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IGNACIO VS. DIRECTOR OF LANDS AND VALERIANO:
Case Doctrine: Article 457 of the New Civil Code (Article 366, Old Civil Code), which provides that:
To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters.
The article cited is clearly inapplicable because it refers to accretion or deposits on the banks of rivers, while the accretion in the present case was caused by action of the Manila Bay.
FACTS: Ignacio applied for registration of a parcel of land adjacent to his land, claiming that he has acquired the
land by right of accretion. Director of Lands, Valeriano opposed, instead it avers that portion sought to be registered is property of public domain.
ARGUMENTS:
1. Appellant contends that the parcel belongs to him by the law of accretion, having been formed by gradual deposit by action of the Manila Bay, and he cites Article 457 of the New Civil Code
2. Appellant next contends that Articles 1, 4 and 5 of the Law of Waters are not applicable because they refer to accretions formed by the sea, and that Manila Bay cannot be considered as a sea.
ISSUE/S: WON the land subject of the dispute can be acquired by right of accretion of Ignacio. HELD:
NO.
The land cannot be acquired by right of accretion. Article 457 is not applicable.
The article cited is clearly inapplicable because it refers to accretion or deposits on the banks of rivers, while the accretion in the present case was caused by action of the Manila Bay.
Manila bay is not a river.
A bay is a part of the sea, being a mere indentation of the same:
Bay. — An opening into the land where the water is shut in on all sides except at the entrance; an inlet of the sea; an arm of the sea, distinct from a river, a bending or curbing of the shore of the sea or of a lake. 7 C.J. 1013-1014 (Cited in Francisco, Philippine Law of Waters and Water Rights p. 6)
DE BUYSER VS. DIRECTOR OF LANDS:
Case Doctrine: Such alluvial formation along the seashore is part of the public domain and, therefore, not open to acquisition by adverse possession by private persons. It is outside the commerce of man, unless otherwise declared by either the executive or legislative branch of the government.
FACTS:
De Buyser is the registered owner of a lot contiguous to the lot subject of this dispute. On the other hand, defendant Tandayags have been occupying this foreshore land under a revocable permit issued by the Director of Lands. Claiming ownership of the foreshore land, de buyser plaintiff filed an action against spouses Tandayag to recover possession of this land and the Director of Lands for having illegally issued a revocable permit to the Tandayags.
ARGUMENTS:
In asserting the right of ownership over the land, plaintiff invokes Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of August 3, 1866 which provides:
Art. 4. Lands added to the shore by accretion and alluvial deposits caused by the action of the sea, form part of the public domain, when they are no longer washed by the waters of the sea, and are not necessary for purposes of public utility, or for the establishment of special industries, or for the coastguard service, the Government shall declare them to be the property of the owners of the estate adjacent thereto and as an increment thereof.
ISSUE/S: WON claim of ownership has legal basis. HELD:
No.
Plaintiff’s claim of ownership is bereft of legal basis.
Such alluvial formation along the seashore is part of the public domain and, therefore, not open to acquisition by adverse possession by private persons. It is outside the commerce of man, unless otherwise declared by either the executive or legislative branch of the government. 1
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State shall grant these lands to the adjoining owners only when they are no longer needed for the purposes mentioned therein. In the case at bar, the trial court found that plaintiff's evidence failed to prove that the land in question is no longer needed by the government, or that the essential conditions for such grant under Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters, exists.
The revocable permit issued by the Director of Lands was not an implied declaration that the land is no longer needed for public use. In the letter of approval by the Director of Lands, it has expressly reserved the right of the government to use it when it is deemed necessary. The state therefor did not relinquish ownership over the land.
GRANDE, ET. AL. VS. COURT OF APPEALS:
Case Doctrine: accretion does not ipso facto becomes registered land just because the lot which receives it is a registered land.
FACTS: Petitioners are the owners of a parcel of land, with an area of 3.5032 hectares, located at barrio Ragan,
municipality of Magsaysay (formerly Tumauini), province of Isabela. When it was surveyed for purposes of registration sometime in 1930, its northeastern boundary was the Cagayan River (the same boundary stated in the title). Since then, and for many years thereafter, a gradual accretion on the northeastern side took place, by action of the current of the Cagayan River, so much so, that by 1958, the bank thereof had receded to a distance of about 105 meters from its original site, and an alluvial deposit of 19,964 square meters (1.9964 hectares), more or less, had been added to the registered area (Exh. C-1).
On January 25, 1958, petitioners instituted the present action in the Court of First Instance of Isabela against respondents, to quiet title to said portion (19,964 square meters) formed by accretion, alleging in their complaint (docketed as Civil Case No. 1171) that they and their predecessors-in-interest, were formerly in peaceful and continuous possession thereof, until September, 1948, when respondents entered upon the land under claim of ownership. Petitioners also asked for damages corresponding to the value of the fruits of the land as well as attorney's fees and costs. In their answer (dated February 18, 1958), respondents claim ownership in themselves, asserting that they have been in continuous, open, and undisturbed possession of said portion, since prior to the year 1933 to the present.
It is admitted by the parties that the land involved in this action was formed by the gradual deposit of alluvium brought about by the action of the Cagayan River, a navigable river.
ISSUE:
Whether the accretion becomes automatically registered land just because the lot which receives it is covered by a Torrens title thereby making the alluvial property imprescriptible.
HELD:
We agree with the Court of Appeals that it does not, just as an unregistered land purchased by the registered owner of the adjoining land does not, by extension, become ipso facto registered land. Ownership of a piece of land is one thing, and registration under the Torrens system of that ownership is quite another. Ownership over the accretion received by the land adjoining a river is governed by the Civil Code. Imprescriptibility of registered land is provided in the registration law. Registration under the Land Registration and Cadastral Acts does not vest or give title to the land, but merely confirms and thereafter protects the title already possessed by the owner, making it imprescriptible by occupation of third parties. But to obtain this protection, the land must be placed under the operation of the registration laws wherein certain judicial procedures have been provided. The fact remain, however, that petitioners never sought registration of said alluvial property (which was formed sometime after petitioners' property covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 2982 was registered on June 9, 1934) up to the time they instituted the present action in the Court of First Instance of Isabela in 1958. The increment, therefore, never became registered property, and hence is not entitled or subject to the protection of imprescriptibility enjoyed by registered property under the Torrens system. Consequently, it was subject to acquisition through prescription by third persons.
REP. OF THE PHIL. VS. CA, ET. AL.:
Case Doctrine: The requirement that the deposit should be due to the effect of the current of the river is indispensable. This excludes from Art. 457 of the New Civil Code all deposits caused by human intervention. Alluvion must be the exclusive work of nature.
