PART I Introduction
A. The Constitution as a social contract
North Cotabato v. GRP GR No. 183591 October 14, 2008 Ponente: Carpio-Morales, J.
B. How to read the Constitution
Francisco v. House of Representatives (HOR) Ponente: Carpio-Morales, J.
Facts:
1. Art 11, Sec 8 Constitution – Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this Section.
2. November 2001 - 12th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings (House Impeachment Rules) superseding the Rules approved by 11th Congress
Section 16. – Impeachment Proceedings Deemed Initiated. – In cases where a Member of the House files a verified complaint of impeachment or a citizen files a verified complaint that is endorsed by a Member of the House through a resolution of endorsement against an impeachable officer, impeachment proceedings against such official are deemed initiated on the day the Committee on Justice finds that the verified complaint and/or resolution against such official, as the case may be, is sufficient in substance, or on the date the House votes to overturn or affirm the finding of the said Committee that the verified complaint and/or resolution, as the case may be, is not sufficient in substance. In cases where a verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment is filed or endorsed, as the case may be, by at least one-third (1/3) of the Members of the House, impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated at the time of the filing of such verified complaint or resolution of impeachment with the Secretary General.
Section 17. Bar Against Initiation Of Impeachment Proceedings. – Within a period of one (1) year from the date impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated as provided in Section 16 hereof, no impeachment proceedings, as such, can be initiated against the same official.
3. July 2002 – House of representatives adopted a Resolution directing Committee on Justice to conduct an investigation in aid of legislation on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Judiciary Development Fund
4. June 2003 – Pres. Estrada filed the first impeachment complaint against Davide and 7 associate justices for culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of public trust, and other high crimes; endorsed by Rep. Suplico, Zamora, and Dilangalen House Committee on Justice dismissed the complain because insufficient in substance
5. October 2003 – Rep. Teodoro and Fuentebella filed second impeachment complaint founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry; resolution of endorsement/impeachment was signed by at least 1/3 of all the members of the House of Representatives
Issue:
1. WON issue is justiciable
2. WON Rules of Procedure for Impeachment Proceedings adopted by 12th Congress is constitutional and second impeachment complaint is valid
1. Justiciable. The Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the sole discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for judicially discoverable standards for determining the validity of the exercise of such discretion through power of judicial review.
a. Locus standi - Case is of transcendental pubic importance.
b. Ripe for adjudication - the second complaint had been filed and the 2001 rules had been promulgated and enforced.
c. Lis mota - (1) whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules adopted by the 12th Congress are unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution; and (2) whether, as a result thereof, the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.
d. Judicial Restraint – not an option because the Court is not legally disqualified; no other tribunal to which the controversy may be referred.
2. Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which were approved by the House of Representatives on November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional. Consequently, the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which was filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella with the Office of the Secretary General of the House of Representatives on October 23, 2003 is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.
a. Interpretation of the term ―initiate‖ – takes place by the act of filing and referral or endorsement of the impeachment complaint to the House Committee on Justice or, by filing by at least 1/3 of the members of the HR with the Secretary General of the House, the meaning of Sec 3 (5) of Art XI becomes clear.
b. Sec 3 (5) of Article XI – once an impeachment complains has been initiated, another complaint may not be filed against the same official within a period of one year.
c. Under Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules, impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if there is a finding by the House Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is sufficient in substance, or (2) once the House itself affirms or overturns the finding of the Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is not sufficient in substance or (3) by the filing or endorsement before the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives of a verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment by at least 1/3 of the members of the House. These rules clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI since the rules give the term ―initiate‖ a meaning different meaning from filing and referral.
C. A framework for constitutional litigation
Francisco v. House of Representatives (HOR) supra
PART II Amendment of the Constitution A. Amendment vs. Revision
B. Proposal
1. By Congress as a constituent assembly 2. By Constitutional Convention
Gonzales v. Comelec Ponente: Concepcion, C.J. Facts:
16 March 1967 The Senate and the House of Representatives passed the following resolutions:
(1) R.B.H. (Resolution of Both Houses) No.1, proposing to amend Art. VI Sec. 5 of the Constitution of the Philippines, so as to increase the membership of the House of Representatives from a maximum of 120, as provided in the Constitution, to a maximum of 180, to be apportioned among the several provinces as nearly as may be according to the number of their respective inhabitants, but each province was to have at least one member;
(2) R.B.H. No. 2, calling a convention to propose amendments to the Constitution, the convention to be composed of two delegates from each representative district, to be elected in the general elections to be held on the second Tuesday of November, 1971; (3) R.B.H. No. 3, proposing to amend Art. VI Sec. 16 of the same Constitution as to authorize Senators and the members of the House of Representatives to become delegates to the aforementioned constitutional convention, without forfeiting their respective seats in Congress.
17 June 1967 The Congress passed a bill, which upon approval by the President, became Republic Act No. 4913, providing that the amendments to the Constitution proposed in the aforementioned Resolutions Nos. 1 and 3, be submitted for approval by the people, at the General Elections which shall be held on 14 November 1967.
21 October 1967 Petition L-28196 was filed; Petitioner Gonzales, citizen, taxpayer and voter, claims to have instituted the aforementioned case as a class unit, for and in behalf of all citizens, taxpayers and voters similarly situated.
Issue:
1. WON the Rep. Act. 4913, in submitting the proposed constitutional amendments to the people for approval at the 1967 General Election instead of at an election solely for its purpose, violates Art. XV Sec. 11 of the Constitution (Ratification must be in a special election?);
2. WON the Rep. Act. 4913 violates Art. XV Sec. 1 of the Constitution, since it was not passed with the ¾ vote in joint session required when Congress proposes amendments to the Constitution (Congress = de facto body?);
3. WON the Rep. Act. 4913 violates the due process clause of the Constitution (Art. III Sec. 1 Subsec.12), in not requiring that the substance of the proposed amendments be stated on the face of the ballot or otherwise rendering clear the import of the proposed amendments, instead of printing at the back of the ballot only the proposed amendments (Procedure for information dissemination, re: amendments, insufficient?).
Held: Petition is dismissed, writs therein prayed for denied, no special pronouncement as to costs. Ratio:
1. Legal Basis
Art. XV Sec. 1, 1935 Constitution: ―…Such amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election which the amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification.‖
Justification
Nothing in the provision indicates that the election therein referred to is a ―special‖, not a ―general‖, election. 2. Legal Basis
1Art. XV Sec. 1, 1935 Constitution: ―The Congress in joint session assembled, by a vote of three-fourths of all the
members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives voting separately, may propose amendments to this Constitution or call a convention for that purpose. Such amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election which the amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification.‖
2
Art.1 Sec.1 Subsec.1, 1935 Constitution: ―No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.‖
Art. VI Sec. 5, 1935 Constitution: ―The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than one hundred and twenty Members …The Congress shall by law make an apportionment within three years after the return of every enumeration, and not otherwise. Until such apportionment shall have been made, the House of Representatives shall have the same number of Members as that by fixed by law for the National Assembly, who shall be elected by the qualified electors from the present assembly districts. ..‖
Justification:
The Constitution itself provides for the continuance of the districting in such case, therefore rendering legal and de jure the status quo.
