Bhamati catussutri

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THE BHAMAT1

CATUSSUTRl

S. S.

SURYANARAYANA

SASTRI

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OSMANIA

UNIVERSITY

LIBRARY

CallNo.

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AccessionNo. '

A

K

V//&

Author

Title

This

book

should bereturned

on

or before thedate

FOREWORD

IT is _{a pleasure} to

know

that Vacaspati's Bhftmatl

on

the first four Satras will

now

be available to

students of Indian Philosophy in

an

edition _brought

out in the orthodox style, with a criticalintroduction,

Sanskrit text, English translation

and

notes. All those interested in Indian Philosophy will _{be deeply}

grateful to

Mr,

S. S.

Suryanarayana

Sastri

and

Dr. C,

Kunhan

Raja

ofthe Philosophy

and

the Sanskrit

Departments

of the

Madras

University for _bringing

out this very useful work.

While

_{S^nkara's Bhftsya}

is_fairly well

known among

studentsofIndian Thought,

the laterthinkers are practically neglected. Vacaspati

presents

one

great section of

Advaita

Vedanta

and

his

BhamatI

is second in

_importance

_only to S'ankara's

The

Introduction, besides _dealing

with

the date

of the

work

and

its _place in the

Advaita

_tradition,

gives

a

clear

and

careful accountofthecentral ideas

VI

its _{compatibility}

with

reason, the natureof

_Avidya

and

its seat, release ultimate

and

relative

and Brahman

and

_Is'vara,

_among

others.

There

are side reflections

on

similar viewsin

Western

_{Thought which}

are

_always

interesting.

The

work

will not _only

add

to the

reputation of its authors but also _help to popularise

Vacaspati's

views

on Advaita Vedanta.

Andhra

_University, Waltair S. R,

CONTENTS

PAGE

Foreword

...

v

Introduction . . . .

.$* ix

Detailed TableofContents . . . liii

Textand Translation:

Superimposition

....

1 Desireto

Know

. . .

.63

Definition . , . .

.119

Scripture-source . . .

.137

Harmony

. . . .

.145

Notes

...

247 Additional Notes . . .

.297

List ofAbbreviations . . ,

.313

Corrections . . . .

.315

INTRODUCTION

I.

DATE AND

DOMICILE

OF

VACASPATT

ON

the strengthof areferencein_{the Ny&yasuclnibandha,}

it is

now

_generally admitted that

_Acarya

_Vacaspati

Mis'ra _belongs to the period

round

about A,D. 841-842

(898

Vikrama

Era).

1

The

last verse of the

Bhdmatl

refers to a

_king

_Nrga,2

While

it is held

_by

some

that

this

king has

not yet

been

identified, others

:!

believe

him

to

have been

a

_king

of Mithila,a predecessorof

Nanyadeva,

who

reigned about

1019

Vikrama

Era, i.e.,

A.D,

962

; it is said that thispredecessor is

named

in

some

inscriptions as Kiratadhipati,

and

Kiratas are well

known

to be those

who

had

human

vehicles. Itis in

any

case certain that there should

have

been

a

_good

interval

between

him and

Udayana

(A.D. 984)

who

wrote

the _{Nyftyavftrtikatfttparyatlkftpariguddhi, as}

a

sub-commentary

on

_{Vacaspati's NydyavftrtikaMparyatlkd.}

1

SeeDas_{Gupta, History}ofIndian PhilosophyII,107.

*

Nares'varS yaccaritH-'nuk&ramicchantikartum naca_pSrayanti

tasmin _{mahipe mahanlya-kirtau}s'rimannrge'k&ri

_may

_nibandhal?.

Seealsop.481,underII,i,33.

"See

Mm.

Dr. _Ganganath Jha, Sanskrit Introductiontohis

edition of the _{Snnkhyatattvakaunwdl,} "_Nfga" means"one

who

has a

human

vehicle,"andkiratas arewell

known

tobe such. The same writer _gives

_many

reasons, some fanciful, for_{holding that}

That

our _{author belonged} to

somewhere

in

Behar

or

_{Bengal would}

_appeartobe evident

from

the_repeated

reference to

mustard

oil. Ithasalso beensaid thatin

what

corresponds to ancient Mithila there is a_city

called

Bhama

(BhamatI)

and

a

tank

ofthe

same

name.

It

_may

be interesting to note a_{story current}in

paijcjit-tradition about the

name

"

Bhamati

". Inthose

days

(as

even

todayin parts of

Upper

India),it

would

appear to

have

been

_customary

to hold learned

discussions

on

suchoccasions asmarriages. Vacaspati,

who

listened to such a discussion

on

theoccasion of

his

own

_marriage,

was

so struck

_by

_{the vagaries}of

dialecticians that

he

resolved _straightaway todevote

himself to the task of _setting forth authoritative

expositions of all the dars'anas. So great

was

his_zeal,

so

_mighty

the task

and

such the _patient

and

tireless

devotion of his wife that the _couple

had

grown

old

before _Vacaspaticould writefinisto hislabours.

Then

alone did Vacaspati realise the

_magnitude

bothof his

neglect of his wife

and

of his wife'sself-sacrifice

;

and

as

a

_tardy

measure

_{of reparation,}

_{he gave}

her

name

to

the last

and

greatest of his _works, so that she could

live

on

_perpetually in the

_BMmati,

_though

not inthe

bodies of children born of her.

The

_story is so _pic*

turesque, so typical ofthescholar's neglect

and

the true

scholarlyrecompense, that itdeservesto betrue.

II.

WORKS

The

works

of _{Vacaspati are}

_enumerated

_{in the}

XI

the

_Nyayakaqika

(a

commentary

on

Maijdana's

Vidhi-viveka), the Brahmatattvasamiksd, (a

commentary

on

Havana's

Brahmasiddhi), the Tattvabindu(adiscussion of

_language

in its relation to meaning), the

NyQya-v&rtikatatparyatikci (a

commentary

on

Udyotakara's

Ny&yav&rtika), theNyclyasuclnibandha (perhaps written

as a

_supplement

to the Tatparyatlkft), the

S&tikhyatatt-vakaumudi

(a

commentary

on

Is'vara Krija's

Sftnkhya-karika), the Tattvavaisaradi (a

commentary

on

Vyasa's

Yogabhctsya)

and

the

Bh&mati

(a

commentary

on

S'ankara'sS'arlrakamlmaipsabhasya).

1

The

Bfitimati has itself

been

commented

_{on by}

several other works.