FACTS: Respondents Benjamin Tancinco, Azucena Tancinco Reyes, Marina (should be "Maria") Tancinco Imperial
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Assistant Provincial Fiscal Amando C. Vicente, in representation of the Bureau of Lands filed a written opposition to the application for registration.
Petitioner submits that there is no accretion to speak of under Article 457 of the New Civil Code because what actually happened is that the private respondents simply transferred their dikes further down the river bed of the Meycauayan River, and thus, if there is any accretion to speak of, it is man-made and artificial and not the result of the gradual and imperceptible sedimentation by the waters of the river.
On the other hand, private respondents submit the fact of accretion without human intervention because the transfer of the dike occurred after the accretion was complete.
ISSUE/S: WON there was accretion HELD:
There is no accretion.
Article 457 of the NCC, requires the concurrence of three requisites before an accretion covered by this particular provision is said to have taken place. They are (1) that the deposit be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be made through the effects of the current of the water; and (3) that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers.
The requirement that the deposit should be due to the effect of the current of the river is indispensable. This excludes from Art. 457 of the New Civil Code all deposits caused by human intervention. Alluvion must be the exclusive work of nature. In the instant case, there is no evidence whatsoever to prove that the addition to the said property was made gradually through the effects of the current of the Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers. We agree with the observation of the Solicitor General that it is preposterous to believe that almost four (4) hectares of land came into being because of the effects of the Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers….xxx…xxx…xxx… However, there is evidence that the alleged alluvial deposits were artificial and man-made and not the exclusive result of the current of the Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers. The alleged alluvial deposits came into being not because of the sole effect of the current of the rivers but as a result of the transfer of the dike towards the river and encroaching upon it. The land sought to be registered is not even dry land cast imperceptibly and gradually by the river's current on the fishpond adjoining it. It is under two meters of water. The private respondents' own evidence shows that the water in the fishpond is two meters deep on the side of the pilapil facing the fishpond and only one meter deep on the side of the pilapil facing the river
The reason behind the law giving the riparian owner the right to any land or alluvion deposited by a river is to compensate him for the danger of loss that he suffers because of the location of his land. If estates bordering on rivers are exposed to floods and other evils produced by the destructive force of the waters and if by virtue of lawful provisions, said estates are subject to incumbrances and various kinds of easements, it is proper that the risk or danger which may prejudice the owners thereof should be compensated by the right of accretion. (Cortes v. City of Manila, 10 Phil. 567). Hence, the riparian owner does not acquire the additions to his land caused by special works expressly intended or designed to bring about accretion. When the private respondents transferred their dikes towards the river bed, the dikes were meant for reclamation purposes and not to protect their property fro m the destructive force of the waters of the river.
BAGAIPO VS. COURT OF APPEALS:
Case Doctrine: In the absence of evidence that the change in the course of the river was sudden or that it occurred through avulsion, the presumption is that the change was gradual and was caused by alluvium and erosion.
FACTS: Petitioner Dionisia P. Bagaipo is the registered owner of Lot which located southeast of Davao river.
While respondent Leonor Lozano is the owner of a registered parcel of land located across and opposite the southeast portion of petitioner’s lot facing the Davao River.
On May 26, 1989, Bagaipo filed a complainti[2] for Recovery of Possession with Mandatory Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Damages against Lozano for: (1) the surrender of possession by Lozano of a certain portion of land measuring 29,162 square meters which is supposedly included in the area belonging to Bagaipo under TCT No. T-15757; and (2) the recovery of a land area measuring 37,901 square meters which Bagaipo allegedly lost when the Davao River traversed her property. Bagaipo contended that as a result of a change in course of the said river, her property became divided into three lots, namely: Lots 415-A, 415-B and 415-C.
In January 1988, Bagaipo commissioned a resurvey of Lot 415 and presented before the trial court a survey
planii[3] prepared by Geodetic Engineer Gersacio A. Magno which concluded that the land presently located across
the river and parallel to Bagaipo’s property still belonged to the latter and not to Lozano, who planted some 350 fruit-bearing trees on Lot 415-C and the old abandoned river bed.
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For his part, Lozano insisted that the land claimed by Bagaipo is actually an accretion to their titled property. He asserted that the Davao River did not change its course and that the reduction in Bagaipo’s domain was caused by gradual erosion due to the current of the Davao River. Lozano added that it is also because of the river’s natural action that silt slowly deposited and added to his land over a long period of time. He further averred that this accretion continues up to the present and that registration proceedings instituted by him over the alluvial formation could not be concluded precisely because it continued to increase in size.
ISSUE/S: WON there was a change in the river’s course which resulted to avulsion? HELD:
NO.
The trial court and the appellate court both found that the decrease in land area was brought about by erosion and not a change in the river’s course. This conclusion was reached after the trial judge observed during ocular inspection that the banks located on petitioner’s land are sharp, craggy and very much higher than the land on the other side of the river. Additionally, the riverbank on respondent’s side is lower and gently sloping. Th e lower land therefore naturally received the alluvial soil carried by the river current.iii[11] These findings are factual, thus conclusive on this Court, unless there are strong and exceptional reasons, or they are unsupported by the evidence on record, or the judgment itself is based on a misapprehension of facts.
The decrease in petitioner’s land area and the corresponding expansion of respondent’s property were the combined effect of erosion and accretion respectively. Art. 461 of the Civil Code is inapplicable. Petitioner cannot claim ownership over the old abandoned riverbed because the same is inexistent. The riverbed’s former location cannot even be pinpointed with particularity since the movement of the Davao River took place gradually over an unspecified period of time, up to the present.
The rule is well-settled that accretion benefits a riparian owner when the following requisites are present: 1) That the deposit be gradual and imperceptible; 2) That it resulted from the effects of the current of the water; and 3) That the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the bank of the river.iv[13] These requisites were sufficiently proven in favor of respondents. In the absence of evidence that the change in the course of the river was sudden or that it occurred through avulsion, the presumption is that the change was gradual and was caused by alluvium and erosion.
MANUEL T. DE GUIA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS (Former Sixth Division) and JOSE B. ABEJO, represented by his Attorney-in-Fact, Hermenegilda Abejo-Rivera, respondents.
2003 Oct 8 1st Division G.R. No. 120864
CASE DOCTRINES
Co-owner may file an action against a co-owner; purpose
Any co-owner may file an action under Article 487 not only against a third person, but also against another co-owner who takes exclusive possession and asserts exclusive ownership of the property. In the latter case, however, the only purpose of the action is to obtain recognition of the co-ownership. The plaintiff cannot seek exclusion of the defendant from the property because as co-owner he has a right of possession. The plaintiff cannot recover any material or determinate part of the property.
