for his DUI conviction in the District. The record establishes, and Mr. Eaglin ac-knowledges in his brief, that he pled guilty so as to get probation before judgment in Maryland in 2007.13 The fact that he served his probationary term without inci-dent and ultimately did not receive a DUI conviction in Maryland is immaterial. He did plead guilty to a DUI in Maryland, and he never obtained an order vacating his guilty plea.14
Mr. Eaglin suggests in his brief that such an order would have been unneces-sary, because in Maryland ‘‘a guilty plea which is immediately qualified as a proba-tion before judgment is no longer a guilty pleaTTTT As a practical matter once the limited conditions of probation are satisfac-torily completed by the accused, the guilty plea no longer exists. It is erased as if it never existed.’’ But he provides no au-thority for this assertion, and we see none. Although Maryland Code § 6–220 makes clear that an individual who receives pro-bation before judgment and successfully completes that probation does not have a conviction, nowhere does the statute
indi-cate that the discharge expunges a guilty plea and its attendant admission of guilt.15 Md.Code § 6–220.
In sum, Mr. Eaglin’s plea of guilty in Maryland to a DUI rendered him a prior offender under D.C.Code § 50–2206.13; the fact that he was never convicted in Maryland of a DUI is immaterial. Thus, he was properly sentenced as a prior of-fender and we affirm the sentence imposed by the Superior Court.
So ordered.
,
In re ESTATE OF Reuben E. WAUGH, Jr.; Gregory Waugh, Appellant.
No. 14–PR–635.
District of Columbia Court of Appeals. Submitted March 31, 2015.
Decided Aug. 27, 2015.
Background: Estate heir filed objections
to proposed distribution of estate in kind 13. Appellant’s Brief at 10 (‘‘In 2007,
appel-lant pleaded guilty to driving under the influ-ence TTTT’’); see also id. at 7 (acknowledging Mr. Eaglin’s guilty plea in Maryland). To be eligible to receive probation before judgment, Mr. Eaglin was statutorily required either to plead guilty or nolo contendere, or to receive a verdict of guilty. See supra note 7.
14. Had Mr. Eaglin received such an order, he
would not qualify as a prior offender under this court’s interpretation of D.C.Code § 50– 2206.13.
15. For this reason, Mr. Eaglin’s argument
that imposition of an enhanced sentence based on his Maryland DUI would violate the Full Faith and Credit Clause, an argument he makes for the first time on appeal, fails our test for plain error. See Thomas v. United States, 914 A.2d 1, 8 (D.C.2006) (explaining
that to prevail on an unpreserved claim on appeal, an appellant must show (1) ‘‘error,’’ (2) that is ‘‘plain,’’ and (3) that affected
appel-lant’s ‘‘substantial rights,’’ and (4) that ‘‘seri-ously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.’’). Mr. Eaglin argues that because he has no convic-tion under Maryland law, he cannot have a prior conviction under the D.C. DUI enhance-ment statute. But as we have explained, the application of the D.C. DUI enhancement statute turns not on whether Mr. Eaglin has a prior conviction, but on whether he has a prior guilty plea in Maryland. And Mr. Eag-lin has cited nothing to us to indicate his guilty plea was invalidated or that Maryland would not give any effect to his guilty plea.
See Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717,
730–31, 108 S.Ct. 2117, 100 L.Ed.2d 743 (1988) (‘‘To constitute a violation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause TTT, it is not enough that a state court misconstrue the law of another State. Rather, our cases make plain that the misconstruction must contradict law of the other State that is clearly established and that has been brought to the court’s at-tention.’’).
and to the amount of attorney fees paid by estate as reflected in accounts of manage-ment and distribution of estate. The Supe-rior Court, John M. Campbell, J., denied the objections. Heir appealed. The Court of Appeals vacated and remanded. On re-mand, the Superior Court explained that heir was required to submit a separate petition to challenge the attorney fees and that heir’s challenge to the proposed distri-bution of estate in kind was untimely. Heir appealed.
Holdings: The Court of Appeals,
Black-burne–Rigsby, J., held that:
(1) heir’s objection to proposed distribu-tion of estate in kind was untimely; (2) an interested party could petition for review of compensation by way of timely objection to an account; and (3) heir’s objections to accounts were
suffi-cient to challenge the compensation paid to attorney.
