23novoice.pdf

in

London's Metropolitan

Strategic

Planning

Process

Judith Allen

London'sincreasinglyexpensive land

market

has intensified

demands

on

commerical

and

residentialland both within

and

outside the city center. These

demands

have

greatly affected the

poor

and working

class. Recognizing that the currentplanningstructuredoes not adequately address theneeds ofthesegroups, theGreater

London

Council in1981 developed the

Community

AreasPolicy, a metropolitan strategicplanninginitiative to involve them.

The

impacts of

its efforts challenged the traditional planning structure,

and

in 1986 the

GLC

was

dissolved.

Introduction

The

struggles during the late nineteenth century for

local democratic

governments which

would

address the

needsofallcitizensillustratesone

common

originof

town

planninginbothBritain

and

America.

However,

the

way

planning has subsequently

been

institutionalized inboth

countries

makes

it difficult to

meet

these aspirations. In practice,planningischaracterized

by an

internaltension

between

aspirations forjustice

and

theneedfora rational

urban propertymarket

demanded

by

thedevelopment

in-dustry.

Sometimes

these

two

interests coincide, but the speculativenatureof

much

urban

property

development

means

that they

more

often conflict.

Between

1981

and

1986, thelastelectedadministration

atthe Greater

London

Council

(GLC)

addressedthese

con-flictsdirectly inaradically

new

approach tometropolitan

strategicplanning, as part of a generallibertarian political

program aimed

at

empowering

specific groups within

London.

The

program

initially focused

on

the

unem-ployed,

women,

and

ethnicminorities

and was

extended

to a wider rangeof groups during the period of office.

Charismaticleadership,

and

abudget

which

made

itthe

"fourteenthlargestnation-stateintheworld,"

meant

that the

GLC

had

theresourcestopursuethesepolitical

com-mitments. It is

commonly

believed that theGLC's

effec-tiveness in mobilizing these groups threatened the con-servativecentral

government

and

was

thepoliticalsource fornationallegislationabolishingnotonlythe

GLC,

but

the six other metropolitan

governments

in

England

in

1986.

This article outlines

some

of the

ways

in

which

the

GLC's radical political

program changed

the practice of

metropolitanstrategicplanningin

London.

Inparticular,

itidentifies

how

thesechangesin strategicplanning

pro-cessesrepresented asignificant challenge to the

conven-tional

wisdom

in British planning.

The

Context: London's

Land

Market

The

speculative land

market

in

London

is extremely buoyant. Office-space rentsincentral

London,

for

exam-ple, arehigherthan in

any

othercity inwestern Europe.

The

buoyancy

of the land

market

is supported

by

high

levelsof direct investment

by

the central

government

in

urbanregeneration

programs which

promote

and

support

speculative

commercial

development.

At

the

same

time, deregulation of the stockexchange has placed

London

on

alevelwith

Tokyo

and

New

York

inthe

world

financial

market, leading to

an

explosion of

demand

for large

(35,000 square foot) tradingfloors. This need islargely

being

met

through

new

development.

London

generallyhas a "traditional"

urban

structure, in

which

poorer

working

classresidentialareassurround

thecentral

commercial

area. Consequently,theeffectsof

enhanced commercialland speculationinthecenterspread

rapidlythroughoutinner

London.

The

demand

for

com-mercialdevelopment hasalso intensified

demand

forinner

cityluxuryhousing,

and

thepriceofresidentiallandhere

now

exceeds that for

commercial

usesoutside thecentral core.

Within

theBritishplanningsystem, increased

hous-ing

demand

isfar

more

difficultto

manage

than

commer-cial

demand,

sincethe systembasicallycontrolschanges

between

land uses,

and

not within

any one

use.

The

Community

Areas Policy

Thisanalysis of the speculativeland

market

incentral

London

informedthe

way

theGLC'sgeneralpolitical

pro-gram

was

interpretedinmetropolitanstrategicplanning.