3. Legal Basis
Art. XV Sec. 1, 1935 Constitution: ―Such amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election which the amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification.‖
Justification
―Submitting‖ (here) means to provide for how, when and by what means the amendments shall be submitted to the people for approval.
(Rep. Act 4913 Sec. 2) The publication in the Official Gazette at least 20 days before the election, the posting of notices in public buildings not later than 14 October 1967, to remain posted until after the elections, the placing of copies of the proposed amendments in the polling places, aside from printing the same at the back of the ballot, provide sufficient opportunity to the voters to cast an intelligent vote on the proposal. ―Due process‖ (Art.1 Sec.1 Subsec.1, 1935 Constitution, see Footnote No.2) refers only to providing fair opportunity; it does not guarantee that the opportunity given will in fact be availed of; that is the look-out of the voter and the responsibility of the citizen. As long as fair and reasonable opportunity is given, and in this case it was, the due process clause is not infringed.
4. By the people through initiative (See RA 6735 August 2, 1989) Santiago v. Comelec
Ponente: Davide, J. Facts:
Atty. Delfin filed with the COMELEC a petition to amend the constitution by People's initiative. His proposal is to lift the term limits of elective officials and thus amending Sections 4 and 7 of Art VI, Section 4 of Art VII and Section 8 of Art X of the 1987 Philippine Constitution. In his petition, Delfin asked the COMELEC to issue an order (1) fixing the time and dates for signature gathering all over the country; (2) cause the publication of such order in newspaper of general and local circulation; and (3) instructing municipal election registrars in all regions of the Philippines to assist him and his volunteers in establishing signing stations. The COMELEC then issued an order directing Delfin to cause the publication of the petition and set the case for hearing.
At the hearing, Senator Roco filed a motion to dismiss the Delfin Petition on the ground that it is not the initiatory petition properly cognizable by the COMELEC. Thereafter, Senator Santiago, et al., filed a special civil action for prohibition before the Supreme Court.
Issue:
1. Whether R.A. No. 6735, entitled An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum and Appropriating Funds therefore, was intended to include or cover initiative on amendments to the Constitution; and if so, whether the Act, as worded, adequately covers such initiative.
2. Whether that portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 (In re: Rules and Regulations Governing the Conduct of Initiative on the Constitution, and Initiative and Referendum on National and Local Laws)
regarding the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution is valid, considering the absence in the law of specific provisions on the conduct of such initiative.
3. Whether the lifting of term limits of elective national and local officials, as proposed in the draft ―Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution,‖ would constitute a revision of, or an amendment to, the Constitution. 4. Whether the COMELEC can take cognizance of, or has jurisdiction over, a petition solely intended to obtain
an order (a) fixing the time and dates for signature gathering; (b) instructing municipal election officers to assist Delfin's movement and volunteers in establishing signature stations; and (c) directing or causing the publication of, inter alia, the unsigned proposed Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution.
5. Whether it is proper for the Supreme Court to take cognizance of the petition when there is a pending case before the COMELEC.
Held:
1. Petition is GRANTED;
2. R.A. No. 6735 is inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution, and to have failed to provide sufficient standard for subordinate legislation;
3. Those parts of Resolutions No. 2300 of the Commission on Elections prescribing rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative or amendments to the Constitution are declared void; and
4. The court orders the Commission on Elections to forthwith DISMISS the DELFIN petition (UND-96-037); 5. The Temporary Restraining Order issued on 18 December 1996 is made permanent as against the
Commission on Elections, but is LIFTED against private respondents. Ratio:
1. The Instant Petition is viable despite the pendency in the COMELEC of the Delfin Petition. COMELEC has no jurisdiction over the Delfin Petition because the said petition is not supported by the required minimum number of signatures of registered voters. COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in refusing to dismiss the Delfin Petition, which does not contain the required number of signatures. In light of these claims, the instant case may likewise be treated as a special civil action for certiorari under Section I of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
2. R.A. No. 6735 intended to include the System of Initiative on Amendments to the Constitution, but is, inadequate and incomplete to cover that system because it does not contain any implementation process for Amendments to the Constitution and merely mentions it. This law cannot use the rules and regulations of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 to compensate for this.
3. COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, insofar as it prescribes rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution, is void. COMELEC cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to implement the exercise of the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of initiative. It does not have that power under R.A. No. 6735. Reliance on the COMELEC‘s power under Section 2(1) of Article IX-C of the Constitution is therefore misplaced.
4. COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in entertaining the Delfin Petition. The Delfin Petition does not contain signatures of the required number of voters. Without the required
signatures, the petition cannot be deemed validly initiated.
5. Further discussion on whether the Delfin Petition is an amendment to, and not a revision of, the Constitution is rendered unnecessary, if not academic.
Lambino v. Comelec GR No. 174153 October 25, 2006 Ponente: Carpio, J.
C. Submission Tolentino v. Comelec Ponente: Barredo, J. Facts:
1. ConCon 1971 was convened by virtue of Resolutions 2 and 4 of the Congress, with RA No. 6132 (Consitutional Convention Act)
this provided in Section 1 of Article XV of the 1935 Constitution
2. As its first formal proposal to amend the Constitution, the Convention approved Organic Resolution No. 1, reducing the voting age in Section 1, Article V of the Constitution of the Philippines to 18 years. Resolution
also included holding of plebiscite on Nov 8, 1971, with the local elections. COMELEC complied with the resolution.
Issue:
1. W/N issue is justiciable
2. W/N it is within the power of the Convention to call for a plebiscite for the ratification by the people of the constitutional amendment proposed in Organic Resolution No. 1 in the manner and form it provides Held:
1. YES 2. NO Ratio:
1. The Convention is not supreme. As any other convention of the same nature, it owes its existence and derives all its authority and power from the Constitution of the Philippines—as provided in Section 1, Article XV on Amendments. The acts of the Convention, its officers and members are not immune from attack on constitutional grounds. And because of the judicial power to decide on the constitutionality of acts by institutions provided for by the Constitution, the case is jusiticiable by the court.
2. As in the language of Section 1, Article XV of the 1935 Constitution, the amendments to be proposed by the Convention must be submitted to the people in a single election or plebiscite.