The most

notableof these isthe

Vedantakalpataru

by

Amalananda

(13th

Century

A.D.),

This

work

in turn

formed

thesubject of

two

commen-taries, the Parimala of

Appayya

Dlksita (16th

Century

A,D.)

and Abhoga

of Laksmlnrsirjiha (17th

Century

A.D.).

The

_Abhoga

is written in the _light of theParimala

and sometimes

criticisesit.

Other commentaries on

the

BMmatl

are (1) the Bhamatlvyftkhya or the

Rjupra-kftstika

_by

S'rlraiiganatha otherwise

known

as

Akharid-ananda

2

; (2) the Bhftmatitilaka*; (3)

and

the

Bhamativitisa.

4

1

All the works have been publishedwith_{the exception}of the

Brahmatattvasanrtkffi, not even a manuscript ofwhichhas been foundsofar.

*

This has been published in part at Calcuttaby

Mahamaho-padhyayaN.S,

Anantak^a

Sastrl.

3

Manuscripts of this work are found in the Government

Oriental Library, Madras.

4

Mentioned by Das Gupta, History of Indian Philosophy,

Xll

ill.

RELATIONS TO

OTHER

WRITERS

The

name

of the Bhftmatl isidentified with

one

of

two

main

streams of S'ankara interpretation.

Vftcaspati

owes

the

major

part of

what

is distinctive

in his teaching to

Mandana's

Brahmasiddhi.

But

as

the views starting

with

Padmapada

are

known

asthe

tenets of the Vivarana-prasthana, the

views

that

started

with

Mandana

passed current as thetenets of

the Bhamatl-prasthana. Vacaspati

draws

largely

on

the Brahmasiddhi,

and sometimes on

the_{Pancapcidika,}

wherever

necessary or possible, Striking verbal

resemblances to the former

work

are indicated in the

notes;a

few

oftheresemblances tothePaficapcidikd are

noted here:

bhasyam

prasannagambhiram

;

(ahankara

as)

idam-anidam-rupam

; mithya-s'abdo 'pahnava-vacanati;

s'arlram

eva

s'arlrakam s'arirake _bhavalj s'arlrako

jlvab;

bhik^u-bhayan

na

sthalya

anadhis'rayanam

; so

'yam

santi-karmani vetalo 'dayafr;

anvaya

possible

even without

reference to asti-kriya as in

1

The references are to _pages 1,18,4,40, 63, 91,and97 ofthe

PancapUdikn (Vizianagaram Sanskrit Series). The statements on

pp. 63 and 91 of the PancapUdikfi are well-known _proverbial

expressions; what is striking is the use ofthembyboth writers

in the same context. The interested student will easily find the

corresponding pages ofthe BhUmatl. Some ofthecriticisminthe

Bhamatl would seem to be _expressly directed _against the

doctrines of the _{PaftcapBdf&B;} see the _{Kalpataru on I,}

iii, 17 (p. 298) and on I, ii, 26 _(p,264).

We

owe this reference to

Mr. T. R. Chintamani (Journal of Oriental _{Research, Madras,}

Xlll

IV. SfoUTi

AS

PRAMANA

For

Vacaspati, asfor all adherentsof

any

orthodox

school of Indian Philosophy,

Revealed

Scripture (S'ruti)

is the final _authority in matters of the Spirit.

The

Spirit (or Intelligence, Consciousness, the Universal

Self,

Brahman)

isthat

whereby knowledge

is_possible;

it is itself

knowledge.

It _cannot, without _losing its

self-hood,

become an

object of

knowledge.

Itis _manifest,

since but for its manifestation the

whole

world

would

be blind.

But

it is not manifested

by

another,since

that

would

lead only to

an

infiniteseries oftheblind

leading the blind. It isself-luminous

and

self-manifest.

Perception,

which would

have

no value but for the

mani-festation ofthe self-luminous intelligencein

_{and through}

it, could not

have

thatintelligence itself forits_object.

Much

less

can

inference

make

thatits sphere, since itis

dependent

on

concomitances

between

the perceived.

Brahman

can

be

known

only through intuition

and

that only

by

gifted

and

disciplined souls,

whose minds

have

been

purified

by

Scripture-ordained duties

and

concentrated

on

the _{Scripture-taught reality.}

Such

minds

will

by

first

_hearing

of the only real,

one

without a second, reflecting

on

it

and

_refuting all

objections to the doctrine, contemplating the real

uninterruptedly for a long time

and

with

faith, realise

Brahman.

The

supreme

pramana

is _Scripture,

_though

it

may

and

indeed has to be _helped

_by

_{reasoning, as}

an

auxiliary, in order to

remove

the doubts that

XIV

subordinated to the explication

and

substantiation of

Scriptural truth

and can

in

no

sense_{be independent.}

Several _{questions naturally} arise out of this:

(1) Is such

an

advocacy

of _Scripture

and

sub-ordination of reason consistent

with

a _truly

philosophi-cal attitude? (2)

How

can Scripture maintain

non-difference to be the truth

where

it conflicts with

perception

which

cognises a world of _plurality

and

difference?

When

there is aconflict

between

_{the two,}

should not _perception prevail over the other? ₍₃₎ In

any

case, is not Scripture cutting atits

own

basisin

denying

authoritativeness to _perception, since there

would

be

no

Scriptural knowledge, if words

and

their

senses

were

notfirst_perceived? ₍₄₎

What

isthe nature

of perception, ifitdoes not cognise a world_{of diversity}?

1. _Authority is claimed _{by Vacaspati not}forall

Scripture as such, but only for _{purportful Scripture.}1

For, in Scripture itself there are

_many

_restatements

and

explanatory

and

eulogistic passages,

which

cannot claim tobe authoritative,except perhapsin

_dependence

on

other _passages

which

lay

down

something

new

and

purportful.

The

marks

determinative of _purport are

well

known;

they are: the

_harmony

of the initial

and

concluding passages, repetition, novelty (e,e., not

being otherwise

made

out), fruitfulness, glorification

by

eulogistic passages or

condemnation

by

deprecatory passages

and

intelligibility in the light of_reasoning.

It is clear

from

an

application of these teststhat the

1

tatparyavati hitfrutUipratyaksidbalavati,nas''ruti-m5tram

ananya-labyahs;

abd&rtha\i.