The

Community

Areas

Policy, a set of linkedinitiatives directlysupporting

communities

threatened

by

commer-cialdevelopment,

formed

the centerpiece ofthestrategy

designated as

"community

areas."

Within

these areas, a

wide

range ofgroups could apply for capital grants to

develop a variety of social

and

community

facilities.

Directing the

money

through

community

groups, rather

than relying

on

direct public sector investment,

was

a

major

innovation in British planning.

Coupled

with revenue supportfor

community

workers, the grantsvisiblylinked theday-to-dayconcernsof

com-munity

groups with wider planningobjectives, thereby supportingthegroups' participationinthe revision of the

metropolitanstrategicplan.Thus,thegrantshelped

coun-teract the tendencyforparticipation tobe

dominated

by

metropolitan-wide interest groups

and

middle class

"amenity groups."

Revising the Strategic Plan

The

Community

Areas Policy

was

further developed

atthestrategic level inthecontext of revising theGreater

London Development

Plan

(GLDP),

which

was

seriously

outofdate

by

1981.

A

radical

view

ofmetropolitan

plan-ninggenerallyinformedtherevisions,

and

thevery high

priority given to the

Community

Areas

Policystrongly influenced specific policy changes.

Other

innovative policychangesarose

from

the

GLCs

commitment

tothedevelopmentofplanningpolicies

rele-vanttoallthegroups included withinitsgeneralpolitical

program.

As

withthe

Community

AreasPolicy, the

plan-ning

work

was

facilitated

by

grants

and

broader policy

programs

directly supportingthesegroups.

Much

of the participation

program

associatedwith the revisions

was

organized

around

these groups, contrasting with tradi-tionalapproaches

which

reflecteither specific landuses

orspatialsubareas.

At

the

same

time, the"spatialvisions"

expressedintherevised

GLDP

grew

outof this

socially-based approach.

Thus, the strategic planning process as a

whole

was

stronglyintegrated intothe

GLCs

generalpoliticalprogram.

Challenging Conventional

Wisdom

in

Metropolitan Strategic Planning

Conventional

wisdom

arises out of a set of

interlock-ingfactors.

By

and

large, itreflects

what

isfeasiblewithin

aparticularadministrativestructure, set ofprofessional

interests,broaderpolitical

environment

and

social struc-ture. These views then

become

embedded

inthe personal

attitudes,values

and

approachesof

members

of the polit-icalsystem.

The

processes

which

institutionalize

conven-tional

wisdom become

self-reinforcing

and

obscure the

possibilityofdevelopingradically

new

approachestomeet wider social objectives.

It is significant, then, that the radical innovations in

metropolitanstrategicplanning

implemented

by

thelast

GLC

administration

had

their roots outside the formal

structure of the

GLC

and

intheplanning section of the

1981

London Labour

Party manifesto.

The

processof

writ-ing themanifesto

had

been highlyconsultative,

and

was

based

on

the

London

Labour

Party'sneedtobuilda

new

electoral coalition in response to changes in the

demo-graphiccompositionofLondon. Thiscoalition

was

largely built

on

addressing the needs of specific, but already

relatively well-organized groups in

London

—

the

unem-ployed,

women,

and

ethnic minorities.

"Community

groups" in

London

pushed

their

demands

within this

broader context,

and

the manifesto's planning

commit-ments

reflect the high level of politicization of "local

planning"issues

which

had

characterized the 1970s.

The

manifesto did, however, address for the first time the

strategicdimensionof these

demands.

The

manifesto out-lined the general political

program

of the last

GLC

ad-ministration

and

providedabroad

framework

foraradical

approach

tometropolitanstrategicplanning.

A

new

kind

ofplanningprocess

was

developed

which

emphasizedfive strategiesfocusing

on

key problems, immediate

implemen-tation, direct implementation, containing

commercial

development,

and

legislative barriers. This

new

process

challengedtheconventional

wisdom

about metropolitan

strategicplanningin

ways

thatwere notpredictedin1981.