Affirmed in part and remanded with di-rection.
1. Statutes O1091, 1101
When construing a statute, the court must first look at the language of the statute by itself to see if the language is plain and admits of no more than one meaning.
2. Statutes O1080
The primary and general rule of stat-utory construction is that the intent of the lawmaker is to be found in the language that he or she has used.
3. Statutes O1151, 1242
Courts may look beyond the plain lan-guage of a statute in order to effectuate the legislative purpose as determined by a reading of the legislative history or by an examination of the statute as a whole.
4. Executors and Administrators
O504(3, 4)
Estate heir’s objection to proposed distribution of estate in kind was untimely, and thus heir’s right to object terminated, where heir filed his objection more than two months after receiving the proposal. D.C. Official Code, 2001 Ed. § 20–1102(d).
5. Executors and Administrators
O504(6, 7)
An interested party in proceedings for probate and administration of a decedent’s estate may petition for a compensation review by way of a timely objection to an account, under statutory provision govern-ing review of compensation of personal representatives and employees of the es-tate, so long as that party adheres to the other statutory requirements and court rules governing compensation review. D.C. Official Code, 2001 Ed. §§ 20–107(c), 20–753(a, b); Probate Rule 424.
6. Executors and Administrators
O504(5)
Estate heir’s objections to accounts of the management and distribution of dece-dent’s estate were sufficient to challenge compensation paid from the estate to at-torney who served as atat-torney for the estate, as copersonal representative with decedent’s common law wife, and as wife’s attorney in her efforts to establish that she was an heir of the estate, where heir un-ambiguously requested an evidentiary hearing and specifically objected to the attorney fees and to attorney’s continuing role as attorney for wife and copersonal representative of estate, and heir specifi-cally invoked statutes governing compen-sation and expenses of estate litigation and addressed reasonableness factors outlined in statute governing compensation review. D.C. Official Code, 2001 Ed. §§ 20–751 to 20–753(b).
James R. Holloway was on the brief for appellant.
Paul M. Toulouse, Washington, DC, was on the brief for appellees.
Before FISHER and BLACKBURNE– RIGSBY, Associate Judges, and KING, Senior Judge.
BLACKBURNE–RIGSBY, Associate Judge:
Over the course of supervised probate, and in two prior appeals before this court, appellant Gregory Waugh has raised mul-tiple challenges to the administration and distribution of the estate of his father, decedent Reuben E. Waugh, who died intestate. Appellant’s primary claim in the present appeal relates to compensation paid to appellee-attorney Paul M. Tou-louse, who has served in three capacities— as attorney for the estate, as co-personal representative with appellee Shanese L. Barber, the decedent’s common law wife, and as the lawyer for Ms. Barber in her efforts to establish that she is an heir of the estate. Appellant contends that the trial court erroneously denied his chal-lenges to Mr. Toulouse’s compensation be-cause appellant raised them by way of an objection to the co-personal representa-tives’ account of estate administration, rather than by a separate petition under D.C.Code § 20–753 (2001). On appeal, we address a question of statutory construc-tion: whether our probate statute permits an interested party to petition the court for a review of the reasonableness of com-pensation paid from estate funds by way of
an objection to the personal representa-tive’s account of estate administration, rather than by a separate petition. We answer in the affirmative and remand for proceedings consistent with this holding.1
I. Factual Background
Reuben E. Waugh, Jr., died intestate on July 17, 2008, leaving Ms. Barber and ap-pellant as potential heirs. Both potential heirs filed petitions for probate, but the trial court granted Ms. Barber’s petition after an evidentiary hearing in which it determined that Ms. Barber was the dece-dent’s common law wife. The trial court also appointed Ms. Barber as co-personal representative of the estate with her attor-ney, Mr. Toulouse, who also served as the attorney for the estate.
A. Appellant’s first and second ap-peals
In appellant’s first appeal before this court, he challenged the trial court’s deter-mination that Ms. Barber was the dece-dent’s common law wife, and we affirmed. See In re Estate of Reuben E. Waugh, Jr.; Gregory Waugh, Appellant, No. 09–PR– 1038, Mem. Op. & J. (D.C. October 19, 2010). Mr. Toulouse represented Ms. Bar-ber in that appeal and received compensa-tion from estate funds.