[provision reads: ―Such amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for ratification.‖]
a. The amendment now being proposed is only the first amendment, and the plebiscite being called for the ratification of the same is not authorized by Section 1 of Article XV. There should only be one election or plebiscite for the ratification of all amendments the Convention may propose. b. Any amendment of the Constitution is as important as the whole of it.
Hence, all acts of the Convention and the respondent COMELEC in that direction are null and void. D. Ratification
PART III Judicial Review A. Separation of Powers
In Re Laureta and Maravilla March 12, 1987 Demetria v. Alba
Ponente: Fernan, J. Facts/Issue:
WON Sec 44 of the Budget Reform Decree of 1977 is unconstitutional on the grounds that it authorizes the illegal transfer of public moneys, it fails to specify the objectives and purposes for which the proposed transfer of funds are to be made; it allows the Pres. To override the safeguards , form and procedure prescribed by the Constitution; it amounts to undue delegation of the legislative powers `1to the executive; and the decree are in excess of their authority and jurisdiction.
Held: Instant petition is granted and Par 1 Sec44 pf PD 1177 is hereby declared null and void. Ratio:
1. In American jurisprudence, Taxpayers have sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditures of moneys raised by taxation and may therefore question the constitutionality of statutes requiring expenditure of money.
2. In the case of Javier vs. COMELC, SC declared that the Court will not disregard and in effect condone the wrong on simplistic and tolerant pretext that the case has become moot and academic. Justice demands the Court to act not only for the vindication of the outraged right, though gone, for the guidance of and as a restraint upon the future.
3. Interpretation of Sec 16(5) Art VIII – The constitution allows the enactment of a law authorizing the transfer of funds for the purpose of augmenting an item from savings in another item in the appropriation of the gov‘t branch. Par 1 Sec 44 of PD 1177 unduly extents the privilege granted under the Sec 16(5). It empowers the Pres to indiscriminately transfer funds without regard whether the funds are actually savings or not.
B. Theory and Justification of Judicial Review Angara v. Electoral Commission
Ponente: Laurel, J. Facts:
1. The new constitution for the Independent Philippine Commonwealth was just promulgated. The petitioner, Angara, ran for the position of representative of the First District of the Province of Tayabas to the NA Septmeber 17, 1935 against Ynsua (one of the respondents) and others. On October 7, he was proclaimed by the provincial board of canvassers as the candidate who won the most votes and thus the winner. He took his oath of office on Novermber 15 (the start of the Commonwealth) and was confirmed by the NA on December 3 as an uncontested member of the NA. Also on this day, Res#8 was passed by the NA, confirming the membership of nonprotested elections of members of the NA and, in effect, limiting the time for presentation of protests. However, there was the ELECOM, which was a constitutional body invested with the jurisdiction to decide ―all cases relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the NA‖, was just being formed on December 4 and 6 and just met for the first time on December 9, fixing that day as the last day for the filing of election protests. Ynsua filed his ―Motion of Protest‖ to the ELECOM on December 8, a day before the said body ended the period for filing of election protest.
2. After that, Angara filed a ―Motion to Dismiss the Protest‖ to the ELECOM on the grounds that he was already confirmed a member of the NA through the Res#8 and through that resolution, the prescribed period for filing of protests had already ended on December 3, and the respondent was late in filing his protest because he filed the protest after December 3.
3. Ynsua filed an ―Answer to the Motion of Dismissal‖ arguing that there was no constitutional or legal provision which stated that members of the NA cannot be contested after confirmationof the NA. Angara replied to this ―Answer‖ but the ELECOM promulgated a resolution denying the petitioner‘s ―Motion to Dismiss the Protest‖. 4. The Petitioner now files a protest to the SC, questioning the jurisdiction of the ELECOM over the case,
arguing that:
5. the ELECOM has jurisdiction over the merits of contested elections to the NA but the NA has the power to regulate the proceedings of the NA, granted that ELECOM is part of the NA. ELECOM could only regulate its proceedings if the NA did not provide for it.
6. Res#8 is valid and should be respected, granted that NA is the only body that could regulate the proceedings of the ELECOM
7. Under Par13 of §1 of Ordinance appended to the Constitution and par6Art7 of the Tydings-McDuffie Law as well as §1 and 2 of art VIII of the Constitution, SC has jurisdiction to pass upon the fundamental questions raised in this issue because it involves the interpretation of the Constitution of the Philippines
8. The Solicitor-General responded on behalf of ELECOM arguing that:
9. ELECOM is a constitutional body invested with the jurisdiction to decide ―all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualification of the members of the NA‖ and that Dec 9 was the date fixed by ELECOM as the last day of filing for protest and its resolution dated January 23, 1936 was an act of its legitimate exercise of quasi-judicial functions. Said act is beyond cognizance or control of SC.
10. Res#8 did and could not deprive ELECOM of its jurisdiction to take cognizance of election protests filed within the limit that the ELECOM would set.
11. ELECOM is not an ―inferior tribunal, or corporation, or board, or person‖ 12. Ynsua filed an anwer arguing that:
13. Res#8 did not limit his filing for protest for ELECOM fixed the deadline on Dec 9 and not on the passage of Res#8, which was on Dec3
15. ELECOM acquired jurisdiction over election protest and Jan 23 resolution of ELECOM denying the ―Motion to Dismiss the Protest‖ was not reviewable by the SC by means of a writ of prohibition since it was part of ELECOM‘s jurisdiction
16. No constitutional nor legal provision requires the confirmation of members of the NA and that the said confirmation could not limit the period for filing protest
17. ELECOM is an independent constitutional entity with quasi-judicial functions and thus, its decisions are final and unappealable; also ELECOM is a constitutional creation which is not an inferior tribunal, or corporation, board, or person and is not subject to a writ of prohibition from the SC
18. Par6,art7 of Tydings-McDuffie Law is not applicable Issue:
1. WON the SC has jurisdiction over the ELECOM and the subject matter of the controversy
2. WON, if ever the first is granted, ELECOM acted within or without its jurisdiction in assuming cognizance of the protest filed against the election of Angara
Held/Ratio:
1. Yes. The SC has jurisdiction over the ELECOM: separation of powers granted by Consti (through separate articles for each branch) but check and balances maintain coordination among the branches. When there are conflicts between the boundaries of powers and functions of each branch, the Judiciary has the power to review and resolve these conflicts through Judicial Review (referred to as Judicial Supremacy). This
however is limited to actual cases and controversies.
2. Yes. ELECOM acted within its jurisdiction since ELECOM is recognized as an independent quasi-judicial body which is not an inferior tribunal, or corporation, board, or person, and is granted the powers to be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the NA. The present constitution granted the ELECOM with all the powers exercised by the legislature relating to the said function of ELECOM, and this includes the regulation of the rules and procedures of election protests. The confirmation of NA of its members is not required and does not limit the ELECOM of its power to fix dates for election protest, or else this would undermine the power and functions of the ELECOM.