Co-ownership; right of enjoyment
The right of enjoyment by each owner is limited by a similar right of the other owners. A co-owner cannot devote common property to his exclusive use to the prejudice of the co-co-ownership. Hence, if the subject is a residential house, all the co-owners may live there with their respective families to the extent possible. However, if one owner alone occupies the entire house without opposition from the other co-owners, and there is no lease agreement, the other co-owners cannot demand the payment of rent. Conversely, if there is an agreement to lease the house, the co-owners can demand rent from the co-owner who dwells in the house.
FACTS:
Petition for Review on Certiorari.
Abejo instituted an action for recovery of possession with damages against DEGUIA. Abejo’s contentions:
1. he is the owner of the ½ undivided portion of a property used as a fishpond registered Register of Deeds of Bulacan.
2. ownership over approximately 39,611 square meters out of the FISHPOND’s total area of 79,220 square meters.
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3. DE GUIA continues to possess and use the FISHPOND without any contract and without paying rent to ABEJO’s damage and prejudice.
4. DE GUIA refuses to surrender ownership and possession of the FISHPOND despite repeated demands to do so after DE GUIA’s sublease contract over the FISHPOND had expired.
5. asked the trial court to order DE GUIA to vacate an approximate area of 39,611 square meters as well as pay damages.
In his Answer, DE GUIA alleged:
1. the complaint does not state a cause of action and has prescribed.
2. the FISHPOND was originally owned by Maxima Termulo who died intestate with Primitiva Lejano as her only heir.
3. ABEJO is not the owner of the entire FISHPOND but the heirs of Primitiva Lejano who authorized him to possess the entire FISHPOND.
4. ABEJO’s ownership of the ½ undivided portion of the FISHPOND as void and claimed ownership over an undivided half portion of the FISHPOND for himself.
5. DE GUIA sought payment of damages and reimbursement for the improvements he introduced as a builder in good faith.
RTC decision: in favor of Abejo. CA decision: affirmed the RTC.
Issue 1: WON a co-owner may file an action for ejectment against a co-owner. Ruling:
Article 487 of the Civil Code provides, “*a+ny one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment.” This article covers all kinds of actions for the recovery of possession. Article 487 includes forcible entry and unlawful detainer (accion interdictal), recovery of possession (accion publiciana), and recovery of ownership (accion de reivindicacion). The summary actions of forcible entry and unlawful detainer seek the recovery of physical possession only. These actions are brought before municipal trial courts within one year from dispossession. However, accion publiciana, which is a plenary action for recovery of the right to possess, falls under the
jurisdiction of the proper regional trial court when the dispossession has lasted for more than one year. Accion de reivindicacion, which seeks the recovery of ownership, also falls under the jurisdiction of the proper regional trial court.
Any co-owner may file an action under Article 487 not only against a third person, but also against another co-owner who takes exclusive possession and asserts exclusive ownership of the property. In the latter case, however, the only purpose of the action is to obtain recognition of the co-ownership. The plaintiff cannot seek exclusion of the defendant from the property because as co-owner he has a right of possession. The plaintiff cannot recover any material or determinate part of the property.
In Hermogena G. Engreso with Spouse Jose Engreso v. Nestoria De La Cruz and Herminio De La Cruz, we reiterated the rule that a co-owner cannot recover a material or determinate part of a common property prior to partition as follows:
It is a basic principle in civil law that before a property owned in common is actually partitioned, all that the co-owner has is an ideal or abstract quota or proportionate share in the entire property. A co-owner has no right to demand a concrete, specific or determinate part of the thing owned in common because until division is effected his right over the thing is represented only by an ideal portion.
As such, the only effect of an action brought by a co-owner against a co-owner will be to obtain
recognition of the co-ownership; the defendant cannot be excluded from a specific portion of the property because as a co-owner he has a right to possess and the plaintiff cannot recover any material or determinate part of the property. Thus, the courts a quo erred when they ordered the delivery of one-half (½) of the building
in favor of private respondent.
xxxx
Following the inherent and peculiar features of co-ownership, while ABEJO and DE GUIA have equal shares in the FISHPOND quantitatively speaking, they have the same right in a qualitative sense as co -owners. Simply stated, ABEJO and DE GUIA are owners of the whole and over the whole, they exercise the right of dominion. However, they are at the same time individual owners of a ½ portion, which is truly abstract because until there is partition, such portion remains indeterminate or unidentified. As co-owners, ABEJO and DE GUIA may jointly exercise the right of dominion over the entire FISHPOND until they partition the FISHPOND by identifying or segregating their respective portions.
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Since a co-ownership subsists between ABEJO and DE GUIA, judicial or extra-judicial partition is the proper recourse. An action to demand partition is imprescriptible and not subject to laches. Each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the common property unless a co-owner has repudiated the co-ownership under certain conditions. Neither ABEJO nor DE GUIA has repudiated the co-ownership under the conditions set by law.
To recapitulate, we rule that a owner may file an action for recovery of possession against a
co-owner who takes exclusive possession of the entire co-owned property. However, the only effect of such action is a recognition of the co-ownership. The courts cannot proceed with the actual partitioning of the co-owned
property. Thus, judicial or extra-judicial partition is necessary to effect physical division of the FISHPOND between ABEJO and DE GUIA. An action for partition is also the proper forum for accounting the profits received by DE GUIA from the FISHPOND. However, as a necessary consequence of such recognition, ABEJO shall exercise an equal right to possess, use and enjoy the entire FISHPOND.
Issue 2: WON it is proper for a co-owner to pay for rents while using the property. Ruling:
The right of enjoyment by each owner is limited by a similar right of the other owners. A co-owner cannot devote common property to his exclusive use to the prejudice of the co-co-ownership. Hence, if the subject is a residential house, all the co-owners may live there with their respective families to the extent possible. However, if one owner alone occupies the entire house without opposition from the other co-owners, and there is no lease agreement, the other co-owners cannot demand the payment of rent. Conversely, if there is an agreement to lease the house, the co-owners can demand rent from the co-owner who dwells in the house.
The co-owners can either exercise an equal right to live in the house, or agree to lease it. If they fail to exercise any of these options, they must bear the consequences. It would be unjust to require the co-owner to pay rent after the co-owners by their silence have allowed him to use the property.