During and after the first appeal, Ms. Barber and Mr. Toulouse continued to ad-minister the estate in accordance with their duties as co-personal representatives. Pursuant to D.C.Code § 20–721 (2001),2 1. Appellant also challenges the trial court’s
determination that his objection to a proposed distribution of estate assets was untimely un-der D.C.Code § 20–1102(d) (2001). We ad-dress this issue briefly, and affirm.
2. D.C.Code § 20–721 provides:
Except as provided in section 20–731, a supervised personal representative shall prepare verified written accounts of the management and distribution of the dece-dent’s property at the times and in the manner prescribed in this subchapter. The personal representative shall file the ac-count with a certificate that there has been
they submitted two accounts of the man-agement and distribution of the estate to appellant and to the probate division for approval, the first on July 19, 2010 (‘‘First Account’’), and the second and final on April 29, 2011 (‘‘Final Account’’). Mr. Toulouse also provided appellant with a proposal to distribute the estate’s assets in kind, pursuant to D.C.Code § 20–1102(d),3 on March 25, 2011. In this proposal, Mr. Toulouse requested that appellant raise any objections to the distribution in kind within thirty days, though appellant did not meet this deadline.
Appellant’s only responses to the co-personal representatives’ communications came in the form of objections to the First and Final Accounts, filed pursuant to D.C.Code § 20–726 (2001).4 Appellant filed objections to the First Account on April 24, 2010, asserting, among other things, that Mr. Toulouse had abdicated his responsibility as co-personal represen-tative by failing to require supporting doc-umentation for the attorney’s fees paid to him for his services, and abdicated his
responsibility as attorney for the estate by failing to provide such documentation. Appellant filed objections to the Final Ac-count on June 1, 2011, renewing his objec-tions to the First Account and, for the first time, objecting to Mr. Toulouse’s proposal for distribution of the estate in kind as ‘‘unfair and uneven.’’ At the time of this filing, more than two months had elapsed since appellant received this proposal, and thus appellant had missed the thirty-day window in which to object to the proposed distribution, pursuant to D.C.Code § 20– 1102(d).5 The trial court denied appel-lant’s objections to both accounts without making specific findings, and appellant once again appealed to this court.6
In appellant’s second appeal, he chal-lenged the trial court’s denial of his objec-tions to the First Account and the Final Account, arguing error on the merits. Mr. Toulouse and Ms. Barber countered on procedural grounds, arguing that appellant had failed to file a petition challenging the reasonableness of compensation paid from the estate under D.C.Code § 20–753(a) 7
mailed or delivered to all interested per-sons, within the previous 15 days, a copy of the account with a notice that the account will be filed on or before a stated date.
3. D.C.Code § 20–1102(d) provides:
After the probable claims against the estate are known, the personal representative may mail or deliver a proposal for distribution to all persons who have a right to object to the proposed distribution. The right of any such person to object to the proposed distri-bution terminates if such person fails to object in writing received by the personal representative within 30 days after mailing or delivery of the proposal.
4. D.C.Code § 20–726 provides that ‘‘[a]ny
in-terested person may file an exception to an account with the Register within 30 days of the filing of the account. Such person shall mail a copy of the exception to the personal representative.’’ Appellant and the trial court refer to these ‘‘exceptions’’ as ‘‘objections.’’
5. See supra note 3.
6. Specifically, in its order approving the First
Account, the trial court stated that appellant’s objections were denied ‘‘[f]or the reasons stated in the opposition to the objection[.]’’ Similarly, in its order approving the Final Ac-count, the trial court handwrote ‘‘the objec-tions filed by Gregory Waugh are denied.’’
7. D.C.Code § 20–753(a) provides:
(a) On petition of any interested person (other than one who has consented after fair disclosure, and any person or entity claiming by or through such interested per-son) or on appropriate motion if adminis-tration is supervised, and after notice to all interested persons and hearing, the reason-ableness of the need for or scope of employ-ment of any person or entity employed by a personal representative including any attor-ney, auditor, investment advisor or other specialized agent or assistant, the reason-ableness of the compensation of any person
and that his objection to the distribution of estate assets was untimely under D.C.Code § 20–1102(d).8 See In re Estate of Reuben E. Waugh, Jr.; Gregory Waugh, Appellant, No. 11–PR–1427, Mem. Op. & J., 60 A.3d 455 (D.C. January 14, 2013). We concluded that the record was insufficient to assess the merits of either party’s assertions and remanded for the trial court to ‘‘further explain its rulings’’ and make the following inquiries:
First, were the objections appellant Waugh filed to the first and second ac-counts sufficient to challenge the attor-ney’s fees paid to appellee Toulouse for his legal work to establish and defend appellee Barber’s status as an heir of the estate, or was appellant required to follow a different procedure?