C. Justiciable and Political Questions Miranda v. Aguirre
Ponente: Puno, J. Facts:
1. May 5, 1994: Republic Act 7720 converting the municipality of Santiago, Isabela into an independent component city was signed into law.
2. July 4, 1994: Republic Act 7720 was ratified by the people of Santiago via plebescite.
3. February 14, 1998: Republic Act 8582 was enacted amending RA 7720 ―reclassifying‖ Santiago into a component city from an independent component city.
Issue:
1. WON the downgrading of Santiago City from and independent component city to a mere component city requires the approval of the people of Santiago City in a plebiscite. >>>Stated otherwise: WON RA 8582 is constitutional
2. As regards present lesson: WON the instant petitions is justiciable Held:
1. The ―reclassification‖ of Santiago City by RA 8528 falls under Art X, Sec 10 of the Constitution and Chapter 2, Section 10 of the Local Government Code because it shares a common denominator with those instances listed therein.
2. Petitioners are the mayor and the people of Santiago City. They have legal standing.
3. The question at bar is whether or not petitioners have the right to approve or reject RA 8528 based on Art X Sec 10 of the Constitution. It is evident that it is a legal question and perfectly justciable.
1. The instances listed in Art X, Sec 10 of the Constitution and Chapter 2, Section 10 of the Local Government Code which require a plebiscite are as follows:
→ created, or divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered
→ The above-mentioned and the ―reclassification‖ to which RA 8528 refers shares a common denominator which is a material change in the rights and duties of the people who reside in the locality in question. → Therefore, a plebiscite is required for this ―reclassification.‖
2. The leading petitioner, Jose Miranda, is the mayor of Santiago. His power and authority would be directly affected (diminished) if Santiago reverts to becoming a component city of Isabela.
→ The city will be placed under the administrative supervision of the provincial government
The people of Santiago will be directly affected by any substantial change to the classification of Santiago. 3. The people of Santiago are asserting a right (i.e. to approve or reject RA 8528 which will affect them directly)
which they feel have been denied them Francisco v. House of Representatives (HOR) supra La Bugal-B’Laan v. Ramos
Ponente: Panganiban, J. Facts:
1. 24 January 2007: the Court en banc declared unconstitutional: (a) certain provisions of RA No. 7942 (Mining Law), (b) its Implementing Rules and Regulations DAO No. 96-40, and (c) the Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) dated March 30, 1995, executed by the government with Western Mining Corporation (Philippines), Inc. (WMCP), mainly on the finding that FTAAs are service contracts prohibited by the 1987 Constitution
2. Respondents filed separate Motions for Reconsideration Issue:
1. W/N case has been rendered moot by the sale of WMC shares in WMCP to Sagittarius Mines, Inc. (a Filipino corporation) and by the subsequent transfer and registration of the FTAA from WMCP to Sagittarius. 2. W/N it is still proper to resolve constitutionality of the assailed provisions, assuming that the case has been
rendered moot.
3. the proper interpretation of the phrase: Agreements Involving Either Technical or Financial Assistance, contained in paragraph 4 of Section 2 of Article XII of the Constitution.
4. thus, W/N provisions are unconstitutional. Held:
1. Because of the validity of sale and the transfer, and that the FTAA is not void per se, the case has become moot. However,
2. there is a need to resolve the unconstitutionality of the assailed provisions.
3. The phrase ―agreements involving either technical and financial assistance,‖ as used interchangeably with the term ―service contracts‖ by the drafters of the Constitution and as interpreted by the court, is not exclusionary and limiting.
4. The assailed provisions are not unconstitutional. Ratio:
1. 1- Nowhere in the provision is there any express limitation or restriction insofar as arrangements other than the three mentioned contractual schemes are concerned. There is no reason to believe that the framers of the Constitution, a majority of whom where obviously concerned with furthering the development and utilization of the country‘s natural resources, could have wanted to restrict Filipino participation in that area. 2. 2- This provision does not necessarily imply that the WMCP FTAA cannot be transferred to and assumed by
a Filipino corporation like Sagittarius, in which event the said provision should simply be disregarded as a superfluity.
3. 3- Section 40 expressly applies to the assignment or transfer of the FTAA, not to the sale and transfer of shares of stock in WMCP. When the transfer of the FTAA happens to be a Filipino corporation, the need for such safeguard is not critical.
4. Petitioners have assumed as fact that which has yet to be established. The Decision of the Court declaring the FTAA void has not yet become final. The FTAA is not per se defective or unconstitutional. It was questioned only because it had been issued to an allegedly non-qualified, foreign-owned corporation.
a. The court concedes that there exists the distinct possibility that one or more of the future FTAAs will be the subject of yet another suit grounded on constitutional issues. [as of June 2002, some 43 FTAAs had been filed]
5. The Court must recognize the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest involved, as well as the necessity for a ruling to put an end to the uncertainties plaguing the mining industry and the affected communities as a result of doubts cast upon the constitutionality and validity of the Mining Act, the subject FTAA and future FTAAs, and the need to avert a multiplicity of suits.
6. The real issue in this case is whether paragraph 4 of Section 2 of Article XII of the Constitution is contravened by RA 7942 and DAO 96-40. By the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the challenged action, the dispute is said to have ripened into a judicial controversy even without any other overt act.
a. The use of the word ―involving‖ signifies the possibility of the inclusion of other forms of assistance or activities having to do with, otherwise related to or compatible with financial or technical assistance. These agreements with foreign corporations are not limited to mere financial or technical assistance. Otherwise, the language of the drafters would have certainly been so unmistakably restrictive and stringent as to leave no doubt in anyone‘s mind about their true intent. There was a conscious and deliberate decision to avoid the use of restrictive wording that bespeaks an intent not to use the expression ―agreements x x x involving either technical or financial assistance‖ in an exclusionary and limiting manner.
7. Such intent cannot be definitively and conclusively established from the mere failure to carry the same expression or term over to the new Constitution, absent amore specific, explicit and unequivocal statement to that effect. Pertinent portions of the deliberations of the members of the ConCom conclusively show that they discussed agreements involving either technical or financial assistance in the same breadth as service contracts and used the terms interchangeably.
a. The gamut of requirements, regulations, restrictions and limitations imposed upon the FTAA contractor by the statute and regulations easily overturns petitioners‘ contention. The FTAA contractor is not free to do whatever it pleases and get away with it; on the contrary, it will have to follow the government line if it wants to stay in the enterprise. Ineluctably then, RA 7942 and DAO 96-40 vest in the government more than a sufficient degree of control and supervision over the conduct of mining operations.
8. The exploration permit serves a practical and legitimate purpose in that it protects the interests and preserves the rights of the exploration permit grantee (the would-be contractor)—foreign or local—during the period of time that it is spending heavily on exploration works, without yet being able to earn revenues to recoup any of its investments and expenditures.