In case the co-owners agree to lease a building owned in common, a co-owner cannot retain it for his use without paying the proper rent. Moreover, where part of the property is occupied exclusively by some co-owners for the exploitation of an industry, the other co-owners become co-participants in the accessions of the property and should share in its net profits. /adsum
RICARDO PARDELL Y CRUZ and VICENTA ORTIZ Y FELIN DE PARDELL, plaintiffs-appellees, vs. GASPAR DE BARTOLOME Y ESCRIBANO and MATILDE ORTIZ Y FELIN DE BARTOLOME, defendants-appellants. 1912 Nov 18 1st Division G.R. No. 4656
CASE DOCTRINES
Hereditary succession gives rise to co-ownership Co-ownership; extent
"Each co-owner may use the things owned in common, provided he uses them in accordance with their object and in such manner as not to injure the interests of the community nor prevent the co-owners from utilizing them according to their rights." (Article 394 of the Civil Code, now Art. 486)
Matilde Ortiz and her husband occupied the upper story, designed for use as a dwelling, in the house of joint ownership; but the record shows no proof that, by so doing, the said Matilde occasioned any detriment to the interests of the community property, nor that she prevented her sister Vicenta from utilizing the said upper story according to her rights. It is to be noted that the stores of the lower floor were rented and an accounting of the rents was duly made to the plaintiffs.
Each co-owner of realty held pro indiviso exercises his rights over the whole property and may use and enjoy the same with no other limitation than that he shall not injure the interests of his coow ners, for the reason that, until a division be made, the respective part of each holder can not be determined and every one of the coowners exercises together with his other coparticipants, joint ownership over the pro indiviso property, in addition to his use and enjoyment of the same.
Co-owner not required to pay rent upon using the co-owned property; stranger to pay rent
Gaspar de Bartolome, occupied for four years a room or a part of the lower floor of the same house on Calle Escolta, using it as an office for the justice of the peace, a position which he held in the capital of that province, strict justice requires that he pay his sister-in-law, the plaintiff, one-half of the monthly rent which the said quarters could have produced, had they been leased to another person. Xxx even as the husband of the
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floor of the house in question, where he lived with his wife, to the detriment of the plaintiff Vicenta who did not receive one-half of the rent which those quarters could and should have produced, had they been occupied by a stranger, in the same manner that rent was obtained from the rooms on the lower floor that were used as stores.
FACTS:
Appeal by bill of exceptions.
Spouses Miguel Ortiz and Calixta Felin died in Vigan, Ilocos Sur, in 1875 and 1882, respectively. Prior to her death, Calixta, executed, on August 17, 1876, a nuncupative will in Vigan, whereby she made her four children, named Manuel, Francisca, Vicenta, and Matilde, surnamed Ortiz y Felin, her sole and universal heirs of all her property. Manuel and Francisca were already deceased, leaving Vicenta and Matilda as heirs.
In 1888, the defendants (Matilde and Gaspar), without judicial authorization, nor friendly or extrajudicial agreement, took upon themselves the administration and enjoyment of the properties left by Calixta and collected the rents, fruits, and products thereof, to the serious detriment of Vicenta’s interest. Despit e repeated demands to divide the properties and the fruits accruing therefrom, Sps Gaspar and Matilde had been delaying the partition and delivery of the said properties by means of unkempt promises and other excuses.
Vicenta filed a petition for partition with damages in the RTC.
RTC decision: absolved Matilde from payment of damages. It held that the revenues and the expenses were compensated by the residence enjoyed by the defendant party, that no losses or damages were either caused or suffered, nor likewise any other expense besides those aforementioned,
Counsel for Matilde took an exception to the judgment and moved for a new trial on the grounds that the evidence presented did not warrant the judgment rendered and that the latter was contrary to law. That motion was denied by the lower court. Thus, this petition.
ISSUE: WON a co-owner is required to pay for rent in exclusively using the co-owned property. RULING:
Article 394 of the Civil Code prescribes:
"Each co-owner may use the things owned in common, provided he uses them in accordance with their object and in such manner as not to injure the interests of the community nor prevent the co-owners from utilizing them according to their rights."
Matilde Ortiz and her husband occupied the upper story, designed for use as a dwelling, in the house of joint ownership; but the record shows no proof that, by so doing, the said Matilde occasioned any detriment to the interests of the community property, nor that she prevented her sister Vicenta from utilizing the said upper story according to her rights. It is to be noted that the stores of the lower floor were rented and an accounting of the rents was duly made to the plaintiffs.
Each co-owner of realty held pro indiviso exercises his rights over the whole property and may use and enjoy the same with no other limitation than that he shall not injure the interests of his coowners, for the reason that, until a division be made, the respective part of each holder can not be determined and every one of the coowners exercises together with his other coparticipants, joint ownership over the pro indiviso property, in addition to his use and enjoyment of the same.
As the hereditary properties of the joint ownership of the two sisters, Vicenta Ortiz, plaintiff, and Matilde Ortiz, defendant, were situated in the Province of Ilocos Sur, and were in the care of the last named, assisted by her husband, while the plaintiff Vicenta with her husband was residing outside of the said province the greater part of the time between 1885 and 1905, when she left these Islands for Spain, it is not at all strange that delays and difficulties should have attended the efforts made to collect the rents and proceeds from the property held in common and to obtain a partition of the latter, especially during several years when, owing to the insurrection, the country was in a turmoil; and for this reason, aside from that founded on the right of co-ownership of the
defendants, who took upon themselves the administration and care of the property of joint tenancy for purposes of their preservation and improvement, these latter are not obliged to pay to the plaintiff Vicenta one-half of the
rents which might have been derived from the upper story of the said house on Calle Escolta, and, much less, because one of the living rooms and the storeroom thereof were used for the storage of some belongings and effects of common ownership between the litigants. The defendant Matilde, therefore, in occupying with her husband the upper floor of the said house, did not injure the interests of her coowner, her sister Vicenta, nor did she prevent the latter from living therein, but merely exercised a legitimate right pertaining to her as a coowner of the property.
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Notwithstanding the above statements relative to the joint-ownership rights which entitled the defendants to live in the upper story of the said house, yet, in view of the fact that the record shows it to have been proved that the defendant Matilde's husband, Gaspar de Bartolome, occupied for four years a room or a
part of the lower floor of the same house on Calle Escolta, using it as an office for the justice of the peace, a position which he held in the capital of that province, strict justice requires that he pay his sister-in-law, the plaintiff, one-half of the monthly rent which the said quarters could have produced, had they been leased to another person. The amount of such monthly rental is fixed at P16 in appearance with the evidence shown in the
record. This conclusion as to Bartolome's liability results from the fact that, even as the husband of the defendant
coowner of the property, he had no right to occupy and use gratuitously the said part of the lower floor of the house in question, where he lived with his wife, to the detriment of the plaintiff Vicenta who did not receive one-half of the rent which those quarters could and should have produced, had they been occupied by a stranger, in the same manner that rent was obtained from the rooms on the lower floor that were used as stores. Therefore, the defendant Bartolome must pay to the plaintiff Vicenta P384, that is, one-half of P768, the
total amount of the rents which should have been obtained during four years from the quarters occupied as an office by the justice of the peace of Vigan.