Second, assuming appellant’s objections were sufficiently preserved, should the estate be required to pay Toulouse’s at-torney’s fees for: services provided to Ms. Barber to establish her status as the decedent’s common law wife; services provided to Ms. Barber defending the ruling on appeal; and/or any other ser-vices provided to Ms. Barber in her capacity as heir, or putative heir, as distinguished from her capacity as co-personal representative?
Third, to the extent appellant seeks a different distribution of assets, is his claim barred by D.C.Code § 20–1102(d), or was his objection to the first or sec-ond account—or the combination of the
two objections—sufficient to raise and preserve this claim?
B. The trial court’s order on remand
On remand, the trial court answered the first and second inquiries by explaining that appellant was required to file a sepa-rate petition for a compensation review pursuant to D.C.Code § 20–753(a), and that appellant’s objections to the First and Final Accounts were not a sufficient sub-stitute.9 The process for reviewing an ac-count, the trial court explained, does not include a review of the reasonableness of compensation paid from the estate. Rath-er, it is an auditing process in which the Probate Division’s auditing staff ensures that the account balances and is supported by documentation and, if so, submits the account to the court for review and ap-proval. The Probate Division’s auditing staff has no authority to decide an issue or make recommendations to the court in re-sponse to an interested party’s objection to the account.
On the other hand, the trial court ex-plained that a petition for a compensation review filed pursuant to § 20–753(a) is meant to put all parties on notice that compensation paid from the estate is dis-puted and provides ‘‘a forum where both parties can submit evidence and a record can be established for the court’s consider-ation of the review petition.’’ Because ap-pellant never filed this petition, and
be-or entity so employed, be-or the reasonable-ness of the compensation claimed or taken by the personal representative for the per-sonal representative’s own services, may be reviewed by the Court. Any person or enti-ty who has received from an estate compen-sation for services rendered in excess of what the Court finds to be reasonable may be ordered to make appropriate refunds if such person or entity was given due notice of the petition and hearing, and the right to participate in such hearing.
8. See supra note 3.
9. Specifically, the trial court stated that
ap-pellant must file a ‘‘ § 20–753(b) petition,’’ referring to the process for requesting a re-view of the employment and compensation of personal representatives and employees of the estate described in § 20–753(a). Section 20– 753(b) provides factors for the court to con-sider in its review.
cause his objections to the First and Final Accounts were not a sufficient alternative, the trial court stated that the parties and the court were ‘‘entitled to proceed with the estate administration with the under-standing that the reasonableness of Mr. Toulouse’s attorney fees w[as] not at is-sue.’’ The trial court found that appellant had ample opportunity to file a petition in compliance with this statute, and conclud-ed that appellant’s failure to do so consti-tuted waiver of this right.
As to the third inquiry on remand, re-garding appellant’s objections to the pro-posed distribution of the estate, the trial court determined that appellant was re-quired to follow the procedure set forth in D.C.Code § 20–1102(d) and object to the proposed distribution ‘‘within 30 days after mailing or delivery of the proposal.’’ Id. The trial court explained that this proce-dure promotes efficient estate administra-tion by allowing the parties to address objections to a proposed distribution be-fore the proposed distribution plan is im-plemented, a concern that is particularly relevant where a hostile heir is involved. Because Mr. Waugh did not object to the proposed distribution within thirty days and instead challenged it in his objection to Final Account—filed more than two months later—the trial court concluded that Mr. Waugh had forfeited his right to do so and that his claim was time barred.10 This appeal followed.
II. Discussion
On appeal, appellant argues that the trial court erred by concluding on remand that his objections to the First Account and the Final Account were inadequate to preserve his challenges to the reasonable-ness of compensation paid from the estate
and to the proposed distribution of the assets of the estate. The trial court’s con-clusions, appellant argues, were entirely based on its own interpretation of the stat-utes implicated, and this interpretation al-lowed the trial court to avoid hearing ap-pellant’s claims on their merits.