Key

Problems

The

last

GLC

administration

saw

planning asfocused

on

solvingspecific,

immediate

key problems. Thisraises

the questions,

"whose

problems?"

and

more

importantly,

"who

must

be satisfied with the solutions?"

These

are

politicalquestions,

and

theanswers

were

clearwithinthe generalpolitical

program

of the administration.

The

clar-ityof thesubsequentlinks

between

specificsocialgroups,

their problems, political support

and

planning policies facilitated widespread participation in metropolitan

strategic planning.

The

strategic planning

approach

which emerged from

thisprocess did not

aim

tobe comprehensive, butitdid

aim

to be comprehensible to the groups

whose

needs

formed

its basis. Itconsequently exposed the

way

com-prehensiveplanning obscureseffective politicalpriorities. In contrast, the conventional

wisdom

inBritain seesthe

planning systemas

one

of"plan-makingplus the control ofdevelopment."Becauseall

proposed

changesintheuse

of land require specific planning permission, the

plan-making

processis

dominated

by

designingasetofcriteria

against

which

specific planning applications will be

The

"developmentcontroldominated" planningprocess generallyhasonly veryattenuated ideasabouta desirable future pattern ofland uses; thisis all that ispracticable

where

virtually all

development

is undertaken

by

the private sector.

The

overall pattern of land usesemerges

from

the application of these rules over a substantial

periodof time.Moreover,theland usepatternisto

some

extent unpredictable, depending

on

developers'decisions

about

which

sites to develop

and

how

to develop

them

most

profitably. Inthefaceof severerestrictions

on

public expenditure, public infrastructureinvestmenttendstobe dominated

by

private sectordevelopmentdecisions. Inthe

process, investmentin

community

facilities"getslost."

As

aconsequence, it isoftenargued thatthe

main

function ofthistypeofplanningisto

remove

keyaspectsof uncer-tainty

from

competition

among

developers.

The

"developmentcontroldominated"approachto

writ-ing plans also leads to unfocused

and

ambiguous

plan documents, since the planners attempt to anticipate all

possible

problems

and

considerationsin the early stages ofplan development.

Such

comprehensive plans are

in-comprehensibletoallbut theprofessionallyinitiated.

The

mystifying planningprocess theninhibitsparticipation.

The City ofLondonacross the riverThames.

Planned

Action

"Now!"

The

incoming

Labour

administration

was committed

to

coming up

with speedy answersto the key problems.

The

GLC

was

politicallymarginal.

The

factthat control alternated

between

the

Labour

and Tory

parties at

vir-tuallyeveryelection clearlychallengedtheconventional

wisdom

that metropolitan strategic planning should be long-termin orientation.

The

GLC

felt it

was

absurd to

wait20 to 25years for solutions to theurgent

problems

of today, especially

when

they

knew

thatthenextelected

administration

would

reverse

many

oftheirkeypolicies.

The commitment

toplanned action"now!" required

de-velopingstrategic policies

which

could be

implemented

immediately.

The

Community

Areas

Policy exemplified

this approach.

Direct Implementation

The

GLC

was committed

to directly

implementing

its

own

plan. Metropolitan

government

in

London was

a

"twotier"system.

The

GLC

was

responsible forproviding

a strategicplanning

framework

within

which

the33

sec-ond-tier

boroughs

couldpursuelocallyadapted planning

policies, aslongasthey

were

consistent withthe

GLDP.

Boroughs

thusheld the

main

developmentcontrol

powers

and

werealso free todevelopformallocalplans.

The

local

government

and

planning system operated

under

the

as-sumption

thatthebulkofpublic sector investment,

out-side of

major

metropolitan roadsinvestment,

would

be undertaken

by

theboroughs.