HELD: partial reversal of RTC judgment. /adsum
ARNELITO ADLAWAN, Petitioner, versus EMETERIO M. ADLAWAN and NARCISA M. ADLAWAN, Respondents. 2006 Jan 20 1st Division G.R. No. 161916
CASE DOCTRINES
Article 487 of the Civil code covers all actions for the recovery of possession; indispensable parties
Under Article 487 of the New Civil Code, any of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment. This article covers all kinds of actions for the recovery of possession, including an accion publiciana and a reinvidicatory action. A owner may bring such an action without the necessity of joining all the other owners as co-plaintiffs because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all. Any judgment of the court in favor of the co-owner will benefit the others but if such judgment is adverse, the same cannot prejudice the rights of the unimpleaded co-owners. If the action is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone who claims to be the sole owner and entitled to the possession thereof, the action will not prosper unless he impleads the other co-owners who are indispensable parties.
FACTS:
Petition for review.
Dominador Adlawan, who died without any other issue, is the owner of a lot and a house built thereon registered in the Registry of Property. Petitioner (Arnelito Adlawan) is an acknowledged illegitimate son and the sole heir of Dominador. He executed an affidavit adjudicating to himself the house and lot. Out of respect and generosity to respondents who are the siblings of his father, he granted their plea to occupy the subject property provided they would vacate the same should his need for the property arise. When he verbally requested
respondents to vacate the house and lot, they refused and filed instead an action for quieting of title with the RTC. Finally, upon respondents’ refusal to heed the last demand letter to vacate dated August 2, 2000, petitioner filed this ejectment case.
In response Narcisa and Emeterio, 70 and 59 years of age, respectively, denied that they begged petitioner to allow them to stay on the questioned property and stressed that they have been occupying lot and the house standing thereon since birth. That the lot was originally registered in the name of their deceased father, Ramon Adlawan and the ancestral house standing thereon was owned by Ramon and their mother, Oligia
Mañacap Adlawan. The spouses had nine children including the late Dominador and herein surviving respondents Emeterio and Narcisa. Petitioner, on the other hand, is a stranger who never had possession of the lot. They further alleged that the transfer of the title to Dominador was simulated. It was done so that their parents will be able to obtain a loan for the renovation of their house. Respondents also contended that Dominador’s signature at the back of petitioner’s birth certificate was forged, hence, the latter is not an heir of Dominador and has no right to claim ownership of the lot. They argued that even if petitioner is indeed Dominador’s acknowledged illegitimate son, his right to succeed is doubtful because Dominador was survived by his wife, Graciana.
MTC decision: dismissed the complaint. RTC decision: reversed the decision of the MTC
Meanwhile, the RTC granted petitioner’s motion for execution pending appeal which was opposed by the alleged nephew and nieces of Graciana in their motion for leave to intervene and to file an answer in intervention.
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They contended that as heirs of Graciana, they have a share in the lot and that intervention is necessary to protect their right over the property. In addition, they declared that as co-owners of the property, they are allowing respondents to stay in the lot until a formal partition of the property is made.
CA decision: set aside the RTC and reinstated the MTC decision.
ISSUE: WON petitioner can validly maintain the instant case for ejectment.
RULING:
Petitioner averred that he is an acknowledged illegitimate son and the sole heir of Dominador. He in fact executed an affidavit adjudicating to himself the controverted property. In ruling for the petitioner, the RTC held that the questioned January 31, 1962 deed of sale validly transferred title to Dominador and that petitioner is his acknowledged illegitimate son who inherited ownership of the questioned lot. The Court notes, however, that the RTC lost sight of the fact that the theory of succession invoked by petitioner would end up proving that he is not the sole owner of Lot 7226. This is so because Dominador was survived not only by petitioner but also by his lega l wife, Graciana, who died 10 years after the demise of Dominador on May 28, 1987. By intestate succession, Graciana and petitioner became co-owners of Lot 7226. The death of Graciana on May 6, 1997, did not make petitioner the absolute owner of Lot 7226 because the share of Graciana passed to her relatives by consanguinity and not to petitioner with whom she had no blood relations. The Court of Appeals thus correctly held that petitioner has no authority to institute the instant action as the sole owner of Lot 7226.
Petitioner contends that even granting that he has co-owners over Lot 7226, he can on his own file the instant case pursuant to Article 487 of the Civil Code which provides:
ART. 487. Any one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment.
This article covers all kinds of actions for the recovery of possession. Article 487 includes forcible entry and unlawful detainer (accion interdictal), recovery of possession (accion publiciana), and recovery of ownership (accion de reivindicacion). A owner may bring such an action without the necessity of joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs because the suit is presumed to have been filed to benefit his co-co-owners. It should be
stressed, however, that where the suit is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone who claims to be the sole owner and entitled to the possession of the litigated property, the action should be dismissed.
xxx
In Baloloy v. Hular, respondent filed a complaint for quieting of title claiming exclusive ownership of th e property, but the evidence showed that respondent has co-owners over the property. In dismissing the complaint for want of respondent’s authority to file the case, the Court held that –
Under Article 487 of the New Civil Code, any of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment. This article covers all kinds of actions for the recovery of possession, including an accion publiciana and a reinvidicatory action. A owner may bring such an action without the necessity of joining all the other owners as co-plaintiffs because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all. Any judgment of the court in favor of the co-owner will benefit the others but if such judgment is adverse, the same cannot prejudice the rights of the unimpleaded co-owners. If the action is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone who claims to be the sole owner and entitled to the possession thereof, the action will not prosper unless he impleads the other co-owners who are indispensable parties.
In this case, the respondent alone filed the complaint, claiming sole ownership over the subject property and praying that he be declared the sole owner thereof. There is no proof that the other co-owners had waived their rights over the subject property or conveyed the same to the respondent or such co-owners were aware of the case in the trial court. The trial court rendered judgment declaring the respondent as the sole owner of the property and entitled to its possession, to the prejudice of the latter’s siblings. Patently then, the decision of the trial court is erroneous.