[1–3] In the absence of prior
interpre-tation by this court, the trial court an-swered our inquiries on remand by engag-ing in a literal interpretation of § 20– 753(a) and –1102(d), and we review its interpretation de novo as applied to appel-lant’s claims. See In re Estate of Wilson, 935 A.2d 323, 326 (D.C.2007). In so doing, ‘‘[w]e must first look at the language of the statute by itself to see if the language is plain and admits of no more than one meaningTTTT The primary and general rule of statutory construction is that the intent of the lawmaker is to be found in the language that he [or she] has used.’’ Peoples Drug Stores, Inc. v. District of Columbia, 470 A.2d 751, 753 (D.C.1983) (en banc) (citations omitted). Yet we may also look beyond the plain language of a statute in order to ‘‘effectuate the legisla-tive purpose TTT as determined by a read-ing of the legislative history or by an examination of the statute as a whole.’’ Id. at 754 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). We turn first to appel-lant’s argument regarding the proposed distribution of the estate, which we ad-dress summarily.
A. Whether Appellant’s objection to the proposed distribution in kind was timely filed, pursuant to Sec-tion 20–1102(d)
[4] Section 20–1102(d) requires the
personal representative to ‘‘mail or deliv-er’’ a proposal for the distribution of the 10. The trial court also concluded that, in any
event, the proposed distribution was fair, as it allocated the estate’s assets in-kind between
appellant and Ms. Barber, who took assets valued at $214,620 and $212,700, respective-ly.
estate to those with a right to object. See § 20–1102(d).11 The interested parties must object to this proposed distribution ‘‘within 30 days after mailing or delivery of the proposal’’ or their right to object ‘‘ter-minates.’’ Id. We agree with the trial court that this timing requirement is a necessary aspect of efficient estate admin-istration and distribution because the per-sonal representatives must address any objections prior to moving forward with the associated transfer of property and assets. Appellant filed his objection to the Final Account, in which he challenged this proposed distribution, more than two months after receiving the proposal. We need not assess whether appellant’s deci-sion to challenge the distribution of the estate within his objections to the Final Account was appropriate under § 20– 1102(d) because appellant’s challenge, even if proper in form, was untimely.
B. Whether appellant’s objections to the First Account and Final Ac-count were sufficient to initiate a compensation review, pursuant to Section 20753(a)
In many cases, the first time that an interested party will discover the amount of compensation paid from estate funds to an attorney or a personal representative is in the personal representative’s written ac-count of the management and distribution of the decedent’s property, which it must deliver to all interested persons and file with the court for review and approval. D.C.Code § 20–721; D.C.Code § 20–731 (2001) (permitting parties to waive the re-quirement of filing accounts); see also D.C.Code § 20–722 (2001) (explaining the required contents of an account, including ‘‘each TTT disbursement and distribution of
assets of the estate’’). Interested parties may file objections to the account explain-ing why they take issue with the account, as presented, and the trial court considers these objections in deciding whether to approve the account. See D.C.Code § 20– 726 (‘‘Any interested person may file an exception to an account with the Register within 30 days of the filing of the ac-count.’’).
If an interested party would like to con-test the reasonableness of compensation paid from estate funds, however, that par-ty must request a compensation review. Essentially, this review is a statutorily-defined evidentiary process in which the court holds a hearing and considers the reasonableness of the employment or com-pensation of the personal representative and persons employed by the personal rep-resentative. See D.C.Code § 20–753(a); see also D.C.Code §§ 20–751 and –752 (2001) (providing for compensation from estate funds for the personal representa-tive and for any personal representarepresenta-tive who ‘‘defends or prosecutes TTT any pro-ceeding relating to the decedent’s estate’’). In pertinent part, § 20–753(a) provides that ‘‘any interested person’’ may file a ‘‘petition’’ or an ‘‘appropriate motion if the estate is supervised’’ seeking review by the court of ‘‘the reasonableness of the need for or scope of employment of any person or entity employed by a personal represen-tative including any attorney’’ and ‘‘the reasonableness of the compensation of any person or entity so employed.’’ D.C.Code § 20–753(a).12 If, after notice and a hear-ing, the court determines that a compensa-tion review is necessary, the court will consider a list of five statutory reasonable-ness factors before issuing its findings and 11. See supra note 3. 12. D.C.Code § 20–753(a) is provided in full
conclusions. See D.C.Code § 20–753(b).13 As the trial court explained, this process allows the court to conduct its compensa-tion review on the basis of a record con-taining evidence from all interested par-ties.