XV

entire _Scripture has _non-duality for purport

The

Chftndogya teaching, for instance, begins

with

pre-mising the secondless unity of _reality

and

goes

on

to

identify thisreality

with

theselfof the pupil instructed,

in the

words

"

That

Thou

art"; the

same

teaching is

repeated nine-fold to

show

that it is _important

and

that it is the

_primary

_purport ; nor is this identity

something

established in _ordinary experience, likethe

heat of fire, in

which

case the Scriptural declaration

would

be a

mere

re-statement; it isa statement ofthe

novel

and hence

is _purportful; it isfruitful,since the

knowledge

of it_helps

one

_{to pass}

_beyond

transmigration;

the

knowledge

of it is_{praised suitably}

and

itsopposite

is

condemned

;

and

the identity of the self

with

the

absolute reality is also found to stand to reason.

1

Though

the _application of reason figuresbut as

one

of

the

marks

of purport,it willbe seen

on

closer

examina-tion that reason really plays a

much

more

_important

part.

There

are disputes

even

as to

which

is the introductory passage

and

which

the conclusion. In the vast

body

of

_knowledge

called _Scripture it is_possible

to choose

a

beginning

anywhere

and

call that the introductory passage; such

a

choice

may

be foundto

favour a dualist rather

than

a non-dualistinterpretation.

As

_against this the non-dualist

has

to

make

out that

all such beginnings are intermediate or _secondary

(a

van

tara), that the realbeginning

(paramo-'pakrama)

1

On advaita as the purport of all Scripture, seetheBh&maft

on I, iii,33 (especially, p. 343, Anantakr.sna S'&strfs edition);

mention of creation etc. is _{not part}ofthe_primaryintention; see

XVI

is _elsewhere,

and

that this favours non-dualism. Similarly of the conclusion.

The

interpretation of

these in

harmony,

again, callsfortheexercise of reason.

And

the

need

of reason will be similarly found in

determining

what

is _{purportful repetition}

and what

is

not, in distinguishing

and

assigning the fruit, in the

ascertainment of the really novel,

and

in finding out

what

is _glorified

and

_{by which}

passage. So that the

authoritarianism ofthe advaitin is _{unphilosophical only}

on

the face of it, involving as it does the

abundant

exercise of reason. _True,

he

says reason findsa _place

only in so far as it does not conflict with_Scripture ;

but in the end, reason itself has to judge

when

it

conflicts

with

Scripture

and

when

itdoes not.

2,

But

how

can

_Scripture over-ride _perception

which

cognises difference as real?

The

assumption here isthat perceptionis ourfirst

and

basic instrument

of

knowledge

;

and

what

isbasic

may

not be rejected.

The

advaitin replies that

no

doubt it is_first,but it is

not basic

and

unsublatable. Indeed,

where

there is

sublation, it isthe earlierthat issublated.

The

initial

statement or _cognition has

no

doubt _{greater value,} because of its _position,

But

there are exceptions to this rule.

Where

a subsequentcognition arises _validly,

and

it cannot arise except as _sublating

what

_goes

before, the earliercognition should necessarilybe

taken

to be sublated; for example, the cognition ofnacre could not arise, if the original cognition as silver

persisted; hence, the nacre-cognition is

admitted

to

sublate the earlier _{silver-cognition. Thus, the}

xvii

of _perception

would

of itself be

_{an argument}

for its

sublation

by

the _{subsequently resulting Scriptural}

knowledge,

especially

when

the latter ariseswithout

depending

on

the validity of the former. In

any

case, as

we

shall see presently, it is not truethat

difference is_perceived.

3.

But

_{surely Scripture} is

_{dependent on}

_perception

for its _very existence1 _Scriptural

knowledge

would

not be possible except forthepriorperception of

words

and

their senses.

The

_reply to thisisthatallthat is

required is_{the existence, the empiricalreality,} of

words

and

their _senses, not their absolute_reality.

Even

in

ordinary experience

we

derive

what

we

treat as valid

knowledge

from

what

is notreal butis _{superimposed.}

Naga

means an

elephant, while

naga means

atree;

the difference in the _length of the

vowel

*

a' isa property not of

*

a' _itself, but of the audiblesound

(dhvani)

which

manifests it;

and

yet the

knowledge

which

results

from

this superimposed difference isnot

delusive.

Sounds

and

their senses arebut manifesters

of

_{knowledge which}

is eternal.

The

former

need

not

and

indeed

cannot

be co-eternal

with

thelatter; so

long as _they exist

and

manifest

_knowledge,

their

func-tion is fulfilled;

an

insistence

on

theirabsolute reality

is vain

and

unreasonable.

4.

Does

not _perception cognise difference?

The

answer

is in the negative.

What

we

know

as

determinate perception does

appear no doubt

to _cognise

difference.

But

this is preceded

by

indeterminate

xvni

thesingle positive undifferentiated

continuum

presented

by

indeterminateperception.

Such

perceptionis

compar-able to the state of feeling

mentioned

by

Bradley,

wherein

there is a

_harmony

ofthe that

and

the what,

existence

and

content; it is broken

up

becauseof the

very finitude offeeling.

1

For

the dialectic

on

difference, Vacaspati is

indebted to

Mandana,

most

of

_{whose arguments}

are

found

briefly

summarised

in the

Bhamati?

The

principal

argument,

which

will bear repetition here,

is that difference cannot be _real, since it

can

be

neither ofthe nature of_{things nor}

an

attribute ofthem,

If difference

were

of the very nature of things, there

would

be

no

things tobedifferent ; for,

whatever you

may

say

is

one

thing will

_immediately

break up,

because difference isofits nature; similarly of

each

of

its _parts;

you

cannot rest

even

inthe primal

atom

;

there is _nothing

which can

betreated as a unit

and

in

1

It is also comparable to what is describedin_{the following}

lines ofTennyson:

Thebaby

new

toearth_{and sky}

What

timehistender_palmisprost

Against thecircleofthebreast

Has_{never thought that}"Thisis i",

Butashegrowshe gathers

much

And

learnstheuseof"I

"

and"

me

"

And

finds"I

am

notwhatIsee

And

otherthan the thingsItouch".

So roundshetoa separate mind

* _Fromwhence

clear

memory

may

begin

Asthroughtheframethatbindshimin

Hisisolationgrowsdefined.

2

On

I,i,4(pp.174-179). Thenotesinthat connection

_may

also

XIX

the absence of

_any

unit there

can

be

no

difference

either. _If, then, difference be said to be

an

attribute,

isthis attribute different

from

its substrate? Ifnot,it is

of its _{very nature,}

and

we

have

really the former

alternative alone. If the attribute is different, then

we

have

three units

on

our hands, thesubstrate, the

difference

which

is its attribute

and

the difference of

the attribute

from

thesubstrate.