9. The evaluation and analysis of the FTAA provisions sufficiently overturn petitioners‘ litany of objections to and criticisms of the State‘s alleged lack of control. The provisions vest the State with control and supervision over practically all aspects of the operations of the FTAA contractor, including the charging of pre-operating and operating expenses, and the disposition of mineral products.
10. The Court does not share the view that in FTAAs with foreign contractors under RA 7942, the government‘s share is limited to taxes, fees and duties. The inclusion of the phrase ―among other things‖ in the second paragraph of Section 81 clearly and unmistakable reveals the legislative intent to have the State collect more than just the usual taxes, duties and fees.
11. BUT, the WMCP FTAA has invalid provisions:
12. Section 7.9 of the WMCP FTAA clearly renders illusory the State‘s 60 percent share of WMCP‘s revenues in providing that: should WMCP‘s foreign stockholders sell 60 percent or more of their equity to a Filipino citizen or corporation, the State loses its right to receive its share in net mining revenues under Section 7.7, with any offsetting compensation to the State.
13. Section 7.8 is likewise invalid, since by allowing the sums spent by government for the benefit of the contractor to be deductible from the State‘s share in net mining revenues, it results in benefiting the contractor twice over. This constitute unjust enrichment on the part of the contractor, at the expense of the government
D. Requisites of Judicial Review 1. Actual Case or Controversy
Prematurity PACU v. Secretary of Education Ponente: Bengzon, J.
Facts:
1. Act 1207 approved in 1917 is entitled, ―An Act making the inspection and recognition of private schools and colleges obligatory for the Secretary of Public Instruction‖
3. Petitioners assailed that Act 1207 as amended by Act 3075 and Commonwealth Act 180 is unconstitutional on the following grounds:
4. They deprive the owners of schools and colleges as well as teachers and parents of liberty and property without due process of law
5. They deprive parents of their natural right and duty to rear their children for civic efficiency
6. Their provisions conferring on the Secretary of Education unlimited power and discretion to prescribe rules and standards constitute an unlawful delegation of legislative power
7. Petitioners claimed that any law requiring governmental approval or permit before a person can exercise a right (in this case, creation of a private school) amounts to censorship
8. Respondents contended that:
9. The matter constitutes no justiciable controversy
10. Petitioners are in estoppel to challenge the validity of the said acts 11. Acts are constitutionally valid
Issue:
1. WON the requisites for justiciability has been met
2. WON the requirement of securing a permit before opening a school in accordance with the Commonwealth Act 180 deprives the owners of liberty and is therefore unconstitutional
3. WON Sec 1 of Act 1207, which confer on the Secretary of Education unlimited power and discretion to prescribe rules and standards, constitute unlawful delegation of legislative power
4. WON the assessment of 1% on gross receipts of all private schools for additional Government expenses in connection with their supervision and regulation is unconstitutional
5. WON the power to regulate the textbooks to be used by the private schools constitute censorship Held: Denied.
Ratio:
1. No. The Court shall exercise its judicial review only when the petitioners will suffer, or has suffered, an injury as a result of a statute.
a. The petitioners already have their permits to operate and are actually operating by virtue of their permits and they did not show that the Secretary of Educations has threatened to revoke their permits. Thus they did not suffer any injury and naturally need no relief in the form they are seeking to obtain. Mere apprehension that the Secretary of Education might under the law withdraw the permit of one of petitioners does not constitute a justiciable controversy.
b. The Court has decided to look into the matter so it will not be said that they refused to act even in the face of clear violation of fundamental personal rights of liberty and property.
2. No. The power of the State to regulate establishments or business occupations shall mean the power to require a permit or license.
a. March 1924, Act 3162 has created a Board of Educational Survey to make a study and survey of education in the Philippines and of all educational institutions. The Board has reported that a great majority of the private educational institutions are money-making devices for those who organize them and that the youth are not getting what they pay for. This system constitutes a ―great evil‖. It has suggested that a control be organized to supervise the administration of these institutions. The Government, in its exercise of its police power to correct ―a great evil‖, could therefore validly establish the ―previous permit‖ system.
3. No. ―General standard of efficiency‖ and ―adequate instruction‖ shall be sufficient as legislative standards justifying delegation of authority to regulate.
a. Despite alleged vagueness, the Sec of Education has fixed standards to ensure adequate and efficient instruction, and the system of public education has, in general, been satisfactorily in operation for 37 years.
b. Petitioners do not show how these standards have injured any of them or interfered with their operation
4. No. The legality of any tax impost or assessment falls within the original jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance
5. No. The controversy shall not constitute a justiciable controversy
a. The petitioners have not shown that the Board of textbooks has prohibited any text, or that the petitioners refused or intend to refuse to submit some textbooks, and are in danger of losing substantial privileges or rights for so refusing.
Ponente: Puno, J. Facts:
1. Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of Sections 2, 51 and 52 of R.A. 7854 ―An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati‖
2. Petitioners held that Section 2 is unconstitutional because it did not properly identify the land area or territorial jurisdiction of Makati by metes and bounds with technical descriptions in violation of Section 10 Article X of the Constitution and Sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government
3. Petitioners claimed that Section 51 attempts to alter the three-consecutive term limit for local elective officials, in violation of Section 8, Article X and Section 7 Article VI of the Constitution. They alleged that this favors the incumbent Mayor, Jejomar Binay, as this will allow him to run again and restart the terms allowed for him.
4. Petitioners contends that Section 52 is unconstitutional because it sought to increase the legislative district of Makati only by special law, this increase was not expressed in the title of thebill, and the addition of another legislative district is not in accordance with Section 5(3) Article VI of the Constitution in relation to the population survey
Issue:
1. Whether or not the requisites for a judicial review are present in the case (lis mota, actual controversy, locus standi and ripeness?)
2. Constitutional Issue – Whether or not there was actual controversy in the case? Held: Court found no merit in the Petition. Case is dismissed.
Ratio:
1. Section 2 of RA 7854 did not change the present territory of Makati and left the resolution of territorial boundaries to the court to decide by virtue of the then existing boundary dispute between Makati and Taguig which was under court litigation.. It is not unconstitutional because Congress had a legitimate reason for not delineating Makati‘s territory by metes and bounds.
2. The basis for assailing the constitutionality of Section 51 of RA 7854 is premised on contingent events i.e. if Mayor Binay will run again, if he will seek a re-election, etc. There is, therefore, no actual controversy, laid down by the petitioners but merely hypothetical issues which have yet to happen. Petitioners are also not the proper parties to raise the abstract issue as they are residents of Taguig (except Mariano, Jr.) They are also asking for declaratory relief where the Court has no jurisdiction since resolution of the boundary dispute is dependent on the outcome of the litigation.