Appellant argues that an interested par-ty may satisfy the ‘‘petition’’ or ‘‘appropri-ate motion’’ requirement of § 20–753(a)— and thereby initiate a compensation re-view—by filing an objection to the person-al representative’s account of the estate. Our de novo review of Title 20, its legisla-tive history, and the Superior Court Rules of the Probate Division leads us to agree. Looking first to the plain meaning of the statute, the trial court’s assumption that a ‘‘petition’’ must be filed separately from an objection to an account is not untenable. Yet this assumption is based on the ab-sence of any mention either way as to whether a party may file a § 20–753 peti-tion within an objecpeti-tion to an account, not on any express or implied prohibition. No provision of Title 20, including § 20–753, and no rule of the Superior Court’s Pro-bate Division, prevents an interested party from including a request for a compensa-tion review within an objeccompensa-tion to an ac-count, so long as that petition complies with the requirements of Title 20 and the Superior Court Rules of the Probate Divi-sion. For probate purposes, the
require-ments for a ‘‘petition’’ are defined quite loosely:
Any request filed by an interested per-son, including any pleading described in this title as a petition, need not be in any particular format. It will be sufficient for the purpose intended as long as it is in writing and specifically identifies the particular issue or concern which the interested person wishes the Court to review or resolve.
D.C.Code § 20–107(c) (2001) (emphasis added). Super. Ct. Prob. R. 424 requires that a ‘‘petition for review of TTT compen-sation by the personal representative’’ for a ‘‘supervised or unsupervised’’ estate must be ‘‘filed pursuant to [Super. Ct. Prob. R.] 412 and TTT address the factors set forth in D.C.Code § 20–753(b) and any other factors deemed relevant.’’ 14 Id. Su-per. Ct. Prob. R. 412(a) adds that the petition ‘‘shall specifically identify the re-lief requested, the legal basis therefore (if any), and the reasons why such relief is believed to be appropriate’’ and ‘‘shall be accompanied by a Certificate of Service.’’ In other words, under these provisions, an interested party may satisfy the require-ments for a § 20–753 petition within a timely objection to an account if, within the objection, that party 1) specifically identi-fies that the relief requested is a determi-nation of the reasonableness of compensa-tion paid from estate assets and why such 13. D.C.Code § 20–753(b) provides:
In determining the reasonableness of any employment or compensation as provided in subsection (a) of this section, the Court shall consider the following factors (as shown in the verified statements of the per-sonal representative or of any other recipi-ent of such compensation), as well as any other factors deemed relevant by the Court: (1) the reasonable relationship of the com-pensation to the nature of the work per-formed;
(2) any estimate of such compensation pro-vided to the personal representative (or to the interested persons, in the case of
com-pensation to the personal representative who is also counsel for the estate);
(3) the reasonableness of the time spent, including the number of hours spent and the usual hourly compensation for the work performed;
(4) the nature and complexity of the mat-ters involved and difficulties encountered, and the results achieved; and
(5) whether or not all relevant time limita-tions have been met (or the reasons for any delay).
relief is appropriate, 2) addresses the fac-tors set forth in § 20–753(b), and 3) pro-vides a Certificate of Service.15 Where such a petition is present, the court and the personal representative(s), in review-ing an interested party’s objections to the account, would thereby be on notice of a request for a compensation review.
Acknowledging the tenability of the trial court’s interpretation, however, we also look to the legislative history of § 20– 753(a). The present compensation review procedure originated as part of the Pro-bate Reform Act of 1994, in which the Council of the District of Columbia (‘‘Council’’) sought to increase the efficien-cy of the probate process by ‘‘revers[ing] the existing presumption in the District of Columbia of court supervision of dece-dents’ estates.’’ D.C. Council, Report on Bill 10–649 at 2 (October 26, 1994). In-stead, the Act created a ‘‘flexible system of estate administration that removes the es-tate from court review and thereby re-duces the time and costs associated with court supervision[,]’’ except where inter-ested persons seek to ‘‘have any contro-versy or uncertainty involving an adminis-tration resolved by court adjudication or declaration.’’ Id. In keeping with this pur-pose, the Council added § 20–753 to ‘‘allow the court, after an objection by an inter-ested party, to review the reasonableness and scope of compensation for all services rendered the estate.’’ Id. at 8.
