks to recover actual damages, moral damages, temperate damages, exemplary damages… How will we now ascertain the jurisdiction of the court? We cannot use the rule of exclusion because what the plaintiff seeks as are relief is the recovery of damages. Let us say that the plaintiff seeks to recover P100,000 actual damages, P500,000 moral damages, and then another P500,000 exemplary damages. The aggregate will be P1.1M but the complaint says that, principally, the plaintiff seeks to recover actual damages of P100,000. With what court do we file that complaint? Again, this is settled. It should be with the Regional Trial Court. When it comes to complaints purely for damages, the determining factor, in so far as jurisdiction of courts is concerned, is the aggregate amount of damages – the totality of the damages. So even if the complaint has specified the amount of damages for each aspect – actual, moral, exemplary, temperate damages – the court that will acquire jurisdiction is the court that has authority to rule on the aggregate totality of all the damages claimed by the plaintiff.
With respect to recovery of personal property… For instance, the recovery of a car. Do we take into account the assessed value of the car in order to ascertain the jurisdiction of the court? The answer is no. B.P. 129 and the amendment to B.P. 129 takes into account the assessed value for purposes of jurisdiction for real properties. With respect to personal properties, the assessed value of that personal property has nothing to do with jurisdiction of the court. So instead of using as a standard the assessed value, when it comes to personal property, the determining factor will be the value of the personal property according to the complaint. In other
words, in our complaint for the recovery of a car, replevin for instance… If the plaintiff wants the case to be tried by the Regional Trial Court, all that he needs to do is state in his complaint is that the value of the car is P800,000 although it may not be true. Although it may be a false figure. When it comes to personal property, we always rely on the variation given by the plaintiff in his complaint. So the jurisdiction of the court will depend solely on the allegations in the complaint. Whether the allegation is true or false, the jurisdiction will be determined by the figure given in that complaint, with respect to personal properties. Supposing the defendant challenges the valuation given by the plaintiff in his complaint by telling the court that the car could not be worth P800,000 because it is a 30 year old car… the true value of the car is only P100,000. And then the defendant is willing to submit evidence to show the true value of the car. Will the court entertain the defendant’s move? No. The court will not. The jurisdiction of the court will be based solely in the allegations in the complaint. In civil cases, after the court has acquired jurisdiction over this particular complaint, relying on the allegations contained in the complaint, it is very likely that, after trial, the evidence submitted by both sides will convince the court that the true value of the car is really P100,000. Can the Regional Trial Court decide the case although it is now the conclusion by the Regional Trial Court that the value of the car is only P100,000? The answer is yes. If a Regional Trial Court acquires jurisdiction over a complaint to recover a car which, according to the complaint is valued at P800,000, the Regional Trial Court continues to exercise jurisdiction over the case until it is finally decided, regardless of the finding of the court that the value of the car is only P100,000. You know that principle very well. That is called adherence to jurisdiction. Once the court acquires jurisdiction over the car, it cannot be ousted of that jurisdiction. It will continue to exercise jurisdiction over the case until the case is finally adjudicated. The only means by which we can oust the court – the Regional Trial Court – of jurisdiction over the case is if Congress enacts a law saying that the jurisdiction of the court will not be based solely in the allegations in that complaint. In other words, if Congress decides to abandon the principle of adherence to jurisdiction then it is possible that the RTC will be deprived of jurisdiction. But as long as the principle of adherence to jurisdiction is not abandoned by Congress, then if the court acquires jurisdiction over a particular case, the exercise by the court of the jurisdiction of that case continues until that case is finally decided.
With respect to inferior courts… Notwithstanding the expansion of the jurisdiction of the inferior courts… Meaning to say that in the expanded jurisdiction of inferior courts, practically all cases that can be decided by a Regional Trial Court can now be decided by an inferior court, depending only on the amount involved… upon the value of the property. So real actions – accion reinvindicatoria, accion publiciana – they are all cognizable by inferior courts now depending upon the assessed value of the property. Even estate proceedings can now be entertained by an inferior court under its expanded jurisdiction. Does it mean to say that an inferior court which exercises expanded jurisdiction can now be treated as a court of general jurisdiction? It’s still a court of limited jurisdiction. It can only take cases that are given to it by substantive law. The provision of B.P. 129 which makes a Regional Trial Court as a court of general jurisdiction is not given to an inferior court. In B.P. 129, in the
enumeration of cases exclusively cognizable by a Regional Trial Court is an item which says the Regional Trial Court shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all action that are not especially assigned to any other court. That provision in B.P. 129 is not contained in the allocation of jurisdiction to inferior courts. So inferior courts continue to exercise jurisdiction only over cases that are assigned to it under B.P. 129 and special laws, or amendment to B.P. 129.