3. Section 52 is not unconstitutional because: 1) Constitution did not prevent Congress from creating another legislative district where the law demands so, such as when population has exceeded 250,000 in a certain area 2) the Constitution provides that should the population increase to more than 250,000, a legislative district is entitled to more than one representative 3. the creation of an additional legislative district does not need one title in the assailed law, Court upheld a liberal interpretation of the ―one title-one subject‖ rule where a general title can encompass the provisions related to the title.
Montesclaros v. Comelec GR No. 152295 July 9, 2002 Mootness
Atlas Fertilizer v. Sec. DAR Ponente: Romero, J. Facts:
1. Atlas et al are engaged in the aquaculture industry utilizing fishponds and prawn farms
2. Petitioners claim that the questioned provisions of CARL violate the Constitution in the following manner: 3. Sections 3 (b), 11, 13, 16 (d), 17 and 32 of CARL extend agrarian reform to aquaculture lands even as
Section 4, Article XIII of the constitution limits agrarian reform only to agriculture lands.
4. The questioned provisions similarly treat of aquaculture lands and agriculture lands when they are differently situated, and differently treat aquaculture lands and other industrial lands, when they are similarly situated in violation of the constitutional guarantee of the equal protection of the laws.
5. The questioned provisions distort employment benefits and burdens in favor of aquaculture employees and against other industrial workers even as Section 1 and 3, Article XIII of the Constitution mandate the State to promote equality in economic and employment opportunities.
6. The questioned provisions deprive petitioner of its government-induced investments in aquaculture Issue:
1. WON some portions of RA 6657, Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, are unconstitutional in so far as they include in their coverage lands devoted to the aquaculture industry, particularly fishponds and prawn farms.
(RA 6657 Sec. 39b, 11, 13, 16d, 17 & 32 & its implementing guidelines and procedures contained in DAR Admin. Order nos. 8&9)
Held: Petition is dismissed. Moot and Academic. Ratio:
2. The question concerning the constitutionality of the assailed provisions has been rendered moot and academic because RA 7881, approved by congress on February 20, 1995, expressly states that fishponds & prawn farms are excluded from the coverage of CARL.
3. The court will not hesitate to declare law or an act void when confronted with constitutional issues, neither will it preempt the Legislative & Executive branches of the government in correcting or clarifying, by means of amendment said law or act.
Lacson v. Perez Ponente: Melo, J. Facts:
On may 1,2001, GMA was faced by an angry and violent mob with explosive, firearms , bladed weapons , clubs stone, and other deadly weapons, assaulting and attempting to break into Malacanang. Thus she issued proclamation 38, declaring state of rebellion in NCR. She likewise issued General order 1 directing the AFP and PNP to suppress the rebellion in NCR. Warrantless arrests of promoters of the rebellion were effected. Both Ernesto Maceda AND Juan Ponce Enrile were arrested in their respective homes
Issue: WON The declaration of the state of rebellion by GMA and the warrantless arrests have basis in fact and in law.
Held:
The petitions are dismissed. However, in GR 147780 (Lacson), 147781, (Santiago), and 14779 (lumbao), respondents, consistent and congruent with their undertaking earlier averted to, together with their agents … are hereby enjoined from arresting petitioners therein without required warrant for all acts committed in connection with the May 1 siege of Malacanan.
Ratio:
1. Since GMA lifted the state of rebellion on May 6, 2001, the instant petitions were rendered moot and academic.
2. Since Hernani Perez declared that the Justice department and the police intend to obtain warrants of arrests from the courts, the petitioners apprehensions must be laid to rest.
3. The fears of Santiago and Lumbao do not justify the need for remedies of mandamus and prohibition because a warrantless arrest is not without adequate remedies in the ordinary course of law.
4. Sec 18 Art VII states that – The pres. Shall be the Commander-in Chief of all the armed forces of the Phils, and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless, violence, invasion or rebellion…
5. LDP is not a real party in interest
In IBP vs. Hon Zamora - The president as Commander in Chief has a vast intelligence network to gather information…In the exercise of the power to call, on the spot decisions may be imperatively necessary in emergency situations to avert great loss of human lives and mass destruction of property.
Exceptions to Mootness Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary
Ponente: Tinga, J. Facts:
1. July 27, 2003 – Some 300 junior officers and enlisted men of AFP, armed with ammunitions and explosives, stormed into Oakwood apartments in Makati. They demanded the resignation of GMA, Defense Secretary and the PNP Chief.
2. Later that day, the President issued Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 both declaring ―a state of rebellion‖ and calling out the AFP to suppress the rebellion.
3. Oakwood occupation ended in the evening after negotiations. 4. August 1, 2003 – President lifted the declaration.
5. PARTIES
- Sanlakas and Partido ng Manggagawa (PD)
a. Sec 18, Art 7 does not require declaration of a state of rebellion to call out the armed forces b. There is no sufficient factual basis for an indefinite period since Oakwood occupation had ceased. - Social Justice Society (SJS) as Filipino citizens, taxpayers, law professors and bar reviewers
c. Declaration is constitutional anomaly that confuses because overzealous public officers acting pursuant to the proclamation are liable to violate the constitutional rights of citizens
d. Circumvention of the report requirement in Sec 18, Art 7, commanding the President to submit a report to Congress within 48 hours from proclamation of martial law
e. Presidential issuances cannot be construed as an exercise of emergency powers as Congress has not delegated any such power to the President
- Rep. Suplico et al as citizens and members of House of Representatives f. Their rights, powers, and functions were allegedly affected
g. Declaration is a superfluity and is actually an exercise of emergency powers and therefore is a usurpation of the power of the Congress in Art 6, Sec 23 par 2
- Sen. Pimentel
h. Issuances are unwarranted, illegal, and abusive exercise of a martial law power that has no constitutional basis
- Solicitor-General
i. Case has become moot because of the lifting of the declaration Issue:
1. a. WON issue is justiciable given mootness of the issue and legal standing of the parties b. WON petitioners have legal standing
2. WON issuances of the President are valid Held/Ratio:
1. The President, in declaring state of rebellion and in calling out the armed forces, was merely exercising a wedding of her Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief powers. These are purely executive powers, vested on the President by Sections 1 and 18, Article 7 as opposed to the delegated legislative powers contemplated by Section 23 (2), Article 6.
1. Justiciable even if moot
2. Courts will decide a question, otherwise moot, if it is capable of repetition yet evading review 3. Lacson v. Perez – mootness preclude the Court from addressing its Constitutionality
4. Only Rep Suplico et al and Sen Pimentel have legal standing because when an act of the Executive injures the institution of the Congress and causes a derivative but substantial injury, then any member can file suit (Phil. Constitution Association v. Enriquez)
5. Sanlakas, PM, and SJS have no legal standing because they did not obtain any direct injury from the governmental act that is being challenged. People‘s organization status would not vest them with the requisite personality to question the validity of the presidential issuances (Kilosbayan v. Morato)
6. SJS as taxpayers and citizens have no legal standing because there was no illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation
2. Presidential issuances are valid
7. Art 7, Sec 18 – Sequence of graduated powers: 1.calling out power, 2.power to suspend writ of habeas corpus, 3.power to declare martial law.