Our interpretation finds support in the Council’s objective of increasing efficiency by freeing the court from overseeing
as-pects of estate administration that it need not supervise, absent a request from an interested party. Id. at 8. In pursuing this objective, the Council noted that it did not intend to ‘‘circumvent, diminish or elimi-nate existing court procedures established to protect estate property for the benefit of interested persons.’’ Id. at 2. In our view, the Council’s objective would not be served by denying interested parties the protective procedure of a review under § 20–753 where a party submits a request for review that complies with the require-ments of § 20–753 within an objection to an account, rather than by a separate peti-tion. Indeed, because the account is likely the first time that the interested party will encounter the disputed attorney fees, per-mitting parties to petition for a compensa-tion review within an objeccompensa-tion to this ac-count would seem to promote, not impede, the Council’s objective.
[5] Accordingly, we hold that an
inter-ested party may petition for a compensa-tion review under § 20–753(a) by way of a timely objection to an account, so long as that party adheres to the requirements of Title 20 and the Superior Court Rules of the Probate Division, as outlined herein.
[6] Looking to the content of
appel-lant’s objections to the accounts in the present case, we note that in his objection to the First Account, he unambiguously requested ‘‘an evidentiary hearing requir-ing TTT [the] Personal Representatives to document and justify the transactions in 15. While § 20–753 requires that such
re-quests be filed by ‘‘petition TTT or on appro-priate motion if administration is supervised,’’ the distinction between a ‘‘petition’’ and a ‘‘motion’’ seems to be a distinction in name, not substance, due solely to the supervised status of the estate. The substantive require-ments for a ‘‘petition’’ described in the Supe-rior Court Rules of the Probate Division would therefore apply equally to a ‘‘motion’’ filed in a supervised estate. This
interpreta-tion is bolstered by D.C.Code § 20–107, which permits an interested person to ‘‘peti-tion the court for an order TTT to resolve a question or controversy arising in the course of a supervised or unsupervised administra-tion of a decedent’s estate,’’ and by Super. Ct. Prob. R. 424, which does not distinguish be-tween a ‘‘petition’’ or ‘‘appropriate motion’’ in stating requirements for initiating a com-pensation review in a ‘‘supervised or unsuper-vised’’ estate. See Super. Ct. Prob. R. 424.
this Account.’’ Appellant specifically ob-jected to the attorney’s fees, noting the absence of supporting documentation and arguing that the fees seemed to improper-ly compensate Mr. Toulouse in his capacity as attorney for the estate rather than as co-personal representative, which would not be ‘‘reasonable compensation for his services’’ under D.C.Code §§ 20–751 and – 752. Appellant objected to Mr. Toulouse’s continuing role ‘‘as both counsel for Ms. Barber in her capacity as a putative heir, and as co-personal representative of the estate.’’ According to appellant, ‘‘Mr. Tou-louse’s action of advocating on behalf of one interested party, and against the inter-ests of a second interested party, plainly violates his fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of all interested parties as co-personal representative.’’ With respect to attorney’s fees, appellant objected to ‘‘Mr. Toulouse’s billing the instant estate $52,616.98, at the rate of $375.00 per hour, for legal work presumably done as the retained attorney for Ms. Barber, one pu-tative heir, for appellate work on her be-half,’’ work that was ‘‘plainly in conflict with the right of Mr. Gregory Waugh, an undisputed heir, to the faithful service by Mr. Toulouse to all interested persons of the estate.’’