Under Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the respondent was mandated to implead his siblings, being co-owners of the property, as parties. The respondent failed to comply with the rule. It must , likewise, be stressed that the Republic of the Philippines is also an indispensable party as defendant because the respondent sought the nullification of OCT No. P-16540 which was issued based on Free Patent No. 384019. Unless the State is impleaded as party-defendant, any decision of the Court would not be binding on it. It has been held that the absence of an indispensable party in a case renders ineffective all the proceedings subsequent to the filing of the complaint including the judgment. The absence of the respondent’s siblings, as parties, rendered all proceedings
subsequent to the filing thereof, including the judgment of the court, ineffective for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.
In the instant case, it is not disputed that petitioner brought the suit for unlawful detainer in his name alone and for his own benefit to the exclusion of the heirs of Graciana as he even executed an affidavit of self-
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adjudication over the disputed property. It is clear therefore that petitioner cannot validly maintain the instant action considering that he does not recognize the co-ownership that necessarily flows from his theory of succession to the property of his father, Dominador.
In the same vein, there is no merit in petitioner’s claim that he has the legal personality to file the present unlawful detainer suit because the ejectment of respondents would benefit not only him but also his alleged co -owners. However, petitioner forgets that he filed the instant case to acquire possession of the property and to recover damages. If granted, he alone will gain possession of the lot and benefit from the proceeds of the award of damages to the exclusion of the heirs of Graciana. Hence, petitioner cannot successfully capitalize on the alleged benefit to his co-owners. Incidentally, it should be pointed out that in default of the said heirs of Graciana, whom petitioner labeled as “fictitious heirs,” the State will inherit her share and will thus be petitioner’s co-owner entitled to possession and enjoyment of the property.
The present controversy should be differentiated from the cases where the Court upheld the right of a co -owner to file a suit pursuant to Article 487 of the Civil Code. In Resuena v. Court of Appeals, and Sering v. Plazo, the co-owners who filed the ejectment case did not represent themselves as the exclusive owner of the property. In Celino v. Heirs of Alejo and Teresa Santiago, the complaint for quieting of title was brought in behalf of t he co-owners precisely to recover lots owned in common. Similarly in Vencilao v. Camarenta, the amended complaint specified that the plaintiff is one of the heirs who co-owns the controverted properties.
In the foregoing cases, the plaintiff never disputed the existence of a co-ownership nor claimed to be the sole or exclusive owner of the litigated lot. A favorable decision therein would of course inure to the benefit not only of the plaintiff but to his co-owners as well. The instant case, however, presents an entirely different backdrop as petitioner vigorously asserted absolute and sole ownership of the questioned lot. In his complaint, petitioner made the following allegations xxxx
Clearly, the said cases find no application here because petitioner’s action operates as a complete repudiation of the existence of co-ownership and not in representation or recognition thereof. Dismissal of the complaint is therefore proper. As noted by Former Supreme Court Associate Justice Edgrado L. Paras “*i+t is understood, of course, that the action [under Article 487 of the Civil Code] is being instituted for all. Hence, if the co-owner expressly states that he is bringing the case only for himself, the action should not be allowed to prosper.”
HELD: petition denied. /adsum
TINING RESUENA, ALEJANDRA GARAY, LORNA RESUENA, ELEUTERIO RESUENA, EUTIQUIA ROSARIO and
UNISIMA RESUENA, Petitioners, versus HON. COURT OF APPEALS, 11th DIVISION and JUANITO BORROMEO, SR., Respondents. 2005 Mar 28 2nd Division G.R. No. 128338
CASE DOCTRINES
Co-owner’s right to file an action for ejectment; occupation by tolerance
Respondent’s action for ejectment against petitioners is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all co-owners of the property since petitioners were not able to prove that they are authorized to occupy the same.
Petitioners’ lack of authority to occupy the properties, coupled with respondent’s right under Article 487, clearly settles respondent’s prerogative to eject petitioners from Lot No. 2587. Time and again, this Court has
ruled that persons who occupy the land of another at the latter's tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, are necessarily bound by an implied promise that they will vacate the same upon demand, failing in which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against them.
FACTS:
Petition for Review on certiorari under Rule 45.
Juanito Borromeo, Sr. is the co-owner and overseer of certain parcels of land located in Pooc, Talisay, Cebu, designated as Lots Nos. 2587 and 2592 of the Talisay-Manglanilla Estate. He owned six-eighths (6/8) of Lot No. 2587 while the Sps. Bascon owned two-eights (2/8) thereof. On the other hand, Lot No. 2592 is owned in common by Borromeo and the heirs of one Nicolas Maneja. However, the proportion of their undivided shares was not determined a quo.
Tining Resuena, Alejandra Garay, Lorna Resuena, Eleuterio Resuena, and Unisima Resuena resided in the upper portion of Lot No. 2587, allegedly under the acquiescence of the Spouses Bascon and their heir, Andres Bascon. On the other hand, petitioner Eutiquia Rosario occupied a portion of Lot No. 2592, allegedly with the permission of the heirs of Nicolas Maneja, one of the original co-owners of Lot No. 2587. Borromeo claimed that they have occupied portions of the subject property by virtue of his own liberality.
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Borromeo developed portions of Lots Nos. 2587 and 2592 occupied by him into a resort known as the Borromeo Beach Resort. In his desire to expand and extend the facilities of the resort that he established on the subject properties, respondent demanded that petitioners vacate the property. Petitioners, however, refused to vacate their homes.
On 16 February 1994, Borromeo filed a Complaint for ejectment with the MTC against the petitioners. MTC decision (summary proceeding): dismissed the complaint. Borromeo had no right to evict the petitioners because the area was owned in common and there was no partition yet.
RTC decision: reversed the MTC decision. It held that Article 487 of the Civil Code, which allows any one of the co-owners to bring an action in ejectment, may successfully be invoked by the respondent because, in a sense, a co-owner is the owner and possessor of the whole, and that the suit for ejectment is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all co-owners.
CA decision: affirmed the RTC decision.
ISSUE: WON Borromeo can lawfully evict the petitioners.
RULING:
Article 487 of the Civil Code, which provides simply that “*a+ny one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment,” is a categorical and an unqualified authority in favor of respondent to evict petitioners from the portions of Lot. No. 2587.
This provision is a departure from Palarca v. Baguisi, which held that an action for ejectment must be brought by all the co-owners. Thus, a co-owner may bring an action to exercise and protect the rights of all. When the action is brought by one co-owner for the benefit of all, a favorable decision will benefit them; but an adverse decision cannot prejudice their rights.