You will also notice that in B.P. 129, with respect to the vesting of authority to inferior courts, there is an identification in Sec. 33 of what we call the totality test in determining jurisdiction. In Sec. 33, the totality test is just a proviso with respect to ascertainment of jurisdiction of courts. The totality test given in B.P. 129 is more encompassing than the totality test given in the Rules of Court. We also have a totality test in the Rules of Court. That is in Rule 2. There is a totality test with reference to the section of joinder of causes of action. If you are going to compare the totality test given in the Rules of Court, under the section on joinder of causes of action, the totality test in the Rules of Court appears to be of a more limited scope. In B.P. 129, the totality test refers to all claims of causes of action that are embodied in 1 complaint, whether they pertain to the same or different parties or they arise out of the same or different transaction. X X X If you compare it to the totality test in Rule 2, the totality test in Rule 2 speaks only about causes of action for money. The totality of money claims will be determinative of the jurisdiction of the courts.
In B.P. 129, with respect to inferior courts, we also meet the term delegated jurisdiction to inferior courts. And also the interlocutory jurisdiction to inferior courts or special jurisdiction to inferior courts. In delegated jurisdiction, the inferior court acts as if it is a Regional Trial Court in deciding land registration and cadastral cases which are contested or which will not be contested. If contested, the limitation is the value of the contested property. If uncontested, the inferior court can act as a land registration court or cadastral court without any limitation. But B.P. 129 is very clear in saying that if an inferior courts as a land registration or cadastral court, the decision of the inferior court is appealable to the Court of Appeal, not to a Regional Trial Court. Which is the rule that we follow in B.P. 129.
That is the delegated jurisdiction of an inferior court. In habeas corpus proceedings, there is also a mention of an inferior court trying a habeas corpus proceeding. It does not mean to say that habeas corpus is cognizable also by an inferior court. The authority of an inferior court to entertain a petition for habeas corpus refers to a situation where a petition for habeas corpus is filed with the proper court – usually a Regional Trial Court. But there are no judges available to act on the petition. But that petition for habeas corpus is filed, still, with a Regional Trial Court which has jurisdiction over petitions for habeas corpus. So the petition for habeas corpus is filed with the Regional Trial Court but the clerk of court finds out that there are no RTC judges that are available – they are absent or are on leave – that can entertain a petition for habeas corpus. This is the remedy provided in
B.P. 129. Attention to habeas corpus cases is urgent under our laws. In fact, habeas corpus proceedings are always given preference by law. So if there are no RTC judges that are available, the next best thing to do X X X is to transfer the petition filed already with a Regional Trial Court to an inferior court. That provision in B.P. 129 does not authorize the filing of a petition for habeas corpus directly with an inferior court. A petition for habeas corpus filed directly with an inferior court can be challenged on jurisdictional grounds because B.P. 120 does not vest unto an inferior court an authority to entertain a petition for habeas corpus. It is only under circumstances where there are no other RTC judges available to entertain a petition for habeas corpus. X X X the judge can now analyze and study the propriety of issuing the writ of habeas corpus.
We need a break in the meantime but before we have a break, I will give you this riddle and then you try to answer it. Just like the riddle in grade school X X X. The question is: who am I? I am just an object. A face in a crowd. Nothing outstanding about it… about my form… about my look. But, usually, I’m between 4 inches to 8 inches long. And both genders, both men and women, young or old, adore me. And then I, on one end… I have a forest of X X X but my friends usually tell me that I am like a soldier X X X because I am on call 24 hours a day. If there is no assignment given me, I just hang around… I just lie down doing nothing. But when I’m giving a specific assignment, I see to it that I’m always ready to complete the X X X. And when I am at work, I usually go back and forth and… that is warm and that is dark. And then when I’m through with my job, my assignment, I always see to it that I give out a sticky X X X white X X X and then I return to my X X X and then just hang around and just lie doing nothing. Who is this person or object?