And

the

moment we

start _inquiringinto the relation ofthisdifference to the

substrate on the

one

hand

and

the attribute

on

the

other,

we

are

launched

on

an

infinite _regress.

The

notion of difference then is_{unintelligible,}

and

since it

pre-supposes the identity at least of a unit that is

different, it is reasonable to hold that difference is

superimposed

on

abasis of identity.

May

not both identity

and

difference bereal?

Do

we

not indeed find this _synthesis

_abundantly

_in

experi-ence?

We

do

no

doubt find their

apparent

synthesis in

experience, but thatis

no

justification for the uncritical

acceptance of both.

To

say that both _identity

and

difference are manifest

cannot

compel

us to

say

that

they are both real, unless all

_attempt

_{at systematic}

thinking is tobe

abandoned.

A

crown

and

abracelet,

it is _said, are different

and

yetnon-different, different

as products, but non-differentin respect of their cause,

gold.

But

if

_they

are really non-different,

he

who

wants

a

crown

must

besatisfied

with

the bracelet ; if

you

say that there isdifference too

between

crown and

bracelet,then there

must

be difference

between

bracelet

XX

And

if,because ofthe difference

between

the

crown

and

bracelet,

he

who

wants

the first does not

want

the

second,

why

should it not be that

he wants

it _too,

because of their non-difference?

Such

in bare outline

is the criticism of the

view

of difference

cum

non-difference (bheda-'bheda).1 Identity

may

be found

only with difference,but philosophy

cannot

stop

with

juxtaposing

them

; either should be taken to be

more

fundamental

than

the other,

and

the advaitin has

shown

sufficient cause for not _treating differenceas

fundamental.

What,

then, is the _goal of

_knowledge

? Is itthe

pre-rational stage of cognition, analogousto feeling in

Bradley's

system?

Obviously, it

cannot

be,for,

on

the

pre-rational supervenes the rational, introducing its

distinctions

and

doubts.

The

goalof

_knowledge

cannot

be

_any

such unstable

_harmony.

For

him

who

has attained that, there is _{perfect peace,}

no

more

return

to the relational world of diversity

and

distraction.

The

final cognition,

though

characterised as _perceptual

and

indeterminate,

cannot

then be ofthe

same

nature

as the indeterminate _cognition of the child

and

the deaf-mute.

Between

the two, there are _only

two

characteristics in

_common,

the

_immediacy

of_cognition

and

its non-attributive nature. All _determinate

cog-nition is attributive; the subject is

known

to possess

a

name,

a class or

a

quality. In the indeterminate

1

Thecriticism ofbheda-'bheda occursunderI,i,4 (pp.175178).

AmalSnanda takes it to apply to Bh&skara, Theargument?are

in substance identical with Mariana's in the Brahmasiddhi

XXI

cognition of the child,there is

no

distinction of subject

and

_predicate at all. In the final_perception,

we

_pass

beyond

the distinction of subject

and

predicate, to

understand the identity underlyingboth,not the

mere

attribution of

one with

respect to the other.

A

typical

cognition of this character is the recognition

"

Thisis

that

Devadatta

".

What

is asserted isnot the

posses-sion of

an

attribute

_by

a subject,but the identity of

Devadatta

seen at a different time

and

_placewith the

Devadatta

seen here

and

now,

The

_judgment

is

essentially

an

identity

judgment

not

an

attributive one.

And

yet it is not bare identity thatisaffirmed, but

identity as qualified

by

the differences of time

and

place. If the differences

were

really attributes of

Devadatta,

forming

part of his essential nature, the

identity

would

be impossible. It istherefore said that

the differences of time

and

place are upalaksanas,

qualifications per accidens,

and

the identity asserted

is so _qualified.

The

difference

between

this

and

the

bare identity of the pre-rational cognitionconsists in

the stability, certitude

and

freedom

from

doubt ofthe

former.

For

it has

been

mediated

; it has passed

through

doubt

and

difference

and

is rich

with

their

significance,

though

they themselvespersist

no

longer,

not being ultimately real,

The

attributive

_judgments

of determinate cognition

have

fulfilled their _purpose

by

extending,

harmonising

and

consolidating the

original

datum

of

knowledge.

What

happens

at the

final stage is the realisation of _{the unity}

and

identity

XX11

to disruption

from

within or _without, as at the

pre-rational level This is the realisation ofakhan(lartha,

the impartite sense,

which

is non-relational innature (sarnsarga-'navagahi-jMnam), not because it is

infra-relational, but because ithas

_{taken up and}

transcended

relations.

Nor

need

one

feel that difference

and

relations

have

not

come

in for fairplaysince _they are

treated

_merely

_{as qualificationsper accidens}; for,

what

matters, the signification, isconserved

even

in the case

of

an

upalaksana.

The crow on

the top ofDevadatta's house serves to identify the house for

him

who

seeks

it ; the identification is thesignificance; that isnever

lost,

though

the

crow

_may

fly

away

and

theattribution

of the

crow

sitting there is _only a qualification

per

accidens.

1

It is _easy to fall into the error ofholding

1

There is little discussion ofthe doctrine of akhandartha in the Bhnmatl itself. But it is adverted to inthe_{Kalpataru, even}

in the course of the first four sutras; andthedoctrineisofsuch

vital _importance to advaita that at leastthispassingmentionhas

to be made. The view that thefinal_cognitionischaracterised_by

freedomfromdoubtanddelusionandthatitis_qualifiedperaccidens

by thedifferencesiselaborated at greatlengthintheAdvaitasiddhi.

VScaspati's failure to discuss akhandSrtha is _{susceptible of}oneof

the following explanations. For him, as for Mandana, verbal testimony is not of itself the cause ofimmediateknowledge. The cognition resulting from such testimony has to be contemplated

with faith, unintermittently and for a long time beforethefinal

intuition results, From the sentence there results but a mediate

cognition which starts _{the indispensable process ofprasankhyana};

it would therefore seem _unnecessary to insistonthe sentencetoo

conveying a sense that is _impartite. Another _possible reasonis

that, unlike Man<Jana, Vacaspati does not holdto_{the sphota-vada,}

the doctrine that _meaning is one and _integral and thatitisbut

revealed graduallyinthespokenlettersandwords.