Respondent’s action for ejectment against petitioners is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all co-owners of the property since petitioners were not able to prove that they are authorized to occupy the same.
Petitioners’ lack of authority to occupy the properties, coupled with respondent’s right under Article 487, clearly settles respondent’s prerogative to eject petitioners from Lot No. 2587. Time and again, this Court has
ruled that persons who occupy the land of another at the latter's tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, are necessarily bound by an implied promise that they will vacate the same upon demand, failing in which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against them.
HELD: Petition is DENIED. /adsum
FIRST MARBELLA CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioner, vs. AUGUSTO GATMAYTAN, respondent. G.R. No. 163196 July 4, 2008
CASE DOCTRINES
Section 20, RA 4726 does not ipso facto grants the right to extrajudicial foreclosure of a condominium unit
Clearly, Section 20 merely prescribes the procedure by which petitioner's claim may be treated as a
superior lien - i.e., through the annotation thereof on the title of the condominium unit. While the law also grants petitioner the option to enforce said lien through either the judicial or extrajudicial foreclosure sale of the condominium unit, Section 20 does not by itself, ipso facto, authorize judicial as extra-judicial foreclosure of the condominium unit. Petitioner may avail itself of either option only in the manner provided for by the governing law and rules. As already pointed out, A.M. No. No. 99-10-05-0, as implemented under Circular No. 7-2002, requires that petitioner furnish evidence of its special authority to cause the extrajudicial foreclosure of the condominium unit.
FACTS:
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.
Gatmaytan is the registered owner of Fontavilla No. 501 (condominium unit), Marbella I Condominium, Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City, under Condominium Certificate of Title No. 1972 (CCT No. 1972). Inscribed on his title is a Declaration of Restrictions and a Notice of Assessment.
On November 11, 2003, Marbella Condominium filed with the RTC, through the Office of the Clerk of Court & Ex-Oficio Sheriff, a Petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of the condominium unit of Gatmaytan. Petitioner’s allegations:
1. that it (petitioner) is a duly organized association of the tenants and homeowners of Marbella I Condominium; that respondent is a member thereof but has unpaid association dues amounting to P3,229,104.89, as of June 30, 2003;
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RTC decision: the request for extra-judicial foreclosure of the subject condominium unit is DENIED. The MR was also denied.
PROCEDURAL ISSUE: WON petitioners can file a petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 based on the
decision of the RTC in the exercise of his administrative function.
RULING:
Only a judgment, final order or resolution rendered by a court in the exercise of its judicial functions relative to an actual controversy is subject to an appeal to this Court by way of a Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The January 7, 2004 Order and March 21, 2004 Order assailed
herein were issued by the RTC Executive Judge in the exercise of his administrative function to supervise the ministerial duty of the Clerk of Court as Ex-Oficio Sheriff in the conduct of an extrajudicial foreclosure sale; hence, said orders are not appealable under Rule 45. Rather, the correct mode of appeal is by petition for mandamus under Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Sec. 3. Petition for mandamus - When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course o f law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent, immediately or at some other time to be specified by the court, to do the act required to be done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the respondent.
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE: WON First Marbella Condominium Association has the right to cause the extrajudicial
foreclosure of its annotated lien on the condominium unit under Section 20 of R.A. No. 4726.
RULING:
xxx petitioner must establish that it has a clear right to the extrajudicial foreclosure sale of the
condominium unit of respondent. Under Circular No. 7-2002, implementing Supreme Court Administrative Matter No. 99-10-05-0, it is mandatory that a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure be supported by evidence that
petitioner holds a special power or authority to foreclose, thus:
Sec. 1. All applications for extra-judicial foreclosure of mortgage, whether under the direction of the Sheriff or a notary public pursuant to Art. No. 3135, as amended, and Act 1508, as amended, shall be filed with the Executive Judge, through the Clerk of Court, who is also the Ex-Officio Sheriff (A.M. No. 99-10-05-0, as amended, March 1, 2001).
Sec. 2. Upon receipt of the application, the Clerk of Court shall:
a. Examine the same to ensure that the special power of attorney authorizing the extra-judicial
foreclosure of the real property is either inserted into or attached to the deed of real estate mortgage (Act No. 3135, Sec. 1, as amended) x x x.
Without proof of petitioner's special authority to foreclose, the Clerk of Court as Ex-Oficio Sheriff is precluded from acting on the application for extrajudicial foreclosure.
In the present case, the only basis of petitioner for causing the extrajudicial foreclosure of the
condominium unit of respondent is a notice of assessment annotated on CCT No. 1972 in accordance w ith Section 20 of R.A. No. 4726. However, neither annotation nor law vests it with sufficient authority to foreclose on the property.
The notice of assessment contains no provision for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the condominium unit. All that it states is that the assessment of petitioner against respondent for unpaid association dues constitutes a "first lien against [the] condominium unit."
Neither does Section 20 of R.A. No. 4726 grant petitioner special authority to foreclose. All that the law provides is the following:
Sec. 20. The assessment upon any condominium made in accordance with a duly registered declaration of restrictions shall be an obligation of the owner thereof at the time the assessment is made. The amount of any such assessment plus any other charges thereon, such as interest, costs (including attorney's fees) and penalties, as such may be provided for in the declaration of restrictions, shall be and become a lien
upon the condominium to be registered with the Register of Deeds of the city or province where such condominium project is located. The notice shall state the amount of such assessment and such other
charges thereon as may be authorized by the declaration of restrictions, a description of condominium unit against which same has been assessed, and the name of the registered owner thereof. Such notice
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shall be signed by an authorized representative of the management body or as otherwise provided in the declaration of restrictions. Upon payment of said assessment and charges or other satisfaction thereof, the management body shall cause to be registered a release of the lien.
Such lien shall be superior to all other liens registered subsequent to the registration of said notice of assessment except real property tax liens and except that the declaration of restrictions may provide for the subordination thereof to any other liens and encumbrances, such liens may be enforced in the same
manner provided for by law for the judicial or extra-judicial foreclosure of mortgage or real property.
Unless otherwise provided for in the declaration of the restrictions, the management body shall have power to bid at foreclosure sale. The condominium owner shall have the right of redemption as in cases of judicial or extra-judicial foreclosure of mortgages.
Clearly, Section 20 merely prescribes the procedure by which petitioner's claim may be treated as a
superior lien - i.e., through the annotation thereof on the title of the condominium unit. While the law also grants petitioner the option to enforce said lien through either the judicial or extrajudicial foreclosure sale of the condominium unit, Section 20 does not by itself, ipso facto, authorize judicial as extra-judicial foreclosure of the condominium unit. Petitioner may avail itself of either option only in the manner provided for by the governing law and rules. As already pointed out, A.M. No. No. 99-10-05-0, as implemented under Circular No. 7-2002, requires that petitioner furnish evidence of its special authority to cause the extrajudicial foreclosure of the condominium unit.