8. 2 and 3 require concurrence of actual invasion or rebellion AND that public safety requires the exercise of such power. These are not required in calling-out power (IBP v. Zamora)
9. It does not expressly prohibit the President from declaring a state of rebellion. The Constitution vests the President not only with Commander-in-Chief powers but with first and foremost, Executive powers
10. US Constitutional history: commander-in-chief powers are broad enough as it is and become more so when taken together with the provision on executive power and presidential oath of office
11. President‘s authority to declare state of rebellion springs in the main from her powers as chief executive and at the same time draws strength from her commander-in-chief powers
12. The declaration of state of rebellion only gives notice to the nation that such a state exists and the armed forces may be called to prevent or suppress it.
13. Declaration cannot diminish or violate constitutionality protected rights (Lacson)
14. President has full discretionary power to call out the armed forces and to determine the necessity of the exercise of such power. There is no proof that the President acted without factual basis.
15. Declaration of state of rebellion does not amount to declaration of martial law. Pimentel v. Ermita
Ponente: Carpio, J. Facts:
Following the vacancy left in GMA‘s cabinet by the Hyatt 10 incident, the President issued appointments to the respondents as acting secretaries of their respective departments, later replacing their acting capacity with ad interim appointments. A group of Senators headed by Sen. Pimentel filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition, seeking to declare the appointments unconstitutional.
Issue/Held/Ratio:
GMA did not infringe on the rights of Congress—the power to appoint is executive in nature and the Committee on Appointments, though it be composed of members of Congress, derives executive power from the Constitution. A department secretary is considered an alter ego of the President; it is only fitting that she personally appoint such a position of great trust and confidence. Bernas argues that ad interim appointments require the approval of the Committee, however, the court held that there was no abuse of appointments as they were made well before the 1 year limit of the positions.
Sec 17 Ch 5 Title 1 Book 3 EO 292:
: ―… the President may temporarily designate an officer already in the government service or any other competent person to perform the function of an office in the executive branch…‖
Art VII Sec 16 -The President shall nominate, and with the consent of the COA, appoint the heads of the executive departments….The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress…but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproved by the COA or the next adjournment of Congress.
2. Proper Party Joya v. PCGG
Ponente: Bellosillo, J. Facts:
1. Special Civil Action for Prohibition and Mandamus with Prayer for Preliminary Injuction and/or Restraining Order seek to enjoin the PCGG from proceeding with the auction sale scheduled on January 11, 1991 by Christie‘s of New York of the following:
a. 82 Old Masters Paintings
b. 18th and 19th century silverware contained in 71 cartons
2. The items were seized from Malacanang and the Metropolitan Museum of manila and place in custody of the Central Bank and alleged to be part of the ill-gotten wealth of the late President Marcos, his relatives and cronies
3. August 9, 1990 – Mateo Caparas, the Chairman of PCGG wrote then President Aquino requesting her for authority to sign the proposed Consignment Agreement between the Republic of the Phil and Christie, Manson and Woods International Inc (Christie‘s of New York) concerning the sale
4. August 14, 1990 – Pres Aquino, through former Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig, Jr. authorized PCGG to sign the agreement
5. August 15, 1990 – PCGG signed the Consignment Agreement with Christie‘s of New York
6. October 26, 1990 – COA submitted to Pres Aquino the audit findings and observations on the Consignment Agreement to the effect that:
a. The authority of PCGG Chairman Caparas was of doubtful legality b. Contract was highly disadvantageous to the government
c. PCGG had a poor track record in asset disposal by auction in the US
d. Assets subject of auction were historical relics and had cultural significance hence their disposal was prohibited by law
7. November 15, 1990 – PCGG, through its new Chairman David Castro, wrote Pres Aquino defending the Consignment Agreement and refuting the allegations of COA Chairman Domingo; Director of National Museum Gabriel Casal issued a certification that the items subject on the Consignment Agreement did not fall within the classification of protected cultural properties and did not specifically qualify as part of the Filipino cultural heritage
Issue: Whether the instant petition complies with the legal requisites for this Court to exercise its power of judicial review over this case
Held: Petition is dismissed for lack of merit Ratio:
1. The Court shall exercise its power of judicial review only if the case is brought before it by a party who has legal standing to raise the constitutional or legal question
a. Legal Standing – personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged
b. Interest – material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or mere incidental interest; must be personal and not one based on a desire to vindicate the constitutional right of some third and unrelated party c. There are certain instances when the Court has allowed exceptions to the rule on legal standing, as
when a citizen brings a case for mandamus to procure the enforcement of a public duty for the fulfilment of a public right recognized by the Constitution and when a taxpayer questions the validity of a governmental act authorizing the disbursement of public funds
d. Petitioners claim that as Filipino citizens and taxpayers and artists deeply concerned with the preservation and protection of the country‘s artistic wealth, they have legal personality
e. However, the paintings were donated by private persons to the Metropolitan Museum of Manila Foundation and the pieces of antique silverware were given to the Marcos couple as gifts from friends and dignitaries from foreign countries. The confiscation of these properties by the Aquino administration should not be understood to mean that the ownership of these items has
automatically passed on to the govt. Petitioners failed to establish that they are the legal owners of the artworks or that the pieces have become publicly owned and thus they do not possess any clear legal right to question their alleged unauthorized disposition
2. The Court shall exercise its power of judicial review only if there is an actual case or controversy
a. Since the purpose of this petition for prohibition is to enjoin respondent public officials from holding the auction sale, which is long past, the issues raised have become moot and academic
Agan v. PIATCO GR No. 155001 May 5, 2003
CHR Employees Association v. CHR GR No. 155336 November 25, 2004
Automotive Industry Workers Alliance v. Romulo GR No. 157509 January 18, 2005 Citizen Standing
Tanada v. Tuvera Ponente: Escolin, J. Facts:
1. Petition to review the decision of the Executive Assistant to the President.
2. Invoking the people‘s right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 constitution, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette, of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders. The respondents would have this case dismissed on the ground that petitioners have no legal personality to bring this petition. Petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public right and its object is to compel public duty, they need not show any specific interest. Respondents further contend that publication in the OG is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates.