The

GLC

retained residual

development

control powers,

mainly

over very large

developments and development

affecting metropolitan

roads. It also maintained a large public sector

home-building program.

The

division ofresponsibilitieswithin thesystem

was

fairly sensible in a period of

expanding

public sector

expenditure

and

relative politicalconsensus overtheuse

ofpublic sectorinvestment. Nevertheless, strongpolitical

divisions

between

inner

and

outer

London

alwayslimited access toland

and

housing to solve inner

London

prob-lems.

From

the mid-1970s on, fiscal crises in the inner

London boroughs

enhancedtheimportanceofdirect

GLC

investment, butthere

was

substantialdisagreement over

whether

todiscourage speculative

development

incentral

London.

Some

of the inner

boroughs were

desperate for theincreasedpropertytaxrevenuegenerated

by

commer-cial development.

Thus, the

GLCs

commitment

tothe

Community

Areas Policy—interpreted as "no go" areas for

commercial

development

—

was

notmerely contentious; it could not

because they could not afford to invest in

community

facilitiesthemselves.

More

importantly thegrants raised

significant

community

oppositiontocommercial

develop-ment

within these boroughs. Thus, the

commitment

to direct implementation

by

the

GLC

challenged

an

un-spoken

assumption, written into the very structure of

London

government, that the

GLC

would

not

become

directly politically involved in "local" or

borough

plan-ning issues.

Commercial Development

The

lastadministrationatthe

GLC

was

primarily con-cernedwiththe detrimentalconsequencesof

commercial

development

on

inner

London

communities.

The

conven-tional

wisdom

ofmetropolitanstrategic planning inthe

sixties

and

seventies

emphasized

organizinga

broad

pat-ternoflandusesto facilitateprivate sector

development

by

designating areas for futuredevelopment.

Within

this context,the

GLDP

provideda

framework

for coordinating public sector infrastructureinvestmentwith private sec-tor development.

The

revised

GLDP

proposed

a tightly

drawn

Central

ActivitiesZone, within

which commercial development

would

becontained. This zone

was surrounded

entirely

by

a

Community

Areas

Ring, in

which commercial

de-velopment

was

largely prohibited.

The

administration

acceptedthat thispolicy

would

increaselandpriceswithin

the CentralActivitiesZone,

and

leadtoincreased

specu-lativepressures

around

itsboundary. Nevertheless, they argued that strong

and

clear strategic policies

would

facilitatecontroloverthese pressures.Thisstrategic

view

of the relationship

between

thelandmarket

and

planning

policies

underpinned

more

detailed policies throughout

the plan.

Legislative Barriers

The

final challenge to the accepted planning practice

was

of adifferent order. Revisingthe

GLDP

to

meet

the

GLCs

political objectivesexposed

many

of the detailed

ways

thattheinstitutional

and

legislative

framework

for

planningfacilitatestheinterestsofdevelopers as a group,

whilefailing toprovideprotection forthose

who

bearthe

social costs of development.

By

the time the

GLC

was

abolished,

work

on

a

new

legislative

framework

for

plan-ning

was proposed and

this concept gained

momentum

up

to the general election in 1987.

By

attemptingtomeetfourapparentlysimple

demands

on

metropolitanstrategicplanning, the

GLC

fundamen-tallyquestionedtheconventional

wisdom

writtenintothe

legal

and

administrative

framework

for metropolitan

strategic planning.

Increasingland valuespromptedBritishRailtoselltheseflatsfor rehabili-tationandowner-occupationat prices farbeyondthemeansof thelocal population.

It isimportantto realizethatthesebasicchallenges to

the conventional

wisdom would

not have led to a radi-ciallydifferentkindofplan

and

planningprocessifthey

had

notbeencloselylinkedwithwiderpracticalinitiatives

enablingbroadergeneralpoliticalparticipationinLondon.

The

next section

examines

the

way

this wider context affected participationin themetropolitanstrategic

plan-ning process.