He

would seem

tohave more_sympathywiththe

AssociatipnistandtheBehaviourist

explanations of the _acquirementofmeaningthanwith an

explana-tion like that of the Gestalt _{psychologist.} Thejuxtapositionof

such adoctrinealongsidethat ofakharxjarthawould haveappeared,

XX111

that the indeterminate _cognition is the pre-rational

and

the _{pre-relational,} that it isbut

_knowledge

of the

bare subject

without

its attributes, the bare

stem

without its modifications.

The

relations

and

the

attributes

and

the modification all count in the final

cognition,

though

they

cannot

count as such, as

independently

and

absolutelyreal.

The

_{logical theory} of _Bradley

and

_Bosanquet

is _generally identified

with

the _predicative

view

of judgment.

Judgment,

according to the former,

relates

an

ideal content to a subject in _reality.

The

aspects of the that

and

the _what, existence

and

content, exist

_harmoniously

in _feeling, but

the

_harmony

is _imperfect because of the finitude of

feeling.

Each

aspect tends to outrun or _{exceed the}

other.

Thought

tries to cure the defect

_by

a

homeopathic

method. It accentuates the _separation

between

the that

and

the what, sunders

them

inorder

to _bring

them

together

more

effectively.

The

that thus sundered

becomes

the logical subject,while the

what

is

the logical predicate. But, elsewhere,

he

holds that

reality itself is the _{logical subject of every judgment.}

Now,

obviously, reality as a

whole

isnot a

mere

that;

it isthe perfect

harmony

ofthe that

and

the what.

Nor

of akhan<Jartha is_{primarily intended}toshowthatstatementsmade

in _{Scripture, despite} their prepositional form involving subjects,

predicates and relations, make known the one and the

supra-relational,not the

_many

in relation.

A

questionofsomeimportance

is

how

words inapropositioncanhave anidenticalimportand_yet

be _{non-synonymous}; it is discussed at some _{length by most}

advaita writers and is _briefly referred to _{by Man<}ana;} the

XXIV

is the predicate, logically considered, a

mere

what, a

bare content. All this

mention

of sundering

and

homeopathic

treatment

seems

then

wide

ofthe

mark,

a

defect

which

Bradley himself recognised in the

_Essays

on

Truth

and

_Reality}

What

is characteristic of

judgment

is_{the presence}of

an

ideal element. Ifreality

alone

were

present in the

judgment,

there could be

no

judgment,

since the latter isrelationalwhile the former

is _{supra-relational.}

Such

relationsas are affirmed

must

be within reality.

But

no

judgment

establishing such

relations alone

can

claim to absolute truth,since the

predication in every case

would

be not of _reality,but

of

what

is in _reality. In order to

_approximate

to

finality, then, the

judgment

should seek toidentify the

ideal with the real ; the identity appears,as itwere, in

a

relational form, thatof predication.

The

predicate of

the

_judgment

isneither

_something

other

than

the_real,

nor a_{single aspect}ofthe real

taken

in abstraction

from

existence ; it is

something

less

than

thereal, in thatit

comprises inadequately

harmonised

aspects of existence

and

content.

That

_judgment

is

most

true

which

1

^Reference

may

be madein particular to pp.316and333ofthe

Essayson TruthandReality. It isnotclaimed that theviewhere explained is _{expressly adopted byBradley}; butitwouldappearto

be in consonancewithhis_metaphysicalprinciples,andfavouredby

a great part of what he_{saysin his later writings.} Ofparticular

interest in this connection are his rejection of the doctrine of

'*

floating ideas

"

andoftheview thatthesubjectisa"merethat".

Forthe Bradleianviewof errorexplainedinthe_{next paragraph,}see

Appearance and Reality, 2ndedition, pp, 193,194,particularlythe

following:

"

We

havecrossed thethreadsofthe connectionbetween

our '

whats*

and our '

thats,' and have thus caused acollision,a

collision which disappears when things are taken as a whole,"

Bradley's anyathakhySti, like that _{provisionally} accepted bythe

XXV

identifies

with

_reality, asthelogical subject,apredicate

which

requires the least

amount

of _readjustment or

supplementation. In essence, the function ofthe

judg-ment

is true _{identification,} not the predication of

an

attribute.

Such

a

view seems

more

in accord with the

fundamental

position of Bradley as well as his

own

expressed dissatisfaction

with

the theory of

_judgment

formulated

by

him

earlier.

And

the approximationit

makes

to the doctrine of

akhandartha

isnot without

interest.

One

may

note in _{passing the Bradleian theory} of

erroras acrossed reference

and

itssimilaritytothe

view

of error as

_{anyathakhyati}

(apprehension as otherwise).

It

_may

be

remembered

that

one

of the

_examples

Bradley gives of error is the

judgment

"Roses are green".

The

error is _possible because ofa confusion

between

the flower

and

theleaf; theleavesare green,

while the flowers are red ; but the greennessofthe

former is _erroneously referred to the _flowers;

when

our

knowledge

extends so as to cover both leaf

and

flower

and

becomes

more

precise,sothat eachcolouris

referred to its appropriate substrate, theerror vanishes.

The

_{anyathakhyati}

view,

though

attributed to the Logicians, has

some

popularity

with

Advaitinstoo ip

the explanation of

_{sopadhika-bhrama,}

delusioncaused

by

the _presence of

an

external adjunct.

For

example, the

white

crystal seen as red isso seen because the redness of the flower in proximity to it is _erroneously

referred toit.

And

the whiteshell isseen to_{be yellow,}

XXVI

the _rays of light

from

the eyes;

and

the yellownessof

the bileis_erroneously referred to theobject

apprehend-ed

_by

those rays oflight. This

view

isso

much

to the

fore in _{Vacaspati's account}of _{super-imposition that}

he

seems

to be a _supporter of _{anyathakhyati.}

And

Amalananda

has to rescue

him

from

thischarge

by

pointing tothe explanationofthe mirage,

where

at least

we

have

not a crossed reference, but a pure creation

which

isnot determinable as either real or unreal.

1

V.

PRIMAL

NESCIENCE

The

stream

of_{indeterminable superimpositions}is

be-ginningless, sothat it isreasonableto look forthe cause

of

each

_{superimposition} in

an

earlier_{superimposition.}2

But

there

must

be a

fundamental

vice,

an

original sin,

which

is _responsible for the _{superimpositions} of the

diverse

and

the relational

on

the one

and

_the

supra-relational.

Granted

relationing,

we

can

understand the

dependence

of

one

relation

on

another; granted

parti-culars,

we

can

understand

their causal dependence.