HELD: the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. /adsum
LEONOR B. CRUZ, petitioner, vs.TEOFILA M. CATAPANG, respondent. G.R. No. 164110 February 12, 2008
CASE DOCTRINES
Alteration; needs concurrence of all co-owners
Under Article 491, none of the co-owners shall, without the consent of the others, make alterations in the thing owned in common. It necessarily follows that none of the co-owners can, without the consent of the other
co-owners, validly consent to the making of an alteration by another person, such as respondent, in the thing owned in common. Alterations include any act of strict dominion or ownership and any encumbrance or disposition has been held implicitly to be an act of alteration. The construction of a house on the co-owned property is an act of dominion. Therefore, it is an alteration falling under Article 491 of the Civil Code. There being no consent from all co-owners, respondent had no right to construct her house on the co-owned property. Entry into the property without the consent of other owners is stealth; getting only the consent of one of the co-owners is strategy.
Respondent’s entry into the property without the permission of petitioner could appear to be a secret and clandestine act done in connivance with co-owner Norma Maligaya whom respondent allowed to stay in her house. Entry into the land effected clandestinely without the knowledge of the other co-owners could be categorized as possession by stealth. Moreover, respondent’s act of getting only the consent of one co-owner, her sister Norma Maligaya, and allowing the latter to stay in the constructed house, can in fact be considered as a strategy which she utilized in order to enter into the co-owned property. As such, respondent’s acts constitute
forcible entry. FACTS:
This petition for review.
Leonor B. Cruz, Luz Cruz and Norma Maligaya are the co-owners of a parcel of land covering an area of 1,435 square meters located at Taal, Batangas. With the consent of Norma Maligaya, Teofila M. Catapang built a house on a lot adjacent to the parcel of land sometime in 1992. The house intruded, however, on a portion of the co-owned property.
In 1995, Leonor B. Cruz visited the property and was surprised to see a part of Catapang’s house was intruding unto a portion of the co-owned property. She then made several demands upon respondent to demolish the intruding structure and to vacate the portion encroaching on their property. The respondent, however, refused and disregarded her demands.
On January 25, 1996, the Cruz filed a complaint for forcible entry against Catapang.
MCTC decision: in favor of Cruz, ruling that consent of only one of the co-owners is not sufficient to justify defendant’s construction of the house and possession of the portion of the lot in question.
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CA decision: reversed the RTC. It held that there is no cause of action for forcible entry in this case because respondent’s entry into the property, considering the consent given by co-owner Norma Maligaya, cannot be characterized as one made through strategy or stealth which gives rise to a cause of action for forcible entry. Petitioner’s contention/s:
1. the consent and knowledge of co-owner Norma Maligaya cannot defeat the action for forcible entry since it is a basic principle in the law of co-ownership that no individual co-owner can claim title to any definite portion of the land or thing owned in common until partition.
Respondent’s contention/s:
1. the complaint for forcible entry cannot prosper because her entry into the property was not through strategy or stealth due to the consent of one of the co-owners.
2. since Norma Maligaya is residing in the house she built, the issue is not just possession de facto but also one of possession de jure since it involves rights of co-owners to enjoy the property.
ISSUE 1: WON the consent of one owner will warrant the dismissal of a forcible entry case filed by another
co-owner against the person who was given the consent to construct a house on the co-owned property.
RULING:
As to the issue of whether or not the consent of one co-owner will warrant the dismissal of a forcible entry case filed by another co-owner against the person who was given the consent to construct a house on the co-owned property, we have held that a co-owner cannot devote common property to his or her exclusive use to
the prejudice of the co-ownership. In our view, a co-owner cannot give valid consent to another to build a house on the co-owned property, which is an act tantamount to devoting the property to his or her exclusive use.
Furthermore, Articles 486 and 491 of the Civil Code provide:
Art. 486. Each co-owner may use the thing owned in common, provided he does so in accordance with the purpose for which it is intended and in such a way as not to injure the interest of the co-ownership or prevent the other co-owners from using it according to their rights. The purpose of the co-ownership may be changed by agreement, express or implied.
Art. 491. None of the co-owners shall, without the consent of the others, make alterations in the thing owned in common, even though benefits for all would result therefrom. However, if the withholding of the consent by one or more of the co-owners is clearly prejudicial to the common interest, the courts may afford adequate relief.
Article 486 states each co-owner may use the thing owned in common provided he does so in accordance with the purpose for which it is intended and in such a way as not to injure the interest of the co-ownership or prevent the other co-owners from using it according to their rights. Giving consent to a third person to construct a
house on the co-owned property will injure the interest of the co-ownership and prevent other co-owners from using the property in accordance with their rights.
Under Article 491, none of the co-owners shall, without the consent of the others, make alterations in the thing owned in common. It necessarily follows that none of the co-owners can, without the consent of the other
co-owners, validly consent to the making of an alteration by another person, such as respondent, in the thing owned in common. Alterations include any act of strict dominion or ownership and any encumbrance or disposition has been held implicitly to be an act of alteration. The construction of a house on the co-owned property is an act of dominion. Therefore, it is an alteration falling under Article 491 of the Civil Code. There being no consent from all co-owners, respondent had no right to construct her house on the co-owned property. ISSUE 2: WON there was valid ground for forcible entry.
Consent of only one co-owner will not warrant the dismissal of the complaint for forcible entry filed against the builder. The consent given by Norma Maligaya in the absence of the consent of petitioner and Luz Cruz
did not vest upon respondent any right to enter into the co-owned property. Her entry into the property still falls under the classification "through strategy or stealth."
The Court of Appeals held that there is no forcible entry because respondent’s entry into the property was not through strategy or stealth due to the consent given to her by one of the co-owners. We cannot give our imprimatur to this sweeping conclusion. Respondent’s entry into the property without the permission of
petitioner could appear to be a secret and clandestine act done in connivance with co-owner Norma Maligaya whom respondent allowed to stay in her house. Entry into the land effected clandestinely without the
knowledge of the other co-owners could be categorized as possession by stealth. Moreover, respondent’s act of getting only the consent of one co-owner, her sister Norma Maligaya, and allowing the latter to stay in the constructed house, can in fact be considered as a strategy which she utilized in order to enter into the co-owned property. As such, respondent’s acts constitute forcible entry.