Challenging Cynicism: participation in

metropolitan strategic planning

Organizingeffectiveparticipationinmetropolitan stra-tegicplanning is difficult at the best of times.

During

a periodof

economic

recession, it

becomes

an even

more

challenging endeavor.

Threeinterrelatedproblemsinhibitinvolvement

by

dis-empowered

groups. First, their

knowledge

of

London

tendstobelocalized,reflectingspatially restrictedaccess

tohousing, jobs

and

transportation.Second,particularly

inatimeof

economic

crisis,

problems

suchas

unemploy-ment, inadequate housing, maintaininga

household and

raising children are of

more

immediate

concern than

commenting

on

issuesaboutthe long-range quality oflife

throughoutthemetropolitanarea. Finally, the generally

legalistic

and

bureaucratic

ways

ofplanninginhibitthose

who

are uncertain, inarticulate

and

those

who

have been

acquiescetothe vagaries

and

whims

ofthosewith power,

money

or education.

Even

at the best of times, participation at the

metro-politanleveltendstomobilizegroups withaclear metro-politan-wide interest. In

London,

the roads lobby

and

privatedevelopershave always been prominent.

Economic

recession enhances their interest inplanning as theytry to increase theiraccess to scarce resources.

With

access

to resourcesto pursue their interests, theselobbyistscan

easilyobscuretheinterestsoflesspowerfulgroups. Inthis situation, planners are often left to defend the

disem-powered

with verylittlepolitical support

and

withinan

administrative

framework which

enjoins

them

to be

"politically neutral."

SELL

elected

members

and

the public

The

GLC's

political

marginality further reinforced these processes, as plan-nersavoided implementingpolicies

which

werepolitically

contentious in order to avoid

undoing

their

own

work

after the subsequent election.

Personal cynicismresults

from

theplacement of polit-ical administration within a broader social structure. It isnottheresultofthe (in)competence orapathyof

indi-viduals, but rather the limits

on what

individuals can

achievewithinthebroadersystem.

The

final administra-tionat the

GLC

expanded

theselimits

by

developing the

planningparticipation processwithin a general political

strategy

which

addressed social structural issues. This departure

from

standard proceduregeneratedenthusiasm

TAN5UELL

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TODDLER

GROUF

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offices

Residents ofLambeth Boroughprotestofficeandhoteldevelopmentandadvocatehousing.

Thiscritiqueofplanningparticipationiswell

known.

However,

withoutconsiderablepolitical

and

administra-tiveresources, individualplanners arepowerless to cor-rect it. In practice, planners have responded to these

problems

with adeep cynicism, reflectingan attempt to

maintain theirdemocraticaspirationswithin

an

institu-tional

framework which

frustrates their achievement.

Narrowly

conceived"professionalinterests"often rein-force thiscynicism.

Making

planninga technicalexercise

enhancesthe

power

ofprofessionalplannerswithin polit-ical administrative systems, usually to the detriment of

among

planningofficersfor participation,

and

involved previouslyexcluded groupsin the participation process.

As

a result, theextensivedirectcontact

between

officers

and

members

of thesegroups mobilizedofficers' profes-sional

commitments

tofair, just

and

democraticplanning,

and

helped

them overcome

much

of their cynicism.

The

lessonsthat

one

canlearn

from

thisexperiencecan

usefullybe analyzedintermsofthe

ways

that

narrow

pro-fessional interests interact with personal cynicism to distortthe participation process.

The

most

direct

way

to

Willingness to Participate

The

firstquestioncynical plannersaskis: "Arepeople

willing

and

ableto participate?"

The

experience of the

GLC

posesafar

more

disturbing question: "Isthelocal

author-ity willing

and

able to participate?"

Threeaspects of theGLC'sparticipation

program

sup-portthisreformulation. First, the

program was

based

on

directconsultationwiththespecificsocialgroupsincluded

intheGLC'sgeneralpoliticalstrategy.