Back

of therelations there isa_relationing;

back

ofthe

particulars there isa _{particularising.} Thisoriginal sin

is _primal nescience, the ignorance that is the cause

(mQla-'vidya or karana-'vidya).

Dependent

on this

1

svarOpeflamaricyambho mtsavScaspater raatam anyathSkhyStirisiS

*

sye

*

ty anyatha, jagrfmrjan&h.

Kalpataru, p. 24.

"In this _Vacaspati differs from PadraapSda,

who

would go

straightaway to primal nescience as the cause of all

xxvn

are derivative ignorances (tala-'vidyas or

'vidy&s);

and

individual delusions are products of

these.

These

delusions are sublatable

_by

other appearancesof the

same

gradeof reality asthemselves;

the _cognition of

a

stick

_may

take the _place ofthe

cognition of a _snake,

where

in truththere isneither

stick nor snake. Derivative ignorances are sublatable

by

cognition of the objects to

which

_{they relate;}

ignorance about nacre is

removable by knowledge

of

nacre; primal nescience is

removable by knowledge

of

the

_supreme

_reality alone;

hence

it persists

up

to the

realisation of

Brahman.

Particularising ceases only

with true

_knowledge,

the

knowledge

ofthe universal,

which

is, notoutside of,but

above

particulars.

Two

difficulties at least

_may

be raised to the con-ception of mula-'vidya.

The

brilliant dialectic of

advaitins like

_{Gaudapada and}

S'ankara

has

shown

the

unintelligibility of the causal concept. It is not

ultimately real. It _obtains, ifatall, only in the

world

of_appearance.

In

the

phenomenal world

of particulars,

then,

one

may

be excusedfor_looking to

one

_particular

as thecauseor effectofanother.

But

what

isthe sense

of asking for a _{cause of the}

phenomenal

world

and

postulating primal nescience as that

cause?

Are

we

not

committing

the

same

fallacy as

_{Kant, who,}

after

confining the applicability of the causal concept to

phenomena,

proceeded solemnly to affirm

things-in-themselves as the causesof

_phenomena

?

The

_difficulty so _presented appears serious enough.

But

thisat least

XXV111

the cause suggested is not _{trans-phenomenal, but} is

itself

_phenomenal.

It is not _{suggested that nescience}

is

_noumenal,

while its _consequences

and

_productsare

phenomenal, though

degreesof unreality are recognised

between

the cause

and

the products, thesedegrees being

distinguished, as stated earlier,accordingto thenature

of the

means

_required forsublation. In_setting

_up

the

alleged causal relation,then,

we

are_{dealing withterms,}

both of

which

are

_phenomenal

and

_{therefore susceptible} ofthesaid relation. _{Further; thecausal relationship as}

between

_tala-'vidya

and

its_products isnotof the

same

kind as that _suggested

between

_mula-'vidya

and

the

tala-'vidyas. It is not _{suggested that mflla-'vidya} isa

cause_{in time, so}

much

asthe logical

ground

ofthe

tula-Vidyas, for the latter too aresaid to _{be beginningless}

(anadi).

Such

a relationship is not inconsistent

even

with the possession of a higher grade of _reality

_by

primal nescience; for, is not

Brahman

the substrate

of the entire world

-appearance? and

is not

Brahman

the absolute real?

The

relational world is the world

of _appearance. It hasas its

_ground

the non-relational ;

but it

_may

also be said to

have

_relating as its

more

proximate ground.

The

advaitin believes

and

rightly

believes _{in progressive}

_development

of

_knowledge.

He

would

concede the doctrine that the effect is

pre-existent in the cause, in order to lead the pupil

on

to

deny

the_separate existence of the effect

from

the cause.

He

would

concede the doctrine ofthe concrete universal

transforming itself into the _particulars,in order to lead

XXIX

an

illusory manifestation,

1

He

would

concede the

causing of delusions

_by

a _{primal nescience} in orderto

lead the pupil to reject finally the concept of cause.

The

distinction

between

causal

and

effected nescience

is but relative

and

there are notsufficientreasons to

disagree withit _{or reject} it.

Another

and

a

more

serious objectionisbased

on

the _{popular conception} of_{ignorance as}

mere

absenceof

knowledge.

For

the traditional _advaitin," nescience

or _ignorance is a positive entity,nota

mere

negation.

And

this

would

well accord

with

the positive natureof

error,

which

consists not in the

mere

absenceof

know-ledge, but in thepositive assertion of

something

else as

knowledge.

It

_may

be thought that itshould bea

non-dualist's business to reduce the

number

of entities to

one

; but this is a misconception. Reality for

him

is

one

; but its unity does not conflict with theplurality

of

_phenomenal

existents;

and

it has never

been

con-tended that _nescience,

_though

_primal, is

_anything

but

phenomenal.

Nor

may

itbesaid that in

_any

casethere

is

no

justification for ascribinga positivecharacter to

what

is _primarily, if not wholly, negative. For, if

ignorance

were

wholly negative, it could not

even

be

known

to exist. _Perception

would

_{not apply}thereto,

since

what

is _{perceived should be} in sense-contact,

and

a

mere

negation cannot be in contact

with

thesenses or

with

_anything

else.

Nor

can

absenceof

_knowledge

1

vivarta-vSdasyahipBrva-bhOmir

vedanta-vade pariijama-vadah, (Sank$epas'3rirakatII, 61.)

<J

XXX

be perceived as

an

attribute oftheself,since

an

attri-bute

can

be perceived only in the case ofasubstrate

that is in the _sphereof_perception; but the selfisnot

in the sphere of perception. Inference,

even

ifitcould apply,

would

give only

mediate

knowledge,

whereas

our experience of _ignorance is _immediate,in the

form

"

I did not

know

nacre; but

now

I

know

"

and

so

on

;

there is the further _difficulty that, being based

on

perceived concomitance,inference isnot _possible,

where

perception is_wholly ruled out.

Nor

is_{recourse possible}

to the

_pram&ia

called_{non-cognition (anupalabdhi)} ; for,

non-cognition

again can

giveonly

mediate knowledge

;

further, the self _{being incapable} of _perception, its

attribute too

cannot

be perceived, while non-cognition

applies only to thatof

which

_perception (or

some

other

means

of cognition) is_possible ; truly, there is

no

cogni-tion of non-existence, except

where

the substrate of

non-existence is _capableof _{beingperceived.}

But

we

do

have

_experience both of _ignorance

and

ofits

removal

by knowledge.