In his objection to the Final Account, appellant incorporated his objections to the First Account and added additional claims. First, appellant reiterated his ob-jections to ‘‘the glaring conflict of interest in the ongoing multiple roles of Mr. Tou-louse as counsel for Ms. Barber, co-person-al representative and counsel for the inter-ested parties in the estate, namely Ms. Barber and Mr. Gregory Waugh.’’ Ac-cording to appellant, there was ‘‘an obvious conflict of interest in Mr. Toulouse acting as both counsel for Ms. Barber in the cause before the Probate Court and on
appeal, and then appointing himself as counsel for the estate and charging the estate for his attorney’s fees before the District of Columbia Court of Appeals.’’ In this regard, appellant noted that a check for $46,156.28 seems to have been issued by Mr. Toulouse, as personal repre-sentative, to Mr. Toulouse, as counsel for the estate. Second, appellant repeated his claim that the attorney’s fees were unsup-ported by accounting or documentation. Third, appellant alleged that a $15,000 bal-ance of attorney’s fees had been used as a method of balancing out the proposed dis-tribution of estate assets.
Appellant’s arguments specifically in-voke §§ 20–751 and –752 and directly ad-dress the reasonableness factors outlined in § 20–753(b) that the trial court must consider in its compensation review.16 Specifically, appellant has addressed ‘‘the reasonable relationship of the compensa-tion to the nature of the work performed,’’ the correctness of ‘‘any estimate of such compensation provided to TTT the personal representative who is also counsel for the estate,’’ and the lack of documentation to determine ‘‘the reasonableness of the time spent.’’ D.C.Code § 20–753(b)(1)–(3). Appellant’s challenge to the lack of sup-porting documentation also encompasses the remaining two factors. See D.C.Code § 20–753(b)(4)–(5) (‘‘the nature and com-plexity of the matters involved and the difficulties encountered, and the results achieved’’ and ‘‘whether or not all relevant time limitations have been met (or the reasons for any delay)’’). In addition, ap-pellant presumably complied with the re-quirement of D.C.Code § 20–726 that he ‘‘mail a copy of the exception to the per-sonal representative[,]’’ as the perper-sonal representatives filed responses to both ob-jections.
Accordingly, we conclude that appel-lant’s objections to the First Account and Final Account sufficiently preserved his challenge to compensation paid from the estate and we remand for the trial court to hold a hearing and review the propriety and reasonableness of this compensation under § 20–753. See In re Estate of Mur-rell, 878 A.2d 462, 463–64 (D.C.2005) (re-manding for a hearing after the trial court, upon a properly filed objection to an attor-ney’s request for compensation, conducted no such hearing and ‘‘made no attempt to relate the compensation awarded to the factors enumerated in D.C.Code § 20– 753(b)’’).
III. Conclusion
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s conclusion that appellant’s right to chal-lenge the proposed distribution of the es-tate was time barred, but we remand for the trial court to hold a hearing and con-sider the reasonableness of compensation paid from the estate pursuant to § 22–753.
So ordered.
,
CONSTANTINE CANNON LLP, Appellant, v. MULLEN MANAGEMENT CO., INC., Appellee.No. 13–CV–977.
District of Columbia Court of Appeals. Argued Sept. 23, 2014.
Decided Sept. 3, 2015.
Background: Delaware limited liability partnership sued Delaware management company for breach of its lease. On
cross-motions for summary judgment, the Supe-rior Court, John Ramsey Johnson, J., ruled that the company had breached the lease and that the lease was not void even though the company’s certificate of author-ity had been revoked before the parties had signed the lease. After trial, the Court entered judgment in favor of the partner-ship. Company appealed.
Holding: The Court of Appeals, Beckwith,
J., held that lease was enforceable notwith-standing that it was signed after compa-ny’s certificate of authority was revoked for failure to pay fees and file reports. Affirmed.
1. Judgment O181(2)
Summary judgment is appropriate only when there are no material facts in issue and when it is clear that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
2. Appeal and Error O893(1)
Court of Appeals reviews the trial court’s grant of summary judgment de novo.
3. Corporations and Business Organiza-tions O3223, 3239(5)
Statute providing that the failure of a foreign corporation to obtain a certificate of authority to transact business in the District shall not impair the validity of a contract or act of such corporation, did not apply to a Delaware corporation whose certificate of authority had been revoked eleven weeks before signing a lease with a Delaware limited liability partnership. D.C. Official Code, 2001 Ed. § 29– 101.119(b).
4. Corporations and Business Organiza-tions O3092, 3239(5)
Reinstatement of a corporation’s arti-cles of incorporation or certificate of