Before we leave jursidiction altogether, You have to know the meaning of primary jurisdiction and residual jurisdiction
Residual Jursidiction is found in appealed cases particularly Rules 41 and 42. It is the jurisdiction enjoyed by the trial court to act on certain matters even if the case is already on appeal. It is well explained in Rules 41 and 42. So it is not correct to assume that if a case is decided by the trial court and the aggrieved party perfects an appeal on time and the jurisdiction over the case is now assumed by the appellate court, like the Court of Appeals, it is not correct to assume that the trial court is divested entirely of jurisdiction even if there is already a perfected appeal. In Residual Jursidiction, the trial court continues to exercise jurisdiction over ceratin matters for a very limited period of time. And after the expiration of that period, absolute jursidiction over the case will now be assumed by the appellate court.
In Primary jurisdiction, this involves quasi judicail bodies, what happens in Primary Jurisdiction is that congress enacts a law which vests jurisdiction under the quasi judicial body to try and decided cases which are cognizable by regular courts under the provisions of BP 129. The reason why congress usually enacts these laws
is that congress feels that the quasi judicial body is better equipped in order to decide disputes between the litigants. A good example of a Primary Jurisdiction conferred by substantive law is the jurisdiction given to a quasi judicial body called HLURB, this board is given original jurisdiction, in some cases exclusive original jurisdiction, to adjudicate cases of disputes between a subdivision buyer and a subdivision developer, so if a subdivision buyer feels aggrieved for the non-performance by the developer of his commitments under the contract, the buyer should not file the complaint with a regular court although under BP 129 the regular court may have jurisdiction, usually for breach of contract the remedies given in the CC would Specific Performance, Recission of Contract or damages for both cases or damages alone. In this rule on Primary Jurisdction, these actions will not be assumed by the regular court although BP129 gives the regular court such authority particularly the Regional Trial Court. The jurisdiction is given by substantive law to the quasi judicial body HLURB because the HU presumably is better equipped to adjudicate contests between the subdivion buyer and developer so that there is a breach by the subdivision developer of his commitments to the buyer, what the buyer will do is to file a complaint with the HLURB.
There is one case however decided by the SC, where the subdivision developer filed a compalint for ejectment against a subdivision buyer because it was the buyer who allegedly violated the terms of the contract and the developer wanted to recover possession of the property purchased by the buyer. The subdivision buyer challenged the authority of HLURB to entertain a complaint for ejectment which under BP 129 is exclusively cognizable by an inferior court. The SC said the primary jurisdiction of the HLURB does not extend to complaints for ejectment filed by one party against the other. So that in the case of primary jurisdiction vested by substantive law to quasi-judicail bodies, the authority of the quasi-judicial body is interpreted strictly. Ejectment could really be a dispute between a subdivision buyer and developer but then when the purpose is to recover physical possession of the property or even in accion publiciana, the court said that it is the regular court who has authority over the complaint.
Now we go the Rules of Court. In analyzing the provisions of the 1997 Rules of Court you should always bear in mind the consitutional limits that are provided by the Constitution to the authoity of the SC on the rules on pleadings, practice and procedure, like the ROC, the rules should be uniform in all courts of the same grade and then the rules should provide for a speedy and inexpensive determination of the case and then the rules should not increase, decrease or modify substantive rights. So if there is any rule on procedure which violates any one of these limitations given under the Consitution, we may then properly challenge the applicability and validity of these rules of procedure. There was one litigant who challenged the validity of a Rule in Criminal Procedure, it’s Rule 115, and Rule 115 of Criminal Procedure really speaks not about procedure but more of the rights of the accused. So the party said that Rule 115 should be excluded from the Rules of Court for it is not procedural but substantive. It modifies, increases or decreases the rights of the person given by substantive law. The SC denied
the petition, saying that while the authority of the SC deals with the procedure, pleadings and practice and that substantive rights should not even be covered, the court said that it is practically impossible for rules of procedure to be devised without incorporating certain provisions that are concered with substantive law. The standard should be if we take the ROC as a whole: are the Rules of Court primarily procedural in character? if the answer is yes and there are certain provisions which speak about substantive rights or it’s coverage, that should not be the justification for deleting the said provisions in the rules of court. The other justification given by the SC is the Civil Code, the CC is substantive law but if we go over the CC, it contains provisions which are not substantive in character, they are also procedural but that does not make CC a procedural law, it’s still a stubstantive law. Some articles cited by the court which refer to procedural matters are articles concerning the issuance by the court of a preliminary mandatory injunction or preliminary injunction in cases of unlawful detainer and focible entry. But the SC said that we cannot simply say that the CC is no longer substantive simply because there are certain articles that speak about procedural matters. So if you come across a provision of the rules of court which violates substantive law in the sense that