Hence,

ignorance (ornescience) isboth

positive,

1

and

indeterminable,

even

like nacre-silver.

VI.

PLURALITY

AND

LOCATION OF NESCIENCE

A

distinctive feature of _Vacaspati's advaita is

the recognition of a plurality of nesciences. If the

1

Vacaspati's recognition of the two avidySs is_apparentfrom

the very first line of his invocatory verse. There isnospecific

defence of the conception ofmnlS-VidyS. Someofthe_arguments here mentioned are based onthe_{I$tasiddhi, copies ofthe proofs}of

which were very kindly supplied bytheeditor,Mr.M.Hiriyanna

XXXI

world

be admitted to be a productof nescience,

when

nescience is _destroyed

on

the release ofa_{single jlva} the

world

should be destroyed for all other jlvas as well;

and

there should be

no

distinction

between

the

bound and

the released.

One

way

out of the difficulty

would

be to affirm theexistence of

one

jlva alone,all

other jlvas, the differences of teacher

and

taught,

bound

and

released, being all alike

_comparable

tothe

dreams

of the single jlva ; this jlva has not yet

been

released;

when

he

is released, the

world

too

would

of

course cease to exist.

But

such radical _solipsism is

unacceptable to _{the majority} of advaitins,

who

hold

that the distinction

between

the

bound

and

the

released

may

not be ignored, since Scripture declares

that certain souls

have been

released

and

disbeliefin

Scripture in such a vital

matter

as release

would

necessarily lead to the discrediting of _Scripture as

such.

A

plurality of jlvas

must

be conceded.

Our

experience

even

of our finite self-hood is

_through

contact

and

conflict

with

other selves.

These

are

no

doubt looked

_{upon by}

the sophisticated

mind

as

mere

not-self or inert

matter

; but primarily the conflict

and

the contrast is

with

other selves.

That

is

_why

the

Bhagavatpada,

in speaking of the reciprocal

superimposition of the self

and

the not-self, refers to

the latter as the concept

"

Thou,"

though one would

have

expected the author to refer to it as

"It"

or "

That

". Vacaspati's

own

non-dualism

willbe

found

to

_approximate

_very closely to

Berkeleyan

idealism,

XXX11

will be

found

to be all the closer in that both the

writersinsist

on

the existenceof

God

and

of

a

plurality

of spirits,

however

much

that

may

seem

to be in

conflict with the idealism they profess.

And

in so

far as

he

insists

on

the _{reality of}other _spirits,

and

of

our duties

and

obligations in relation to

them

up

to

the stage of final realisation, Vacaspati'sdoctrine (as

also that of

Mandana

from

whom

it is derived) should be characterised as realistic rather than idealistic.

1

The

stream

that culminates in the solipsism of

Prak&s'ananda

2 does not

have

its sourcein

Mandana

or Vacaspati ; its

more

likely source is the

view

that

Brahman

isboth the locus

and

the content_{of nescience,}

which

is but single,

and

that it is

Brahman who

through its

own

nescience

seems

bound

as it

were and

through

its

own

knowledge

seems

to be released asit

were.

3

1

In a sense,alladvaitaisidealistic,in thatthe materialworld

cannot have absolute and _{independent reality,} on_anyvarietyof

advaita. If such a world existed, its _veryexistence couldnot be

known. In the last resort, knowledge is _{possible only} because

the self is self-luminous andtheself is_knowledge. If _thingsare

known, it must be _{because they}arenotreallyotherthantheself, being super-imposed thereon; seethe samvid-bhnmatt,pp.34-38;

also the Brahmasiddhi, p. 7; ekatvaev&'yam drastr.-drs'ya-bhavo

'vakalpate, drastur eva cidatmanal\ tatha" tattia _viparintaSd

vivartanadva; nanatve tu vivikta-svabhavayor

asarnsr.sta-paras-para-svarUpayor asarabaddhayolikidr.s'odrastr-dts'ya-bhSvah?

*_{The author of the Vednntasiddhftntamukt&val}r

t> the

out-standing representative of VedSnta Solipsism orDr.stisrsti-va'da,

the view that perception of thingsiseither the creation ofthem

or is simultaneous with their creation; the latterview seemsto

havebeen favouredbyPrakSs'ananda.

3

Suchaviewismoreinaccordwith_{the teachingof Sures'vara,}

wrongly identified with Mandana. Sures'vara was an immediate

XXX111.

Of

the nesciences that constitutethe world there

should then be as

_many

as there arejivas.

When

a

particular jlva attains

knowledge,

his nescience is

destroyed

and

for

him

the world ceases tobe.

Other

nesciences,

however,

continue to exist

and

to bind the

souls _yet unreleased. It

_may

be possible to explain

the distinction

on

the basis of different capacities

(s'aktis) possessed

by

a

single nescience. Nescience

binds every jlva because in respect of

each

jlva ithas

a different _capacity to bind;

and

when

a particular

jlva is _released, that_particular capacity is lost,

though

nescience itself persists for otherjivas.

Though

such

an

_explanation is _{plausible, the unity} of

_avidya

is a

needless complication. It is said for instance that,

though

the pain in the footis_{not a pain} in_{the hand,}

the

hand

reaches forth to _pluck the fliorn

from

the

foot, because both

hand and

foot are

members

of

a

single

organism

and

thus there is

_community

of_feeling.

There

is

no

such

_community

of feeling

between

different

individuals since there is no

common

_organism

of

which

they are

members.

That

is

_why

Caitra does not feel

Maitra's painashis

own.

If thedifferent_experiencesof

Caitra

and

Maitra

were,

however,

products ofasingle

avidya, this

_may

discharge the functionsof a

common

organism

;

and

it

would

bedifficulttoexplain

why

Caitra

does not recall Maitra's painas if it

were

his

own.

1

1

This is a development of the advaitin'sexplanationof

non-recollection (ananusandhSna). It must be confessed that that

explanation does not appearto_{be thorough-going,}asit_apparently ignores the fact of individuals beingmembersof socialandother

XXXIV

The

ignorances thus

assumed

must

be located in the jlvas.

Brahman

who

is_pure

and

_perfect

cannot

obviously be the locus of defect;

and

avidya, the

material causeofall defects,isitselfthe greatest defect.

Apart

from this, it is the jlva thatis_instructed, that

strives

and

acquires the

_knowledge

which

destroys

nescience.

But

there

can

be

no

relation of_destroyer

and

destroyed except as

between

what

_occupy

the

same

locus.