These

groups

were

ina positiontorespondpositively

and

creativelybecause they

were

supported

by

broader grants

and

policy

pro-grams. Second, groups

were

encouraged to talk about

theirgeneralconcerns veryearly

on

intheplanning

pro-cess

and were

not restricted to simply

commenting on

"planningmatters" asdefined

by

planners.

These

general discussions often originatedinpolicy

work

outside of the

planningdepartment

and

providedan importantbasisfor

developingspecificplanningpoliciesaddressingbroader

concerns. For example, the

women's

unit in the director

general'sdepartment identified a series ofspecific

plan-ningproblemsassociatedwithsetting

up women's

centers

as part of theirgeneralgrants

and

policy

work.

Finally,

the speed of the planning process itself generated a

momentum

which

sustainedinterest inparticipation. In

these

ways

thegeneral politicalstrategy of the

GLC

sup-ported a planning participation process

which

led to

innovative planning policies specifically addressing

an

increasedscopeofissues

and problems

fora

wide

range

of

disempowered

groups.

Representation

Second,cynical plannersask:"Arelocal organizations representativeof theurban poor?"

The

experience of the

GLC's political

commitment

to specific social groups exposesthe fallacyinthe

way

thisquestionis

posed

and

suggeststhatitshouldberephrased:"Isthelocalauthority representative of the

urban

poor?"

Ingeneral, the

narrow

pursuit of professionalinterests

within political administrative systems succeeds partly

because it neglects to analyze the mobilization of bias

withininterlockingpolitical, electoral, administrative

and

technicalprocesses. Thissilencereinforcescynicismabout

participation, becauseitimplicitlydenies the existence of

alternatives.

The

GLC

deliberatelysoughttomobilizebiasinfavor

of

disempowered

groups. Paticipantsinthemetropolitan

strategicplanningprocessclearlyderivedtheircredentials

and

legitimacy

from

thesebroader political

and

demo-craticprocesses, not

from

the technical

and

professional

preoccupations

—

orevenaspirations

—

of planners. With-out this strong political

commitment,

very little

would

have changed.

Organization

Third, cynicalplannersask,

"how

shouldparticipation

beorganized?"Usually they

mean,

"should

we

use

ques-tionnaires,postalsurveys,publicmeetingsorexhibitions?"

The

experienceatthe

GLC

shows

that thequestion

must

be linked to political

and

social organization generally,

and

the techniques used

must

support,

and

not under-mine, broadersocialorganization.Thus,thequestioncan bereformulated:

"How

does theparticipationprocessfit into the wider social organization of the area?"

The

GLC's

participation exercise

was

based

on

clear political answers to thisquestion.

As

a result, thesingle

most

effective, positive,

and

creative publicmeeting

on

the

GLDP

revisions

was

the

women's

meeting.

Two

hun-dred

and

fifty

women

packed

a county hall conference

room,

and

spent

an

eveningenthusiasticallytalkingabout

the variety of

ways

in

which

planning could help them.

The

successofthis meeting ensuredthat

women's

issues

wereintegratedthroughoutthe revised

GLDP.

In contrast, later meetings organized

around

specificland use topics

were

desultory.

The

GLC

alsodevelopeda

number

oftechnical

innova-tions. Meetings

were

tape recorded

and

oral

comments

were

generally accepted asformalsubmissions.Copiesof

draftsof theplan,withpeople's

own

marginal

comments,

werealsoaccepted. Smalldiscussiongroupswerecarefully

plannedtoensurethat articulate

members

of

community

groups

were

present to encourage the less articulate to criticizethe successive drafts. Meetings

were

chaired

by

people

who

were notpart of the

GLC, and

politicians

and

seniorofficers rarelyspokeat thesemeetings. Platforms

were

carefully balanced to demonstrate the

GLC's

com-mitment

to particular groups.

Documents

were

under-standable,

and

available in a variety of languages.