the rules of court reduces substantive rights or modifies substantive rights there is a possiblity that this provision could be challenged or deleted from the rules. For instance, in special procedings like the settlement of estate of a deceased person there is a provision in the rules concerning the filing of claims. You are familiar with the rule that when a person dies and then there is a settlement proceeding that is commenced with the court, the creditors for money arising from a contract which is expressed or implied, should file their claims against the estate, they have no right to file a civil action for the recovery of the money claim against the estate of the deceased or against the executor or administrator. Otherwise, if the money claim is not submitted within the period fixed under the rules, the claim of these creditors will be barred. and then there is another provision that says that if the deceased is a solidary debtor together with another one who is still alive, it is the duty of the creditor to file a claim against the estate for the recovery of the whole indebtedness. That is a violation of a principle under the Civil Code which says that when there is solidary relationship between two debtors, the creditor is given by the CC the authority to file a complaint against any one of the solidary debtors for the recovery of the whole indebtedness. So, if we apply the Civil Code provisions, the creditor in the example could file a complaint for the recovery of the whole obligation against the solidary debtor who is still alive, he does not have to file a money claim against the estate of the deceased solidary debtor. In several cases which raised this issue, the SC said that the CC provision saying that a creditor can file a complaint against any one of the solidary debtors will not be affected by the provision of the Rules of Court concerning the filing of claims. This is an example of a provision in the Rules of Court which substantially reduces the right given by law to a creditor to file a complaint against any one of the solidary debtors for the recovery of the whole obligation.
These 1997 Rules of Court should be interpreted liberally according to the Rules. But the interpretation is not a liberal interpretation in favor of the plaintiff or in favor of the defendant. A court being an impartial party to the
dispute. The meaning of a liberal interpretation is to promote justice, to carry out the duty of the SC under the limitations given under the Constitution.
Under the Rules now, a civil action is always commenced by the filing of a complaint. That is the general rule. There are certin civil actions usually special civil actions which are not commenced by a filing of a complaint. Instead, we file for a petition. But it does not really matter whether we file a petition or a complaint when an action is sought to be commenced. The filing of a complaint has given rise to the action that when a compalint is filed, the court automatically acquires jursidiction over the person of the plaintiff. So in that action, the only problem concerning the jurisdiction is the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the defendant. But the latest decisions, last year the court decided a case where it was held that even if a complaint is filed before a competent court, if the one who filed the complaint is not authorized to do so, the court does not acquire jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff. In fact, the court said that the court does not even acquire jurisdiction to try or adjudicate the case. So the rule that we follow in our procedural principles which says that the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff through the filing of a complaint will not necessarily give jurisdiction by the court over the person of the plaintiff. The court can examine whether or not the filing of the complaint is authorized by the plaintiff. If it is not authorized by the plaintiff, the court will not acquire jurisdiction over the plaintiff. The court will not even acquire authority to decide the case. The court is absolutely without any jurisdiction to try and decide the case if it is demonstrated that the filing of the complaint is without authority given by the plaintiff.
In a complaint properly filed in court, that is one filed by the plaintiff himself or with the authority of the plaintiff, of course the plaintiff under rule 10 has the right to amend that complaint provided that an answer has not yet been filed by the defendant. The amendment made under Rule 10 is a matter of right. If the plaintiff amends that complaint by impleading another defendant, then the court will have nothing to do except accept the complaint since the amendement is a matter of right. And in so far as that new defendant is concerned, the date of the filing of the complaint will relate back to the date when the original complaint was filed unless a new cause of action is introduced in that complaint. In which case, we don’t make use of that relating back doctrine. The classification of actions under the rules is very simple as civil action, a special civil action, criminal action and special proceedings. In the definition of a civil action, it is very clear that we do not necessarily follow the definition of a cause of action under Rule 2. In Rule 2 a cause of action is defined as a violation by the defendant of a right belonging to the plaintiff. So for a cause of action to accrue, the plaintiff must allege that he has a right and that the defendant has violated such right. The indication given by this definition is that the right holder must wait for a person to violate his right before he can have a cause of action to bring an action in court. That concept of a cause of action should always be related to the definition of a civil action under section 1. The definition of a civil action does not require a prior violation of a right so that the rightholder may have a justification to go to court. The definition of a civil action is one by which a person sues another for the enforcement or protection for a violation or a threat to violate such right. So there is no need for an actual