The

_poison

drunk

_by

Caitra will not

remove

the life of Maitra.

Hence,

nescience

must have

the

same

locus as the

knowledge

which

_destroys it, i.e.,

the jlva,

But

it

_may

be _objected that the finitude,

transmigration

and

suffering of the _jlva, all that

constitute his _jlva-hood in short, are the products of

nescience; there

would

be

no

jlva except as the product

of nescience;

how

then

can

nescience itself reside in

the jlva?

The

_{attempted charge}

_{of reciprocal}

depend-ence willnot stand, forthe interaction of_ignorance

and

jlva-hood is_{beginningless,}

We

_{do not say} at

_any

time that ignorance

was

and

the jlva

was

not, or that the

jlva

was

and

ignorance

was

not. If itbestill _urged

that such

_dependence

isin the last resort unintelligible,

we

counter it with the question, "

why

expect in-telligibility in the caseofnescience?

"

Itis of_{the very}

essence of nescience to be _{unintelligible} in the last

resort: tad

eva

'

vidyanam

avidyatvam.

VII, IS'

V

AHA

AND

THE

CREATION OF

THE

WORLD

There

being a _plurality of _{nesciences, granted}

XXXV

are

bound

to be a plurality of worlds, In conserving

the authoritativeness of _Scripture,

we

seem

to

have

sacrificed the claimsof empirical usage,

which

demands

a _singleworld

common

toallsouls.

The

latter

demand

is, however, not imperative, since all thatis

needed

is

no

more

than

the

measure

of

_agreement

that exists

among

the different spectators of

an

illusion.

When

the _rope is seen tobe a snake,as it _were,

_by

a

number

of _people, the

_agreement

_among

them

does notprove

the existence of a_single objectivesnake.

What

does

exist without

happens

to beinterpreted

by

all of

them

in the

same manner

; ifthe

snake

existed objectivelyit

should not be possiblefor

some

_people tomistake itfor

a garland.

The

objectivity of the world, then, is

no

more than

the consilienceof illusions.

What

happens, then, to the

view

_accepted

_by

the

Vedanta

that

God

is the Creator of the

Universe?

Each

jlva

would appear

tobe the creator ofhisworld, through

and

out of _{the nescience abiding}in

him

; the

world is sustained

by

his nescience,

and

is_destroyed

with

its destruction.

The

true creator, sustainer

and

destroyer

would

thus

appear

to be the jlva himself.

If the world be considered to be created

by

a

_God,

that could be

no more than an

illusion,

on

a par

with

the world-illusion itself.

The

Creator

and

His

Creatorship

would

both be _figments of the creature's

imagination.

The

jiva is enthroned

_{on high and}

God

apparently reduced to _nothing.

But

such aconclusion

can

hardly beconsistent

with

the truetrendof advaita.

XXXVI

ultimate;

endow

Him

as

we

may

with the utmost

knowledge and

power,

He

still fallsshort of perfection,

since the Perfect is

_beyond

all attributes; greatnessis

significant only in relation to smallness, while the

Absolute is neither great nor small

and

is

above

relative predications, All this,

however,

is _very

different from the position thatIs'vara is_{a figment}of

the jlva's nescience.

On

the face of it, Vacaspati

would

seem

to be

more

idealistic

than

Berkeley,

who

conserved the independent reality of

God

along with that of other souls.

And

this is allthe

more

difficult

to

comprehend

in the case of _Vacaspati,

who

_begins

his

work

with

due

invocation to

_{Bhava, Kartikeya and}

Ganapati,

and

throughout his

work

_betrays littletrace of the atheism that is hisapparent conclusion.

There

is

no

doubt,

however,

that the_possibility of

an

atheistic

conclusion

must

have

struck

_many

of his critics, as

the author of the

_Kalpataru

is anxious to

make

out repeatedly that Vacaspati does recognise Is'vara

and

that they are fools

who

say there is

no

_place for

Is'vara in his _system.

The

truth of the

matter seems

to be this.

_Ignorance

is _bi-polar. It is located

somewhere,

i.e., it belongs to

some

one

;

and

it has a

content.

_Though

the jlva is the locus, the content is

Is'vara.

When

ordinarily

we

use the possessive

pronoun

'mine'

or _'his,

1

we

_imply

in the _person capacity to control

what

isreferred to.

Not

so in the case of _ignorance; I

mean

by

"

my

ignorance

"

the

ignorance that is in me, not the ignorance that I

can

xxxvu

my

limited

_powers

of

_knowing

and

acting,but to the

omniscient

and omnipotent

Being. Is'vara too

_may

be

said to be the aa'raya of ignorance, if

by

as'raya

is

meant

thecontent, but notits_{locus (adhara).}

When,

therefore, it is said that

_my

ignorance creates the

universe, it does notfollow that I createthe universe ;

rather does it

mean

that Ts'vara, the contentof

my

ignorance, uses the ignorance that is in

me

and

out

of that as material cause, evolves the world ; the

ignorance in me, the

_maya,

the prakrtiis _{the primal}

material cause ;

he

who

wields it for fashioning

the _world, the

_mayin,

the arch-juggler, is Ts'vara.

l

At

no

time then

do

we

have

Is'vara without the

jlvas or the jlvas without Ts'vara."

_Ignorance

is the

condition of the existence of both.

And when

there is

ignorance, it

must

exist

somewhere

and

it

must

have

a content.

When

thispolarity of ignorance isresolved,

ignorance itself is transcended

and Brahmanhood

fully

realised.

But

when

_ignorance exists, Ts'vara is the

image

which

is reflected, as it _were, in the various

nesciences.

The

reflections are the jlvas. Vacaspati

does not hold that the jlvas areliterally reflections,

1

We

areindebtedto_{Mah5mah6padhy&ya}Prof.S,_Kuppuswami S'astriar, M.A., I.E.S., for considerable help in_{understanding}this

part of the doctrine. See further on thesametopic,

MahSmaho-padhyaya N. S.Anantakr^naS'Sstri's_commentaryonthe

Vedftnta-paribhZn> first edition, Calcutta, pp.2-3. Reference

may

bemade

tothe_{Kalpataru,particularlyp.}404.

*Cp.

"The

personal God of India, Is'vara, issues from the

Brahman simultaneouslywiththe Stman, thesoul,andboth appear

together assimultaneousand mutuallydeterminedoccurrences. It

is the same in Eckhart's teaching. Only with and forthesoul,

with and for thecreature,is_God,Godas person,assubject,andas