Itisnecessarytoexplicitlydesignparticipation

methods

which

provide details of the needs of specific social

groups. Failure todevelop thissortof

approach

suggests

political failure, rather than the lack of appropriate

techniques.

Data

Fourth, cynicalplannersask,

"what

datais

needed

for

planning

and

how

is it to be collected?"

The

pursuit of professionalinterestssuggests that answeringthis ques-tionispart of the planner's technicalexpertise.

However,

rephrasing thequestion illustrates itsrelation to

partici-pation:

"What demands

are being expressed through

participation

and what

new

datasources

may

be needed?"

Two

examples

from

the

Community

AreasPolicy

show

why

rephrasing the questionin this

way

isimportant.

The

'thttt

fl M II "

*

I!

1.1"

I

*

U

fci

a

77ieCommunity-based Coin StreetGroup isdeveloping56new housesandflats.

changesoflandusewithout planningpermission.

Creep-ing conversions can have substantial

and

irreversible

impacts

on

small areasover very shortperiods of time.

Planners usually rely

on

administrative records of

per-mitapplications to determine trends in current

demand

for particular land uses.

Only

after

community

groups

persistently pointed out creeping conversions did

GLC

plannersadmitthatlandusescouldchange without

plan-ners'permission

and

begin to develop policies to tackle the problem.

The

second

example

comes from

the

Community

Areas

grants program. After thefirst request for applications

produced

atotallyunexpectedflood of responses,

one

of the

program

administrators remarked, "I'vebeen a

plan-nerfor twentyyears. I'vealways beentold that it's part

of

my

professionalexpertise to

know

what

the

community

wants.

Looking

attheseapplicationsnow, I

know

forthe

first timein

my

career

what

the

community

wants."

The

grants

program

enabled people to say in real

and

prac-tical terms

what

they needed.

Many

of thegroups

who

applied for grants

would

never have participated in a

formal planning participation exercise, but their views about

what

they

needed were

integratedinto the

metro-politan strategic planning process

from

the beginning through the grants program.

The

GLCs

planning participation exercise, because it

was

setwithin the contextofa general

program

ofpolitical participation, brought to light

how

planners' cynicism about participation is aconsequence of

power

relation-ships in broader social

and

political structures.

More

importantly, it

showed some

of the

ways

that planning

participationexercisescancontributeto or

modify

these

relationships.

Conclusion

The

last

GLC

administration demonstrated not only

how

metropolitanstrategicplanning

and

public

participa-tion canbe closely linked, but also

how

each is further linked to wider political

and

democratic processes.

By

developing

an

"alternativepractice"

which

explicitly ad-dressed questions of powerlessness within thewiderurban

society of

London,

the

GLC

exposed the

ways

in

which

"conventional" planning practice obscures

power

rela-tionships.

The

lastinglegacy of thelast

GLC

administrationisnot merelyjust that itprovidesacritique of"normal" or

ac-ceptedplanningpractice. Italsoprovidesa

way

of think-ing about planningpractice

which

allows us tobegin to

developequallycreative

and

positiveapproachesinother

political

and

social circumstances.

Many

of thepeople associated with thelast

GLC

ad-ministration currently feel tired

and

disappointed. But

they

do

not feelthat theirefforts

were

wasted.

To

move

so closetoa vision offair, just

and

democraticplanning,

tosee

what

isinvolvedinprogressivesocial

and

political

change,

and

to beginto understand

how

local authority planning can contribute to this

change

areinspiring.

In-deed,

many

of the lessons learned

from

this experience

havebeen adopted elsewhereinBritishplanning.

By

giv-inganeffectivevoiceto

disempowered

socialgroups, the

GLC

showed

thatthestructure of

power

withina society

can be a matter of social choice.

JudithAllen teachesplanningatthe Polytechnic of CentralLondon. She

wasinvolved inplanningatthe

GLC

between 1981 and 1986.She is