Issue: WON publication in the Official Gazette is an indispensable requirement for the effectivity of the PDs, LOIs, general orders, EOs, etc. where laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates
Held/Ratio:
1. Yes. It is the people‘s right to be informed on matters of public concern & corollarily access to official records, & to documents & papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, shall be afforded the citizens subject to such limitation as may be provided by law (Sec. 6, Art. IV, 1973 Constitution). Laws, to be valid & enforceable, must be published in the OG or otherwise effectively promulgated. The fact that a PD or LOI states its date of effectivity does not preclude their publication in the OG as they constitute important legislative acts. The publication of presidential issuances ―of public nature‖ or ―of general applicability‖ is a requirement of due process. Before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially informed of its contents.
2. Decision Respondents ordered to publish in Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances of general application, and unless so published shall have no binding force and effect.
3. Important Point It illustrates how decrees & issuances issued by one man — Marcos — are in fact laws of general application and provide for penalties. The constitution afforded Marcos both executive & legislative powers.
4. The generality of law (CC Art. 14) will never work w/o constructive notice. The ruling of this case provides that publication constitutes the necessary constructive notice & is thus the cure for ignorance as an excuse. 5. Ignorance will not even mitigate the crime.
Chavez v. PEA and Amari Ponente: Carpio, J. Facts:
1. Nature: original Petition for Mandamus with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction and a temporary restraining order. Petition also seeks to compel the Public Estates Authority (PEA) to disclose all facts on PEA‘s then on-going renegotiations with Amari Coastal Bay and Development Corporation to reclaim portions of Manila Bay. The petition further seeks to enjoin PEA from signing a new agreement with AMARI involving such reclamation.
2. 1973: The government through the Commission of Public Highways signed a contract with the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP) to reclaim certain foreshore and offshore areas of Manila Bay
3. 1977: President Marcos issued PD No. 1084 creating the PEA, which was tasked to reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas and to develop, improve, acquire x xx lease and sell any and all kinds of lands. On the same date, President Marcos issued PD. 1085 transferring to PEA the lands reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore of the Manila Bay under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP)
4. 1981: Pres. Marcos issued a memorandum ordering PEA to amend its contract with CDCP which stated that CDCP shall transfer in favor of PEA the areas reclaimed by CDCP in the MCCRRP
5. 1988: Pres. Aquino issued Special Patent granting and transferring to PEA parcels of land so reclaimed under the MCCRRP. Subsequently she transferred in the name of PEA the three reclaimed islands known as the ―Freedom Islands‖
6. 1995: PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) with AMARI, a private corporation, to develop the Freedom Islands and this was done without public bidding
7. Pres. Ramos through Executive Secretary Ruben Torres approved the JVA
8. 1996: Senate Pres.Maceda delivered a privileged speech in the Senate and denounced the JVA as the ―grandmother of all scams‖. As a result, the Senate conducted investigations. Among the conclusions were: 9. The reclaimed lands PEA seeks to transfer to AMARI under the JVA are lands of the public domain which
the government has not classified as alienable lands and therefore PEA cannot alienate these lands; 10. The certificates of the title covering the Freedom Islands are thus void, and
11. The JVA itself is illegal
12. 1997: Pres. Ramos created the Legal Task Force to conduct a study on the legality of the JVA in view of the Senate Committee report.
13. 1998: The Philippine Daily Inquirer published reports on on-going renegotiations between PEA and AMARI 14. PEA Director Nestor Kalaw and PEA Chairman ArsenioYulo and former navy officer Sergio Cruz were
members of the negotiating panel
15. Frank Chavez filed petition for Mandamus stating that the government stands to lose billions of pesos in the sale by PEA of the reclaimed lands to AMARI and prays that PEA publicly disclose the terms of the renegotiations of JVA. He cited that the sale to AMARI is in violation of Article 12, Sec. 3 prohibiting sale of alienable lands of the public domain to private corporations and Article 2 Section 28 and Article 3 Sec. 7 of the Constitution on the right to information on matters of public concern
16. 1999: PEA and AMARI signed Amended JVA which Pres. Estrada approved Issue:
1. WON the principal reliefs prayed for in the petition are moot and academic because of the subsequent events
2. WON the petition merits dismissal for failure to observe the principle governing the hierarchy of courts 3. WON the petition merits dismissal for non-exhaustion of administrative remedies
4. WON petitioner has locus standi to bring this suit
5. WON the constitutional right to information includes official information on on-going negotiations before a final agreement
6. WON the stipulations in the amended joint venture agreement for the transfer to AMARI of certain lands, reclaimed and still to be reclaimed, violate the 1987 constitution; and
7. WON the court is the proper forum for raising the issue of whether the amended joint venture agreement is grossly disadvantageous to the government.
>>> Threshold issue: whether AMARI, a private corporation, can acquire and own under the amended JVA 367.5 has. of reclaimed foreshore and submerged area in Manila Bay in view of Sections 2 & 3, Art. 12 of the 1987 constitution
(1) The prayer to enjoin the signing of the Amended JVA on constitutional grounds necessarily includes preventing its implementation if in the meantime PEA and AMARI have signed one in violation of the Constitution and if already implemented, to annul the effects of an unconstitutional contract
(2) The principle of hierarchy of courts applies generally to cases involving factual questions Reasoning: the instant case raises constitutional issues of transcendental importance to the public
(3) The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply when the issue involved is a purely legal or constitutional question
(4) Petitioner has standing if petition is of transcendental public importance and as such, there is the right of a citizen to bring a taxpayer‘s suit on these matters of transcendental public importance
(5) The constitutional right to information includes official information on on-going negotiations before a final contract and must therefore constitute definite propositions by the government and should not cover recognized exceptions like privileged information, military and diplomatic secrets and similar matters affecting national security and public order
Reasoning The State policy of full transparency in all transactions involving public interest reinforces the people‘s right to information on matters of public concern. PEA must prepare all the data and disclose them to the public at the start of the disposition process, long before the consummation of the contract. While the evaluation or review is on-going, there are no ―official acts, transactions, or decisions‖ on the bids or proposals but once the committee makes its official recommendation, there arises a definite proposition on the part of the government
(6) In a form of a summary:
a. The 157.84 has.of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may lease these lands to private corporations but may not sell or transfer ownership of these lands to private corporations. PEA may only sell these lands to Philippine citizens, subject to ownership limitations in the 1987 Constitution and existing laws.
b. The 592.15 has.of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural resources of the public domain and outside the commerce of man until classified as alienable or disposable lands open to disposition and declared no longer needed for public service. The government can make such classification and declaration only after PEA has reclaimed these submerged areas. Only then can these lands qualify as agricultural lands of the public domain, which are the only natural resources the government can alienate
c. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of 77.34 has.of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 3, Article 12 of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain
d. Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156 has.of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2, Article 12 of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands of the public domain. PEA may reclaim these submerged areas. Thereafter, the government can classify the reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable, and further declare them no longer needed for public services. Still, the transfer of such reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain to AMARI will be void in view of Section 3, Article 12 that prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.
